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ABSTRACT 
 
The Gulf of Guinea is a region of strategic importance and a major 
source of essential commodities for both domestic and industrial use, 
while its sea lanes connect trade from multiple continents. The maritime 
profile of the region also presents enormous opportunities for enhancing 
socio-economic development of member States and for delivering 
positive human development index across the region. However, there are 
increasing maritime security threats in the Gulf of Guinea that affect the 
peaceful uses of sea, impair the exploitation of coastal resources and also 
undermine regional and global security. Effective responses to these 
threats require a comprehensive approach, one which is based on 
regional and international cooperation.  
 
This thesis examines the prospects and challenges of maritime security 
cooperation in the Gulf of Guinea. It analyses the concept of maritime 
security cooperation and develops a framework for explaining maritime 
security threats in the Gulf of Guinea.  The thesis examines the responses 
to maritime security threats in the Gulf of Guinea by assessing the 
effectiveness of regional and international cooperative initiatives. The 
conclusion of the thesis is that current processes of maritime security 
cooperation in the Gulf of Guinea are inadequate and suffers multiple 
limitations. Appropriate responses must therefore be put in place to 
address the gaps. The thesis provides several suggestions for enhancing 
maritime security cooperation in the Gulf of Guinea.  
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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION  
 
1.1 BACKGROUND  
The Gulf of Guinea region stretches from Cape Verde to Angola on the 
West coast of Africa, forming part of the Atlantic Ocean and its maritime 
system.
 1
 The sea lanes of the Gulf of Guinea connect maritime traffic 
from multiple continents, while the region’s central location (particularly 
its proximity to Europe and America) makes it an important part of 
global trade. The Gulf of Guinea also possesses valuable goods, 
commodities and minerals, making it the subject of European 
expansionism and imperialism.
2
 However, the region’s geostrategic 
importance has endured into the post-colonial period, and particularly in 
the last decade due to increasing global dependency on the region’s 
energy resources.
3
  
 
                                                          
1
 The Gulf of Guinea is defined in this thesis as comprising 25 States: 20 coastal States from Cape 
Verde to Angola, and 5 neighbouring landlocked States. The coastal States are Angola, Benin, 
Cameroon, Cape Verde, Congo, Cote D’Ivoire, Democratic Republic of Congo, Equatorial Guinea, 
Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Liberia, Mauritania, Nigeria, Sao Tome & Principe, 
Senegal, Sierra Leone and Togo. The landlocked States are Burkina Faso, Central Africa Republic, 
Chad, Mali and Niger.   
2
 Generally on colonialism, the scramble for Africa and the Gulf of Guinea in particular, see Thomas 
Pakenham, The Scramble for Africa: White Man's Conquest of the Dark Continent from 1876 to 1912, 
New York, Hearst Corporation, 1991. Michael Crowder, West Africa Under Colonial Rule, London, 
Hutchinson, 1968. Adu A. Boahen, Britain, the Sahara, and Western Sudan, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 
1964. 
3
 George F. Jedrzej and Manuel Paulo, "A New Scramble for African Oil? Historical, Political and 
Business Perspectives” African Affairs 106, 423, 2007, pp. 229-51. Douglas Yates, "The Scramble for 
Africa Oil," South African Journal of International Affairs 13, 2, 2006, pp. 11-31. Pierre Abramovici, 
"United States: the new scramble for Africa," Review of African Political Economy 31, 2004, pp. 685-
90. Neil Ford, "Oil from Deep Waters (2): Africa - World’s Greatest Deepwater Potential " Platts 
Energy Economist Briefing, 248, June 2002, 2-11. "A new scramble," The Economist, 27 November 
2004. 
2 
 
The maritime profile of the Gulf of Guinea is also making an enormous 
contribution to the social-economic development of the region. In 2010, 
the Gulf of Guinea was the only developing region that registered an 
average growth rate of six per cent, with high-income gains of about ten 
per cent of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of some States.
4
 This 
growth is grounded in favourable international trade, with the shipping 
industry being the primary vehicle. Indeed, the 2011 World Bank Report 
shows that offshore oil and gas resources have substantially contributed 
to favourable economic indicators in the Gulf of Guinea, including 
increased capital inflows.
5
 Fisheries resources are also a major source of 
employment, especially in coastal communities, and equally contribute 
to poverty alleviation and food security across the region.
6
  
 
However, since 2005 piracy has been on the rise in the Gulf of Guinea, 
with the region’s maritime space being described as “Africa’s other 
dangerous waters” and “pirates…new territory”.
 7
 In 2011, the Gulf of 
Guinea ranked second after the Indian Ocean in terms of frequency of 
piracy attacks.
8
 These violent attacks constitute a serious threat to global 
                                                          
4
 World Bank, Global Economic Prospects: Maintaining Progress and Turmoil, vol. 3, Washington 
DC, June 2011, pp. 127-128. Angola, Congo Brazzaville and Gabon have experienced higher growth 
levels as a result of their offshore oil and gas industries. 
5
 World Bank, Global Economic Prospects: Maintaining Progress and Turmoil, vol. 3, Washington 
DC, June 2011, pp. 127-141. 
6
 FAO Report, Increasing the Contribution of Small Scale Fisheries to Poverty Alleviation and Food 
Security, 2007. FAO, Achieving Poverty Reduction through Responsible Fisheries: Lessons from 
West and Central Africa, FAO Fisheries and Aquaculture Technical Paper, 513, 2008. 
7
 Peter Pham, “Africa’s Other Dangerous Waters: Piracy in the Gulf of Guinea,” World Defence 
Review, 3 December 2009. Scot Baldauf, “Pirates Take New Territory: West African Gulf of Guinea,” 
The Christian Science Monitor, 15 January 2010. 
8
See “Reports on Acts of Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships Annual Report – 2011,” 
International Maritime Bureau, MSC.4/Circ.180, 1 March 2012. See also International Maritime 
Bureau, Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships Annual Reports from 2005-2010. Page 26 of the 
2008 Report (which analysed global piracy trends), indicated that Nigeria has the second highest 
number of serious piratical attacks in the world.   
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trade and the security of the region.
9
 The Gulf of Guinea is also 
confronted with a myriad of other sea-based threats. Transnational 
organised crimes undermine the security and stability of member States. 
Decades of illicit trafficking in narcotic drugs fuels crime and imperils 
governance institutions, illegal migration by sea frequently leads to 
maritime accidents and disasters, while illegal trafficking in weapons has 
also contributed to multiple internal conflicts and widespread 
instability.
10
 Moreover, food security in the region is being threatened by 
illegal fishing activities and unsustainable fishing practices.
 11
 This has 
the effect of placing the livelihood of coastal communities in jeopardy. 
 
There are clearly multiple maritime security threats and challenges in the 
Gulf of Guinea. These threats are undermining the region’s development 
agenda, threatening the security of international shipping, and above all, 
endangering regional and international security. Effective responses to 
these threats require a comprehensive response, one which is based on 
regional and international cooperation.  
 
                                                          
9
 See United Nations Security Council, Resolution 2018 - Piracy and Security in Africa (Security 
Council 6645th Meeting, 31 October 2011). See also United Nations Security Council, Resolution 
2039 - Peace Consolidation in West Africa (Security Council 6727th Meeting, 29 February 2012). 
10
 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), “The Globalization of Crime: a 
Transnational Organized Crime Threat Assessment,” 2010. See also UNOD, “World Drug Report 
2011. UNODC, “Cocaine Trafficking in West Africa,” December 2007. UNODC, “Drug Trafficking 
as a Security Threat in West Africa,” 2008.    
11
 Mark Rowe, "Fishy Business" Geographical, August 2013. Eyiwunmi Falaye, Illegal Unreported 
and Unregulated Fishing in West Africa (Ghana and Nigeria), Marine Resources Assessment Group, 
2008. MRAG and DEFID, "Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Fishing” Policy Brief 8, 2009. See 
also David J. Agnew and Colin T. Barnes, Economic Aspects and Drivers of IUU Fishing: Building a 
Framework, 2004, Available: http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/17/7/29468002.PDF (accessed 24 March 
2011). 
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1.2 PREVAILING INTERNATIONAL AND REGIONAL 
RESPONSES TO MARITIME SECURITY COOPERATION IN 
THE GULF OF GUINEA 
The United Nations (UN) Security Council has adopted two Resolutions 
which express deep concern over the spate of piratical attacks in the Gulf 
of Guinea region. The first Resolution was adopted in October 2011, the 
second in February 2012.
12
 In November 2011, the UN Secretary 
General sent a special mission to the Gulf of Guinea to assess the piracy 
situation, and in February 2012, the UN Security Council convened a 
debate on the growing insecurity in the region.
13
   
 
These developments demonstrate the enormity of the problem in the 
Gulf of Guinea, and also the concern of the international community 
with finding an effective solution to the region’s security dilemma. In 
geostrategic terms, the developments also illustrate that the attention of 
the global community is steadfastly fixed on the Gulf of Guinea region. 
Indeed, 2011 saw a sharp decline in successful piratical incidents off the 
Horn of Africa, offering both a glimmer of hope and an opportunity to 
celebrate the success of international anti-piracy efforts (particularly in 
regard to the Somali piracy enterprise).
14
 However, 2011 also manifested 
an endemic piracy problem in the Gulf of Guinea.  
                                                          
12
 United Nations, Resolution 2018 - Piracy and Security in Africa(Security Council 6645th Meeting. 
31 October 2011). United Nations, Resolution 2039 - Peace Consolidation in West Africa(Security 
Council 6727th Meeting. 29 February 2012). 
13
 UN Security Council, “Report of the United Nations Assessment Mission on Piracy in the Gulf of 
Guinea,” S/2012/45, 19 January 2012. United Nations, Security Council 6723
rd
 Meeting, S/pv.6723, 
27 February 2012.  
14
 A distinction is being made between total number of attempted hijacks and the number of successful 
hijacks. While total  hijacks in the Indian Ocean remained high in 2011, according to the International 
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In a sense therefore, the Gulf of Guinea presents a paradox of 
opportunity and complexity to the international community. The 
opportunity, at least in principle, is that the international efforts that were 
successful in substantially suppressing the threat of piracy off the Somali 
coast can be applied elsewhere, such as in the Gulf of Guinea. Indeed, it 
should be easier for the international community to deal with the piracy 
situation in this region, as there are past experiences to draw on. In this 
way, the lessons learnt from combating the ‘horn pirates’ at both the 
strategic and enforcement levels could be migrated across the equator 
and applied to ‘gulf pirates’. The conundrum, however, is that many 
factors set the two situations apart.
15
 In the case of the Gulf of Guinea 
you will be dealing with multiple States with stable and legitimate 
governments – even if they are largely ineffective. Moreover the nature 
and drivers of piratical incidents in the Gulf of Guinea are different from 
those in the Horn of Africa.
16
 Above all, the Guinea of Gulf represents a 
different geostrategic environment.
17
   
 
These contrasting dynamics demonstrate that even in the context of 
piracy, the Gulf of Guinea requires a unique and individual approach. 
Nonetheless, the multilateral processes commenced by UN suggest that 
an effective path is being charted to address the insecurity in the region. 
It is therefore necessary to assess whether the maritime situation in the 
                                                                                                                                                                    
Maritime Organisation (IMO)  only 15% were successful. See IMO, Acts of Piracy and Armed 
Robbery Against Ships - Annual Report 2011 (MSC.4/Circ.180. 1 March 2012). 
15
 Chapter 4 of this thesis offers a comparative analysis of piracy and armed robbery in the Gulf of 
Guinea and Somalia.  
16
 See chapter 4.  
17
 See chapter 6 and 7.   
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region is, in fact, being adequately dealt with. To this end, it is necessary 
to examine the context within which the current multilateral efforts will 
take place. This will be done by analysing the two Resolutions and the 
accompanying regional and international initiatives in some detail.  
 
First, the Resolutions declare that the ongoing regional and international 
initiatives are on track to adequately address the maritime security 
situation in the Gulf of Guinea. For example, Resolution 2018 
commends initiatives being pursued by member States of three regional 
organisations in the Gulf of Guinea: the Economic Community of West 
African States (ECOWAS), the Economic Community of Central 
African States (ECCAS), and the Gulf of Guinea Commission (GGC), 
and also encourages the convening of a region-wide summit to bring 
together the political leaders of Gulf of Guinea States so that the issue 
can be further explored.
18
 The Resolution also recognises the support 
being offered to Gulf of Guinea States by member States of the 
international community and relevant international organisations, while 
calling for further assistance to bolster regional efforts. The content and 
wording of the second resolution, Resolution 2039, is even more 
emphatic.
19
 It describes initiatives being adopted by ECCAS member 
States as “comprehensive”
20
, noting that steps are also being taken by 
                                                          
18
 United Nations, Security Council Resolution 2018, 29 October 2011.  
19
 United Nations, Security Council Resolution 2039, 27 February 2012. 
20
 The relevant paragraph is as follows: “Noting the ECCAS comprehensive joint maritime security 
architecture to counter piracy in the Central African subregion, including the strategy adopted by the 
ECCAS Peace and Security Council in February 2008, the establishment of the Regional Centre for 
Maritime Security in Central Africa (CRESMAC) in Pointe- Noire, Congo, as well as the 
multinational coordination centres in the region …”. See United Nations, Security Council Resolution 
2039, 27 February 2012. 
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ECOWAS to adopt an “integrated maritime strategy”.
21
 The Resolution 
further designates the Maritime Organisation for West and Central 
Africa (MOWCA) as another key regional platform for addressing the 
maritime security situation. Indeed, preceding the adoption of Resolution 
2039, the UN Secretary General had unequivocally urged Gulf of Guinea 
States to take steps to implement the regional coast guard project 
pioneered by MOWCA.
22
 It was in between the adoption of these two 
resolutions, and entreaties by the UN Secretary General, that the 
assessment mission was sent to the Gulf of Guinea and the UN-convened 
debate was held on the floor of the Security Council.
23
  
 
A further reason for interrogating the comprehensiveness of the maritime 
security cooperative framework in the Gulf of Guinea is founded on the 
headings of the two resolutions, as well as the institutional mandate and 
raison d’être of the UN. Resolutions 2018 and 2039 are respectively 
titled “Piracy and Security in Africa” and “Peace Consolidation in West 
Africa”. These titles convey both a premise and a promise that a 
comprehensive maritime security solution is being sought for the Gulf of 
Guinea - one that will scope maritime security within the larger security 
and stability requirements of the region. As a matter of fact, the 
                                                          
21
 The relevant paragraph is as follows: “Further noting the preparatory steps taken by ECOWAS 
towards developing a maritime security approach through an Integrated Maritime Security Strategy 
and an Integrated Maritime Plan…”. See United Nations, Security Council Resolution 2039, 27 
February 2012.  
22
 UN News Centre, Ban calls for integrated strategy against maritime piracy in Gulf of Guinea  19 
October 2011, Available: 
http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=40103&Cr=gulf+of+guinea&Cr1  9 December 
2012.  
23
 UN Security Council, “Report of the United Nations Assessment Mission on Piracy in the Gulf of 
Guinea,” S/2012/45, 19 January 2012. United Nations, Security Council 6723
rd
 Meeting, S/pv.6723, 
27 February 2012.  
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fundamental role of the UN, and particularly the UN Security Council, is 
to maintain international peace and security.
24
 When discharging this 
responsibility, therefore, the UN cannot be seen to be acting in a 
fragmented manner. Every action mandated by the UN should be 
founded on the broader security and strategic requirements of the 
situation. It is precisely for this reason that in the area of conflict 
resolution, the UN has endeavoured to move beyond merely deploying 
peacekeeping forces to implementing broader peacebuilding and 
governance measures as part of its objective to restore peace, security 
and stability to struggling States.
25
  
 
By way of summary, Resolutions 2018 and 2039 (and their 
accompanying multilateral measures) have defined a context within 
which maritime security cooperation is to be executed, and that context 
has been deemed appropriate and responsive to the maritime security 
needs of the region. The Resolutions have thus charted a course for 
cooperative international engagement in the Gulf of Guinea, and have 
explicitly sanctioned ongoing regional and global efforts as being 
fundamental for the operationalisation of regional maritime security 
cooperation. It is therefore to be expected that regional States and the 
international community will implement both the broad and specific 
                                                          
24
 United Nations, Charter of the United Nations and the Statute of the International Court of Justice, 
San Francisco, 1945. See particularly Chapters 1, 6 and 7.  
25
 For a comprehensive approach to UN peacekeeping, see Cedric De Coning and Karsten Friis, 
"Coherence and Coordination The Limits of the Comprehensive Approach " International 
Peacekeeping 15, 1,  2013, pp. 243-72. Richard Gowan, "The Strategic Context: Peacekeeping in 
Crisis, 2006–08," International Peacekeeping 15, 4,  2008, pp. 453-69. See also Espen B. Eide, "From 
Peacekeeping to Peacebuilding," FIIA Report 14/2006,  2006, pp. 43-52. Cedric de Coning, "United 
Nations and the Comprehensive Approach," Danish Institute for International Studies 14,  2008. Tom 
Woodhouse, "Conflict resolution and peacekeeping: Critiques and responses," International 
Peacekeeping 7, 1,  2000, pp. 8-26. 
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prescriptions that have emerged. Indeed, in June 2013, the Summit of 
Heads of State and Government of Gulf of Guinea States was convened 
in Yaoundé, Cameroon, as recommended by the two Resolutions.
26
 As 
anticipated, the meeting was heralded a success, with the remarks of the 
UN Secretary General making news headlines.
27
   
 
However, what emerges from a thorough examination of the prevailing 
situation is that the processes being implemented inadequately address 
the state of insecurity in the Gulf of Guinea. Firstly, the Resolutions 
endorse multiple channels for addressing maritime security in the region, 
thereby creating confusion and disharmony with regional processes. 
Secondly, the prevailing maritime security cooperative agenda for the 
Gulf of Guinea centres on piratical attacks, thus failing to prioritise other 
dimensions of insecurity, such as depleting fisheries resources, which 
have substantial effects on the security and stability of the region. 
Thirdly, critical requirements that will contribute to durable maritime 
security outcomes, such as the nexus between land and sea in maritime 
security threats, as well as the governance-based dimensions of the 
region’s insecurity, do not feature prominently in the cooperative 
dialogue. 
 
 
                                                          
26
  Summit of Heads of State and Governments of ECOWAS and ECCAS, Yaoundé, Cameroon on 
24- 25 June 2013. 
27
 At UN-backed meeting, African States seek to combat piracy in Gulf of Guinea, UN News Centre, 
Available: http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=44440&Cr=piracy&Cr1=, 29 December 
2013. Ban welcomes anti-piracy strategy adopted by leaders from West, Central Africa, UN News 
Centre Available: http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=45281, 29 December 2013. 
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1.3 HYPOTHESIS  
The hypothesis underlining this thesis is that the current approach to 
maritime security cooperation in the Gulf of Guinea is inadequate and 
suffers multiple limitations.  
 
The thesis argues that the current maritime security cooperative 
processes in the region do not comprehensively address the relevant 
maritime security threats, thereby failing to provide an inclusive concept 
of security. It also demonstrates that current regional and international 
processes have not yielded a well-defined regional platform for maritime 
security cooperation, while critical factors that will contribute to 
enduring maritime security outcomes (such as enhanced legal 
frameworks for States and addressing the governance-based dimensions 
to maritime security), are being insufficiently prioritised in the 
cooperative process.  
 
1.4 AIMS AND OBJECTIVES OF THESIS 
To establish the hypothesis and defend the thesis statement, the central 
aim of this research is to provide a comprehensive analysis of the 
maritime security situation in the Gulf of Guinea, and to demonstrate the 
inadequacy of the current cooperative mechanisms which seek to address 
the maritime security needs of the Gulf of Guinea region. As a corollary 
to this central aim, the thesis examines critical factors that will contribute 
to effective maritime security cooperation and the delivery of robust 
maritime security outcomes in the Gulf of Guinea.    
11 
 
 
In furtherance of the above aims, the first objective of the thesis is to 
establish the strategic importance of the Gulf of Guinea and the vast 
array of maritime interests in the region. The second objective is to 
develop a conceptual framework for understanding the maritime security 
situation in the Gulf of Guinea, and to analyse the multiple maritime 
security threats in the region. The third objective is to establish the gaps 
in the prevailing regional and international approaches to maritime 
security cooperation in the Gulf of Guinea.  
 
To achieve the above objectives, the thesis will answer the following 
mutually reinforcing questions: what is the strategic importance of the 
Gulf of Guinea maritime domain? What are the underlying interests of 
external actors and stakeholders in the region? How does the region’s 
maritime domain contribute to the socio-economic development and 
long term security and stability of Gulf of Guinea States? What threats 
undermine these opportunities and what are the imperatives for 
addressing them? How effective are the national and regional response 
frameworks for maritime security, and what are the underlying 
challenges to regional cooperation? And finally, how adequate and 
viable is the contribution and support of the international community to 
maritime security coperation in the Gulf of Guinea?  
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1.5 APPROACH AND METHODOLOGY  
The main research approach employed in the thesis is the identification, 
collection, review and analysis of primary and secondary literature. The 
primary data which has been relied upon includes official reports and 
documents of relevant international and regional organisations, including 
conventions and agreements. Additional primary sources include 
national legislative instruments and policy documents. Secondary data 
sources which have been used in the thesis include books, published 
journal articles in print and electronic form, newspaper articles and 
critical commentaries, newsletters, press releases and information from 
internet sources. The thesis also relies on the author’s experience as a 
naval officer in the Ghana Navy, along with the administrative and 
operational insights this role has afforded the author regarding maritime 
security dynamics in the Gulf of Guinea.  
 
1.6 THESIS STRUCTURE   
The thesis is presented in eight chapters. This introductory chapter 
highlights the inadequacies in the current approach to maritime security 
cooperation in the Gulf of Guinea, as well as the need for a 
comprehensive approach to the maritime security needs of the region. It 
also outlines the thesis methodology, structure and the significance and 
contribution of the thesis to the existing knowledge base.  
 
Chapter two sets the overarching background for the thesis. More 
specifically, the chapter reviews various conceptions of the Gulf of 
13 
 
Guinea region, and adopts a working definition of the geographical 
scope of the region for the purpose of the thesis. The chapter analyses 
the socio-economic profile of the Gulf of Guinea, and also examines the 
geostrategic importance of the region from both a historical and 
contemporary perspective. Most importantly, however, the chapter 
examines the major contributions of the Gulf of Guinea’s maritime 
domain to the region’s socio-economic development and long term and 
security and stability, In doing so, the chapter highlights the interests of 
external actors and stakeholders, especially offshore oil and gas 
companies, as well as the opportunities and challenges that these 
interests present to the security and stability of the region.   
 
Chapter three provides both a conceptual and empirical context for the 
thesis. Indeed, the chapter develops an analytical framework for 
understanding the concept of maritime security in the Gulf of Guinea, 
and provides an overview of maritime security challenges in the region. 
First, the chapter reviews the evolution of the concept of security in 
security studies, highlighting various dimensions of security. The chapter 
then analyses the link between general concepts of security (as they have 
evolved in security studies) and the concept of maritime security. 
Building on the analysis in the first two parts, the chapter goes on to 
provide unique insights into the evolution of the concept of maritime 
security, and also develops an analytical framework for applying the 
concept of maritime security to the Gulf of Guinea. The analytical 
framework is then used to outline the substantive maritime security 
threats which will be investigated in the thesis. These threats include: (i) 
piracy and armed robbery; (ii) threats to sustainable fisheries, including 
14 
 
illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing (IUU fishing); (iii) illicit 
trafficking in narcotic drugs by sea; (iv) illegal trafficking in arms by 
sea; and (v) illegal migration by sea.   
 
The analysis of maritime security challenges is continued in chapter four, 
with a case study focusing on piracy and armed robbery in the Gulf of 
Guinea. The chapter highlights the complex nature of piratical attacks in 
the Gulf of Guinea, and distinguishes Gulf piracy from the Somali 
situation. The analysis examines the actors and drivers of piracy in the 
region, and traces the evolution of piracy from a fairly narrow base into 
an insidious regional threat. The chapter also examines the implications 
of piratical attacks for both regional and global security and concludes 
by developing a profile of Gulf of Guinea piracy, and illuminating the 
future trends and complexities of piracy in the Gulf of Guinea. 
 
Chapter five examines the responses of Gulf of Guinea States to 
maritime security challenges by assessing the implementation of various 
international legal frameworks at the national level. Indeed, these 
international frameworks provide cooperative mechanisms and 
jurisdiction for addressing maritime security threats. Therefore, the 
chapter investigates the extent to which Gulf of Guinea States have 
responded to and implemented the requisite legal regimes.  
 
Chapter six examines the four platforms being used for maritime security 
cooperation in the Gulf of Guinea, evaluating the responsiveness of these 
15 
 
platforms to the maritime security concerns in the region. In particularly, 
the chapter examines the structural, geopolitical and governance-based 
challenges and limitations of the current frameworks. It also assesses 
which regional platforms are suitable for forging maritime security 
cooperation in the region, and presents policy recommendations for how 
the initiatives can be moulded to meet the maritime security 
requirements of the region.  
 
Chapter seven examines the role and contribution of the international 
community to maritime security cooperation in the Gulf of Guinea. In 
doing so, the chapter examines the involvement of five key global 
players in the cooperative process: the United States, France, the United 
Kingdom, the European Union and China. The chapter analyses the 
strategic interests underpinning the maritime security partnerships of 
these actors, as well as the convergence and divergence of these interests 
vis-à-vis the relevant actors. The chapter then evaluates the positive and 
negative implications of these interests, concluding with a discussion of 
the limitations and challenges presented by the strategic partnerships.     
 
The final chapter synthesises the results of the research to ascertain 
whether the findings support the thesis hypothesis – that is, that the 
current approach to maritime security cooperation in the Gulf of Guinea 
is inadequate and suffers multiple limitations. The conclusion reveals 
that the hypothesis has been established, and then proceeds to offer 
suggestions as to how maritime security cooperation in the Gulf of 
Guinea could be improved.  
16 
 
1.7 SIGNIFICANCE OF THE RESEARCH  
The thesis is significant for three reasons. First, the thesis provides the 
needed intellectual input for understanding maritime security issues in 
the Gulf of Guinea, and for enhancing maritime security cooperation in 
the region. The thesis is the first piece of research to comprehensively 
analyse maritime security threats in the Gulf of Guinea, as well as the 
challenges to regional and international cooperation. Therefore, the 
thesis sets the scene for further research on Gulf of Guinea maritime 
security. Also, the limitations and gaps that the thesis identifies in the 
current cooperative initiatives will serve to guide regional States and the 
global community in adopting an effective maritime security cooperative 
framework for the Gulf of Guinea region.   
 
Second, the thesis makes a unique contribution to the growing literature 
on maritime security. Contemporary literature on maritime security is 
generally focused on examining isolated maritime security threats, while 
the concept of security is largely applied in maritime security studies 
without being scrutinised. The thesis is one of the first studies to provide 
a detailed conceptual and empirical analysis of the diverse maritime 
security challenges in the Gulf of Guinea. The thesis thus lays the 
foundation for future research in this area.  
 
Third, the thesis emphasises a novel approach to understanding maritime 
security challenges. While there is a tendency to view maritime security 
threats as being exclusively sea-based, the thesis emphasises the land-sea 
nexus and governance-based dimensions to maritime security threats. 
17 
 
The study will therefore fuel further research into how poor governance 
results in security threats at sea, while policy makers will be better 
placed to address the broader dynamics of maritime security challenges. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
THE SEA AS THE GEOSTRATEGIC ESSENCE OF THE GULF 
OF GUINEA: A HISTORICAL AND CONTEMPORARY 
OVERVIEW  
If we flow with life's lessons, we learn that the sea is what it is 
                                             Swahili Proverb 
 
2.1 INTRODUCTION  
The Gulf of Guinea has attracted profound global attention and interest 
in the last decade, due largely to its growing status as a source of global 
energy security.
1
 The oil and gas factor has led to the region being 
characterised as a province of vast untold wealth,
2
 the spotlight of 
Africa’s greatness,
3
 the El Dorado of the globalised-corporate world,
4
 
and, at the strategic level, as taking centre stage in the contest of the 
superpowers, especially between the United States of America (US) and 
China.
5
 
 
                                                          
1
 Sam Raphael and Doug Stokes, "Globalizing West African oil: US ‘energy security’ and the global 
economy," International Affairs 87, 4,  2011, pp. 903-21. Paul M Lubeck, Michael J Watts and 
Ronnie Lipschutz, Convergent Interests: United States Energy Security and the ‘Securing’ of 
Democracy in Nigeria   (Massachusetts: February 2007 ). 
2
 Ricardo Soares de Oliveira, Oil and Politics in Gulf of Guinea, London, Hurst, 2007, p. 1. See also 
“Oil Empires,” Africa Confidential, 21 March 2002. “Africa drowns in a pool of oil”, Los Angeles 
Times, 1 July 2003.  
3
 James Dao, ‘Oil Puts Africa in Spotlight’ New York Times, 20 September 2002. 
4
 Ricardo Soares de Oliveira, Oil and Politics in the Gulf of Guinea, Hurst, 2007, p. 9. Somini 
Sengupta, "The Making of an African Petrostate," New York Times,  18 February 2004. 
5
 George F. Jedrzej and Manuel Paulo, "A New Scramble for African Oil? Historical, Political and 
Business Perspectives " African Affairs, 106/423, pp. 229-51, Gal Luft, "Fueling the Dragon: China's 
race into the oil market   " Institute for the Analysis of Global Security,  2004. Okbazghi Yohannes, 
"America's new frontier: Oil in the Gulf of Guinea," The Black Scholar 33, 2,  2003. James Hentz, 
"The Contending Currents in United States Involvement in Sub-saharan Africa", in  Ian Taylor and 
Paul Williams, eds. Africa in International Politics: External Involvement on the Continent, London 
and New York, Routledge, 2004, pp. 23-40. 
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While this energy-security-geostrategic renaissance is important, and 
indeed strengthens the requirement for effective maritime security 
cooperation in the region, the analysis in this chapter will demonstrate 
that the maritime domain of the Gulf of Guinea has much wider 
significance, that it is a key enabler of socio-economic development, and 
that in both historical and contemporary context the maritime realm is 
indeed the geostrategic essence of the Gulf of Guinea.  
 
The chapter is organised in four parts. First, the chapter will define the 
Gulf of Guinea region, and by so doing, adopt a working definition for 
the thesis. Second, the chapter summarises the demographic and socio-
economic profile of the Gulf of Guinea region. Third, the chapter 
reviews the historical significance of the Gulf of Guinea, and finally, the 
chapter examines the contemporary importance of the Gulf of Guinea 
and the accompanying geostrategic interests.   
 
2.2 DEFINING THE GULF OF GUINEA REGION  
Prevalent references to the “Gulf of Guinea” in contemporary global 
dialogue, including in the official documentation of the United Nations 
(UN),
 6
 
 
may convey an impression of certainty about the geographical 
scope of the Gulf of Guinea. However, this is far from the case. The Gulf 
of Guinea is by no means a uniformly defined region, as depending upon 
the particular issue or interest at stake, the physical or geographical 
                                                          
6
 See for example references to the “Gulf of Guinea” in a report of the UN. United Nations, Report of 
the United Nations Assessment Mission on Piracy in the Gulf of Guinea, UNSC S/2012/45 (19 
January 2012). 
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scope of the Gulf of Guinea changes. These varied connotations of the 
region translate into conflicting policy perspectives, thus compounding 
the challenges of fostering effective maritime security cooperation. The 
discussion below examines the different perspectives on the Gulf of 
Guinea under three broad headings, resulting in a definition for the 
thesis.  
 
2.2.1 The Gulf of Guinea in Academic Literature  
One of the most cited works on the Gulf of Guinea is Ricardo de 
Oliveira’s book, “Oil and Politics in Gulf of Guinea.”
7
 Although the 
book has no specific definition of the Gulf of Guinea, it contains a map 
depicting eight coastal States,
8
 from Nigeria to Angola, and the 
landlocked States of Chad and the Central African Republic, as Gulf of 
Guinea States. 
9
 In the absence of a clear definition, it can be inferred 
that the writer views the ten States as constituting the Gulf of Guinea 
region. James Forest and Mathew Sousa also provide an identical map in 
their book, “Oil and Terrorism in the New Gulf,” but leave out the 
Central African Republic.
10
 Thus, although the authors differ on the total 
number of States that constitute the Gulf of Guinea, their shared focus on 
oil and gas resources leads to a common understanding of the Gulf of 
Guinea as a region of coastal and landlocked States banded together.  
 
                                                          
7
 Ricardo Soares de Oliveira, Oil and Politics in Gulf of Guinea, London, Hurst, 2007.  
8
 The term “coastal State is used here as a contrast to “landlocked State”, and therefore includes the 
archipelagic States of Cape Verde and São Tomé and Principe.  
9
 Ricardo Soares de Oliveira, Oil and Politics in Gulf of Guinea, London, Hurst, 2007, p.9.   
10
 James J. F. Forest and Mathew V. Sousa, Oil and Terrorism in the New Gulf: Framing U.S Energy 
and Security Policies in the Gulf of Guinea, New York and Oxford Lexington Books, 2006, p. x-xii. 
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A contrary approach to the Gulf of Guinea can be found in the most 
recent security review of the International Crises Group.
11
  The report 
centres on the same geographic space as the two books but defines and 
limits the Gulf of Guinea region to only eight coastal States.
12
 Raymond 
Gilpin has a similar coastal inclination of the Gulf of Guinea and 
therefore defines the region as consisting only of littoral States.
13
 
However, for Gilpin, the region comprises eleven States, from Ghana to 
Angola.
14
 According to Freedom Onouha, the Gulf of Guinea comprises 
nineteen States (from Gambia to Angola), all of which are coastal except 
one,
15
 while Kamal-Deen Ali and Martin Tsamenyi have broadened the 
coastal definition to include Cape Verde.
16
  
 
2.2.3 Institutional Conceptions of the Gulf of Guinea 
Institutional definitions and understandings of the Gulf of Guinea also 
differ remarkably.
17
 The Gulf of Guinea Commission (GGC) conveys 
                                                          
11
 See International Crises Group, "The Gulf of Guinea: The New Danger Zone " Africa Report No. 
196,  12 December 2012 p. 2. 
12
 Ibid. The Report, however, extrapolated the research analysis to cover Benin, Togo and Ghana.  
13
 Raymond Gilpin, "Enhancing Maritime Security in the Gulf of Guinea," Strategic Insights VI, 1,  
January 2007. 
14
 Ibid. p.2. 
15
Freedom C. Onuoha, "The Geo-strategy of Oil in the Gulf of Guinea: Implications for Regional 
Stability," Journal of Asian and African Studies 45,  2010, pp. 370-71. 
16
 Kamal-Deen Ali and Martin Tsamenyi, "Fault Lines in Maritime Security: Analysis of maritime 
boundary uncertainties in the Gulf of Guinea," African Security Review,  August 2013, pp. 1-16. 
17
 It is noted that the word “institution” has a deeper application and a different conceptual meaning in 
the field of international relations. The use of the word here is not intended to evoke the conceptual 
debate, if it does however, then it is used in the context of John Mearsheimer’s view of institutions as 
formal organisations through which States interact. See John J. Mearsheimer, "The False Promise of 
International Institutions," International Security 19, 3,  1994/95, pp. 5-49.  For a discussion of 
institutions in the African context, see Samuel M. Makinda, "Terrorism, counter-terrorism and norms 
in Africa," African Security Review 15, 3,  2006, pp. 19-31. On institutions generally see Robert O. 
Keohane, International Institutions and State Power: essays in international relations theory, 
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the narrowest concept of the Gulf of Guinea region.
18
 Although the name 
of the Commission has in a way monopolised the phrase “Gulf of 
Guinea,” only eight States make up the Commission.
19
 The definition of 
the region by the International Hydrographic Organization (IHO) is also 
quite narrow, but broader than that of the GGC. The IHO defines the 
Gulf of Guinea in its 1953 publication titled “Limits of Oceans and 
Seas” as the area from Cape Palmas in Liberia to Cape Lopez in Gabon 
(0'38' S, 8"42' E).
20
 The area encompasses the coastal domain of ten 
States and that has been maintained in 
 
 the 2002 edition.
 21
  Thus, 
Angola, Congo-Brazzaville and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DR 
Congo), all of which are very prominent in other conceptions of the 
region, fall outside the IHO definition.  
 
Compared to the narrow views canvassed above, the Gulf of Guinea 
Current Large Marine Ecosystem (GCLME) Project defines the Gulf of 
Guinea as constituting sixteen coastal States, from Guinea to 
Angola.
22
The Maritime Organization for West and Central Africa 
(MOWCA) provides an even broader outlook for the Gulf of Guinea.
23
 
                                                                                                                                                                    
Boulder, Colo Westview, 1989, Hedley Bull, The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World 
Politics, New York, Columbia University Press, 1977.  
18
 See chapter 6. 
19
 These members States are Angola, Cameroon, Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Nigeria, and São 
Tomé and Príncipe. 
20
 See International Hydrography Organization, Limits of Oceans and Seas, 3rd ed., 1953, p. 19.   
21
 The ten States whose coastal domain are covered in the IHO definition are Liberia, Cote d’Ivoire, 
Ghana, Togo, Benin, Nigeria, Cameroon, Equatorial Guinea, São Tomé and Príncipe  and Gabon.  
International Hydrographic Organization, “Limits of Oceans and Seas,” Draft 4
rd
 Edition 2002, 
Chapter 1.  
22
 "Gulf of Guinea Current Large Marine Ecosystem (GCLME) Project: Trans-boundary Diagnostic 
Analysis,"  2006, pp. 6-8.  
23
 On MOWCA, see chapter 6. 
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Although MOWCA has no precise definition for the Gulf of Guinea, in 
practice the Organisation has deemed its twenty five member States to 
comprise the Gulf of Guinea region.
 24
 This can be discerned from the 
feasibility study on its integrated regional coast guard network, as well 
as the accompanying Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) on the 
coast guard network.
25
 Although this broad definition is unique, it has 
commonalities with those conceptions of the Gulf of Guinea that 
includes landlocked States within the geographic scope of the region.
26
 
 
 
 
2.2.3 Evolving Global Concept of the Gulf of Guinea 
There is an evolving global outlook for the Gulf of Guinea that differs in 
some respects from the definitions reviewed thus far. What this evolving 
concept shares with other notions of the Gulf of Guinea is the geographic 
element that the Gulf of Guinea is contiguous to the Atlantic Ocean. 
However, this evolving concept is marked by a shift in emphasis from 
defining the Gulf of Guinea region on the basis of physical limits 
towards a more functional perspective.
 
Thus the emphasis is on securing 
the benefits that inure from the region, especially energy security and 
international trade.
27
  The second element of the evolving concept of the 
Gulf of Guinea is the stress on regional frameworks as the means for 
                                                          
24
 The coastal States of MOWCA are Angola, Benin, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Congo, Cote D’Ivoire,  
Democratic Republic of Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea Bissau, 
Liberia, Mauritania, Nigeria, São Tomé and Príncipe , Senegal, Sierra Leone and Togo. The 
landlocked States are Burkina Faso, Central Africa Republic, Chad, Mali and Niger.   
25
 MOWCA, Memorandum of Understanding on the Establishment of a Sub-Regional Integrated 
Coast Guard Network In West and Central Africa (MOWCA/XIII GA.08/8. 2008). IMO, Report on 
the Mission on Evaluation and Assessment of the Feasibility to Establish An Integrated Coast Guard 
Network in the West And Central African Region (TC/0046-01-2000. 15 February 2006).   
26
 The landlocked States are Burkina Faso, Central Africa Republic, Chad, Mali and Niger.   
27
 Fidelis Allen, "Oil and Security in the Gulf of Guinea: Reflections on the External and Domestic 
Linkages," Journal of Sustainable Development 5, 4,  2012, pp. 132-40. Cristina Barrios, "Fighting 
piracy in the Gulf of Guinea Offshore and onshore," European Union Institute for Security Studies,  
May 2013. 
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enhancing maritime security in the region.
 
This underpins United 
Nations Security Council (UNSC) Resolutions 2018 and 2039.
28
 The 
Resolutions view the Gulf of Guinea as synonymous with the member 
States of four key organisations, and treat the structures and institutional 
capacity of these organisations as the platform for delivering security to 
the region.
29
 The four institutions are the Maritime Organization for 
West and Central Africa (MOWCA), the Economic Community of West 
African States (ECOWAS), the Economic Community of Central 
African States (ECCAS), and the Gulf of Guinea Commission.
30
 
 
2.2.4 Thesis Definition and Scope of the Gulf of Guinea 
Since the focus of this thesis is on challenges and prospects of maritime 
security cooperation, the thesis adopts a working definition of the Gulf 
of Guinea in the context of UNSC Resolutions 2018 and 2039, 
comprising twenty five States and four regional organisations. Indeed, 
the four regional organisations mentioned in the Resolutions are 
regarded as the drivers of maritime security cooperation, so this 
definition facilitates an evaluation of their suitability for delivering 
effective maritime security cooperation in the region.
31
 
 
 
There are also conceptual justifications for the approach the thesis takes 
to the Gulf of Guinea. Both international relations and security studies 
                                                          
28
 United Nations, Resolution 2018 - Piracy and Security in Africa(Security Council 6645th Meeting. 
31 October 2011). United Nations, Resolution 2039 - Peace Consolidation in West Africa(Security 
Council 6727th Meeting. 29 February 2012). 
29
 This point is examined in chapter 6.  
30
 These institutions are examined in chapter 6. 
31
 See chapter 6.  
25 
 
literature regard “regions” and “inter-state cooperative frameworks” as 
both means and agents of global and regional order.
32
 The emphasis in 
these theoretical perspectives is on establishing a common approach and 
solving shared problems, rather than physical boundaries.
33
 Similarly, 
concepts of ocean governance view regional institutions and inter-state 
frameworks as converging points for adopting appropriate responses to 
ocean management concerns generally,
34
 and increasingly with regard to 
maritime security.
35
 Therefore, the scope and definition of the Gulf of 
Guinea adopted in the thesis has both practical and conceptual 
                                                          
32
 Acharya Amitav, ed., Crafting Cooperation : Regional International Institutions in Comparative 
Perspective Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2007. Maren Ihlau, How can we best account 
for the role of regional institutions in providing security? In reference to Sub-Saharan Africa, 
M nchen GRIN Verlag GmbH 2010, Nkechi Mgbeoji, Collective Security – The Liberian Crisis, 
Unilateralism and Global Order, Vancouver University of British Columbia Press, 2003 , Abbas 
Bundu, "Sub-regional Organizations and the Promotion of African Economic Integration: The Case of 
ECOWAS", in  Ojomo M.A. and Adewale O, eds. African Economic Community Treaty: Issues, 
Problems and Prospects, Nigeria Institute of Advanced Legal Studies, 1993.  
33
 Andrew Hurrell argues that there are no natural regions, and that the definition of “region” or 
“regioness” depends on the issue or problem area under investigation. Andrew Hurrell, "Explaining 
the Resurgence of Regionalism in World Politics," Review of International Studies 21,  1995, pp. 331-
58.  Generally on regionalism, cooperation and regional organisations, see Louise L. Fawcett and 
Andrew Hurrell, eds., Regionalism in Word Politics: Regional Organization and International Order,  
Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1995. Nye S. Joseph, International Regionalism: Readings, Boston, 
Little Brown & Co, 1968. Crickard Fred, Fred Deveaux and Katherine Orr, eds., Multinational Naval 
Cooperation and Foreign Policy in the 21st Century,  Adershot, Ashagate, 1998. 
34
 Aldaberto Vallega, "The regional approach to the ocean, the ocean regions, and ocean 
regionalisation – a post-modern dilemma," Ocean and Coastal Management 45,  2000, pp. 712-60. 
Elizabeth A. Kirk, "Maritime Zones and the Ecosystem Approach: A Mismatch," Review of European 
Community and International Environmental Law 8, 1,  1999, pp. 67-72. Tanaka Yoshifumi, "Zonal 
and Integrated Management Approaches to Ocean Governance: Reflections on a Dual Approach in 
International Law of the Sea," International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law 19, 4, 2004, pp. 483-
515. Lewis L. Alexander, "Regional Arrangements in the Oceans," The American Journal of 
International Law 71, 1,  1977, pp. 84-109.   
35
 Chris Rahman, Concepts of Maritime Security: A strategic perspective on alternative visions for 
good order and security at sea, with policy implications for New Zealand, The Centre for Strategic 
Studies, New Zealand Victoria University of Wellington, 2009. Manoj Gupta, Indian Ocean Region: 
Maritime Regimes for Regional Cooperation, New York Springer, 2010. Catherine Zara Raymond 
and Arthur Morriën, "Security in the Maritime Domain and Its Evolution Since 9/11", in  Rupert 
Herber-Burns, Sam Bateman and Peter Lehr, eds. Vol. 3 Lloyd’s MIU Handbook of Maritime 
Security, CRC Press, 2008, pp. 3-12. Sam Bateman, "Capacity Building for Maritime Security 
Cooperation: What are We Talking About? ", in  Peter Cozens and Joanna Mossop, eds. Capacity 
Building for Maritime Security Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific, New Zealand, Center for Strategic 
Studies, 2005, pp. 3-23. Mark J. Valencia, "Prospects for Multilateral Maritime Regime Building in 
Asia", in  Sam Bateman, ed. Maritime Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific Region: Current Situation and 
Prospects, Canberra Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, 1999, pp. 27-68. 
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foundations. Figure 2.1 depicts the twenty five States of the Gulf of 
Guinea. 
 
Figure 2.1: Map of the Gulf of Guinea 
 
A look at figure 2.1 shows that five landlocked States- Burkina Faso, 
Chad, the Central African Republic, Mali and Niger, are included in the 
Gulf of Guinea region. These landlocked States depend on ports of 
neighbouring coastal States and the sea routes of the Gulf of Guinea for 
international trade. The case of Chad is even more peculiar. In addition 
27 
 
to general trade, Chad exports its oil through a pipeline laid to the coast 
of Cameroon.
36
  
 
2.2.5 Regional Organisations of the Gulf of Guinea 
Chapter six of this thesis will analyse the maritime security frameworks 
of the four organisations mentioned in the last section, that is, 
ECOWAS, ECCAS, MOWCA and the Gulf of Guinea Commission 
(GGC). A detailed analysis of the evolution and structures of these 
organisations, as well as the dynamics of cooperation and conflict with 
the organisations is, however, outside the scope of this thesis. 
Nonetheless, to the extent that some of these undercurrents are relevant 
to understanding maritime security cooperative challenges in the Gulf of 
Guinea, they will be examined in chapter six.  
 
However, it is important to clarify the membership of the four 
institutions at this stage. It should be noted that the twenty five member 
States of the Gulf of Guinea are also member States of MOWCA. 
ECOWAS has fifteen member States,
37
 while States ECCAS has ten.
38
 
As indicated earlier, the Gulf of Guinea Commission has eight member 
States.
39
 Since the twenty five member States of MOWCA also 
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 The Doba-Kribi pipeline, estimated to cost US$ 4.2 billion, is the single most costly investment on 
the African continent. It is owned by a consortium of ExxonMobile, ChevronTexaco and Petronas.  
37
 The States of ECOWAS are Benin, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Cote d’Ivoire, Gambia, Ghana, 
Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, and Togo.  
38
 The States of ECCAS are Angola, Burundi, Cameroon, The Central African Republic, Chad, 
Congo-Brazzaville, DR Congo, Gabon, Equatorial Guinea and Sao Tomé and Principe. See 
“Economic Community of Central African States,” http://www.au.int/en/recs/eccas, 28 September 
2013.  
39
 See chapter 6. The members of the Gulf of Guinea Commission are Angola, Cameroon, Congo, 
Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Nigeria, and São Tomé and Príncipe. 
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constitute the twenty five States of the Gulf of Guinea, MOWCA 
occupies a special position as the biggest platform for discussing 
maritime security cooperation. However, unlike the other three 
organisations, MOWCA is not an inter-state political organisation, as its 
mandate is limited to the promotion of commercial shipping.
40
  
 
Although some reports suggest that the Republic of Rwanda has renewed 
its membership of ECCAS, the country is not listed in the official 
membership of ECCAS and is therefore excluded from the analysis in 
this thesis.
41
 The second point to note is that the Republic of Mauritania 
falls within the definition of the Gulf of Guinea by virtue of its 
membership of MOWCA, but Mauritania now belongs to the Arab 
Maghreb Union,
42
 having withdrawn its membership of ECOWAS in 
2000.
43
 As analysed in chapter six, this creates challenges for maritime 
security cooperation in the Gulf of Guinea, because while maritime 
security imperatives should be part of any evolving cooperative 
framework, the institutional framework to support the inclusion of 
Mauritania is lacking at the moment.   
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 See chapter 6.  
41
 Rwanda was originally a member State of ECCAS, but withdrew from the Community as a result of 
major disagreements with other member States, especially Angola. Indeed, the two States fought in 
opposite sides in the war in DR Congo. There have been reports that Rwanda has renewed its 
membership to the Community. However, Rwanda is not listed as a member State on the official 
website of ECCAS. See “Economic Community of Central African States,” 
http://www.au.int/en/recs/eccas, 28 September 2013.  
42
 Other member States of the Arab Maghreb Union include Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia and Libya.  
43
 On the withdrawal of Mauritania, see ECOWAS, “Executive Secretary's Report 2000: chapter II,” 
http://www.comm.ecowas.int/sec/index.php?id=es-rep2000-3-5&lang=en, 14 October 2013. 
Generally on issues of ECOWAS integration including Mauritania, see Fumi Olonisakin, "ECOWAS: 
from Economic Integration to Peace Building", in  Thomas Jaye, Dauda Garuba and Stella Amadi, 
eds. ECOWAS and the Dynamics of Conflict and Peace-building Senegal, CODERSA, 2011, pp. 11-
26. Kofi O. Kufuor, The Institutional Transformation of the Economic Community of West African, 
Ashgate Publishing, Aldershot, 2006, pp. 19-68. 
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2.3  SUMMARY OF THE SOCIO-ECONOMIC AND 
MARITIME PROFILE OF THE GULF OF GUINEA  
The land area of the Gulf of Guinea is approximately 12,754,790 million 
square kilometres - three times the size of the European Union.
44
 The 
estimated population of the region is 435.5 million people, with over 
one-third of the population living in Nigeria.
45
 Fifteen States in the Gulf 
of Guinea are Francophone, 
 
having French as their national language.
46
 
Five are Anglophone, having English as their national language.
47
 Four 
States are Lusophone, having Portuguese as their language,
48
 while 
Equatorial Guinea is the only Spanish speaking State in the region. Table 
2.1 summarises the socio-economic and maritime profile of the Gulf of 
Guinea. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
44
 The European Union website (Europa) States the land size of the EU to be about 4 million km² with 
503 million inhabitants. See Europa, “Size and Population,” http://europa.eu/about-eu/facts-
figures/living/, 2 July 2013.  
45
 The official webpage of Nigeria simply States that its population is over 150 million people, but the 
CIA World Factbook gives a figure of 150.8 million people. See Federal Republic of Nigeria, 
http://www.nigeria.gov.ng/2012-10-29-11-05-46, 14 October 2013.  
46
 The Francophone States were colonised by France. They are Benin, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, The 
Central African Republic, Chad, Congo Brazzaville, Cote d’Ivoire, The Democratic Republic of 
Congo, Gabon, Guinea, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Senegal and Togo. 
47
 The Anglophone States are English speaking. Four are former colonies of Britain: Ghana, Gambia, 
Nigeria and Sierra Leone. The fifth, the State of Liberia, was formed in 1847 when the United States 
returned ex-slaves and settled them in West Africa. 
48
 Lusophone States are Portuguese speaking and former colonies of Portugal. They are Angola, Cape 
Verde, Guinea Bissau and São Tomé and Príncipe.  
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Table 2.1 Socio-economic and Maritime Profile of Gulf of Guinea 
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Global Competitive Index 
2010/2011    
Angola 20 1,246,700 1,600 501,050 84,391 122 119 136 130 7.6 1.9  
Benin 8.8 112,622 121 30,024 6,633 82 87 133 122 5.9 2.8  
Burkina Faso 15.8 273,800 - - 8,820 98 90 134 124 - 3.1 landlocked 
Cameroon 19.4 475,440 402 14,693 22,394 53 107 126 118 6.9 2.2  
Cape Verde 0.5 4,033 965 796,840 1,648 102 56 109 79 5.5 -  
Central Af.  Rep 5.0 623,000 - - - - - - - 7.8 2.1 landlocked 
Chad  11.3 1,284,000 - - 7,588 137 135 137 138 8.5 1.7 landlocked 
Congo 4.5 342,000 169 40,499 11,898  - - -  6.3 2.1  
Cote d’Ivoire 20.6 322,463 515 174,545 22,780 94 133 99 102 7.8 2.2  
DR Congo 66 2,344,858 37 1,072 13,145 - - - - 8.2 2.0  
Equ. Guinea 0.7 28,051 296 308,337 14,007 - - - - - 1.9  
Gabon 1.5 267,667 885 193,627 13,011 - - - - 5.1 2.8  
Gambia 1.7 11,295 80 22,630 807 117 37 69 97 6.7 2.8  
Ghana 24 238,533 539 224,908 31,306 136 67 106 117 5.9 4.1  
Guinea 10 245,857 320 109,456 4,511 - - - - 7.5 2.0  
Guinea Bissau 1.6 36,125 350 106,117 879 - - - - 7.5 2.1  
Liberia 4 111,367 579 246,152 986 - - - - 7.4 3.3  
Mali 14.5 1,240,000 - - 9,251 65 109 121 128 7.0 2.7 landlocked 
Mauritania 3.4 1,030,000 754 155,422 3,636 118 116 122 132 6.9 2.3  
Niger 11.5 1,267,000 - - 5,549 - - - - 7.5 2.6 landlocked 
Nigeria 158.3 923,768 853 216,789 193,609 97 121 135 104 7.0 2.4  
São Tomé  .2 964 209 165,364 197 -  -  4.3 -  
Senegal 13.7 196,722 531 157,550 12,954 89 76 122 93 7.5 2.9  
Sierra Leone 6.4 71,740 402 159,744 1,905 - - - - 7.2 2.4  
Togo 6.6 56,785 56 15,375 3,153 - - - - 5.3 2.4  
TOTAL  435.5 12,754,790 9,663 3,640,194 475,058        
 
Data Interpretation: Global Competitive Index: Ranking out of 139 States. Stability: 10= highly 
unstable; 0 = Very stable. Transparency: 10= Clean; 1= Very Corrupt. EEZ: Limits are truncated at 
200m water depth.   
Data Sources:  Data sources are indicated in the footnotes as follows: Population, Land Size, and 
Coastline,
49
 EEZ Areas,
50
 GDP,
51
 Global Competitive Index,
52
 Instability Index
53
 and Transparency 
Index.
54
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 Population, Land Size and Coastline data has been taken from official country websites. In cases 
where the information was not available on official websites, the data has been taken from the CIA 
World Factbook and the Nations Online Project, http://www.nationsonline.org/.     
50
 Estimates of EEZ Areas are taken from the Sea Around Us Project. The estimates are truncated at 
the 200m water depth.  
51
 “World Bank Development Indicators 2010,” World Bank, July 2011.  
52
 World Bank, Africa Competiveness Report 2011, World Bank 2011. 
53
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The information in Table 2.1 conveys the socio-economic multiple 
challenges that confront the Gulf of Guinea. The Gulf of Guinea also 
ranks very low in terms of development indicators. The average position 
of the region in three areas of global competiveness: economic 
environment, infrastructure and technology, is 110 out of 139 States 
globally.
55
 Overlaid on the economic and developmental setbacks are a 
myriad of governance weaknesses. National institutions in the region are 
dysfunctional, with most States ranking in the upper limit of the global 
instability index, and no State in the region has attained even a mid-level 
rating for good governance or transparency.
 56
 All these factors impact 
on maritime security and the capacity for regional cooperation.
57
   
 
Despite the ailing socio-economic profile of the Gulf of Guinea, the 
region still has key strengths. This can be gleaned from the physical data 
in Table 2.1, which will be further explored in the next two parts of this 
chapter. The region has a vast land area and its tropical environment 
supports the growth of unique plantations and cash crops for export. The 
region is also a major import market for global goods and services, partly 
because of its growing population, and also due to the absence of 
domestic production. Many of the States in the region have vast areas of 
maritime jurisdiction (with 40 to 80 per cent of the total area of some 
States comprising maritime domains). Indeed, for some States, their total 
maritime area far exceeds their land area. These maritime spaces 
constitute a viable maritime estate which has in the last couple of years 
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contributed to appreciable economic growth across the Gulf of Guinea 
region. 
58
 
 
Therefore, the challenges and vulnerabilities of the Gulf of Guinea 
region co-exist with its potential.
59
 Indeed, the combination of 
economically valuable mineral resources, essential commodities that are 
vital for international trade, important coastal living and non-living 
resources, and international sea lines for shipping, underpins the strategic 
significance of the Gulf of Guinea in historical and contemporary times. 
Indeed, the maritime border, more than anything else, have influenced 
the history and socio-economic dynamics of the region.  
 
2.4 A GEOPOLTICAL HISTORY FROM THE OCEAN    
This part examines the strategic importance of the Gulf of Guinea from a 
historical perspective. The argument underlying the analysis is that the 
Gulf of Guinea has been part of, and in some cases at the centre of, 
major transformations in the history of the world, and that the maritime 
domain of the Gulf of Guinea has been pivotal to the historical role and 
prominence of the region. The discussion is divided into four sections: 
early exploration and trade in the Gulf of Guinea, the Dutch-Portuguese 
commercial rivalry in the Gulf of Guinea and its influence on the 
evolution of the doctrine of Mare Liberum, slave trade and the industrial 
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revolution, and finally, the inseparable link between the quest for sea 
power by European States and the imposition of the system of 
colonialism.     
 
2.4.1 Early Exploration and Trade 
History shows that the activities of early humans were restricted to their 
immediate surroundings, and as a result, communities had little 
knowledge or awareness of each other.
 60
 In this primordial world, the 
influence possessed by any particular society ended at the outskirts of 
their territory, and feudal lords enjoyed limited wealth because they lived 
principally on land resources.
 61
 This was largely the case until the 
Roman Empire rose to greatness, owing its growth to the opportunities 
afforded by the Mediterranean Sea.
62
 Since the Mediterranean Sea 
offered vast commercial and strategic military advantages, the city of 
Carthage also assumed prominence on the shores of present day North 
Africa.
63
 Though it had little arable land, Carthage prospered because its 
ports had become regional centres for trade and commerce by 300 BC.
64
 
The centuries that followed saw the rise and fall of many kingdoms in 
different geographical locations; however, those kingdoms with access to 
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the sea were able to greatly expand their social, economic and political 
base, as well as display enduring growth and power. This was the case 
with many Pre-Westphalian Europeans settlements and kingdoms that 
subsequently became States.
65
  
 
In the case of the Gulf of Guinea, the great ancient empire of Ghana was 
located on the banks of the Atlantic coast, around present day 
Mauritania, and the sea anchored its socio-economic power.
 66
 Even the 
thirteenth century Mali Empire, though not in the precincts of the coast, 
relied on trade by rivers and also benefited from trade by sea. Thus, the 
Gulf of Guinea established patterns of interaction with the sea much 
earlier than the recorded discovery of the region by the great sailor 
Vasco Da Gama.
67
 However, it was Vasco Da Gama’s sea trip that 
increased awareness about the region, firmly linking it with other parts 
of the world, and from that point, the Gulf of Guinea became a place for 
achieving strategic objectives, with the sea as the primary vehicle.
68
 In 
fact, the economic and commercial potential of the Gulf of Guinea 
expanded, leading to an increased focus on the region, and culminating 
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in competition and contest between the early European powers, the 
Dutch and Portuguese.
69
 
 
2.4.2 Gulf of Guinea and the birth of Mare Liberum Doctrine  
The treatise or doctrine of Mare Liberum, articulated in 1609 by Hugo 
Grotius, remains the most celebrated development in maritime strategic, 
legal and commercial thinking, and has its antecedents in events in the 
Gulf of Guinea.
70
 
As in the case of earlier empires, Portugal built its wealth and power by 
dominating trade. In order to retain its supremacy, Portugal tried to limit 
the trading opportunities of other nations.
71
 The assertiveness of Portugal 
was partly grounded in a 1493 declaration by Pope Alexander VI, which 
divided the world’s oceans between Portugal and Spain.
72
 However, the 
Dutch, as commercial competitors of the Portuguese, went on to 
establish trade relations with the Gold Coast in 1598, and started 
spreading trade posts to the rest of the Gulf of Guinea.
73
 The effective 
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assertion of Dutch trade in the Gulf of Guinea heightened tensions 
between Portuguese and Dutch trading companies in other parts of the 
world. Portugal persisted with the enforcement of monopolistic methods 
in the East and West Indies. As part of their scheme of retaliatory 
measures, the Dutch seized a Portuguese ship, the Santa Catarina, in the 
Strait of Malacca in 1603.
74
 This resulted in the famous treatise Mare 
Librium (Freedom of the Sea) by Hugo Grotius, with the jurist arguing in 
support of the right of the Dutch East Indian Company to trade in the Far 
East, and also justifying the capture and sale of the Santa Catarina as a 
prize.
75
  
 
Thus, the Gulf of Guinea was at the centre of the sequence of events that 
gave birth to Mare Liberum, the monograph that underpins the 
conceptual and strategic character of the sea. It was the commercial 
triumph of the Dutch in the Gold Coast that emboldened them to contest 
the Portuguese monopoly in other parts of the world. Indeed, evidence of 
the ensuing wars between these competing powers to control trade routes 
and ports in the Gulf of Guinea can be seen in the remnants of canons 
and guns on the shores of Elmina in Ghana, and other places in the 
region.
76
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2.4.3 Trans-Atlantic Slave Trade  
No matter how the (in)famous transatlantic slave trade is regarded 
today,
77
 it was the political economy of the world for about three 
centuries, and a large part of the human chattel came from the Gulf of 
Guinea, christened “the slave coast.”
78
Notable slave centres in the Gulf 
of Guinea included Badagry in Nigeria, Cabinda in the DR Congo, the 
Cape Coast in Ghana, and Launda in Angola.
79
 From these forts, 
millions of coastal and hinterland dwellers of the Gulf of Guinea were 
shipped across the Atlantic Ocean and traded by mercantile and 
corporate interests.
80
Although the United States of America (US) stands 
out as the dominant endpoint, there were also key slave destinations in 
Europe and other parts of the world.
 81
 The Atlantic Slave Trade was 
subsequently abolished in the early nineteenth century,
82
 but clearly the 
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Gulf of Guinea was the source of the human labour that ensured 
increased production and economic prosperity in the destination States, 
turning otherwise poor and obsolescent Western economies into vibrant 
and powerful States.
83
 The sea provided the means and platform for the 
whole enterprise.  
 
2.4.4 The Industrial Revolution 
The abolition of the slave trade facilitated the revival of transactions in 
natural goods, providing the impetus for the industrial revolution in 
Europe.
 84
 The survival of this new political economy depended on two 
additional pillars: secure markets for goods, and a reliable source of 
industrial raw materials. The Gulf of Guinea provided both.
85
 Indeed, the 
annual value of trade from the region was over 3 million pounds 
sterling.
86
 Among the valuable commodities bought from the region 
were ivory, gum, beeswax, wild coffee, peanuts, cotton, rubber, clothes, 
iron and steel. The Gulf of Guinea accounted for a sixth of the ivory 
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traded in London in 1860, and by 1891, modern day Ghana had become 
the leading producer of rubber in the whole of the British trading zone.
 87
   
 
The industrial revolution inspired great transformations in Western 
empires, nonetheless, other parts of the world also profited from it. 
Within the Gulf of Guinea, new patterns of socio-economic expansion 
evolved, including a growing indigenous wealthy society and a regional 
system which has been positively described as a pluralistic regional 
environment.
88
 Thus, the trade routes of the Gulf of Guinea and the 
larger Atlantic Ocean were important sea lines of communication, not 
just for the benefit of Europe, but also for West African inhabitants and 
rulers.
 89
   
 
2.4.5 Seapower, the Berlin Conference and Colonialism  
The above accounts of the historical significance of the Gulf of Guinea 
should not be understood as mere socio-economic engagements. On the 
contrary, they were the result of strategic thinking and emerging 
concepts of the time. Foremost among these concepts was the notion of 
“seapower” in the classical work of Alfred Thayer Mahan.90 This was 
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followed by the restated concept of “maritime power” by Sir Julian 
Corbett. 
91
 Inspired by these strategic edits, the mutual trade upon which 
the industrial revolution was anchored was soon to be obliterated by the 
quest for expansionism.
 92
   
 
Mahan’s doctrinal ethos bounded naval power, conquest and trade as the 
inseparable instrument of national power and prosperity, and seapower 
was just an instrument for trade but also to establish dominion over 
territories across the world.
93
 Indeed, Mahan’s ideas stimulated the rise 
of the British Navy to support British expansion and influence.
 94
 
Mahan’s writings were also translated into all major languages of the 
time, and thus Pax Britannica was not just a hegemonic tool, it also 
spurred the ambition of other European powers to seek overseas 
territories. As German Emperor and strategist, Kaiser Wilhelm II, 
affirmed: “I am not just reading it but devouring it; and it is on board all 
my ships.”
95
 Sir William Corbett’s “Some Principles of Maritime 
Strategy”, which emphasised maritime power in the context of maritime 
trade, further revolutionised strategic thinking and the desire of nations 
to gain control of territories abroad.
96
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The Gulf of Guinea became representative of both the process and the 
product of the doctrines of “seapower” and “maritime strategy”, with all 
the major European powers of the time setting their eyes on the African 
continent. The Berlin Conference, which formalised colonial rule across 
Africa, was convened because of events in the region. Germany, widely 
considered a minor power at the time, had established political authority 
in Togo and Cameroon by hoisting flags.
97
 This brought Germany to the 
brink of war with other European powers, especially Great Britain. The 
conference was therefore convened to formalise colonial possessions and 
to divide the rest of the continent.
98
 Thus by 1890, the whole of the Gulf 
of Guinea was under colonial rule,
99
 and as all the imperial powers were 
coastal States, they made use of the sea for the execution of their rule 
and administration.
 100
  
 
Although the Berlin Conference is recorded in historical narratives as the 
meeting that partitioned the African continent, thereby placing emphasis 
on the land component, a careful reading of the Berlin Agreement shows 
that the maritime domain was as strategically important to the colonialist 
as the land. Article 4 of the Agreement stipulated that each power was to 
extend its coastal possessions inland, while Article 5 granted all 
signatory States the freedom of navigation through the sea to the Congo 
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and Niger rivers.
101
 It is clear from these two Articles that access to the 
sea coast was the foremost concern for the colonialist, and thus it was the 
sea, rather than the land, that held the key to the development of a 
colonial empire.
 102
 It is for this reason that Britain, the most dominant 
power of the time, gathered for herself only coastal colonies in the Gulf 
of Guinea.
103
 The French taxonomy of its colonies as territoire d'outre 
mer (or “oversees territory”) equally underscores the centrality of the sea 
to colonial rule.
104
 
 
The above analysis shows that the Gulf of Guinea has historically been a 
region of strategic importance. Indeed, economic and commercial gains 
were made from the region, the implementation of seapower concepts 
yielded great dividends, and imperialist ambitions were realised. It 
should also be mentioned in passing that the Gulf of Guinea was also 
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central to two other crucial events in world history - the First and Second 
World Wars, by providing troops for the war effort.  
 
The above analysis shows that the geopolitical history of the Gulf of 
Guinea - whether viewed as beneficial or detrimental - has much to do 
with the sea. The ‘positive' exploitation and use of global maritime 
commons, including the waters of the Gulf of Guinea, has historically 
allowed many States to rise to greatness. However, the same cannot be 
said for Gulf of Guinea States. In light of this fact, what lessons can Gulf 
of Guinea States draw from the prosperous nations that have come 
before them? As the Swahili proverb quoted at the beginning of this 
chapter states:  "the sea is what it is". Thus, the benefits of the sea still 
abound, and it is not too late for Gulf of Guinea States to chart a 
geostrategic future based on the sea. This leads us into an investigation 
of the contemporary value and strategic derivatives of the Gulf of Guinea 
and its maritime space.  
 
 
2.5 A GEOSTRATEGIC FUTURE IN THE OCEAN   
There is a tide in the affairs of men, which, taken at the flood, leads on to fortune. 
Omitted, all the voyage of their life is bound in shallows and in miseries. On such a 
full sea are we now afloat. And we must take the current when it serves, or lose our 
ventures.    Shakespeare
105
  
 
The Gulf of Guinea remains a region of great importance. In fact, global 
interest in the region is on the rise, and the maritime domain is once 
again central to this strategic outlook. The analysis of the contemporary 
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status of the Gulf of Guinea will be discussed with reference to four 
specific areas: international trade and shipping, oil and gas resources, 
marine living resources, and finally, submarine cables and pipelines. 
 
2.5.1 International Trade and Shipping 
The world’s oceans remain the most important means for global trade, 
with over 90 per cent of trade in goods and services being carried out by 
sea.
106
 The emergence of containerised shipping has also made shipping 
quicker and safer, thereby placing it at the heart of global trade and 
transportation.
107
 The total volume of goods loaded on ships in 2010 was 
8.4 billion tons, a 7 per cent increase from the previous year.
108
 Although 
Africa’s share in overall maritime trade remains low (an estimated 7.5 
per cent between 2006-2010, compared to, for example, 43 per cent for 
Asia),
109
 maritime trade is still the most critical determinant of socio-
economic development and long term stability in the Gulf of Guinea. 
This is demonstrated by an analysis of export and import trade in the 
region.   
 
2.5.1.1 Export Trade  
As in the case of many other developing economies, Gulf of Guinea 
States derive a substantial part of their Gross Domestic Product (GDP) 
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from the export of cash crops and mineral resources, but are also steadily 
increasing their share of trade in non-traditional products like pineapples, 
pawpaw and mangoes to both traditional and emerging markets.
110
 The 
tropical weather of the region, combined with its lush rainforests, 
ensures high yields of cocoa, cotton, groundnuts, shea-nuts and timber. 
Cote d’Ivoire and Ghana produce more than half of the world’s cocoa.
111
 
Other States in the region also contribute substantially to global trade in 
cocoa. Between 2010 and 2011, global production of cocoa was 
estimated to have increased to a record figure of 4.3 million tonnes, with 
3.2 million tonnes or 80 per cent being produced by Cote d’Ivoire, 
Ghana, Nigeria and Cameroon.
 112
The Gulf of Guinea also abounds in 
precious stones and minerals.
113
 The world’s largest deposit of cobalt is 
in DR Congo.
 114
Other mineral endowments in the region include gold, 
diamonds and titanium, as well as dense minerals like iron, bauxite and 
manganese. These resources attract significant interest and investment, 
even in the midst of conflict and instability.
115
 Table 2.2 represents the 
maritime trade of Gulf of Guinea States from 2006 to 2010. 116  
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Table 2.2:  Seaborne Trade in the Gulf of Guinea 2006-2010  
 
Year  Goods Loaded 
    Crude       Products   Dry Cargo       Total 
Goods Unloaded  
  Crude     Products     Dry Cargo       Total 
  Millions of tons   
2006 224.6 15.2 46.1 285.7  7.5 15.9 69.7 93.2  
2007 232.8 12.9 54.3 300.0  10.4 19.0 75.5 104.9  
2008 246.0 14.9 63.2 324.5  8.5 16.3 70.4 94.3  
2009 233.7 12.5 49.9 295.6  8.9 13.5 77.1 99.3  
2010 220.8 11.1 63.0 295.6  8.4 13.7 87.6 115.8  
    
 Source: UNCTAD Review of Maritime Transport 2011.  
 
 
A comparison of the import and export figures above makes the Gulf of 
Guinea region a net volume exporter of goods. The total goods exported 
for the five year period is about three times the quantity of imports.
 117
 It 
is significant that dry cargo exports increased from 46.1 million tons in 
2006 to 63 million tons in 2010, whilst exports of other products has 
been at appreciably high levels. The point to draw from these statistics is 
that maritime trade and shipping is contributing substantially to export 
drive, and a number of important interpretations can be made from this 
broad fact.  
 
The first is that the sustainability of export trade is fundamental to the 
economies of Gulf of Guinea States. Export trade drives domestic 
production, generates employment, builds private capital, and it is also 
an essential source of revenue and foreign exchange for governments.
118
 
Second, at the social level, export trade is vital to the wellbeing of 
citizens in the region. For example, poverty in Ghana’s cocoa producing 
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areas remains very low compared to the rest of the country.
119
 This 
positive development has a direct relationship with shipping, as the 
cocoa produced by these communities is integrated into global maritime 
trade, translating into a better standard of living for these communities 
and increasing the profile of the standard of living at the national 
level.
120
 This will certainly aggregate into positive regional development 
in the future. Therefore, while the Gulf of Guinea is satisfying global 
needs with its exports, international trade and shipping is providing 
revenue and foreign exchange earnings for the region, which is crucial 
for regional security and stability. The stability and development of the 
Gulf of Guinea region is thus tied to the safety and security of 
international shipping.   
 
2.5.1.2 Import Trade 
The other side of the global trade equation in the Gulf of Guinea is 
import trade. The region’s share of consumption of global goods and 
services is on the rise, from 93.2 million tons in 2006 to 115 million tons 
in 2010. Imports of dry cargo, including food and other industrial 
products, rose from 69.7 million tons in 2006 to 87.6 million tons in 
2010, while the import of refined crude for domestic and industrial use 
went up by about 10 per cent within the same period. These rising 
imports may be interpreted in two ways: as a positive reflection of a 
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burgeoning middle class which has increased purchasing power, or a 
stern warning of the region’s increasing dependence on external sources 
for its livelihood. However, both conclusions reiterate the importance of 
maritime trade as the primary mode for obtaining food and other basic 
necessities. Significantly, the import figures cement the Gulf of Guinea 
as an important market for the consumption of global goods. 
 
2.5.1.3 Transit Trade of Landlocked States 
The landlocked States of the Gulf of Guinea are equally dependent on 
international trade and shipping for economic growth and development.  
The main ports which are used to transfer goods to and from landlocked 
States are the Port of Abidjan in Cote d’Ivoire, the Port of Duala in 
Cameroon, the Port of Lome in Togo, and the Port of Tema in Ghana. 
Available figures show that roughly 4 per cent of the total cargo handled 
by these five ports in 2006 was transit cargo,
121
 and in 2008 the Port of 
Tema handled an estimated 865,000 tons of transit cargo from 
neighbouring landlocked States.
122
 It is important to note that the 
landlocked States of the Gulf of Guinea region also export a substantial 
quantity of goods for the international market. For example, exports of 
cotton from landlocked States in the ECOWAS sub-region accounted for 
5 per cent of the global total in 2006.
123
 These statistics indicate that 
maritime security in the Gulf of Guinea is as important to landlocked 
States as it is for their coastal counterparts.  
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2.5.2  The Gulf of Guinea and Global Energy Security    
Oil and gas resources form the bedrock of global energy security.
 
 
Indeed, the network of global transportation (cars, aeroplanes, trains and 
ships), depend on oil and gas, as does the military.
 124
 Although there are 
attempts to reduce dependence on fossil fuels (petroleum, coal and 
natural gas), petroleum remains the world’s leading fuel, representing 
33.6 per cent of global energy consumption.
125
 In recent times, demand 
for liquid natural gas (LNG) has also outpaced fossil fuels like coal, 
owing to its environmentally friendly profile.
126
 There are two critical 
determinants of global oil and gas energy security: first, the volume of 
reserves and supplies, and second, the ability to protect and ensure 
regular supplies. In the current global setting, the Gulf of Guinea 
commands both, with the region possessing additional advantages over 
other regions.
127
 It is estimated that global dependence on the Gulf of 
Guinea for oil and gas supplies will rise by 30 per cent by 2040.
128
 
 
The rest of this section examines the significance of the Gulf of Guinea 
to global energy security. It will analyse the oil and gas reserves in the 
region and the comparative advantage of the Gulf of Guinea as a source 
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of global energy security. The section will also examine the oil and gas 
interests of key global players in the Gulf of Guinea, and conclude with a 
discussion of oil power politics, as well as associated governance and 
security challenges.  
 
2.5.2.1 Gulf of Guinea Oil and Gas Reserves 
Global interest in the Gulf of Guinea has increased tremendously, largely 
due to vast discoveries of offshore oil and gas resources.
 129
 For many 
years, sizeable oil and gas reserves have been limited to a few regions, 
such as the Middle East, the Caspian Basin, the North Sea and the 
Americas.
130
 Studies, however, indicate that the African continent has 
major oil reserves, particularly in the offshore and deep-water areas of 
the Gulf of Guinea.
131
 The discovery of oil offshore Congo-Brazzaville 
in 1969 gave some indication of the region’s oil and gas potential, but 
the extent of such potential remained uncertain until the first deep-water 
oil discovery in offshore Angola in 1996.
132
  Since then, oil and gas 
discoveries in the ultra-deep water areas across the region have 
continued to occur, while onshore discoveries have also sharply risen.
133
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Nigeria has the ninth highest oil reserves in the world,
134
 with its daily 
production of over 2 million barrels in 2010 placing it in the top three oil 
producing nations according to the Organization of the Petroleum 
Exporting Countries (OPEC).
135
 Angola’s estimated output of 1.8 million 
barrels is also one of the highest in the world, and projections are for 
Angola to reach a daily output of 2 million barrels in 2014.
136
 Nigeria 
and Angola, together with Congo-Brazzaville and Gabon, are mature oil 
producers, with a large part of their reserves and production being 
generated from offshore operations. In 2004, major oil reserves 
discovered in offshore Equatorial Guinea signalled that the region had 
become a key oil producing region.
 137
  
 
The landlocked State of Chad is also a significant oil player on the world 
stage. It is estimated that Chad has oil reserves exceeding 900 million 
barrels, and its oil is carried by a pipeline from Doba in Chad to the 
Cameroonian coastal town, Kribi.
138
 The 663 mile pipeline, which cost 
approximately $US4.2 billion, is owned by a consortium consisting of 
ExxonMobile, ChevronTexaco and Petronas, and is regarded as the 
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single most expensive private investment in Africa.
139
 Cameroon’s oil 
industry, which declined in the 1990s because of waning land-based 
reserves, has recently recovered due to an injection of funds following 
the discovery of new oil reserves in its offshore areas.
140
  
 
Benin, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Cote d’Ivoire and Ghana 
have also become oil producing States, further raising the oil profile of 
the Gulf of Guinea. Ghana announced its first oil discovery in 2005, and 
since then more discoveries have been made.
141
 According to the 
International Energy Outlook of 2011, Ghana’s budding offshore oil 
industry made a positive contribution to global energy resource levels, 
and the trend is expected to continue.
142
There have also been reports of 
offshore oil discoveries in Sierra Leone as well,
143
 while both Senegal 
and Guinea have onshore oil fields, which strongly indicate that the two 
States may reap the benefits of the deep-water potential of the Gulf of 
Guinea.
144
 The proven oil reserves for selected Gulf of Guinea States as 
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at 2011 is contained in Table 2.3 below. The significant thing to note e is 
that the oil reserves in the Gulf of Guinea have tripled from 20.4 million 
barrels in 1990 to 59.22 million barrels in 2011. Almost all the States 
that have proven oil reserves also have huge deposits of gas, and in the 
case of Cote d’Ivoire, its proven gas reserves exceed its oil reserves.
145
  
Table 2.3:  Proven Oil Reserves of Gulf of Guinea Sates  
 1990 2000 2009 2010 2011
146
 
 Billion Barrels  
Angola 1.6 6.0 13.5 13.5 13.5 
Congo Brazzaville 0.8 1.7 1.9 1.9 1.9 
Equatorial Guinea  0.8 1.7 1.7 1.7 
Gabon  0.9 2.4 3.7 3.7 3.7 
Nigeria 17.1 29.0 37.2 37.2 37.2 
      
Benin    0.08 0.08 
Cameroon     0.20 0.20 
DR Congo    0.18 0.18 
Ghana    0.01 0.66 
Cote d’Ivoire     0.10 0.10 
Total of Estimates 20.4 39.9 58.0 58.7 59.22 
Sources: Angola to Nigeria, BP Statistical Review of Energy Outlook June 2011  
  Benin to Cote d’Ivoire, Oil & Gas Journal, vol. 108, No. 46, Dec 2010  
 
2.5.2.2 Comparative Advantages and Security of Gulf of 
Guinea Oil and Gas Reserves 
Apart from having substantial  oil reserves and the ability to meet the 
increasing demands of the global energy market, the Gulf of Guinea oil 
industry has several advantages over oil industries in other regions. In 
terms of quality, the oil from the region is classified as “sweet oil” due to 
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its low sulphur content, the low cost of refining the oil, and its limited 
environmental harm.
147
 Moreover, the region’s deep water exploration is 
regarded as the new frontier of energy security. There are two reasons 
for this. First, the absence of human habitation in the deep waters of the 
Gulf of Guinea renders the entire offshore area an exploitable zone. 
Second, problems with older technology which were previously seen as 
an impediment for extracting deep water reserves have been 
overcome.
148
  The advent of new technology in the oil and gas industry 
has allowed the production, storage and processing of oil to take place 
offshore. Congo-Brazzaville is the first State in the world to boast a 
state-of-the-art system known as a Floating, Drilling, Production, 
Storage and Offloading (FDPSO) System.
149
   
 
The Gulf of Guinea also enjoys great advantages over other oil 
producing regions with respect to transportation. As noted by one energy 
expert: “There is a lot of excitement about West Africa oil industry, its 
politics may be complex but transportation and logistics are easier than 
the Persian Gulf.”
150 This remark points to three distinct advantages of 
the Gulf of Guinea oil industry. First, the ease with which the oil can be 
exploited, processed, and loaded directly onto ships, compared to other 
regions where the resources are on land or in shallow waters. Second, the 
close proximity of the region to both Europe and the US, which are the 
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two major centres for oil consumption and trade worldwide. And third, 
unlike other regions, where vessels carrying oil have to pass through 
narrow straits or chokepoints (with attendant safety and security 
concerns),
151
 
 
the open nature of the Gulf of Guinea makes it suitable and 
safe for use by all ships, including very large oil carriers.
152
  
 
There are three additional advantages of the Gulf of Guinea oil and gas 
industry. First, since production is offshore, the operation as a whole 
suffers less risk of being disrupted by civil unrest or violent attacks.
153
 
Second, the Gulf of Guinea oil and gas industry has led to a 
diversification of supply and dependency, a crucial determinant of 
energy security. With the exception of Nigeria and Angola, none of the 
Gulf of Guinea oil States are members of the Organization for Petroleum 
Exporting Countries (OPEC). Non-OPEC States have flexibility with 
regard to both output levels and the direction of trade.
154
 It is also 
unlikely that there will be a general embargo of oil supplies by these 
States.
155
 Third, market and investment analysts have noted that financial 
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arrangements offered to transnational oil companies in the Gulf of 
Guinea, including higher shareholding and tax exemptions, are more 
favourable compared to other regions.
156
 
  
The above analysis underscores the strategic value of the Gulf of Guinea 
region in the context of global energy security. Indeed, energy security 
has become fundamental in the conceptualisation of security and 
maritime security partnerships in the Gulf of Guinea.
157
 It is thus 
necessary to review the oil and gas interests of key global States in the 
region, as well as the transnational energy corporations that are reaping 
substantial benefits. Indeed, such a review will serve as the background 
to Chapter 6, which assesses the strategic underpinnings of international 
support to maritime security cooperation in the Gulf of Guinea.  
 
2.5.2.3 United States Oil and Gas Interest in the Gulf of Guinea  
The United States (US) is highly dependent on fossil fuels as a source of 
energy, with the US Department of Defence being the largest single 
consumer of oil and gas stocks.
158
 Access to oil is therefore a matter of 
national security, but 
 
despite many years of oil diplomacy in the Middle 
East, US energy security in the region is still threatened by political 
instability, religious conflict and terrorist activities.
159
 These factors, 
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combined with other problems, have compelled Washington to seek 
innovative solutions to energy security.
160
 
United States oil diplomacy in the Gulf of Guinea was ushered in by the 
visit of US Secretary of State Colin Powell to Angola and Gabon in 
September 2002.
161
 Not long after Powell’s visit, President Bush met 
with leaders of oil producing countries in the region.
162
 These moves 
coincided with expert projections of an increase in global energy 
reserves, especially from deep water explorations in the Gulf of 
Guinea.
163
 Current indications are that the Gulf of Guinea region will 
provide 25 per cent of US oil imports by 2015 and 40 per cent by 
2025.
164
   
 
To fortify its energy security, the US will have to first secure access to 
reserves. Given its free market orientation, this task has been indirectly 
consigned to Corporate America. It should thus come as no surprise that 
US oil companies are mapped across the Gulf of Guinea. 
ChevronTexaco pumps about 60 per cent of Angolan oil, and also has a 
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major presence in Congo-Brazzaville.
165
 ExxonMobil, the world’s 
largest oil company, and Amerada Hess and Marathon, both US 
companies, are prime movers in Equatorial Guinea’s oil industry. 
ExxonMobil and Chevron also have a presence in São Tomé and 
Príncipe, and are equally seeking a considerable stake in Nigeria’s oil 
and gas industry.
166
 There are also reports of ExxonMobile trying to 
acquire a stake in Ghana’s offshore Jubilee Fields.
167
 These energy 
interests partly underline the maritime security interest and activities of 
the US in the Gulf of Guinea that will be examined in chapter seven. 
 
2.5.2.4. Oil and Gas Interest of the European Union in the Gulf 
of Guinea 
Member States of the European Union (EU) are highly dependent on oil 
and gas imports for domestic consumption.
168
 In 2011 for example, the 
EU imported an estimated 80 and 60 per cent of its oil and gas 
consumption respectively.
169
 Unlike the US that has substantial domestic 
oil and gas reserves, the EU has limited reserves, and local gas 
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production in particular has declined over the years.
170
 Meanwhile, there 
is a shift away from the use of coal towards oil and gas in a bid to 
address climate change, with gas being the preferred energy resource.
171
 
This has made the EU increasingly dependent on Russian gas supplies, 
with the concomitant concern that Moscow may use its privileged 
position as a provider of renewable energy resources as a strategic 
weapon.
172
   
 
To fortify its energy security, individual EU States as well the Union’s 
executive arm – the EU Commission – is looking at both renewal energy 
and emerging sources such as the Gulf of Guinea.
173
 Nigeria and 
Equatorial Guinea are among the top eleven members of the Gas 
Exporting Countries Forum (GECF), also known as Gas-OPEC, which 
controls an enormous share of the global gas market.
174
 As indicated 
earlier, Cote d’Ivoire is also making substantial gas discoveries, and 
many of the oil producing States in the region are moving from flaring 
gas to harnessing it for export.
175
 In strategic terms, therefore, the Gulf of 
Guinea is not just seen as a region that can help meet the quantity and 
quality of EU’s energy requirements , but also as a region that can help 
diffuse the EU’s gas dependency on Russia.  
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Twenty two per cent of the total oil and gas production in the Gulf of 
Guinea is traded and consumed in the EU.
176
 In terms of specific EU 
States, the French company TotalFinaElf controls large offshore oil 
activities in Congo, and also has sizeable investments in the offshore 
fields of Angola, Gabon, Cote d’Ivoire and DR Congo.
177
 Perenco (an 
Anglo-French oil and gas Company), has extensive investments in 
Cameroon’s offshore fields.
178
 Other examples of EU corporate interests 
in the region include
 
Shell (Dutch), which controls almost half of 
Nigeria’s production; Eni (Italy) and Maersk (Denmark), which have 
substantial offshore oil productions in Angola; and Tullow (Ireland), the 
operator of Ghana’s offshore Jubilee fields.
179
 Moreover, in 2011 and 
2013, Eni announced that it had made multiple energy resource 
discoveries in offshore Ghana.
180
  
 
2.5.2.5 China’s Energy Activities in the Gulf of Guinea  
In the past two decades, China has been on the path of rapid 
development and industrialisation. This growth, coupled with high 
household demands, has resulted in an insatiable need for all types of 
energy – coal, gas and oil. Chinese energy consumption increased by 
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11.2 per cent in 2010, and with a net consumption of 20.3 per cent of the 
global total, in 2011 China surpassed the US as the world’s largest 
energy consumer.
181
 Based on current trends, China’s share of global 
energy is projected to grow to 150 per cent by 2020.
182
 Although China 
produces oil and gas domestically, the nation’s production is woefully 
insufficient compared to its consumption.
183
 Thus, just as the Sino-Soviet 
split in 1960 created energy supply challenges for China, and major 
efforts had to be made to change the tide, China has reverted to a similar 
position of vulnerability.
184
 This has led to an intense search for energy 
supplies beyond the Middle East.
 185
  
 
As in the case of the US, China’s focus is now on Africa to secure long-
term energy supplies.
186
 Indeed, in 2005 China’s oil import dependence 
on Africa exceeded 30 per cent, and this figure is expected to increase to 
50 per cent by 2020.
187
 China has a two-prong approach to securing 
current and future energy security in the Gulf of Guinea. The first is to 
invest in oil exploration, the second is to secure oil supplies as part of 
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loan arrangements with governments. China’s State-owned companies - 
China National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC), China National 
Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) and China Petroleum and Chemical 
Corporation (Sinopec), are competitively acquiring oil reserves across 
the region.
188
 The entry of Chinese oil companies into the Gulf of Guinea 
commenced in 1997, when CNPC acquired exploration licences in the 
Chad Basin, followed by two oil blocs in Nigeria’s Niger Delta region in 
1998.
189
 This opened the way for more acquisition of offshore acreage 
and an expansion of Chinese corporate oil trading across the Gulf of 
Guinea.
190
 A substantial part of the national share of the annual oil 
production of Congo-Brazzaville is now being bought by CNPC, whilst 
Sinopec has purchased a major stake in the SIR refinery in Cote 
d’Ivoire.
191
  
 
China’s “loans for oil” diplomacy started in the Gulf of Guinea, with a 
package of US$2 billion to Angola in 2004. This allowed Sinopec to bid 
for two deep water blocs off the Angolan coast.
 192
 Then, in 2006, 
CNOOC acquired a share in Nigeria’s future oil production, with a 
US$2.3 billion loan for infrastructure development.
193
 The most recent 
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case of this Chinese scheme is the Government of Ghana entering into an 
arrangement for a US$3 billion Chinese loan, the re-payment terms of 
which include the supply of oil to China.
194
  
 
2.5.2.6 Oil Power, Governance and Maritime Security 
The analysis in this section demonstrates that the Gulf of Guinea is a key 
player in securing global energy needs, and it is likely that this will be 
the case into the foreseeable future. Indeed, this situation has increased 
the visibility of the region on the world stage, placing it on the edge of a 
geopolitical renaissance.
195
 This geopolitical regeneration presents 
economic and political advantages to the region. Whereas growth in 
other parts of the world has waned in recent years (and particularly from 
2009 to 2011), the average rate of economic growth in the Gulf of 
Guinea has remained high, mostly due to favourable oil and gas trade.
196
 
Angola, Congo Brazzaville and Gabon - all of which are highly 
dependent on offshore oil production, experienced a rate of economic 
growth exceeding ten per cent.
197
 According to development analysts, 
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these economic indicators are translating into job creation and a fast 
growing middle class.
198
  
 
On the flipside, the Gulf of Guinea’s newfound oil wealth and economic 
potential also calls for a degree of caution. If the lessons of history are 
anything to go by, the exploitation of the region’s oil and gas resources 
can lead to gaping governance challenges, potentially outweighing any 
socio-economic gains.
199
 In fact, years of exploitation of mineral 
resources has hardly benefitted Gulf of Guinea States. On the contrary, it 
has instigated conflicts in Angola, DR Congo, Liberia and Sierra Leone, 
just to name a few, and there is no reason to believe an oil resource 
boom would produce a different result.
 200
 Indeed, Nigeria is in its fourth 
decade of oil exploration and wealth, yet the country is still at the bottom 
of the global development index. While the country has enjoyed 
considerable oil wealth, a large proportion of Nigeria’s population lives 
in poverty, while corruption is rife within political spheres and the 
governing class.
201
 Oil has also brooded conflict and crime in the Niger 
Delta region, with consequences beyond Nigeria.
202
 Equatorial Guinea 
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and Gabon also face similar governance challenges, with long term 
implications for stability.
203
  
 
The second major concern is the realpolitik of oil power. The much-
talked about geopolitical renaissance of the Gulf of Guinea may have 
other, more significant implications. Many commentators view the Gulf 
of Guinea as the new political battleground of the US and other rising 
powers, especially China.
204
 As these States are frantically trying to 
secure their energy security in the region, oil diplomacy is ongoing for 
both States, partnerships are being forged, and in some cases arms sales 
and defence support is added to the equation.
205
 While the US and China 
have been given visibility in commentaries and discussions, the 
historical analysis of the Gulf of Guinea presented in this chapter, and 
the political reality of the region, still make European States (especially 
France) a major force in the Gulf of Guinea.
206
 These competing external 
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interests can strain regional cohesion, create conflict among States, and 
turn the region once again into a sphere of major power rivalries.
 207
  
 
Although the aforementioned geopolitical and governance challenges 
deserve attention, and must be factored into the wider dialogue of 
development and stability in the Gulf of Guinea, this thesis proceeds on 
the optimistic note that, Gulf of Guinea States can harness both petro-
dollars and petro-power to project and develop the region. A key 
imperative for achieving this is effective regional maritime security 
cooperation. Indeed, such cooperation must be fostered between States in 
the region to deal with increasing threats to critical offshore energy 
infrastructure.
208
  
 
2.5.3 Gulf of Guinea Marine Living Resources  
Marine living resources are a vital component of the maritime estate of 
the Gulf of Guinea.
 209
 In the 1970s, when there was little scientific 
information about the offshore oil and gas potential of the Gulf of 
Guinea, fisheries resources were the major motivation for Gulf of Guinea 
States, and indeed other African States, seeking to extend their 
jurisdiction and control further into sea. This issue was canvassed at the 
                                                          
207
 Jeremy Keenan, "Terror in the Sahara: the Implications of U.S. Imperialism for North & West 
Africa," Review of African Political Economy 101,  2004, Yates, The Scramble for African Oil: 
Oppression, Corruption, and War for Control of Africa’s Natural Resources. Markakis, Resource 
conflict in the Horn of Africa. 
208
 See chapters 3 and 4.  
209
 Jacqueline Alder and Ussif Rashid Sumaila, "Western Africa: A Fish Basket of Europe Past and 
Present," Journal of Environment & Development 13, 2,  June 2004, pp. 156-78. 
67 
 
Third United Nations Conference on the Law of Sea (UNCLOS III),
 210
  
and resulted in the recognition of the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ).  
The EEZ regime offers Gulf of Guinea States sovereign rights over 
living resources up to 200 nautical miles from their baselines.
211
  
 
2.5.3.1 Socio-economic Importance of Fisheries  
Location, climatic situations and sea conditions are also important 
determinants of fish productivity.
212
 Luckily, the Gulf of Guinea is 
situated close to the equator, where the natural upwelling of the sea 
supports very high fish productivity, especially from Sierra Leone to 
Mauritania.
 213
 In addition to shrimp and other demersal species, the Gulf 
of Guinea is very rich in pelagic stocks such as sardine and tuna, which 
are important for both industrial and artisanal fishing sectors.
214
 In terms 
of revenue, Senegal, Gambia and Sierra are net exporters of fish, and 
their fisheries revenue contribution to overall export merchandise in 
2008 was 9.7 per cent, 6.9 per cent and 4.7 per cent respectively.
215
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Although fisheries may have a less direct contribution to foreign 
exchange revenue compared to offshore oil and gas resources, fisheries 
nonetheless support broader socio-economic development in the Gulf of 
Guinea. The first element of the wider impact of fishing is on food 
security.
216
 Inadequate food, including sources of protein, is a key threat 
to the survival and food security of many people in developing 
countries.
217
  The contribution of fish to dietary protein requirements 
ranges from 34.4 per cent in DR Congo to 63.9 per cent in Ghana, and is 
as high as about 80 per cent in São Tomé and Príncipe.
218
 Fishing is also 
a source of employment for coastal communities, and recent data shows 
a positive reduction in poverty across most fishing communities in the 
Gulf of Guinea.
 219
 In this regard, it is significant that women who would 
otherwise have no source of income, and thus suffer serious challenges 
relating to food, health care, child care and mortality, are empowered by 
the fish trade.
220
 The New Partnership for Africa Development (NEPAD) 
and the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) – two strategic 
instruments aimed at improving the livelihood of people in Africa - have 
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noted the centrality of sustainable fisheries to the human security needs 
of the continent.
221
 When judiciously managed, the fishing sector can 
also engineer the growth of other sectors of the economy, including food 
processing and fertilizer industries.
222
 
 
2.5.3.2 External Interest in Gulf of Guinea Fisheries  
Although fisheries resources within the EEZ are generally subject to the 
control of Gulf of Guinea States, there are nonetheless major foreign 
interests in fisheries as well.  The reasons for this are found in the legal 
framework of UNCLOS, as well as the specific arrangements entered 
into by Gulf of Guinea States.  
  
First, Articles 63 and 64 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of 
the Sea (UNCLOS) stipulate special management and access regimes for 
the category of fisheries known as shared species and highly migratory 
species. Tuna, which is of very high economic value, falls within the 
category of highly migratory species. The result of this categorisation is 
that these species do not fall under the exclusive control of Gulf of 
Guinea States. Therefore, States outside the Gulf of Guinea have access 
rights to tuna in the region, with the access quotas being managed within 
                                                          
221
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the framework of 
 
the International Commission for the Conservation of 
Atlantic Tunas (ICCAT).
223
  
The second reason for foreign interest in Gulf of Guinea marine living 
resources is partly economic and partly historical. The historical 
connection between EU States and the Gulf of Guinea is not just limited 
to politics, but entails a unique fisheries relationship. Indeed, most EU 
States have fishing licensing and access arrangements in the Gulf of 
Guinea.
 224
 In recent times, however, other distant fishing nations, 
especially China, Korea and Taiwan, have managed to secure fishing 
access arrangements with Gulf of Guinea States. This has contorted the 
interest in fisheries and created competition in the region, with serious 
implications for maritime security and maritime security cooperation in 
the Gulf of Guinea.
225
    
 
2.5.4  Submarine Cables and Pipelines  
Though less discussed in comparison to other issues, the sea is the most 
important medium for bridging the technology gap in the Gulf of 
Guinea. The exponential growth of technology and telecommunications 
infrastructure in the region in the last decade demonstrates that the 
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regime governing submarine cables (as set out in UNCLOS) is being 
utilised.
226
 Submarine cables have long been recognised as the most 
reliable, effective and cheapest form of transmitting voice and data 
information, and hence UNCLOS recognises the right of all States to lay 
submarine cables.
227
 But for many years neither the governments of Gulf 
of Guinea States nor private sector actors took full opportunity of the 
right, resulting in a digital gap in the region and thus  high cost for 
telecommunication services.
228
  
 
However, the seascape is now changing, with more subsea cables 
landing in the region.
229
 This breakthrough started with the arrival of the 
South Atlantic 3/West Africa (SAT 3) Cable in 2001, connecting eight 
States in the Gulf of Guinea. These States include Cote d’Ivoire, Gabon, 
Ghana, Nigeria and Senegal.
230
 The Main One Cable and the Glo Cable 
landed in 2010, with mega bandwidths connecting the region with other 
head cables in Portugal and the United Kingdom.
 231
 Two additional 
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information on SAT 3, see the project website at http://www.safe-sat3.co.za/, 23 February 2013.  
231
 The Main One Cable stretches from Portugal to South Africa, landing at a number of West African 
States. For more on the cable see the company website, http://www.mainonecable.com/, 23 February 
2013. The Glo cable is owned by the mobile telecommunication company Glo. The cable landed in 
Nigeria in 2009 and in Ghana in 2010.  
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cables landed in 2012 - the West Africa Cable System (WACS)
232
 and 
the Africa Coast to Europe (ACE) System.
233
 These cables have allowed 
the Gulf of Guinea to engage in faster, more efficient communication. At 
the same time, they represent costly investments involving global 
companies and strategic partnerships.  
 
Given the centrality of communication and technology to the modern 
world, the protection and security of these cables is as important as the 
protection afforded to traditional maritime interests such as shipping. A 
related piece of critical offshore infrastructure in the Gulf of Guinea is 
the West Africa gas pipeline.
234
 This 678 kilometre pipeline, which cost 
an estimated US$1 billion to construct and install, carries gas from 
Nigeria to Benin, Togo and Ghana. This gas is heavily relied on for 
electricity production in both the domestic and industrial sector.
235
 
 
2.6 CONCLUSION 
The analysis in this chapter has demonstrated that the Gulf of Guinea is a 
region of great strategic importance – both historically and in 
contemporary times. Indeed, the region remains an integral part of the 
                                                          
232
 Global Telecoms Business, West Africa Cable System ‘completed’,  February 2012, Available: 
http://www.globaltelecomsbusiness.com/article/2983212/West-Africa-Cable-System-completed.html, 
28 February 2013. 
233
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2013.  
234
 For more on the West Africa Pipeline see, West Africa Gas Pipeline Company, About the Pipeline, 
Available: 
http://www.wagpco.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=122&Itemid=84&lang=e
n, 14 March 2013.  
235
 Ernest Abankroh, West Africa Gas Pipeline Project Available: 
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global system of maritime trade, and its sea routes connect and sustain 
international shipping. Exports and imports are important sources of 
revenue and foreign exchange for Gulf of Guinea States, and are also 
pivotal to realising the socio-economic requirements of the region, 
including food security.  
 
The analysis also demonstrates that while fisheries resources continue to 
make a substantial contribution to the socio-economic development of 
Gulf of Guinea States, offshore oil and gas reserves have more of a 
strategic importance for the region. Indeed, current and future global 
energy security depends on the secure exploitation of the enormous 
reserves that the region holds. Governments in the Gulf of Guinea also 
have an opportunity to address the developmental deficits in the region 
through the judicious application of oil and gas revenue. The realisation 
of these shared objectives depends on effective maritime security. 
However, the analysis has also revealed that there are competing 
regional and external interests at stake in the Gulf of Guinea, and these 
constitute important variables for understanding the dynamics of 
maritime security cooperation in the region. 
 
The analysis has therefore provided the background for analysing 
maritime security dynamics in the rest of the thesis. The next chapter 
will demonstrate that there are mounting insecurities in the Gulf of 
Guinea which threaten the strategic imperatives and socio-economic 
opportunities analysed in this chapter. The analysis will be scoped within 
an analytical framework that focuses on the concept of security, and 
following on from that, the concept of maritime security.  Proceeding in 
this way will allow a link to be forged between, on the one hand, the 
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historical and strategic importance of the Gulf of Guinea region, and on 
the other, the emerging tensions and shortfalls in the construction of a 
durable maritime security agenda that will equitably bind the interests of 
actors.   
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CHAPTER THREE 
THE CONCEPT OF MARITIME SECURITY AND AN 
OVERVIEW OF MARITIME SECURITY CHALLENGES 
IN THE GULF OF GUINEA   
 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter has two primary objectives. It will examine the concept of 
maritime security and its application in the Gulf of Guinea region. The 
chapter will also analyse maritime security challenges in the Gulf of 
Guinea and their implications for national, regional and global security. 
The chapter is organised in four parts. First, the chapter will examine the 
concept of security in the field of security studies and its relevance to 
maritime security cooperation. Second, the chapter will analyse various 
approaches to the concept of maritime security, and in doing so, adopt an 
independent approach to the evolution of the concept of maritime 
security. Third, the chapter will develop an analytical framework for 
maritime security cooperation in the Gulf of Guinea. Finally, the chapter 
will provide an overview of maritime security challenges in the Gulf of 
Guinea and their implications for national, regional and global security.  
 
3.2 RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE CONCEPT OF 
SECURITY AND MARITIME SECURITY COOPERATION  
Maritime security cooperation entails the collective pursuit of “security” 
by States in a maritime context. Indeed, the presumption is that 
cooperating States have common security interests to protect. This raises 
two fundamental questions. First, what is the meaning of security in the 
context of interstate relations? Second, can States share a concept of 
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security, or have common security interests? Several other issues can 
then be raised from these two questions: by what process or means is the 
cooperation being pursued? What are the prevailing threats to the 
security? What are the objectives of security cooperation? And, for 
whom and what purpose is security being sought?  
 
To answer the above questions, it is necessary to examine the concept of 
security in the field of international security studies, as well as its 
relationship with the notion of maritime security cooperation.  
 
3.2.1 A State-Centric Approach to the Concept of Security  
The traditional view of security has been espoused by realist schools of 
international security studies. According to this view, ‘security’ is a 
state-centric concept and an objective outcome of an anarchical society.
1
 
This view of security has two strands - classical and revisionist.  
 
Classical realism views interstate relations as intrinsically anarchical due 
to the absence of a commanding sovereign.
2
 Thus, self-interest and 
power are the most relevant considerations, with States being in 
competition with each other to maximise their autonomously defined 
                                                          
1
 The word “anarchical” has been popularised by the work of classical realists like Hedley Bull, 
Kenneth Waltz, Andrew Hurrell and Stanley Hofman. See Hedley Bull, The Anarchical Society: A 
Study of Order in World Politics, New York, Columbia University Press, 1977. Kenneth N. Waltz, 
Theory of International Politics, Reading Addison-Wesley, 1979. Kenneth N. Waltz, Man, the State, 
and War: A theoretical analysis, New York, Columbia University Press, 2001. Andrew Hurrel, The 
International Politics of the Environment: Actors, Interests, and Institutions, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 
1992.  
2
 Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace, New York, Knopf, 
1985, p. 31. 
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interest.
3
 In this environment, the chief security interest of a State 
becomes its national security, which is threatened by the interests, 
policies, ambitions and values of other States.
4
 Therefore, the ability of a 
State to defend itself against another State, or at the very least dissuade 
the other State from attacking it, becomes a measure of its security.
5
 It is 
in this sense that security is referred to as the “irreducible minimum, the 
necessary element of…interests vis-à-vis other units.”
6
 To guarantee this 
irreducible minimum, States must maintain enough military might to 
withstand adversaries, or enter into alliances with other States.
7
 But since 
power is dynamic in nature, and alliances can be fragile, it is clear that 
there can be no permanent guarantee of security.
8
 Also, the very 
measures designed to achieve security yield insecurity, resulting in a 
“security dilemma” where real security becomes an illusion, or at best is 
merely transient.
9
  
                                                          
3
 Hedley Bull, The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics, New York, Columbia 
University Press, 1977, p. 5.  
4
 Arnold Wolfers, "National Security’’ as an Ambiguous Symbol’," Political Science Quarterly 67,  
1952, p. 485. See also Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics, Reading, Addison-Wesley, 
1979.  
5
 Michael Mastanduno, "Preserving the Unipolar Moment: Realist Theories and US Grand Strategy 
after the‘Cold War’," International Security 21, 4, 1997, pp. 49-88. John J. Mearsheimer, "A Realist 
Reply," International Security 20, 1, 1995. 
6
 Hans Morgenthau, The Problem of the National in Politics in the Twentieth Century, Chicago 
University of Chicago Press, 1971, pp. 204-237, p. 219. The term “anarchical” was popularised by 
Hedley Bull. See, Hedley Bull., The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics, 
Columbia University Press, New York, 1977. 
7
 Stephen M. Walt, "The Renaissance of Security Studies," International Studies Quarterly 35, 2,  
1991, pp. 211-39. Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics, Reading, Addison-Wesley, 
1979. Kenneth N. Waltz, Man, the State, and War: A theoretical analysis, New York Columbia, 
University Press, 2001. 
8
 On views on how alliances and military means are inadequate for long term security see, Robert O. 
Keohane, International Institutions and State Power, Boulder Westview Press, 1989. 
9
 Eugene F. Carroll, "Nuclear Weapons and Deterrence", in  Gwym Prins, ed. The Nuclear Crisis 
Reader, New York, Vintage 1984, p. 13. Gwyn Prins, "Introduction: The Paradox of Security", in  
Gwyn Prins, ed. The Choice: Nuclear Weapons versus Security London, Chatto and Windus, 1984, 
Richard Little, The balance of Power in International Relations: metaphors, myths, and models, 
Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2007, p. xiii. See also Paul T. V., Power Versus Prudence: 
Why Nations Forgo Nuclear Weapons, Quebec McGill-Queen's Press, 2000. Lawrence W. Prabhakar, 
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The second strand of the traditional approach to security is equally state-
centric, but its main focus is on sovereignty and territorial integrity.
10
 
Security in this setting is judged by the ability of a State to extend or 
maintain control over its territorial boundaries. This view of security still 
puts emphasis on the military and related institutions. 
11
 In short, in a 
state-centric approach to security, issues such as the balance of power, 
deterrence and sovereignty, become sub-elements in the dialogue on 
security construction. It is this traditional view of security that has 
dominated the field of international security studies for most of the 
twenty-first century.  
 
3.2.2 Broader Concept of Security  
Some international relations schools, however, have not shared the state-
centric view of security.  These dissenting interpretations have affirmed 
that society is not as violent as the realist approach proclaims.
12
 
Proponents of this contrary view argue that, in practice, States can 
accommodate each other and are very much concerned with threats and 
security outcomes outside of war.
13
 This broader approach to security 
                                                                                                                                                                    
Joshua H. Ho and Sam Bateman, eds., The Evolving Maritime Balance of Power in the Asia-Pacific : 
maritime doctrines and nuclear weapons at sea Singapore, Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies, 
2006.  
10
 Jessica T. Matthews, "Redefining Security," Foreign Affairs 68,  1989, pp. 162-77. Richard H. 
Ullman, "Redefining Security," International Security 8 1983, pp. 129-53. Martin Shaw, "There Is No 
Such Thing as Society: Beyond Individualism and Statism in International Security Studies," Review 
of International Studies 19,  1993, pp. 159-75. 
11
 Michael Sheehan, "Military Security", in  Alan Collins, ed. Contemporary Security Studies Oxford, 
Oxford University Press, 2007, pp. 147-59, p.50. See also Alan Collins, The security dilemmas of 
Southeast Asia, New York, Macmillan, 2000.  Kenneth N. Waltz, Realism and International Politics, 
New York, Routledge, 2008. 
12
 This group is led by Robert Keohan and Charles Doyle, see Robert O. Keohane, International 
Institutions and State Power, Boulder, Westview Press, 1989. Michael W. Doyle, Ways of War and 
Peace: Realism, Liberalism, and Socialism, New York, Norton 1997.  
13
 Ann J.Tickner, "Re-visioning Security", in Ken Booth and Steve Smith, eds. International Relations 
Theory Today, Oxford, Polity, 1995, pp. 175-97.  
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has gained prominence since the end of the Cold War,
14
 and emphasises 
the stress caused by security threats, as well as the preference for 
multilateralism as a source of security and stability.
15
 This approach to 
security has been espoused in the 1994 Human Development Report, as 
well as the 1995 Report of the Commission on Global Governance, 
where security is viewed as a “public good.”
 16
 According to this 
conception, security should yield societal benefits, such as enhancing 
people’s livelihoods and affirming human dignity, and should also be 
understood both as an ingredient of socio-economic development and a 
measure of progress. Over time, this notion has moulded into the concept 
of human security.
17
 
 
This fundamental shift in the notion of security has facilitated other 
important interpretations of the concept. Research has shown that the 
main threats to human health and safety are not military attacks or 
interstate conflicts, but basic issues such as food shortages, 
                                                          
14
 Ann J.Tickner, "Re-visioning Security", in Ken Booth and Steve Smith, eds. International Relations 
Theory Today, Oxford, Polity, 1995, pp. 175-97. 
15
 On the issue of non-traditional security, see Michael E. Brown, ed., Grave New World: Security 
Challenges in the 21st Century, Washington D.C., George Town University Press, 2003. See also 
Michael W. Doyle, Ways of War and Peace: Realism, Liberalism, and Socialism, New York, Norton, 
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 United Nations Development Programme, Human Development Report. (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1994). “The Report of the Commission on Global Governance,” United Nations, 
1995. See also "The UN’s Role in Global Governance," Ralph Bunche Institute for International 
Studies Briefing Note No. 15,  August 2009.  
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 On human security, see Sabina Alkire, Concepts of Human Security, Human Insecurity in a Global 
World, Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 2003, pp. 15-39, Barbara von Tigerstrom, Human 
Security and International Law: Prospects and Problems Oxford Hart Publishing, 2007. David 
Roberts, "Human Security or Human Insecurity? Moving the Debate Forward," Security Dialogue 37,  
2006, pp. 249-61. Astri Suhke, "Human Security and the Interest of States," Security Dialogue 30, 3,  
1999, pp. 265-76. Neil S. MacFarlane and Yuen F. Khong, Human Security and the UN: A Critical 
History, Bloomington, Indiana University Press, 2006.  
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environmental disasters, epidemics and violent crimes.
18
 This wider 
interpretation of security threats has been emphasised by the 2004 UN 
High-level Panel Report on Threats and Challenges, as well as the 2005 
UN Secretary General Report on Development and Security.
19
 The 
concept of security has since expanded to cover food security, 
environmental security and threats from non-State actors.
20
 Despite 
criticism being levelled against the concept of human security and its 
subfields, it continues to form part of international security discourse.
21
   
 
3.2.3 Embedded Elements in the Concept of Security 
Before examining some embedded elements in the concept of security, it 
is important to clarify two issues. The first concerns the relationship 
between the traditional approach to the concept of security and its 
restatements. It must be made clear that the shift in emphasis in the 
concept of security should not be interpreted as a rejection of, or a 
decline in, the role of States in providing security. Indeed, States remain 
at the centre of seeking and promoting security, but this is not an end in 
itself, but rather a means of protecting the interests of citizens and 
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 Daniel Deudney and Richard Matthew, Contested Grounds: Security and Conflict in the New 
Environmental Politics, New York, State University Press, 1999, pp. 61-187.  
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society in general.
22
 Thus, in the evolution of the concept of security, it 
is only recently that other important elements of security have been 
recognised – elements that were originally ignored or not prioritised.
23
 It 
is this broader understanding of security, where the policies and 
decisions of States are subject to questioning, that ensures that the 
security needs of citizens and the international system as a whole are 
satisfied.
24
  
 
The second point to clarify is the meaning of specific terms, such as 
‘threat’ and ‘challenges.’ Generally, the word ‘threat’ is used to signify a 
fear or anxiety over possible harm.
25
 However, in the context of security 
studies, a ‘threat’ refers to the probability of damage to the values or 
vital interests of a State, a community of States, or society.
26
 Drawing on 
the earlier discussion on the concept of security, it is evident that the 
terms “security threats” and “security challenges” are largely 
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 Barry Buzan, "Peace, Power and Security: Contending Concepts in the Study of International 
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synonymous, and represent strands of a common security concern. With 
these clarifications, we can proceed to analyse the embedded elements in 
the concept of security.  
 
To give practical effect to the concept of security, its various sub-
elements or constituents must be examined. Indeed, Barry Buzan has 
noted that the concept of security is less relevant unless it has a frame of 
reference.
27
 For this reason, Buzan has advocated the idea of “levels of 
security” and “dimensions of security” as tools for understanding and 
applying the concept of security.
28
 “Levels of security” comprise 
individual security (i.e. the security of groups and communities), 
national security and international security.
29
 Since the end of the Cold 
War, however, regional institutions have become veritable sources of 
security, and the international system as a whole is viewed as consisting 
of regions.
30
 Therefore, the typology of levels of security should include 
regional security.
31
 Buzan also conceives of security as having three 
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dimensions: societal security, economic security and environmental 
security.
32
 It is prudent to add food security to this list, especially if we 
view this dimension from the perspective of Gulf of Guinea States and 
Third World countries in general.
33
 Indeed, food security has become 
central to the global dialogue on survival and development, particularly 
in light of declining food supplies, the increasing global population, and 
the aggravating effect of environmental factors on agriculture and food 
production.
34
  
 
There are other applications of the concept of security which lie outside 
traditional security studies, some of which are relevant for this thesis. A 
typical example is the notion of transnational security threats or simply 
transnational security.
35
 The focus of transnational security is on 
organised crime, where the actors are not States but carry out their 
activities across State boundaries.
36
 These organised groups or sub-state 
actors, as they are known in the literature, are in fact contra-state because 
their activities threaten the security of States and other dimensions or 
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levels of security.
37
 The ‘transnational security’ terminology has also 
been used in environmental studies, where it is used interchangeably 
with trans-boundary threats to refer to environmental impacts which are 
felt beyond the place of origin of the incident.
38
  
 
A question that logically flows from the above analysis is: what is the 
interaction between the various levels or dimensions of security? In 
answering this question, one must contemplate both vertical and 
horizontal interactions. In practice, these levels of security may overlap 
significantly, and should at times be expected to be in conflict with one 
another.
39
 This is chiefly the case when individual security is posited 
against national security, national security against regional or 
international security, and also in balancing environmental security 
concerns with national security.
40
 In all these instances, elements of 
security are in competition with each other.    
 
The above explanation of competing security interests introduces two 
other important elements of the concept of security: the securitisation of 
security and the notion of regime security. As is the case with other 
security concepts, the debate on the securitisation of security is vast. 
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According to the Copenhagen School of Security (which pioneered the 
concept), the securitisation of security refers to the labelling of 
something as a security threat in order to justify extraordinary 
countermeasures or validate rule-breaking behaviour.
41
 While this 
description of the concept is intelligible, further elucidation of the 
concept by the School has been viewed with scepticism.
42
 Nonetheless, 
the concept provides an analytical framework for understanding the 
struggle between different security concerns, particularly where the 
pursuit of one security concern is used as a justification for curtailing 
others, or where other equally important security concerns are deemed 
less relevant by an actor because of specific preferences or interests.
43
  
 
Unlike other forms of security, regime security has not received much 
attention in the field of security studies.
 
In terms of categorisation, 
regime security sits within the wider discourse on regime survival 
theory, and centres on the construction of security by political leaders for 
the purpose of perpetuating their political power or gaining political 
legitimacy.
44
 However, to avoid making this objective apparent, national 
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security becomes the public facade or “mask”
45
 that is employed. A 
prime example of regime security is the political preoccupation with 
military expenditure, as well as the creation of institutions and structures 
that protect the political elite.
46
 Another example is where leaders give 
less credence to those aspects of security that have a wider societal 
benefit, instead prioritising those aspects that directly benefit them. For 
this reason, regime security is ubiquitous in States where there is 
dictatorship, lack of accountability or where corruption is rife. Academic 
discourse on regime security also extends to concerns on how to subject 
security institutions in developing Countries, especially the military, to 
democratic culture and governance.
47
  
 
3.2.4 Concept of Security Cooperation  
The concept of security cooperation could well be embodied in the 
discussion on the elements that comprise the security concept. However, 
it deserves a separate examination here since the thesis is focused on 
regional security cooperation.  
 
The theories of security analysed in sections 3.2.1 and 3.2.2 are also 
applicable to the idea of security cooperation. Indeed, opinions as to 
whether interstate cooperation is possible or not, and the strength of the 
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outcomes that can be achieved, largely depend on what views are held 
about the concept of security in the first place.
48
 From a realist 
perspective, self-reliance is the most prudent form of security, not 
cooperation.
49
 Therefore, security cooperation should only be used as a 
transient measure to ward-off a common threat, and should cease once 
the threat is no longer imminent.
50
 Indeed, the realist approach views 
cooperation as unsustainable, because even States that are compelled to 
form an alliance may covertly be enemies, and will prefer to seek their 
exclusive security as soon as practicable.
51
 According to this conception, 
security cooperation itself is a threat, since one party may detect 
weaknesses in the other, and later seek to exploit them.
52
  
 
Modifications of the realist position on security cooperation have 
produced the idea of security communities.
 53
 According to this 
restatement, States have the option to choose between an amalgamated 
security community, on the one hand, and a pluralistic security 
community on the other.
54
 An amalgamated security community is 
where the pursuit of shared security concerns demands the formal 
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merger of States into a composite unit.
55
 In the case of a pluralistic 
security community, States retain their independence, but still converge 
around very structured arrangements whose raison d’être is military 
action and defence.
56
 Further shifts in the realist view occurred following 
the Cold War.  Indeed, interstate security cooperation was now seen as a 
feasible, but not ideal or rational choice.
57
 Thus, according to the realist 
approach, intergovernmental institutions such as the UN are not 
favoured; indeed they are seen as structures for interaction rather than 
organisations with any durable value for peace and stability.
58
 
 
However, the evolution of the concept of security has resulted in liberal 
theories on security cooperation dominating the discourse.
59
 This has 
resulted in interstate cooperation being viewed as a feasible choice, 
paving the way for intergovernmental institutions to promote shared 
interests and values outside the scope of war.
60
 All forms of cooperation, 
from bilateral to multilateral, are now accepted as useful means of 
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solving common security concerns.
61
 This has provided the impetus for 
global institutions to be used as platforms for promoting security 
dialogue,
 62
 with regional organisations and structures being regarded as 
a source of durable security cooperation.
63
 In essence, States that are not 
pre-occupied with achieving dominance can attain stability and 
development through responsive security cooperation.
64
  
 
In the context of the Gulf of Guinea, regional security cooperation is 
structured within the Economic Community of West African States 
(ECOWAS) and the Economic Community of Central African States 
(ECCAS). Chapter six will examine the role of these two bodies, and 
other regional organisations, in the context of maritime security. Suffice 
to say, despite the usefulness of interstate cooperation generally, and 
security cooperation in particular, cooperative structures are still 
subservient to the realities of State sovereignty and the conflicting 
interests of States.
65
 Also, where security cooperation in a defined region 
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requires the participation of extra-regional partners, questions 
concerning the degree of interest the external participants have in the 
long-term security of the region ought to be investigated. 
 
3.2.5 Relating the Concept of Security to Maritime Security 
It can be deduced from the analysis above that the concept of security 
has conceptual and practical relevance to maritime security and maritime 
security cooperation. Thus, rather than embarking on an extensive 
theoretical comparison, the author intends to raise practical questions, 
using the Gulf of Guinea as the context, to highlight how the concept of 
security is relevant to the study of maritime security.    
 
Since the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) has addressed the 
question of Gulf of Guinea maritime security through its resolutions, it is 
appropriate to start at the global level. One may ask: what concept of 
security is projected in Resolution 2018 of October 2011, and how 
broadly has the concept been framed?
66
 Does the title of the Resolution - 
“Piracy and Security in Africa”, convey the security concerns of Africa, 
or is the Resolution chiefly concerned with the security of the world in 
Africa? When the Resolution commends the international community for 
offering support to improve maritime security in the region, does that 
amount to an endorsement that the support has solved the maritime 
security threats in the region? Are there other, equally important security 
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threats that are being ignored? If piracy constitutes a threat to 
international and regional security, is it the case that the support being 
offered by external actors is geared towards meeting other strategic 
objectives independent of the piracy threat itself?  
 
Similar issues can be raised when the spotlight is turned on Gulf of 
Guinea States. Do Gulf of Guinea States share a common concept of 
security? What about a common concept of maritime security? What 
dimension or level of security is piracy a threat to? And is it likely that 
this will be the same for all Gulf of Guinea States? Is it possible that 
non-maritime security concerns may nonetheless impact on maritime 
security cooperation? Are there elements in the concept of security - for 
example, disputed maritime boundaries, which have the capacity to 
undermine a common concept of maritime security? Is good governance 
understood as an element of security? And will governance concerns be 
part of the dialogue on enhancing maritime security? 
 
These questions will be addressed in the thesis, and the answers they 
elicit will undoubtedly demonstrate the conceptual and empirical links 
between the concept of security and maritime security cooperation.  
 
3.3 CONCEPT OF MARITIME SECURITY  
This part examines the concept of maritime security. It will assess the 
application of the concept of security in maritime security literature. This 
will be followed by an examination of various definitions and 
approaches to the concept of maritime security. Finally, this section will 
analyse the evolution of the concept of maritime security.  
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3.3.1 The Concept of Security in Maritime Security Literature  
The questions raised in the previous section reveal the links between the 
concept of security and maritime security cooperation. It should 
therefore be expected that maritime security literature will demonstrate 
these links in an effort to provide a better understanding of the dynamics 
of maritime security cooperation. However, this is generally lacking in 
the literature. One explanation for these missing links is that writers and 
researchers see them as axiomatic. However, the absence of any such 
discussion can potentially impede the success of maritime security 
cooperation, particularly in a regional and multilateral context. Based on 
a review of the relevant literature, three authors have addressed the 
relationship between the two concepts: one very remotely, another 
indirectly, and the third directly.   
 
Geoffrey Till’s book, Seapower: A Guide for the Twenty-First Century,
 
67
 is primarily about naval strategy, covering naval concepts of war and 
the projection of naval power, which are traditional issues of security. 
Even so, Till dedicates chapter eleven of his book to an analysis of 
“maintaining good order at sea.” The chapter stipulates four attributes of 
the sea: the sea as a resource, the sea as means of transportation, the sea 
as a means of gaining and exchanging information, and the sea as an area 
of dominion.
68
 The book analyses key threats to these attributes, 
including piracy and illicit drug trafficking by sea. The book also notes 
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that “the concept of ‘security’ has widened…from traditional, ‘hard’ 
national defence concerns to issues of marine safety”.
69
 Although this 
statement is made in passing, and no further discussion of a conceptual 
link is provided, Till has shown by this statement that the bounds of the 
concept of security has expanded to include maritime security concerns. 
 
   
 
A number of phrases in the opening chapter of Nathalie Klein’s book 
suggest the importance of interrogating the concept of security in the 
study of maritime security.
70
 In highlighting the scope of the book, Klein 
indicates her ultimate objective: to establish how security interests have 
influenced the development of the law of the sea.
71
 Klein goes on to state 
that maritime security should not be understood simply as a legal term of 
art, but must be considered in the broader perspective of international 
relations.
72
 The book discusses some concepts in security studies, 
including human security, 
73
 and also expands on various definitions of 
maritime security (which we shall return to later). However, Klein 
provides no deeper analysis of the interface between concepts of security 
and maritime security. Nonetheless, it is clear from Klein’s approach in 
the book that the concept of security, as espoused in security studies, is 
relevant to the maritime domain, but the extent to which it is relevant 
remains in doubt.  
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In contrast to the above approaches, Chris Rahman has provided a 
comprehensive analysis of the concept of security and its interface with 
maritime security.
74
 Rahman’s work commences with a detailed 
examination of the general concept of security, and then proceeds to 
review the evolution of the concept of security, the various applications 
of the concept, as well as its constituent elements.
75
 The paper also 
analyses the relationship between the concept of security and the concept 
of maritime security. In doing so, Rahman postulates that maritime 
security may be seen as a dimension of security in its own right, and 
furthermore, that each of the dimensions of security may be applicable to 
the maritime environment.
76
  
 
This thesis adopts a position similar to that of Rahman. In particular, the 
author takes the view that the levels and dimensions of security in 
security studies have comparable application to the concept of maritime 
security. It is argued that since the ocean environment serves the 
political, economic and strategic objectives of States, the dynamics that 
surround the pursuit of all interstate interests will similarly be reflected 
in the maritime realm. According to this conception, it is possible to 
investigate how maritime security threats affect national security, 
regional security, economic security or even food security, and how 
these security concerns may compete with one another. We can equally 
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examine the competing interests of various actors that occupy these 
levels and dimensions of security. Indeed, the analysis of the historical 
and contemporary significance of the Gulf of Guinea in chapter two has 
already provided empirical evidence of the strategic importance of the 
sea to Gulf of Guinea States (and the international community as a 
whole), but it has also alluded to the conflicts that may exist between 
States in pursuit of these interests.   
 
The above conceptual position will be further developed in the next 
section of this chapter, and also employed in later chapters to interrogate 
these shared but competing interests.  
 
3.3.2 Definitions and Approaches to the Concept of Maritime 
Security  
Since the concept of security has been conceived in different ways, it 
follows that a diverse range of approaches to the concept of maritime 
security will emerge. Indeed, differing interests, political perspectives, 
organisational viewpoints and cultural sensibilities will produce varied 
perspectives and applications of the concept of maritime security.
77
 
Kenneth Hawkes’ definition of maritime security – that is, as measures 
employed to prevent crime and sabotage, can be regarded as the shipping 
industry’s perspective of maritime security.
78
 This can be contrasted to 
the approach outlined in the United States National Strategy for 
Maritime Security (US NSMS), which looks at a broad spectrum of 
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maritime security threats including terrorism and the proliferation of 
weapons of mass destruction (WMD).
79
 After reviewing various 
approaches to maritime security, Natalie Klein has defined maritime 
security as “the protection of a State’s land and maritime territory, 
infrastructure, economy, environment and society from certain harmful 
acts occurring at sea.”
80
 
 
The author’s review of the various definitions of, and approaches to, 
maritime security reveals that three factors account for the differences: 
time, interests and actors. Definitions of the concept will differ because 
maritime security is an evolving notion, and thus earlier definitions may 
not take into account newer dimensions. Maritime security may also be 
defined based on a particular interest or subject. Such a definition may 
ignore other dimensions completely, because those dimensions are not 
material to the subject. Thirdly, the orientation of an actor or participant 
will affect the definition or approach to maritime security, and to that 
extent, an actor’s definition may be constructed in competition with, or 
in opposition to, other dimensions of security.  
 
3.3.3 Evolution of the Concept of Security 
The above analysis of the main factors which account for different 
approaches to the concept of maritime security marks the first point of 
departure of this thesis with contemporary literature on maritime 
security. The second point of departure is that this thesis traces the 
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evolutionary process of the concept of maritime security. It is the 
author’s view that this provides a holistic approach and enables a better 
understanding of the concept of maritime security.   
 
3.3.2.1 Maritime Transportation Security  
The traditional concern of maritime security has been maritime 
transportation, although the scope of this concern has changed over 
time. From the perspective of the shipping industry (and in particular 
ship operators) perspective, maritime security involves adopting and 
implementing measures designed to protect a ship and its cargo from 
threats.
81
 These threats have historically included piracy, sabotage and 
the theft of cargo, and with the exception of piracy, have customarily 
been regarded as ‘safety’ issues rather than ‘security’ threats.
82
 Hence, at 
the global institutional level, the Maritime Safety Committee of the 
International Maritime Organization (IMO) has served as the forum for 
discussing concerns and responses to maritime transportation security.  
 
3.3.2.2  Mare Clausum and National Security 
The second phase in the evolution of the concept began when coastal 
States perceived activities in waters close to their shores as threats to 
their national security.
83
 The core security threats for coastal States 
include possible attacks from enemy vessels, espionage and gunboat 
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diplomacy.
84
 Thus, Britain’s attempt to safeguard itself against these 
threats was justified by the doctrine of Mare clausum, with the nation 
arguing for a right to exercise controls over the water belt close to its 
shores.
85
 Responses to these threats resulted in the territorial sea regime, 
where sovereignty-security measures can be exercised.
86
 Subsequently, 
the breadth of the territorial sea was considered insufficient for security 
controls, because ships outside the territorial sea could still partake in 
activities that are inimical to the interests of coastal States, such as drug 
trafficking and trading in prohibited items and uncustomed goods.
87
 The 
concept of the contiguous zone thus evolved to create a policing and 
enforcement jurisdiction beyond the territorial sea.
88
  
 
3.3.2.3  Offshore Energy Security   
Although a number of developments were responsible for the broadening 
of the concept of security, all are grounded in changes to the 
international law of the sea. First, by the 1940s scientific evidence had 
pointed to large deposits of hydrocarbon material in the sea bed, and thus 
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the maritime domain became a growing source of energy supplies.
89
 This 
inspired the 1945 proclamation by US President Harry Truman - that the 
seabed contiguous to the US and its resources were subject to US 
sovereignty.
90
 Other States followed the US, making similar declarations 
and setting into motion a chain of events which would eventually lead to 
a customary international law rule.
91
 The Continental Shelf Convention 
of 1958, and subsequently the United Nations Convention on the Law of 
Sea (1982) made the continental shelf and its oil and gas deposits the 
exclusive national interest of States.
92
 Indeed, this provided the impetus 
for their inclusion in the national security interest of coastal States. Thus, 
both the control and access to offshore oil and gas resources became a 
matter of national security.   
 
Second, the exploitation of offshore oil and gas resources has been 
enabled by a complex system of offshore structures and facilities, 
collectively referred to as offshore installations or platforms.
93
 Unlike 
ships that are mobile, these platforms are fixed to the seabed, thus 
increasing their vulnerability to accidents and intentional attacks. A 
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combination of these factors gave rise to legal and practical concerns 
relating to offshore energy security.
94
  
 
The third development is very much related to the second. Earlier, in 
1961, a mutinying crew took control of the Santa Maria cruise ship,
95
 
and then in 1985 the Achille Lauro was hijacked by supporters of the 
Palestinian Liberation Front (PLO) as part of the Israeli-Palestinian 
conflict.
96
 The hijacking of the Achille Lauro pointed to a more serious 
threat to the security of shipping - terrorist hijackings.
97
 The international 
response to this threat, and threats to offshore energy installations, 
resulted in two international instruments in 1988 which expanded the 
scope of the concept of maritime security.
98
  
 
3.3.2.4 The Exclusive Economic Zone Concept and Further 
Dimensions of Maritime Security 
It is not clear when marine environmental security became a dimension 
of the maritime security concept, but the regime of the Exclusive 
Economic Zone (EEZ) can be regarded as the catalyst.
99
 The adoption 
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and coming into force of the United Nations Convention on the Law of 
Sea (UNCLOS) 1982, strengthened the scope of existing maritime 
security jurisdiction, for example in the territorial sea and the contiguous 
zone.
100
 It also extended jurisdiction and enforcement measures over 
living resources and the conservation and management of the marine 
environment.
101
 Since the concept of security is a product of the 
construction of particular interests, the extended interest of States into 
the sea has necessarily yielded a concept of security to protect that 
interest.
102
 Marine environmental security can equally be seen as a 
product of an environmentalist agenda – one that aims to protect the 
earth and its resources, particularly following the UN Conference on 
Environment and Development (UNCED).
103
 From a national viewpoint, 
however, the EEZ regime serves as the anchor for marine environment 
security.
104
  
 
3.3.2.5  Naval Constabulary Roles and the Construction of 
Maritime Security  
The analysis thus far has shown that ‘soft security’ interests at sea have 
expanded from maritime transportation security to include broader 
dimensions of security. In a national setting, these different dimensions 
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would be treated as separate segments of maritime or ocean governance 
concerns and administered by different national agencies. In contrast, 
navies and coastguards (being the response and enforcement arms of 
these dimensions of security), adopt a composite approach in their 
constabulary roles.
105
 This is often reflected in operational concepts that 
provide an expansive definition of maritime security operation.
106
  
 
The conceptual framework that underpins naval constabulary roles 
influences the concept of maritime security in three ways. First, rather 
than seeing maritime security in segments, naval concepts provide a 
composite approach to the definition of maritime security – one which 
embodies all aspects of the duties to be performed. Second, this approach 
is situated in the context of national security, which accords with the 
institutional role of navies. Third, the concept of maritime security is 
assimilated into naval strategy or ‘hard security.’ Thus, while sea lines of 
communication security (SLOC-security) may be viewed simply as the 
protection of shipping, as far as navies are concerned, it is embedded in 
the concept of Naval Control of Shipping (NCS) that co-locates SLOC-
security with concepts of sea denial and power projection.
107
 For 
example, the 2010 US Naval Operations Concept (NOC) referred to the 
role of the Navy in war as “conduct[ing] sea control operations...to 
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enforce freedom of navigation, sustain unhindered global maritime 
commerce, prevent or limit the spread of conflict, and [to] prevail in 
war.”
108
 Furthermore, the NOC considers sea control to be essential to 
“all naval missions.” These operational concepts directly link sea 
control, a war fighting concept, with the constabulary role of the US 
Navy.
109
 
 
This, in essence, represents a securitisation of ‘soft security,’ but that is 
the reality of how navies view and deliver maritime security. Indeed, 
because naval tasks – whether they be militaristic, diplomatic or related 
to law enforcement - are delivered as part of a spectrum of activities, 
even when textual differences are made apparent, the objectives and 
outcomes are fused.
110
 Ivan Luke has described the overlaps in the US 
NOC 2010 as the inappropriate inclusion of roles in one domain, into 
another.
111
 But in my view it is more of a structural and conceptual issue 
founded on the indivisibility of naval capabilities and operational 
posture, and also on the constant interaction of military and non-military 
aspects of the sea as combined elements of sea power.
112
  
 
There is also a tendency to label this defence construction of maritime 
security as a post-9/11 phenomenon, but this is not the case, as events 
after the 9/11 attacks have added new dimensions to the concept. 
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Western naval power has historically revolved around mercantile trade, 
and similarly mercantile trade has thrived on naval support.
113
 Navies 
have equally exploited ‘soft security’ concerns in distant waters for 
strategic ends.
114
 As Martin Murphy has noted: “once pirates begin to 
prey on international trade, they attract the interest of States, and States 
throughout history have used piracy suppression as a device to further 
foreign policy objectives.”
115
 These extra-strategic objectives have the 
tendency to make external engagement with, and support for, maritime 
security problematic.
116
  
 
3.3.2.6 Post-9/11 Maritime Security 
The final phase of the evolution of the concept of maritime security 
occurred as part of the broader security dynamics following the terrorist 
attacks on the World Trade Centre in New York on 11 September 2001. 
Indeed, the concept of maritime security changed dramatically as a new 
approach to maritime security was adopted by the US and this influenced 
the overall global outlook. This new approach is characterised by an 
expansion in threat perception and the scope of maritime security, a 
diminishing land-sea interface, and an extension of the response space 
for maritime security. It is within this new environment that Natalie 
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Klein’s definition of maritime security as “the protection of a State’s 
land and maritime territory, infrastructure, economy, environment and 
society from certain harmful acts occurring at sea” seems apt.
117
 
 
The successful hijacking of aircrafts by terrorists also heightened fears 
that ships could be hijacked, particularly since security arrangements at 
seaports are generally lax compared to those of the aviation industry.
118
 
The US also became concerned that ships could be used as a means for 
attacking States, by loading them with destructive biological, chemical 
or nuclear (BCN) weapons.
119
 Hence, the threat to maritime security was 
no longer limited to attacks at sea, but also extended to attacks on land 
from the sea.
120
 The US responded to these threats by enhancing security 
in overseas seaports, and also by screening ship cargo and containers. To 
this end, the US launched the Container Security Initiative (CSI) and the 
Customs-Trade Partnership against Terrorism (C-TPAT).
121
 Many States 
subsequently joined these programmes, creating a broad countersecurity 
regime.
122
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At the multilateral level, the US pushed for global instruments to be 
adopted to counter these new types of threats.
123
 The US also 
promulgated a number of strategic documents which underpin its 
approach to maritime security and maritime security cooperation.
124
 
Suffice to say, the post-9/11 dimension of maritime security is partly 
global and partly US-centric.
 125
 This deduction is not to suggest that the 
spectrum of responses adopted by the US at the multilateral level is 
meant to satisfy the exclusive maritime security needs of the US. Rather, 
the conclusion is to highlight just how far the US has conditioned and 
influenced not just the notion of maritime security, but security generally 
in a post-9/11 environment. Indeed, this raises serious concerns about the 
quality and durability of the new approaches to security.
126
  
 
3.3.4  The 2008 Oceans and the Law of Sea Report and the 
Harmonisation of Maritime Security  
Three important points emerged from the analysis of the evolution of the 
concept of maritime security in the preceding section. First the 
discussion shows that the concept of maritime security has broadened 
over time. Second, that the maritime interest (or location) of a State may 
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determine what threats are of priority to the State. Third, that there is no 
consensus on all the elements of maritime security.   
 
Therefore, one of the objectives of the UN Secretary General’s report on 
oceans and the law of the sea, 2008, 
 
was to provide a global overview of 
maritime security.
127
  The report noted that the concept of maritime 
security varies significantly, and as such, there is no single definition of 
the concept that is universally applicable.
128
 Nonetheless, the report 
identified seven threats that are generally accepted as maritime security 
threats: (i) piracy and armed robbery against ships; (ii) terrorists acts 
involving shipping, offshore installations and other maritime interests; 
(iii) illicit trafficking in arms and weapons of mass destructions; (iv) 
illicit traffic in narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances; (v) 
smuggling and trafficking of persons by sea; (vi) illegal, unreported and 
unregulated fishing; and (vii) intentional and unlawful damage to the 
marine environment.129  
 
Although this shift from defining the concept of maritime security to 
listing maritime security threats was intended to garner international 
consensus, the approach has some shortcomings. These will be analysed 
in the next section as part of the background to the framework that has 
been developed and applied in the thesis.  
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3.4 THESIS APPLICATION OF THE CONCEPT OF 
MARITIME SECURITY TO THE GULF OF GUINEA 
At the regional level, maritime security cooperation requires clarity of 
policy objectives and outcomes.
 130
 Regional States must define the core 
interests to be protected, the processes for doing so, and also identify the 
critical responses that will contribute to enhanced cooperative efforts. As 
demonstrated in the analysis of the concept of security, maritime security 
threats have effects beyond national and regional boundaries. Therefore, 
regional maritime security cooperation should accommodate external 
participation and third party roles. Thus, what we have are three levels of 
action: national, regional and global. Harmonisation of these levels 
reinforces the need for a common understanding of the concept of 
maritime security and a well-defined cooperative process.  
 
This thesis has developed a framework for the purpose of enhancing 
maritime security cooperation in the Gulf of Guinea. The framework is 
analysed in the three sections that follow. The first section argues for a 
broader concept of maritime security and also develops a concept of 
maritime security cooperation for the Gulf of Guinea. The second section 
develops a maritime security threat path which explains the nature and 
impact of maritime security threats, while the third section develops a 
framework for particular maritime security concerns in the Gulf of 
Guinea region.  
 
                                                          
130
 Generally on challenges of regional maritime security cooperation, see Sam Bateman, "Solving the 
“Wicked Problems” of Maritime Security: Are Regional Forums up to the Task?," Contemporary 
Southeast Asia 33,  2011, pp. 1-28. 
109 
 
3.4.1  Analytical Framework for Maritime Security Cooperation in 
the Gulf of Guinea  
As indicated earlier, the UN approach to maritime security has some 
limitations. Indeed, the approach has the potential to hamstring the 
broader conceptualisation of some aspects of maritime security, 
particularly the security interest in fisheries. It is a fact that the profound 
interest of States in shipping, and also in offshore energy resources, is 
what has yielded the concepts of maritime transportation security and 
offshore energy security. Indeed, the classification of these concerns as 
‘security interests’ has promoted broader governance and protective 
measures.  
 
In the case of fisheries, there has been a reluctance to classify the broad 
concerns of the sector as maritime security issues. Instead, illegal, 
unreported and unregulated fishing (IUU) has been singled out as the 
threat to be addressed through cooperative responses. This narrow 
approach excludes key concerns such as decreased access to food and the 
impact of foreign fishing license agreements on the livelihood of coastal 
communities in developing countries. In regard to the human security 
dimensions of fisheries, it has been noted that seafood constitutes the 
primary source of protein for over 100 million people in Southeast Asia. 
Moreover, the fishing industry represents the main source of 
employment for countless individuals and communities.
131
 Evidently, the 
connection between depleting fisheries resources, declining food 
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supplies and the economic dimensions of maritime security are all very 
much apparent in the Gulf of Guinea.
132
   
 
As will be demonstrated in the last part of this chapter, there are multiple 
causes of depleting fisheries resources in the Gulf of Guinea, one of 
which is the impact of foreign fishing licences.
133
 This point is perhaps 
best illustrated by Geoffrey Till: 
 
Already, most world fishing grounds are under severe pressure, and  many 
local fishing communities around the world are further threatened by the 
advent of highly mechanised distant-water fishing fleets from elsewhere, which 
have moved into new fishing grounds, because they have exhausted their own. 
European Union fishing boats operating off the coast of Senegal, Mauritania 
and other parts of West Africa are a typical example. Here, as elsewhere, 
licences are granted by struggling Third World governments desperate for 
immediate capital with inadequate means of supervising the activities they 
have allowed off-shore. In effect, they feel they have to mortgage their future 
for the sake of the present.
 134
   
 
The above quote vividly portrays the threat posed by depleting fisheries 
resources to human security, societal security, food security, and even 
national and regional security. Indeed, the alarm bells of this threat have 
been sounding for over a decade, yet little has been done to rectify the 
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situation.
135
 Such concerns should be the subject of global maritime 
security dialogue at the UN, but the restrictive approach to maritime 
security being adopted in the Gulf of Guinea, as reflected in the UN 
Security Council resolutions, clearly impedes this.
136
 In fact, the 
approach is even more restrictive when the scope of the IUU concept is 
fully analysed. This will be done in the next part of this chapter.  
 
It could be argued that concerns over foreign fishing arrangements have 
been overstated. After all, the granting of foreign fishing licences is a 
deliberate choice made by governments, and should therefore not be 
classified as a security threat. Such an argument, however, is based on a 
limited application of the concept of security. The fact that choices are 
deliberate, or even consensual, does not prevent the choices from being 
security threats. Indeed, the Cold War was a product of deliberate 
choices and policies of governments, yet it constituted a global security 
concern. A number of Gulf of Guinea States have made deliberate 
choices regarding the governance and management of natural resources, 
but such choices have resulted in conflicts and threats to national, 
regional and even global security. Furthermore, if any or all of the States 
in the Gulf of Guinea were to transfer or sell their offshore oil reserves to 
one nation (e.g. China), such action would surely be treated as a threat to 
global energy security, despite the consensual nature of the transaction.  
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Our decision to quote Till at length is not to suggest that the depletion of 
fish stocks in the Gulf of Guinea is solely attributable to foreign fleets. 
Rather, the point being established is that the singling out of IUU fishing 
inadequately addresses one of the major concerns of maritime security in 
the region. In other words, an important dimension of maritime security - 
one with similar consequences to piracy, has not been properly situated 
within the maritime security agenda of the Gulf of Guinea.
137
   
 
Figure 3.1 represents the conceptual framework that has been developed 
in the thesis for enhancing maritime security in the Gulf of Guinea. It 
recognises three key components of the maritime security process: 
adequate national capacity, effective regional frameworks and viable 
global support. It also has three critical success indicators: improved 
governance, adequate legal frameworks and a durable maritime security 
concept. We may refer to it as the 3layer 3indicator framework. The 
three overlapping triangles show that maritime security is a shared 
responsibility, but they equally denote the three levels of security 
analysed in the concept of security: national, regional and global.  
Ideally, maritime security cooperation would involve a leveraging and 
coordination of efforts at the national, regional and global level.
138
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Figure 3.1 Framework for Maritime Security Cooperation
139
  
 
 
The analysis of the evolution of the concept of maritime security has 
already emphasised the role of legal frameworks in defining and 
contributing to maritime security. Chapter five will put this in context by 
reviewing the implementation of maritime security legal frameworks in 
the Gulf of Guinea. However, the adequacy of legal frameworks is not a 
sufficient condition for enhancing maritime security. If maritime security 
cooperation is to yield positive outcomes and have long term benefits, 
governments in the Gulf of Guinea must accept that improving 
governance is an integral element of the concept of maritime security.
140
 
External actors should equally embrace a broader concept of security - 
one that enhances the long term security of the region. 
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The core elements of the framework are summarised below: 
National Effort: Strength and capability of maritime forces, Legal 
frameworks and enforcement, Institutional Coordination, Quality of 
Governance.   
Regional Effort: Quality of Regional Frameworks, Funding, Shared Concept 
of Security, Coordination of efforts.    
Global Effort: Inclusive Concept of Security, Coordination of effort, Support 
to Governance, Funding. 
Governance: Institutional Strengths, Quality of leadership, Resource 
management, Accountable and transparent processes, Security sector reform. 
Legal Framework: Ratification of international frameworks, Effective 
national legislation, Implementation and enforcement of international 
frameworks, Availability of judicial processes. 
Concept of Security: Broad concept of security, Governance as inclusive 
element of security, Priority given to regional security concerns.  
  
The analysis in the rest of the thesis, more so chapters five, six and 
seven, will cover these core elements.  
 
3.4.2  Gulf of Guinea Maritime Security Threat Path 
The purpose of the maritime security threat path is to explain the nature 
and impact of maritime security threats. A maritime security threat can 
be conceived as embodying two components: an activity and its effect. 
The activity is ordinarily generated or caused by human action, and the 
effect or impact is also felt on humans, although there may be 
intermediary consequences. Thus, the consequence of a maritime 
security threat is equally as visible as the activity or incident that 
generates it, and because of this dual visibility, both may in fact be 
referred to as ‘the threat’. This relationship is represented in Figure 3.2, 
from which four threat paths can be analysed.  
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Figure 3.2 Maritime Security Threat Paths 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
First, a threat activity and the consequence of the threat can both occur at 
sea. Piracy and illegal fishing activities properly fit into this scenario. In 
the case of piracy, a piratical attack (activity) may result in a disruption 
to navigation, damage to a ship, as well as injury to crew members - all 
sea-based consequences. But the real effect is the undermining of various 
dimensions of security, for example, transportation security and 
economic security. Indeed, piracy has the potential to undermine or 
threaten multiple dimensions of security.  
 
The second conceptualisation of the threat path is where the activity or 
incident occurs at sea (or from the sea), but the consequence or effect 
takes place on land. Illicit trafficking in narcotic drugs and weapons fits 
into this description. Illicit trafficking (the activity) is carried out at sea, 
while the consequences (which include danger to human life and 
national security) are felt on land.  
 
The third interpretation is where activities on land contribute to disorder 
at sea, in which case the consequences will be felt on land and at sea. In 
fact, all disorder at sea has some connection with the land. For example, 
116 
 
poor governance can result in civil protests and then escalate into 
insurgency, which in turn can threaten offshore energy installations.  
 
Finally, and more importantly, the threat relationship in Figure 3.2 is 
mutually reinforcing, thus leading to continuous insecurity unless all 
components of the land-sea nexus are addressed.  
 
3.4.3 Thematic Concerns of Gulf of Guinea Maritime Security 
The third model, Figure 3.3 below, is derived from a practical 
application of the first and second models examined above to the 
analysis of the geopolitical importance of the Gulf of Guinea in chapter 
two, overlaid with the concept of security espoused in the early parts of 
this chapter. The model identifies five components of the concept of 
security, and depicts their relationship with five threat sources. It also 
shows primary and secondary effects which combine to create a web of 
interaction. 
Figure 3.3:  Thematic Concerns of Gulf of Guinea Maritime Security    
 
  
 
 
 
  
 
117 
 
Although the threats and dimensions of security are vertically denoted, in 
practice they are indivisible. The dimensions relate and overlap, while 
the threats may intersect or morph into one another. For example, the 
economic security of Gulf of Guinea States is tied to resources, and is 
therefore linked with energy security. Moreover, food security in the 
Gulf of Guinea centres not just on sustainable fisheries, but the food 
security requirements of the region as a whole, which in turn is 
dependent on international trade and shipping (as discussed in chapter 
two). Hence, there are inextricable links between food security, 
economic security and transportation security.  
 
The rest of the thesis proceeds on the basis of these three, mutually 
reinforcing models. 
 
3.5 OVERVIEW OF MARITIME SECURITY CHALLENGES 
IN THE GULF OF GUINEA 
 
This part of the chapter examines the maritime security threats and 
challenges in the Gulf of Guinea. It provides a practical discussion of the 
implications of the threats and thematic areas identified in Figure 3.3. 
Although the analysis goes into considerable detail, it is nonetheless an 
overview of the case study presented in the next chapter. It needs to be 
emphasised that although reference will be made to some of the root 
causes of the maritime security threats, the thrust of the analysis is on the 
implications of the threats to security and stability.  
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3.5.1 Piracy and Armed Robbery at Sea 
In the last decade, piracy and armed robbery at sea have become the 
chief maritime security threats, mainly due to their impact on 
international trade and SLOC security.
141
 Indeed, global attention has 
centred on Southeast Asia, especially the Malacca and Singapore Straits, 
where piratical attacks have become commonplace.
142
 Piratical attacks in 
the Indian Ocean have also become a global concern, especially from 
2005 and peaking in 2008.
143
 This prompted a series of UN resolutions 
targeting Somalia, the source of many piratical activities.
144
 However, as 
the global response to the problems in the Indian Ocean was unfolding, 
piracy and armed robbery in the Gulf of Guinea was gaining momentum. 
This prompted the two UN Security Council Resolutions expressing 
concerns about piratical attacks in the Gulf of Guinea, and calling for 
regional States to take remedial action.
145
  
 
Chapter four will examine the threat of piracy and armed robbery in the 
Gulf of Guinea. This detailed case study is justified by the historical 
significance of piracy and armed robbery as a maritime security threat, 
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as well as the complex dynamics and implications of the crime on 
critical dimensions of maritime security (as illustrated in Figure 3.3).   
 
 
3.5.2  Illicit Drug Trafficking in the Gulf of Guinea  
The 2008 UN Secretary General’s Report on Oceans and the Law of the 
Sea identified the illicit trafficking in narcotics and psychotropic 
substances as a maritime security threat.
146
 Indeed, a year earlier the 
International Drug Control Board assessed illicit drug trafficking in the 
Gulf of Guinea, concluding that it had become a region-wide 
phenomenon.
147
 This section examines the nature, trends and dynamics 
of drug trafficking in the Gulf of Guinea, as well as its implications. 
 
3.5.2.1 Drug Vessels and Transhipment at Sea 
For over two decades the Gulf of Guinea has been a major hub of drug 
trafficking.
148
 The multiple sea approaches to the region, coupled with 
governance and structural weaknesses, has made the Gulf of Guinea an 
attraction for organised crime.
149
 The region is a key link in what has 
become known as the “cocaine triangle” – consisting of South America, 
Africa and Europe.
150
 Cocaine originating from South America is usually 
transported by mother-ships and brought directly into ports, or 
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transhipped at sea into smaller vessels and canoes, covertly landing the 
drugs along beaches and remote parts of the coast.
151
 These drugs are 
then distributed within Africa, and subsequently trafficked using 
multiple channels into European and other markets.
152
 In 2009, the 
United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) estimated that 35 
metric tonnes of cocaine landed in Africa, with some 21 metric tonnes 
being transferred to Europe. The remainder was most likely left as 
payment for network members or consumed locally.
 153
   
 
Drug entry points were originally restricted to a few States in the Gulf of 
Guinea, but are now well established across the entire region.
154
 As early 
as 1993 a Nigerian drug baron was convicted for importing 250 
kilograms of heroin from Thailand by sea.
155
 In 2000, Cape Verdean 
authorities intercepted a ship heading from the Caribbean with 2.3 tonnes 
of cocaine, and three years later, a consignment of 7.2 tonnes heading to 
Spain from Cape Verde and Senegal was intercepted.
156
 Approximately 
588 kilograms of cocaine was seized in the Port of Tema, Ghana, in 
2004,
157
 and in 2006, a large quantity of cocaine was brought into Ghana 
                                                          
151
 See UNODC, Cocaine Trafficking in West Africa: The Threat to Stability and Development with 
Special Reference to Guinea-Bissau. (Vienna: UNODC, December 2007). UNODC, "The 
Globalization of Crime: A Transnational Organized Crime Threat Assessment,"  2010.  
152
 UNODC, "Transnational Organized Crime in West Africa: A threat Assessment,"  February 2013.  
153
 UNODC, "World Drug Report,"  2011, pp. 40-41. See also, UNODC, "The Globalization of 
Crime: A Transnational Organized Crime Threat Assessment,” 2010.    
154
 International Narcotics Control Board, "International Narcotics Control Board Report 2007."   
155
 Stephen Ellis, "West Africa’s International Drug Trade," African Affairs 108, 431,  2009, pp. 171-
96, p.92.  
156
 Flemming Quist, “Drug trafficking in West Africa 2000–2004 in an International Perspective,” 
UNODC Workshop on West African Organized Crime (Dakar: 2–3 April 2004). 
157
 Flemming Quist, "Drug Trafficking in West Africa 2000–2004 in an International Perspective," 
UNODC Workshop on West African Organized Crime, Dakar,  2-3 April 2004.  
121 
 
by a fishing vessel.
158
 According to the UNOCD, the amount of cocaine 
intercepted in the ECOWAS segment of the Gulf of Guinea by Spanish 
and British navies in 2006 and 2007 amounted to 9.9 tonnes and 5.7 
tonnes respectively.
159
 While West Africa is the main entry point for 
drugs into the Gulf of Guinea, the sea coast of Angola, which is further 
south, is also a notorious route for Brazilian drug networks.
160
  
 
3.5.2.2 The Switch from Cocaine Ships to Shipping Containers  
The interception of multiple vessels transporting cocaine at sea has led to 
drug traffickers changing their tactics. To escape detection (and thus 
reduce the risk of losing large shipments), drug cartels are increasingly 
using shipping containers to transport drugs.
161
 Through this method, 
drugs are trafficked by being deceptively labelled as legitimate goods or 
concealed in legitimate goods within shipping containers.
 
Eleven 
seizures of cocaine trafficked in this way were made in 2011, amounting 
to a staggering 6 tonnes.
162
 Since only a limited number of containers are 
actually inspected globally, more cocaine could be coming into the Gulf 
of Guinea through this method than through traditional channels. Indeed, 
the quantity seized in 2011 indicates that drug trafficking is more likely 
                                                          
158
 UNODC, "Drug Trafficking as a Security Threat in West Africa,"  November 2008, pp. 1. See also 
Helena Selby, Ghana: MV Benjamin 77 Parcels of Cocaine Docket On Asem Dake Before A-G,  9 
March 2012, allAfrica, Available: http://allafrica.com/stories/201203091286.html, 10 April 2012.  
159
 See pages 2-5 of UNODC, Cocaine Trafficking in Western Africa: Situation Report October 2007, 
Available: http://www.unodc.org/documents/data-and-analysis/Cocaine-trafficking-Africa-en.pdf, 10 
August 2011. 
160
 Audra K. Grant, "Trafficking in Africa", in  Kimberley L. Thachuk, ed. Transnational Threats: 
Smuggling and Trafficking in Arms, Drugs, and Human Life, Westport, Praeger Security International 
2007, pp. 117.   
161
 UNODC, "Transnational Organized Crime in West Africa: A threat Assessment." February 2013.  
162
 See page 12, UNODC, "Transnational Organized Crime in West Africa: A threat Assessment." 
February 2013.  
122 
 
increasing than declining. This raises questions about the response 
measures and capacity of Gulf of Guinea States to tackle this problem.
163
 
 
3.5.2.3 Implications of Drug Trafficking For National and 
Regional Security 
The security and stability challenges posed by drug trafficking in the 
Gulf of Guinea have been succinctly stated by the Executive Director of 
UNODC as follows:  
   
West Africa…has become a hub for cocaine trafficking. Ships and planes 
loaded with cocaine are coming from Latin America into poorly guarded 
ports and airfields in West Africa. This is more than a drugs problem. It is a 
serious security threat.
164
 
 
Two broad implications of drug trafficking can be drawn from the above 
statement. The first is the impact of drug trafficking on national and 
regional security. The second is the transnational security dimensions of 
drug trafficking, and its symbiotic relationship with other types of 
organised crime. Both have disastrous outcomes for maritime security 
generally and in particular for long term national and regional stability.   
 
Drug trafficking constitutes a serious threat to the security and stability 
of the Gulf of Guinea region.
 165
 It has the potential to destroy 
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communities, corrupt State institutions and affect the stability of the 
State system as a whole.
166
 Guinea-Bissau is a microcosm of this fact.
167
 
Although a small State in terms of landmass, Guinea-Bissau has many 
islands. Indeed, the regime of islands under UNCLOS recognises the 
right of a coastal State to claim maritime spaces for these islands, 
including an EEZ.
168
 This vast maritime estate should have been of great 
benefit to Guinea-Bissau, but a lack of maritime enforcement of 
maritime spaces, coupled with corruption, has turned Guinea-Bissau into 
a “narco-State” or “narco-coast.”
169
 This description epitomises the fact 
that the national budget of Guinea-Bissau is estimated to be the value of 
just 2.5 tonnes of cocaine, a small fraction of the annual quantity of 
cocaine believed to be trafficked through the country.
170
  
 
The UN has indicated that Guinea-Bissau has moved from being a mere 
drug transit State into a consumption market.
171
 Indeed, the instability 
and intense political conflicts that characterise the State are generally 
regarded as a product of the struggle to access the cocaine trade and drug 
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money.
172
 The assassinations of the President of Guinea and the head of 
army in 2009 have both been linked to cocaine politics.
173
 However, 
Guinea-Bissau is not the only country associated with cocaine politics. 
The proceeds of the State’s cocaine trade are widely believed to finance 
unsavoury political activities in other Gulf of Guinea States, including 
Ghana.
174
 In this way, cocaine money provides the perfect means for 
drug networks to infiltrate the corridors of power, compromising 
governance structures in the region, including law enforcement 
agencies.
175
  
 
However, the greater threat posed by illicit drug trafficking is its 
connection with transnational organised crime (TOC) in the Gulf of 
Guinea.
176
 Organised criminals, including terrorists, sustain their 
activities through money raised from their participation in drug 
trafficking, or from money supplied directly by drug traffickers.
177
 In 
2009 Ghanaian authorities arrested three Malians on drug charges, 
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subsequently extraditing the men to the US on the basis of alleged links 
with Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM).
178
 This raises the 
possible forging of alliances between drug traffickers and terrorists in the 
Gulf of Guinea.
179
 The African Marine Commando, a militant group in 
Cameroon which is deeply involved in the maritime drug trade, has also 
been noted to have conducted piratical attacks.
180
 There are also reports 
of militias in the Niger Delta region of Nigeria having accepted cocaine 
as in-kind payment for services rendered to drug traffickers.
181
 These 
examples parallel the connection between pirates and the al-shabab in 
Somalia.
182
  
 
The above trends suggest the presence of dangerous, transnational 
organised crime partnerships in the Gulf of Guinea - a situation that 
needs to be addressed urgently. The analysis also demonstrates that any 
attempt at addressing maritime security in the Gulf of Guinea must be 
holistic, as there is interaction between the different facets of threats. 
However, UN Resolutions 2018 and 2039 treated piracy as an isolated 
maritime security threat.
183
 Indeed, although Resolution 2039 mentioned 
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drug trafficking as a possible threat to peace and security in the Sahel 
region, the entirety of recommendations and action plans in the 
Resolution are directed at combating the threat of piracy and armed 
robbery at sea.  Any cooperative processes built on the Resolutions 
would therefore set a narrow maritime security framework for the Gulf 
of Guinea.  Chapter five will also assess the extent to which Gulf of 
Guinea States have implemented international instruments that address 
the subject of illegal drug trafficking.  
 
3.5.3 Illegal Migration by Sea  
There are two related issues involved in illegal migration by sea: migrant 
smuggling and people trafficking.
184
 Migrant smuggling involves 
facilitating the illegal entry of persons into a State for financial or other 
material benefit.
185
 Migrant smuggling is undertaken with the consent of 
the migrant who anticipates better living conditions at the point of 
destination.
186
 This can be contrasted with trafficking of people, where 
the objective is to put the trafficked persons in some form of servitude, 
for example, forced prostitution.
187
 In a legal context, however, both 
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involve entry into a State in breach of its migration laws. Migrant 
smuggling accounts for the bulk of illegal migration by sea, but the two 
crimes are very much related and are often perpetrated by the same or 
related criminal networks.
188
 Thus, persons who willingly embark on 
illegal migration can quite easily end up in bondage or servitude.
189
  
 
In the context of the Gulf of Guinea, migrants intending to enter Europe 
often walk long distances, while others are transported by fishing vessels 
to congregate at Cape Verde and Senegal (the main transit countries in 
the Gulf of Guinea), or to other transit States including Algeria, Libya 
and Morocco.
190
 They are then put on boats or fishing vessels which 
travel through the Canary Islands or the Strait of Gibraltar on route to 
Spain or Malta, the chief ports of entry into Europe.
191
 Almost 32,000 
irregular migrants were detected through the Spanish route in 2006, with 
35,000 being detected in 2008.
192
 It has been noted in a 2012 report that 
approximately 11 per cent of illegal immigrants into Europe originate 
from countries in the Gulf of Guinea.
193
 While these people undertake 
the journey voluntarily, it nonetheless exposes them to exploitation and 
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the perils of the sea, while providing a great profit to organised criminal 
groups who arrange for their passage.  
 
Although the Gulf of Guinea is the source, rather than the destination, of 
illegal migration, this activity can still be classified as a maritime 
security threat to the region. The criminal syndicates involved in these 
operations often use unseaworthy vessels, thus running the risk of the 
vessels sinking or becoming distressed at sea, thereby creating further 
maritime security challenges. The crime also puts the lives of people 
from the region in peril, while creating a lucrative trade for the people 
smugglers.  
 
3.5.4  Declining Fisheries as a Maritime Security Threat 
The significance of fisheries as a source of food security in the Gulf of 
Guinea has been addressed in chapter two. In reality, however, the 
majority of States in the Gulf of Guinea are net importers of fish, despite 
having large areas of maritime space.
194
 For example, Cote d’Ivoire and 
Nigeria are among the principal importers of fish globally.
195
  
 
As the above heading indicates, this section intends to broadly analyse 
the maritime security dimension of fisheries in the Gulf of Guinea. Yet it 
must be conceded that a discussion of the causes of declining fish stocks 
is outside the scope of this section. Therefore, the analysis will focus on 
Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated (IUU) fishing, while seeking to 
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outline some threat dimensions beyond IUU fishing. To put the analysis 
in context, we will first review the statistics that reveal the economic cost 
of IUU to developing countries and the Gulf of Guinea. This will be 
followed by an examination of the meaning and scope of IUU fishing. 
Then we will analyse the threats to fisheries beyond the IUU factor. 
Finally, the larger security threats posed by depleting fish stock in the 
Gulf of Guinea will be examined.  
 
3.5.4.1 Scale and Cost of IUU Fishing in the Gulf of Guinea 
It is estimated that between US$9 billion and US$24 billion is lost to 
IUU fishing globally, with the level of illegal fishing in the Gulf of 
Guinea being 40 per cent higher than the global average in 2009.
196
 
Some reports put the financial losses from IUU fishing in the Gulf of 
Guinea at US$1 billion.
197
 In Sierra Leone, Guinea and Guinea Bissau, 
illegal fishing accounts for 50 to 60 per cent of total stock catch.
198
 It is 
estimated that Guinea loses US$105 million annually to illegal fishing, 
while Sierra Leone loses US$29 million and Liberia US$12 million.
199
 
The EU was initially thought to be the destination for illegal catches, but 
there are now indications that Asia has become a major market, and there 
is an increasing involvement of Chinese and South Korean vessels in 
IUU fishing activities off the Gulf of Guinea.
200
  
 
                                                          
196
 MRAG and DEFID, "Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Fishing " Policy Brief 8, 2009. Policy 
Brief 8, 2009.  
197
 Karin Brulliard, U.S. Outreach on Rough Seas off Western Africa, Washington Post, 21 May 2009. 
198
 See page 39, Marine Resources Assessment Group Ltd., Review of Impacts of Illegal, Unreported 
and Unregulated Fishing on Developing Countries 2005, Available: 
http://www.imcsnet.org/imcs/docs/iuu_fishing_synthesis_report_mrag.pdf, May 2011 2011.   
199
 Mark Rowe, "Fishy business " Geographical, August 2013.   
200
 Karin Brulliard, U.S. Outreach On Rough Seas Off Western Africa, Washington Post, 21 May 
2009. 
130 
 
In May 2013 two South Korean vessels - Premier and Solevant, 
reportedly negotiated an out of court settlement for illegal fishing in 
Sierra Leone, with South Korea reportedly paying a fine of US$2 
million.
201
 This fine reflects the illegal gains from IUU fishing and the 
corresponding losses to Gulf of Guinea States. Given the socio-economic 
fragility of the region, as reflected in the lack of basic human needs such 
as access to health care, adequate food supplies, education and shelter, 
the economic losses attributed to IUU fishing could substantially 
enhance the livelihood of many people.
202
 Chapter five will evaluate the 
extent to which Gulf of Guinea States have implemented international 
frameworks designed to combat IUU fishing. However, there is a 
tendency to view the international framework for addressing IUU fishing 
as comprehensively dealing with fisheries governance concerns. 
Therefore, the term ‘IUU fishing’ must be analysed so that its scope can 
be appreciated.  
 
3.5.4.2 The Concept of IUU Fishing and Its Limitations   
The term ‘IUU fishing’ has been attributed to the work of Commission 
for the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources (CCAMLR) 
in 1997.
203
 However, the term remained undefined until it was adopted 
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and used in the International Plan of Action to Prevent, Deter and 
Eliminate Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Fishing (IPOA-IUU) in 
2001.
204
 Though the IPOA-IUU definition is widely used, it is still 
regarded as lacking clarity in many areas.
205
 Thus, unless the meaning of 
IUU fishing is properly understood, it can be easily be misapplied.
206
  
 
To properly understand the meaning and scope of the term ‘IUU 
fishing’, it is important to note that the term has three separate 
components: ‘illegal fishing,’ ‘unreported fishing,’ and ‘unregulated 
fishing.’ Each of these components is described in the IPOA-IUU in 
relation to fishing in areas that are subject to a State’s national 
jurisdiction and on the high seas.
207
 The analysis in this section is 
concerned with the definitions that deal with fishing in waters that are 
under the national jurisdiction of a State. From a coastal State point of 
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view, ‘illegal fishing’ refers to activities conducted by foreign or national 
vessels in waters under the jurisdiction of a State without the permission 
of the State or in contravention of its laws.
 208
 “Unreported fishing” 
refers to fishing activities which have not been reported, or have been 
misreported to the relevant national authority.
209
 While illegal and 
unreported fishing is concerned with illegal conduct in waters under 
national jurisdiction, “unregulated fishing” refers only to high seas 
fishing or fisheries managed within the Regional Fisheries Management 
Organization (RFMO) framework.
210
 Thus, “unregulated fishing” 
describes fishing in a manner that is not consistent with or contravenes 
the conservation and management measures of a RFMO.
211
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Put simply, IUU fishing in a national context is fishing in violation of 
national fisheries laws.
212
 Even from this description it is clear that the 
concept is very limited and its application very narrow. Technically 
therefore, if there are weaknesses in the legislation of a State, it is 
perfectly legitimate for other States to exploit these legislative loopholes 
- for example, by using a fishing method that is prima facie destructive, 
while maintaining that the activity is not IUU fishing. Therefore, while 
conservation groups or Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) may 
describe a situation as IUU fishing, flag States of fishing vessels can 
stand their ground, arguing that the conduct does not fall within the 
description of IUU fishing.   
 
3.5.4.3  The Need for a Broader Approach and the Governance 
Dimension to IUU Fishing  
The analysis above demonstrates that addressing fisheries concerns 
through the international framework for IUU fishing is highly 
inadequate. Depleting fisheries should be examined from the perspective 
of food security instead. This approach will allow threats and issues on 
all levels – national, regional and global, to be addressed. An 
examination of maritime security cooperative frameworks in the Gulf of 
Guinea will show that, thus far, States in the region have adopted a 
narrow approach to IUU fishing governance.
213
 External partners have 
also tended to avoid addressing concerns of depleting fisheries, and 
when they do, they focus exclusively on the issue of IUU fishing, 
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ignoring broader threats to the sustainable access to fisheries resources 
(particularly by coastal communities in Gulf of Guinea States).
214
  
 
The above argument does not suggest that external factors are solely 
responsible for depleting fisheries and illegal fishing activities in the 
Gulf of Guinea. Indeed, analysis in chapter five will show that even the 
requisite framework for addressing IUU fishing is poorly implemented 
by Gulf of Guinea States.
215
 Reports have also cited corruption and the 
complicity of government officials as a factor undermining fisheries 
management measures.
216
 
 
Moreover, there are indications that vessels 
flagged by some Gulf of Guinea States are engaging in IUU fishing 
activities within the region. In a report to Congress in 2013, the US 
government listed Ghana as an IUU fishing State because vessels 
flagged by Ghana are in flagrant violation of measures for combating 
IUU fishing.
217
 For the same reason, the EU is reported to have placed a 
ban on tuna exports from Ghana, and possibly also Cape Verde, Cote 
d’Ivoire and Senegal.
218
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3.5.4.4 Implications of Declining Fisheries in the Gulf of Guinea  
The socio-economic consequences of depleting fisheries in the Gulf of 
Guinea have already been alluded to. However, the nexus between 
declining fisheries and regional security and stability need to be 
examined. Fundamental to this nexus is the fact that fishing is a social 
activity.219 Therefore, the consequences of depleting fisheries are far 
reaching. The first flow-on effects from a decline in fisheries stock 
include unemployment, social unrest and poverty, particularly in coastal 
communities.
220
 These factors, coupled with the deplorable socio-
economic indicators analysed in chapter one, lead to increased social 
dislocations. Indeed, research has shown that the threat of HIV/AIDS is 
more acute in fishing communities where fisheries are in decline.
221
 This 
vulnerability may also lead to malevolent behaviour at sea, with those 
people previously engaged in the fishing sector searching for an 
alternative source of income - a situation criminals can easily exploit.
 222
 
Research conducted in Southeast Asia suggests that unemployed 
fishermen increasingly become involved in the theft of vessels and 
canoes.
223
 A decline in fisheries has equally been shown to contribute 
significantly to piracy off the coast of Somalia.
224
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The UNODC has confirmed that fishing vessels and fisherfolk in West 
Africa are involved in drug trafficking and people smuggling.
225
 There 
are also reports of unemployed fishermen in Senegal threatening to 
resort to piracy if issues surrounding IUU fishing and foreign fishing 
licences are not resolved by the government.
226
 Indeed, even if these 
fishermen choose not to engage in piracy due to the increased risks, they 
may nonetheless turn to drug trafficking or other types of organised 
crime. Applying this situation to Figure 3.4 below, fishing communities 
and States fall into the first quadrant, with declining fish stocks leading 
to vulnerability in fishing communities and an increased crime rate in 
susceptible States.  
 
Figure 3.4: Fisheries as a Threat to Regional Security and Stability   
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Further depletion of fish stocks may also create tension among fisherfolk 
within and across State boundaries.
227
 This trend may be exacerbated by 
the growing oil and gas interests that lie in close proximity to fishing 
grounds in the Gulf of Guinea – interests that are ripe for exploratory 
activities.
228
 Finally, as fishing communities struggle to catch their last 
fish at sea, interstate conflicts will likely result.  Indeed, research already 
points to food scarcity and competition for resources as the main drivers 
of small and large scale conflicts.
229
  
 
3.5.5  Offshore Energy Security Concerns and Challenges  
The contribution of the Gulf of Guinea to global energy security has 
been extensively analysed in chapter two. Thus, the safety and security 
of offshore energy platforms is a major concern. The objective of this 
section is to examine the general challenges to the security of offshore 
platforms in the Gulf of Guinea. The next chapter will analyse specific 
attacks on offshore platforms as part of the case study on piracy and 
armed robbery in the region.  
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3.5.5.1 The Nature of Offshore Oil and Gas Infrastructure 
In 2011, the Gulf of Guinea’s deep-water petroleum industry was 
described as the most active in the world, with the level of offshore 
activities projected to increase in the coming years.
230
 Offshore oil and 
gas extraction comprises two key phases: exploration and production. 
Each phase involves the use of platforms that are vulnerable to deliberate 
attacks and accidents.
231
 To put the analysis of safety and security 
concerns in context, it is important to briefly explain the nature of 
offshore oil and gas development, as well as the types of offshore 
platforms that are used in the Gulf of Guinea.  
 
The exploration phase of offshore oil and gas development normally 
commences with a seismic survey. This is carried out with the use of 
ships that have been specifically designed for this purpose.
232
 This is 
followed by drilling the seabed using mobile drilling platforms. These 
platforms may be semi-submersible or submersible, and are generally 
referred to as mobile drilling units (MODUs).
233
 A key feature of 
MODUs is their mobility, and as a result they are regulated like ships 
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under international conventions and frameworks.
234
  This also explains 
why MODUs are susceptible to the same security risks and 
vulnerabilities as ships.  
 
The second phase of activity in offshore energy exploration is 
production. Successful detection of oil and or gas in commercial 
quantities will typically be followed by the establishment of one or more 
oil wells. Production will then be carried out using fixed platforms.
235
 In 
fact production from these wells and floating platforms will usually be 
continuous, and may last for over fifty years. This results in significant 
human activity taking place on board production platforms, with larger 
platforms boasting accommodation and living facilities for hundreds of 
personnel.
236
  
 
Extracted oil and gas is mostly processed in the Gulf of Guinea by the 
use of Floating, Production, Storage and Offloading units (FPSOs). 
These are either converted double hull oil tankers or structures 
specifically designed for this purpose.
237
 Indeed, this technology is 
widely regarded as one of the greatest technological breakthroughs in the 
industry, as it has made deep sea oil and gas production viable.
238
 Built 
in 2007, Nigeria’s FPSO Agbami is the largest in the world, with a 
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storage capacity of over 2.1 million barrels.
239
 Meanwhile, Angola’s 
Dalia FPSO, located 80 nautical miles offshore, has a capacity of 2 
million barrels.
240
 FPSO Nkrumah serves the Jubilee oil fields offshore 
Ghana,
241
 while FPSO Serpentina is being used in the Zafiro oil fields of 
Equatorial Guinea.
242
  As an alternative to FPSOs, extracted crude may 
be kept in a Floating Storage Offloading unit (FSO) and then transferred 
ashore for processing.   
 
3.5.5.2 Safety and Security Concerns of Offshore Infrastructure   
Two significant security concerns stem from the nature and processes of 
offshore oil and gas development: investment security and the physical 
vulnerability of offshore infrastructure.
243
 Summarising the possible 
impact of an accident or attack on Ghana’s offshore oil and gas 
platforms, Martin Tsamenyi and Kwame Mfodwo have noted:  
 
Incidents in the...offshore oil and gas industry would…put pressure on 
regional security arrangements; increase operating costs through increased 
security requirements…and higher insurance premiums; provide adverse 
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publicity, impacting negatively on public and business confidence…More 
importantly it could negatively affect investment in the country as a whole.
 
244
  
 
Although the summary above is from the perspective of a single country, 
it nonetheless characterises regional and global security dimensions.
245
 
Every activity in the oil and gas production process requires substantial 
financial investment. For example, the cost of a single FPSO can be 
upwards of US$800 million.
246
 Moreover, offshore oil platforms are 
exposed to different levels of physical risks across the activity chain, 
such that a single incident of violence or interference directed at offshore 
oil and gas infrastructure can have serious consequences.
 247
 At the 
general level, accidents from commercial and fishing vessels are a 
concern,
248
 with higher level risks encompassing deliberate attacks by 
pirates, insurgents or terrorists.
249
 FPSO’s are particularly vulnerable to 
violent actions because of their large size, predictable location and high 
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value.
250
 As demonstrated in the analysis in chapter two, oil and gas are 
strategic global commodities.
251
 Therefore, any interference with the 
supply chain in any part of the world will have global consequences. 
 
3.5.6 Illicit Trafficking in Weapons 
The final maritime security concern to be discussed in this chapter is 
illicit trafficking in weapons. The contribution of small arms and light 
weapons (SALW) to instability in the Gulf of Guinea is palpable.
 252
 
Liberia and Sierra Leone are still lurking in the shadows of years of 
conflict in which thousands of lives were lost and State institutions 
completely dismantled.
253
 The fragility of Angola’s future is also rooted 
in decades of conflict.
254
 Fighting is still ongoing in DR Congo, the 
Central African Republic and Mali. Many other States, Nigeria being the 
most recent one, are in the throes of violence perpetuated by the 
prevalence of SALW.  
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While weapons proliferation is a major factor in communal violence, 
impoverishment and underdevelopment,
255
 it is difficult to establish the 
percentage of weapons being circulated due to illicit trafficking, and the 
percentage of weapons coming in by sea.
256
 However, research has 
indicated that the maritime corridor is a source of illicit arms 
trafficking.
257
 Indeed, an insurgent group leader in Nigeria has been 
reported as saying that arms can easily be purchased from ships anchored 
off the coast of Nigeria.
258
 Also, speedboats are reported to be involved 
in transferring arms from ships into Guinea-Bissau, Gabon and 
Cameroon.
259
 
 
Countering illegal trafficking of weapons in the Gulf of Guinea requires 
regional and global cooperation. Such a cooperative process will also 
entail the implementation of relevant international instruments that 
addresses the issue of illegal trafficking in weapons, particularly the 
United Nations Transnational Organized Crime Convention (UNTOC)
260
 
and the Protocol against Illicit Manufacture and Trafficking in 
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Firearms.
261
  Chapter five will assess the extent to which Gulf of Guinea 
States have responded to these frameworks. It also worthy of note that 
the UN Security Council Resolution 2039,
262
 has at least, indicated the 
threat posed by illegal trafficking in weapons to the security of West 
Africa and the Sahel regions.
263
 However, this is only in the preamble as 
the subject was not addressed in the substantive paragraphs of the 
Resolution which concentrated on piracy.  
 
3.6 CONCLUSIONS 
This chapter has shown that maritime security cooperation in the Gulf of 
Guinea primarily requires a well-developed conceptual framework. As 
the analysis has revealed, however, there are key shortcomings in the 
current application of the concept of maritime security in the Gulf of 
Guinea. The chapter has developed a cooperative framework that takes 
into account the fundamental maritime security requirements of the 
region. This framework recognises three key components of the 
maritime security process: adequate national capacity, effective regional 
frameworks and viable global support. The framework also has three 
critical progress indicators: improved governance, adequate legal 
frameworks and a durable maritime security concept. The proper 
implementation of this framework to maritime security cooperation in 
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the Gulf of Guinea will yield effective outcomes and also ensure long 
term security and stability.  
 
The analysis in this chapter has also demonstrated that multiple maritime 
security threats and challenges exist in the Gulf of Guinea. Illicit drug 
trafficking, the proliferation of weapons and illegal migration by sea all 
affect the good order of the oceans, and also pose serious challenges to 
the security of Gulf of Guinea States. Furthermore, although the issue of 
depleting fishery resources has been given less priority within the 
cooperative framework of the region, it constitutes a serious threat to 
long term security and stability of the region. Finally, concerns over the 
safety and security of offshore platforms have the potential to endanger 
the socio-economic interests of Gulf of Guinea States, while at the same 
time undermining global energy security.  
 
Despite the persistent nature of these maritime security threats in the 
Gulf of Guinea, they cannot be viewed in a vacuum. Indeed, the 
pervasiveness of these security challenges suggest that governance and 
institutional frameworks are either weak or have been compromised. It 
is, in fact, a reflection of the inability of States in the region to provide 
and maintain security as a public good. The next chapter provides a case 
study of piracy and armed robbery in the Gulf of Guinea. The rest of the 
thesis examines how well the cooperative framework developed in this 
chapter is being implemented in the Gulf of Guinea region.  
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CHAPTER FOUR  
A CASE STUDY OF PIRACY AND ARMED ROBBERY 
IN THE GULF OF GUINEA    
 
4.1 INTRODUCTION  
The objective of this chapter is to analyse the nature and dynamics of the 
threat of piracy and armed robbery in the Gulf of Guinea, as well as its 
implication for regional and global security. The chapter begins by 
examining the legal and conceptual framework of piracy and armed 
robbery. This is followed by an overview of piratical attacks that have 
occurred in the Gulf of Guinea. The chapter then analyses the anatomy 
of Gulf of Guinea piracy, its evolutionary tracks and contrast the 
paradigm of Gulf of Guinea piracy with contemporary piracy concepts.  
The chapter also examines the implications of Gulf of Guinea piracy for 
regional and international security, summarises the profile of Gulf of 
Guinea piracy, and concludes with analysis of future projections.  
 
4.2  LEGAL, CONCEPTUAL AND INSTITUTIONAL ASPECTS 
OF PIRACY AND ARMED ROBBERY AGAINST SHIPS 
Although piracy and armed robbery against ships have similar maritime 
security implications, the two activities have different conceptual and 
jurisdictional ramifications. This section examines the legal, conceptual 
and institutional bases of piracy and armed robbery at sea. The first two 
sections will define and clarify the jurisdictional and conceptual 
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foundations of piracy and armed robbery at sea, while the third section 
will examine institutional approaches to the two crimes.   
  
4.2.1 Nature, Definition and Jurisdiction over Piracy 
The concept of piracy has deep historical roots and has evolved over 
time. Indeed, some ancient kingdoms and their rulers were beneficiaries 
and perpetrators of piratical activities, with pirates generally being 
regarded as noble people.
1
 However, piracy was subsequently considered 
a heinous crime and a threat to the good order of the oceans, and was 
thus outlawed in many kingdoms.
2
 This crystallised into a rule of 
customary international law that made piracy a universal crime, thus 
allowing every State to exercise jurisdiction over pirates.
3
 This principle 
of customary international law finds its most lucid expression in the 
1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).
4
 
Articles 100-107 of the Convention require State parties to cooperate in 
the repression of piracy. Article 101 defines “piracy” as: 
                                                          
1
 For an historical account of piracy, see Anne Perontin-Dumon, "The Pirate and the Emperor: Power 
and Law", in  C.R. Pennel, ed. Bandits at Sea: A Pirate Reader, New York, New York University 
Press, 2011, pp. 25-55, Daniel Heller-Roazen, The Enemy of All: Piracy and the Law of Nations New 
York Zone Books, 2009. Jack A. Gottschalk and Brian P. Flanagan, Jolly Roger with an Uzi: The Rise 
and Threat of Modern Piracy, Annapolis US Naval Institute Press, 2000. 
2
 Harry D. Gould, "Cicero's Ghost: Rethinking the Social Construction of Piracy", in  Michael J. 
Struett, Jon D. Carlson and Mark T. Nance, eds. Maritime Piracy and the Construction of Global 
Governance, New York, Routledge, 2013, pp. 23-46. 
3
 Gerhard O.W. Mueller and Freda Adler, Outlaws of the Ocean: The Complete Book of 
Contemporary Crime on the High Seas New York Hearst Marine Books, 1985, p. 288. Thomas A. 
Walker, A History of Law of Nations, vol. I, Cambridge Cambridge University Press, 1899. Terence 
Fokas, "The Barbary Coast Revisited: The Resurgence of International Maritime Piracy," University 
of San Francisco Maritime Law Journal 9 1997, pp. 427-60. 
4
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), 1833 U.N.T.S. 397. The full text of 
the Convention is reprinted in 21 International Legal Materials 1261 (1982). The Convention opened 
for signature at Montego Bay, Jamaica, on 10 December 1982, and came into force on 16 November 
1994. It has 164 ratifications as at 24 September 2012.   
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(a) Any illegal acts of violence or detention, or any act of 
depredation, committed for private ends by the crew or the 
passengers of a private ship or a private aircraft, and directed:  
(i) On the high seas, against another ship or aircraft, or 
against persons or property on board such ship or aircraft;  
(ii) Against a ship, aircraft, persons or property in a place 
outside the jurisdiction of any State;  
(b) Any act of voluntary participation in the operation of a ship or 
of an aircraft with knowledge of facts making it a pirate ship or 
aircraft; (c) any act inciting or of intentionally facilitating an act 
described in sub-paragraph (a) or (b).     
 
The above definition may appear simple at first glance, upon close 
examination, however, it becomes clear that the wording contains 
complex issues and nuances.
 
The key elements of the offence of piracy 
are therefore analysed below.  
 
4.2.1.1 A Crime of Universal Jurisdiction 
Piracy is unique in its conceptual and legal underpinnings in that it is an 
offence over which States have universal jurisdiction.
5
 Under 
international law, the jurisdiction of States may be classified into four 
                                                          
5
 Eugene Kontorovich, "Universal Jurisdiction and the Piracy Analogy," Harvard International Law 
Journal 45, 1,  2004, pp. 183-237, Jose L. Jesus, "Protection of Foreign Ships against Piracy and 
Terrorism at Sea: Legal Aspects," International Journal  of Marine and Coastal Law 18,  2003, pp. 
363-400.  
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different types - territorial, nationality, extra-territorial and universal.
6
 
The concept of territorial jurisdiction is founded on the sovereignty of 
States over their territory. According to this idea, States have control 
over all matters in their territory, thus making territorial jurisdiction the 
primary mode of jurisdiction.
7
 In exercising territorial jurisdiction, States 
have the right to enact and enforce laws and regulations, as well as 
punish those who violate such laws in their territory.
8
 In relation to 
maritime domains, coastal States enjoy similar territorial jurisdiction in 
their ports and internal waters, and pre-eminent jurisdiction in their 
territorial sea.
9
  
 
Nationality jurisdiction is based on the binding relationship between a 
State and its citizens, such that citizens remain subject to the jurisdiction 
of their State even when they are outside its territory.
10
 Similarly, States 
have jurisdiction and responsibility over vessels flying their flag, 
regardless of the location of the vessel. However, a coastal State may 
have concurrent or overriding jurisdiction where the vessel is in its ports 
or territorial sea, or otherwise engages in activities over which UNCLOS 
                                                          
6
 It is noted that there are varying views on the classification of jurisdiction under international law. 
Some commentators refer to only two types of jurisdiction - prescriptive and enforcement, preferring 
to treat territorial, nationality, extra-territorial and universal jurisdiction as examples of the exercise of 
the other two types of jurisdiction. Other writers discuss only territorial and nationality jurisdiction, 
treat the other two as exceptions. It is important to note, however, that the classification of jurisdiction 
adopted in this chapter does have the support of several commentators.    
7
 Donald R. Rothwell, Stuart Kaye, Afshin Akhtarkhavari and Ruth Davis, International Law: Case 
and materials with Australian Perspective, New York Cambridge University Press, 2011, p. 335-346.  
8
 The right to legislate is often referred to as an example of prescriptive jurisdiction, whilst 
enforcement jurisdiction refers to the right to investigate, arrest, prosecute and punish perpetrators for 
violations.  
9
 UNCLOS, Articles 2, 21, 27 and 28. See also Robin R. Churchill and Vaughan Lowe, Law of the 
Sea, Manchester, Manchester University Press, 1999 p. 71-101.  
10
 This principle was elaborated in the Nottebohn Case (Liechtenstein v Guatemala) ICJ Reports 4 
[1955].   
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vests primary jurisdiction in coastal States.
11
 However, where a vessel is 
on the high seas, only the flag State will have jurisdiction over the 
vessel, except in exceptional circumstances provided by UNCLOS.
12
  
 
Extra-territorial jurisdiction is largely a derivative of territorial and 
nationality jurisdiction, and can only be exercised in special 
circumstances. For example, an offence outside the territory of a State 
may nonetheless affect or impact on the State, thus allowing it to assume 
jurisdiction in respect of the activity.
13
 This head of jurisdiction is 
sometimes referred to as the protective principle.
14
  
 
In contrast to the other three forms of jurisdiction, universal jurisdiction 
is a unique creation of international law, vesting States with the right to 
legislate and take enforcement measures over crimes that neither relate 
to their territory nor their citizens.
15
 These crimes are considered 
heinous, and thus the objective of universal jurisdiction is to suppress or 
prevent their commission. International law has long treated piracy as a 
crime of universal jurisdiction, along with slave trading, war crimes, 
                                                          
11
 For example, the rights of coastal States in the Contiguous Zone, Article 33; in the EEZ, Articles 55 
and 73; and over the Continental Shelf, Article 77.   
12
 UNCLOS, Article 92.  
13
 See Attorney-General of the Government of Israel v Eichmann 36 International Legal Materials 5 
(1961).   
14
An example is the Barcelona Traction Case, where the ICJ upheld the right of Belgium to claim 
jurisdiction to protect the investment interest of its nationals who were principal shareholders in a 
company. Barcelona Traction Case (Belgium v Spain) ICJ Reports 3 [1970].  
15
 Rothwell, Kaye, Akhtarkhavari and Davis, International Law: Case and materials with Australian 
Perspective.  
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genocide and crimes against humanity.
16
 Pirates may therefore be 
arrested and prosecuted by the legal system of any State, irrespective of 
the flag of the vessel attacked, the flag of the vessel used to commit the 
piracy, or the nationality of the pirates.
17
 In practice, however, States 
may show reluctance in taking counter-piracy measures. This posture 
may be informed by practical constraints (including logistics), or 
dictated by a national policy that justifies prosecution of non-nationals 
only when a well-defined national interest (political, security or 
economic) is affected.
18
 Prosecution may also be stalled because of the 
inadequacy of the domestic legal framework of the State concerned.
19
  
 
4.2.1.2 Acts of Violence, Detention, Depredation and 
Facilitation  
For the crime of piracy to be made out, it must involve acts of violence, 
detention or depredation directed against a ship, goods on board the ship 
or persons on board the ship.
20
 This requirement is generally less 
                                                          
16
 Cherif M Bassiouni, "The History of Universal Jurisdiction and Its Place in International Law", in  
Stephen Macedo, ed. Universal Jurisdiction: National Courts and the Prosecution of Serious Crimes 
Under International Law, Philadelphia, University of Pennsylvania Press, 2004. Recent 
acknowledgement of the applicability of universal jurisdiction in regard to heinous crimes can be 
found in the ICJ’s ruling in Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Democratic Republic of the Congo v 
Belgium) ICJ Reports  3 [2002]. 
17
 Robin Churchill and Vaughan Lowe, Law of the Sea, Manchester, Manchester University Press, 
1999, pp.209-211. See also United States v. Brig Malek Adhel (2 How), 1844, and United States v. 
Smith, 18 (5 Wheat.), 1820.  
18
 Amber Ramsey, Barriers to Prosecution: The Problem of Piracy,  September 2011, Civil-Military 
Fusion Centre, Available: https://www.cimicweb.org/Documents/CFC%20Anti-
Piracy%20Thematic%20Papers/CFC_Anti-Piracy_Report_Prosecution_Aug_2011_FINAL.pdf, 20 
September 2013, Christiane Ahlborn, Adjudicating Somali Piracy Cases – German Courts in a 
Double Bind, ,  13 January 2013, Blog of Cambridge Journal of International and Comparative Law, 
Available: http://www.cjicl.org.uk/index.php/cjicl-blog/adjudicating-somali-piracy-cases--german-
courts-in-a-double-bind, 20 August 2013. 
19
 Diana Chang, "Piracy Laws and the Effective Prosecution of Pirates," Boston College International 
and Comparative Law Review,  2010, pp. 273-188. 
20
 UNCLOS, Art 101(a).  
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contentious than the other elements of the offence. However, it must be 
emphasised that the crime of piracy does not require that goods, property 
or money be stolen. A close reading of UNCLOS reveals that Article 101 
treats the very act of violence or depredation against a ship, its crew, or 
goods on board the ship as piratical acts, provided the other elements of 
the crime are present. Hence, domestic legislation seeking to incorporate 
the piracy provisions of UNCLOS should be broad enough to encompass 
assault, injury or damage committed in a piratical context.
21
 Article 101 
also classifies the act of inciting or intentionally facilitating piracy, as 
well as voluntary participation in the operation of a pirate ship, as 
piratical acts.
22
  
 
4.2.1.3 Committed on the High Seas  
Fundamental to the definition and exercise of jurisdiction over piracy is 
the place of the offence (locus delicti).
23
 For an act of violence or 
depredation to be classified as piracy, the activity must take place on the 
“high seas” or a “place outside the jurisdiction of any State.”
24
 In this 
context, “high seas” includes the contiguous zone and the Exclusive 
Economic Zone (EEZ),
25
 while the expression “in a place outside the 
jurisdiction of any State” contemplates regions such as Antarctica, which 
is not subject to the jurisdiction of any State.  
                                                          
21
 Eugene Kontorovich, "A Guantanamo on the Sea: The Difficulty of Prosecuting Pirates and 
Terrorists," California Law Review 98,  2010, pp. 243-76. Chang, "Piracy Laws and the Effective 
Prosecution of Pirates."   
22
 UNCLOS Art 101(b)(c).  
23
 Robin Churchill and Vaughan Lowe, Law of the Sea, Manchester University of Manchester Press, 
1999. 
24
 See generally, Thomas A. Walker, A History of Law of Nations, vol. I, Cambridge, Cambridge 
University Press, 1899. 
25
 UNCLOS, Articles 55, 58 and 88-115. 
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A recent decision by the United States Appellate Court, United States v 
Ali, involving the trial of a Somali ransom negotiator for pirates, 
provided a perceptive interpretation of the scope of the “high seas” 
requirement for an offence of facilitating piracy.
26
 In the Court’s view, 
since the phrase “on the high seas” has been used in Article 101(a) 
(which covers acts of violence or depredation), but is missing in Article 
101(c) (which focuses on inciting or facilitating the crime of piracy), the 
two sections must be interpreted differently.
27
 The Court took the view 
that while the offence of facilitating piracy must be in aid of acts 
committed on the high seas, the charge of facilitating (or aiding and 
abetting) is not contingent on the person having physically participated 
in the crime on the high seas. Rather, it is sufficient that the person has 
played a role in facilitating the offence.
28
 This reasoning may be 
criticised as overstretching the bounds of Article 101,
29
 but the 
interpretation is logical, well-grounded and a potent tool for combating 
piracy networks in a regional and global context.
30
  
 
4.2.1.4 Private Ship or Aircraft against Private Ship or Aircraft 
Another element required for the crime of piracy is what is often referred 
to as the “ship to ship” rule. This element demands that acts constituting 
                                                          
26
 United States v Ali. District of Columbia Court 11 June 2013.   
27
 United States v Ali. District of Columbia Court 11 June 2013, p.20. 
28
 Ibid. 
29
 Jonathan Bellish, The Possible Unintended Consequences of United States v. Ali,  10 July 2013, 
Blog of European Journal of International Law, Available: http://www.ejiltalk.org/the-possible-
unintended-consequences-of-united-states-v-ali/, 19 September 2013. 
30
 Jonathan Bellish, A High Seas Requirement for Inciters and Intentional Facilitators of Piracy: Jure 
Gentium and Its (Lack of) Implications for Impunity, Available: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2226030, 19 
September 2013. Douglas Guilfoyle, Piracy on dry land: now with added case law,  5 July 2013, Blog 
of the European Journal of International Law, Available: http://www.ejiltalk.org/piracy-on-dry-land-
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piracy be committed by the crew or passengers of a private ship (or 
aircraft) against another ship or aircraft. At first glance, this “ship to 
ship” requirement does not appear to create any difficulties. After all, 
piracy is a maritime crime and is thus expected to be committed at sea. 
However, this requirement excludes situations where crew members or 
passengers hijack a ship on which they are on board. It also excludes 
attacks committed on offshore installations that do not qualify as a 
ship.
31
 Examples of these types of hijacking include the Santa Maria and 
Achille Lauro. In the case of the Santa Maria, her crew mutinied and 
took control of the ship,
 32
 while the Achille Lauro was hijacked by 
persons who illegally hid within the ship.
33
 Both incidents fell outside 
the definition of piracy, although they posed serious threats to the 
security and safety of the shipping industry and the crews on board. It 
also follows that, with the exception of coastal States, the ability of 
States to invoke jurisdiction over attacks on fixed offshore energy 
platforms is circumvented, despite the strategic nature of these 
installations.
34
 Attempts to cure these jurisdictional gaps led to the 
Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of 
                                                          
31
 Douglas Guilfoyle, Shipping Interdiction and the Law of the Sea, New York Cambridge University 
Press, 2009, pp 254-259. 
32
 In 1961 the Santa Maria, a Portuguese liner carrying over 600 passengers, was seized by several 
crew members as part of a political agitation. For developments on the mutiny, see “Crew of Santa 
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33
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Maritime Navigation, 1988 (SUA 1988) and its Protocols, which will be 
analysed in the next chapter. 
  
4.2.1.5 Committed for Private Ends 
The most problematic element of the crime of piracy is the requirement 
that the act be committed for “private ends” (lucri causa).
35
 This 
requirement is problematic for two reasons. First, it is difficult to prove 
the private motive of a crime. Second, it restricts the scope of piratical 
acts, such that a person may escape conviction on grounds that the 
piratical acts were committed for public ends. The Achille Lauro incident 
is a classic example of the difficulty associated with the “private ends” 
requirement. Assuming the ship to ship requirement had been met, there 
was still the issue of whether the crime qualified as piracy, since the 
hijackers were purportedly acting on behalf of the Palestinian Liberation 
Organization.
36
 
 
The difficulties associated with the lucri causa element are exacerbated 
by the fact that UNCLOS provides no clarification as to what amounts to 
“private ends”. And although the expression has been equated with some 
kind of economic or financial motivation, there is nothing in the wording 
of Article 101 to suggest that the benefit obtained must be pecuniary in 
nature.
37
 Indeed, as Douglas Guilfoyle has argued, the expression 
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 Maximo Q. Mejia Jr, "Modern Piracy at Sea: Selected Legal Aspects," International Proceedings of 
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36
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37
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“private ends” may have been used to echo the expression “private ship” 
(which is also used in Article 101), and to clarify the fact that piratical 
acts sponsored by a State do not amount to piracy.
38
  
 
4.2.2 Armed Robbery at Sea-Nature, Definition and Jurisdiction  
In contrast to piracy, the phrase “armed robbery against ships” or “armed 
robbery at sea” (or simply “sea robbery”), denotes robberies or acts 
similar to piracy that are undertaken within the territorial sea, internal 
waters, ports or anchorages.
39
 Since the sovereignty of coastal States 
extends to these maritime spaces, jurisdiction over armed robbery 
against ships comes under the exclusive authority of these States.
40
  
 
Since the crime of armed robbery against ships comes under the 
exclusive jurisdiction of coastal States, UNCLOS has no provisions 
dealing with the offence. Therefore, the particular acts that constitute the 
crime must be expressed in the domestic legal system of coastal States.
41
 
This has both positive and negative implications. On the negative side, 
States will have varying and sometimes conflicting approaches to the 
exercise of jurisdiction which can hamper maritime security 
                                                          
38
Douglas Guilfoyle, Shipping Interdiction and the Law of the Sea, New York, Cambridge University 
Press, 2009, pp. 254-259. See also Alfred P. Rubin, The Law of Piracy, Honolulu University Press of 
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39
 Lawrence Azubuike, "International Law Regime Against Piracy," Annual Survey of International & 
Comparative Law 15, 2010, pp. 43-60. 
40
 UNCLOS, Article 2. See also Article 49 in the case of archipelagic States.  
41
 See generally Robin Geiss and Anna Petrig, Piracy and Armed Robbery at Sea: The Legal 
Framework for Counter-Piracy, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2011. 
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enforcement.
42
 Conversely, it could be argued that the exclusive 
jurisdiction of coastal States over armed robbery at sea gives such States 
the opportunity to enact their own legislation, thus circumventing the 
difficulties inherent in the definition of piracy under international law. In 
practice, however, the concept of exclusive jurisdiction has fettered 
attempts to combat armed robberies against ships. This is because the 
legislative and enforcement capacity of many coastal States is weak, yet 
sovereignty considerations proscribe unilateral intervention by other 
states.
43
  
 
4.2.3 Implications of the Somali Experience for the Future 
Development of the Law on Piracy and Armed Robbery at Sea 
As alluded to in the last paragraph, international efforts aimed at 
combating the activities of Somali pirates have been hampered by legal 
and conceptual challenges.
44
 These challenges have been compounded 
by the fact that the State of Somalia claims a territorial sea of 200 
nautical miles.
45
 Indeed, such action is inconsistent with the 12 nautical 
miles stipulated by international law, thus adding to the difficulty in 
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 Martin Murphy, "Piracy and UNCLOS: Does International Law Help Regional States to Combat 
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43
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44
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implementing counter-piracy measures. Additionally, the Somali State 
has been subject to widespread violence and instability for many years, 
and has often been without a functioning government. As a result, it has 
not been practically possible for the State to combat acts of piracy and 
armed robbery.  
 
To obviate the above legal and practical difficulties, the UN Security 
Council adopted Resolution 1846, granting authority to naval forces to 
enter Somali territorial waters and use “all necessary means” to repress 
piracy.
46
 Additional resolutions were also adopted, including Resolution 
1851, which permits the pursuit of pirates into Somali land territory.
47
 
Though the resolutions do not stipulate specific measures, their scope 
has been interpreted as including the right to seize and dispose of boats, 
vessels, arms and related equipment being used by the pirates or robbers, 
as well as the right to arrest and prosecute such offenders.
48
  
 
In maritime security literature, these resolutions have been described as 
creating the regime of “reverse hot pursuit”.
49
 Arguably, the resolutions 
reflect a progressive development in the law on piracy and armed 
                                                          
46
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robbery against ships.
 50
 This view, however, can be rebutted on grounds 
that the resolutions were meant to address a specific situation, and are 
not intended to have a wider application.
 51
 Also, since the resolutions 
required the permission of the Transitional Federal Government of 
Somalia, it is possible to argue that the resolutions merely reflect 
existing principles of international law – namely, the exclusivity of 
territorial jurisdiction, with the caveat that States have the right to waive 
their sovereignty and exclusive jurisdiction.
52
 The resolutions may also 
be construed as an exercise of the authority of the Security Council on 
matters of peace, rather than a new direction in international law.
53
 No 
matter which one of these positions is taken, the fact remains that the 
Somali resolutions have brought a new dimension to countering piracy 
and armed robbery against ships, and may be able to be replicated in 
other situations.
54
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4.2.4 Institutional Approaches to Piratical Incidents    
The International Maritime Organization (IMO) and the International 
Maritime Bureau (IMB) are the key global institutions whose activities 
are centred on ensuring the safety and security of ships. Both 
organisations collate, analyse and publish reports on piracy and armed 
robbery that are relied on globally for research and policy decisions.  
 
4.2.4.1 International Maritime Organization 
The International Maritime Bureau (IMO), previously known as the 
Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organisation (IMCO), was 
established in 1948 to regulate shipping and navigation safety.
55
 All 
coastal States in the Gulf of Guinea are members of the IMO.
56
 The IMO 
adopts the definition of “piracy” provided by UNCLOS, but has also 
formulated a definition of “armed robbery against ships”
 
which is cast in 
similar terms to the UNCLOS definition of piracy, except that it only 
applies to piratical acts landward of the outer limit of the territorial sea.
57
 
Notwithstanding the similarity of the two definitions, the IMO maintains 
separate data on the two crimes and distinguishes between successful 
attacks and attempted attacks. 
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 "Convention of the Intergovernmental Consultative Organization," 6 March 1948, 89 UNTS 48. 
Ademuni-Odeke, Protection and the Future of international Shipping, Dordretch Martinus Nihojj, 
1984.   
56
 IMO, Member States, http://www.imo.org/About/Membership/Pages/MemberStates.aspx, 17 July 
2013.  
57
 The IMO Code of Practice for the Investigation of the Crimes of Piracy and Armed Robbery 
Against Ships, adopted pursuant to Resolution A.1025(26), defines "Armed robbery against ships" as 
any of the following acts: (a) any illegal act of violence or detention or any act of depredation, or 
threat thereof, other than an act of piracy,  committed for private ends and directed against a ship or 
against persons or property on board such a ship, within a State's internal waters, archipelagic waters 
and territorial sea; (b) any act of inciting or of intentionally facilitating an act described above". See 
IMO, IMO, Resolution A.1025(26) - Code of Practice for the Investigation of Crimes of Piracy and 
Armed Robbery Against Ships( . 18 January 2010). 
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Since a definition of “armed robbery against ships” is missing under 
international law, the IMO’s definition provides an opportunity for 
member States to adopt a uniform approach to combating the crime. The 
IMO’s practice of keeping separate information on piracy and armed 
robbery is equally important for a number of reasons. Since this 
information is publicly available, a close examination of piracy trends 
can guide States and the shipping industry to take protective and 
remedial measures. Logically, the closer the incidents are to the coast of 
a State, the greater the likelihood that the perpetrators are from that State 
or have networks in that State.
58
 This will allow coastal States to take 
steps to arrest the growing piracy rates.  Ships traversing the coast or 
calling into port will also be alerted to take protective measures, while 
neighbouring States may be better placed to increase their own security 
capabilities, thus preventing the spread of piracy and armed robbery in 
the area. Moreover, in a cooperative context, continuous robberies in the 
territorial sea or port area of a particular State reflect a decline in the 
enforcement capacity of that State. Therefore, neighbouring States and 
the global community may assist the State to strengthen its capacity to 
prevent further threats to global trade. 
  
However, by mirroring the UNCLOS definition of piracy for armed 
robbery at sea, the IMO has transposed the challenges associated with 
the legal concept of piracy onto the concept of armed robbery at sea. 
Thus, member States of the organisation who fail to separate the two 
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 Section 4.4 of this chapter, however, demonstrates that piratical incidents in the Gulf of Guinea 
region defy this logic.  
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concepts may limit their legislative and enforcement jurisdiction for 
armed robbery.   
 
4.2.4.2 International Maritime Bureau 
The International Maritime Bureau (IMB) is a branch of the International 
Chamber of Commerce (ICC) that provides a wide range of services to 
the shipping industry, including marine insurance cover and risk 
analysis.
59
 Despite its private industry character, the IMB plays an 
important role in facilitating maritime traffic and preventing shipping 
related fraud. The IMO has recognised the vital role played by the IMB, 
and in 1981 urged member States of the IMO to cooperate with the IMB 
in the performance of its functions.
60
 
 
Since 1992, the IMB has monitored piracy and armed robbery offences 
through a network of reporting points, with the main centre being located 
in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia.
61
 Compared to the IMO, however, the IMB 
has a different approach to the definition and reporting of piracy and 
armed robbery offences. Though the IMB has taken note of the 
definition of “piracy” in UNCLOS, as well as the definition of “armed 
robbery against ships” formulated by the IMO, the IMB does not 
generally distinguish between the two crimes. Indeed, it simply defines 
piracy as an “act of boarding or attempting to board any ship with the 
intent to commit theft or any other crime and with the attempt to or 
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 For details on the IMB, see http://www.icc-ccs.org/icc/imb.  
60
 IMO, Resolution A504 (XII) of 20 November 1981. 
61
 See IMB Piracy Reporting Centre, http://www.icc-ccs.org/piracy-reporting-centre, 22 July 2013.  
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capability to use force in the furtherance of that act.”
 62
 Therefore, 
although the reports published by the IMB categorise maritime attacks as 
either “actual” or “attempted” attacks, they treat all incidents as piracy 
attacks, irrespective of the location of the incident.
63
  
 
The IMB’s approach of not distinguishing between reported incidents of 
piracy and armed robbery is problematic, as it confuses the jurisdictional 
powers of States. Nonetheless, the reports of the IMB, much like those of 
the IMO, provide a useful analysis of incidents that are relevant for 
understanding the trends and evolution of piracy. For this reason, the 
discussion in this thesis relies on the IMO reports as the primary basis 
for analysis, supported by the IMB reports. It should be noted, however, 
that because of the varied approaches of the two institutions, there are 
occasional discrepancies in the reports, especially in the figures showing 
the total number of attacks.  
 
4.3 OVERVIEW OF PIRACY AND ARMED ROBBERY IN 
THE GULF OF GUINEA 
Although piratical attacks form part of the history of the Gulf of 
Guinea,
64
 piracy in the region has not been a matter of global concern 
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 This definition is contained in successive IMB piracy reports. See, for example, IMB, Piracy and 
Armed Robbery Against Ships - Annual Report 2009, p. 3.  
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 Dana Dillon, "Maritime Piracy: Defining the Problem," SAIS Review 25, 1,  2005, pp. 115-64. 
64
 For example, the Ijaw and Itsekiri groups of present day Nigeria conducted raids against each 
other’s trading canoes and vessels until the Itsekiri were able to turn the tide between 1890-1900,  
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offshoots of contests between coastal kingdoms to control and influence trade and commerce. See P. 
C. Lloyd. ‘The Itsekiri in the Nineteenth Century: An Outline Social History’. The Journal of African 
History, Vol. 4, No. 2, 1963, pp. 225-6. See also Ukoha Ukiwo. ‘From ‘Pirates’ to ‘Militants’: A 
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until recently. Within a short space of time, starting from 2005, the Gulf 
of Guinea has seen a rising trend in piratical incidents. In terms of total 
figures, the number of attacks rose from 23 in 2005 to 43 in 2006, 
peaking at 60 attacks in 2007. For reasons that will be discussed in depth 
in the next section,  the number of incidents decreased to 50 in 2008 and 
36 in 2009, but have since swelled to 47 in 2010, 61 in 2011 and 56 in 
2012. Table 4.1 shows the frequency of piracy and armed robbery 
incidents in the region.     
 
Table 4.1: Piracy Statistics in the Gulf of Guinea  
 2005 
 
2006 2007 2008 
 
2009 2010 2011  2012 
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7 
In Territorial 
Sea 
4 1 8  2
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5 1
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5 8 7 
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6 
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1 
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2 
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5 
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2 
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1 
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2 
24 29 
9 
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Weapons Used   
Guns 8 
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2 
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1 
8 14 19 18 
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1 
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2 
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15 
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7 
26 
7 
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1 
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Barge  
2 7 12 8 3 8 7 8 
Container Ship 1 2 3 8 2 3 4 4 
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2 
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2 
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1
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3
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1
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4
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1
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3
9 
1
7 
23         31 60 50 36 47 61 56 
Legend: Committed (Y) and Attempted (X) 
Source: Collated by Author from IMO Piracy Reports: 2005-2012 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                    
Historical Perspective on Anti-State and Anti-Oil Company Mobilization among the Ijaw of Warri, 
Western Niger Delta’. African Affairs, Vol. 106, No. 425, p. 592. John Darnton, ‘Pirates plying 
Nigerian Seas’, New York Times, 9th January 1977.  
165 
 
It can be seen from the above statistics that piratical incidents are not just 
limited to port areas and the territorial sea, but also extend to the high 
seas. Furthermore, the trends reveal that piratical attacks in all three 
maritime areas are on the increase. Robberies in the territorial sea rose 
from 5 in 2005 to 31 in 2007. The region recorded only one attack on the 
high seas in 2005, but this number jumped ten-fold the following year, 
with the rate of successful attacks on the high seas also increasing. 
Indeed, as early as 2006 pirates hijacked a Russian oil tanker, Shkotov, 
about 60 nautical miles off Guinea, brandishing automatic rifles and 
Rocket Propelled Grenades (RPGs).
65
 In March 2011, pirates fired on 
and damaged the Star Gamma 85 nautical miles off Nigeria.
66
 It is 
important to note that 15 out of 21 high seas attacks in 2012 were 
successful, and more than half of the total attacks in 2012 were on 
moving vessels. The situation is even worse than the statistics depict, 
because unlike other regions, it is thought that only half of the incidents 
of piracy in the Gulf of Guinea are actually reported by ships’ captains 
and operators, mainly due to fears of reprisal attacks on their next visit.
67
 
Notwithstanding the limited reports, since 2009 the Gulf of Guinea 
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 The IMO report on the attack on the Shkotov (Oil Tanker, Russian Federation) gave the following 
details: the incident took place on 22/05/2006 about 60 nautical miles from Conakry. Two speedboats 
approached the ship underway and six pirates armed with automatic rifles and RPGs boarded. They 
held the cook hostage and forced him to take them to the Master's cabin. The pirates disembarked 
after forcing the Master to surrender about USD$3,000. IMO, "Reports on Acts of Piracy and Armed 
Robbery against Ships: Acts reported during May 2006," MSC.4/Circ.87, 20 June 2006.  
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 Star Gamma Bulk carrier Marshall Islands, 20/04/2011, Around 85 NM South of Lagos, Nigeria: 
Pirates in a skiff chased and fired on the ship underway. Master raised alarm, activated SSAS, sent 
distress message and increased speed. Ship sustained some bullet marks. Eventually the pirates 
abandoned the attempted boarding. See IMO, "Reports on Acts of Piracy and Armed Robbery Against 
Ships: Acts reported during April 2011," MSC.4/Circ.171,  23 May 2011. 
67
 See, page 41 of International Maritime Bureau, Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships Annual 
Report 2009. See also Neptune Maritime Security, “Analysis - Pirates Eye Share of Gulf of Guinea 
Riches,” July 29, 2011, http://neptunemaritimesecurity.posterous.com/analysis-pirates-eye-share-of-
gulf-of-guinea, 22 August 2011.  
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region has been considered the new piracy ‘hotspot’ after Somalia.
68
 
Indeed, experts have now stipulated that the area 200 nautical miles from 
the coastlines of some Gulf of Guinea States constitutes a piracy risk 
zone.
69
  
 
The above overview shows that Gulf of Guinea piracy is not a localised 
issue. Indeed, the incidents of attacks are increasing while trends are 
getting complex. There is therefore a need to have a much deeper 
understanding of the dynamics. This is examined in the next part of the 
chapter.  
 
4.4 UNDERSTANDING THE ANATOMY OF GULF OF 
GUINEA PIRACY 
This part analyses the nature and drivers of piratical attacks in the Gulf 
of Guinea. The first section categorises the Gulf of Guinea region into 
piracy hotspots and enclaves, the second section examines the immediate 
factors accounting for the rising threat of piracy in the Gulf of Guinea, 
while the third section analyses the evolution and spread of piratical 
attacks in the Gulf of Guinea.    
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 Peter J. Pham, "Africa’s Other Dangerous Waters: Piracy in the Gulf of Guinea " World defence 
Review,  3 December 2009. IMB, Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships - Annual Report 2009, p. 
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 The Joint War Committee, which specialises in maritime risk analysis, has put the coasts of Benin 
and Nigeria at the highest level of risk (known as a “war-risk zone”). The risk zone extends 200 
nautical miles from the entire coastline of Nigeria and also from parts of the coastline of Benin.  
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4.4.1 Piracy Hotspots and Enclaves 
Although the information in Table 4.1 covers the entire Gulf of Guinea 
region, two points must be emphasised when explaining the phenomenon 
of piracy in the region. First, incidents of piracy and armed robbery have 
not taken place across the whole Gulf of Guinea region between 2005 
and 2012. Second, even in areas where high incidents have been 
recorded, the nature of the attacks, as well as the trends associated with 
the attacks, have changed with time. It is therefore necessary to 
categorise the Gulf of Guinea maritime domain into piracy hotspots and 
enclaves.  
 
The categorisation of certain areas in the Gulf of Guinea as “piracy 
hotspots” is based on the frequency of incidents and the degree of 
violence employed in the attacks, while the categorisation of other areas 
in the region as “piracy enclaves” is based on where pirates are residing 
or launching their operations. This classification is depicted in Figure 4.1 
below, with “1” indicating the most dangerous coast or hotspot, and “6” 
being the least dangerous area. Primary piracy enclaves are represented 
by “PPE”, while secondary piracy enclaves are denoted by “SPE”.  
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Figure 4.1: Gulf of Guinea Piracy Hotspots and Enclaves   
 
Angola and Cape Verde receive category 6 classifications as there are 
very few reported piratical incidents off the coasts of these States. 
Moreover, there is a trend towards fewer piracy attacks off the coasts of 
neighbouring States. Incidents in category 5 States (Democratic Republic 
of Congo, Congo-Brazzaville, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea-Bissau, 
Liberia, São Tomé and Príncipe and Senegal) include theft from ships in 
ports and anchorages, as well as occasional robberies in the territorial 
sea. Attacks off the coasts of Cameroon and Equatorial Guinea have 
declined substantially since 2009, thus downgrading the piracy risk of 
these two States from category 3 to category 4. Recent multiple attacks 
in Cote d’Ivoire have increased the piracy risk of this State to category 3, 
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with Sierra Leone falling into the same category, but for a different 
reason. Although Sierra Leone has had fewer piracy attacks off its coast 
compared to Cote d’Ivoire, the nature of these attacks have been more 
violent.  
 
Guinea receives a category 2 classification due to the number and 
severity of attacks taking place. Since 2006 attacks off the coast of 
Guinea have been characterised by the heavy use of weapons and 
violence. In May 2006 two ships, Shkotovo and Maersk Belfast, were 
attacked at 60 and 25 nautical miles off the coast of Guinea by pirates 
using automatic rifles and RPGs.
70
 Though the Shkotovo was underway, 
the pirates successfully boarded the ship, showing a high level of 
sophistication. The Isola Verde (an Italian tanker) was boarded by armed 
robbers whilst underway in November 2009,
71
 and Songa Emerald (a 
Marshall Islands tanker) was attacked in February 2010.
72
 More recently, 
armed pirates attacked the Maltese vessel Constanza, anchored 20 
nautical miles off Guinea, causing damage to the ship.
73
 The frequency 
and similarity of these attacks suggests the existence of a piracy base in 
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 IMO, "Reports on Acts of Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships: Acts reported during May 
2006."  The incident involving Maersk Belfast, Chemical tanker - United Kingdom, 02/05/2006, was 
described as follows: “The chemical tanker drifting 25NM off the port received a VHF call by 
someone claiming to be from Conakry port. The caller asked the ship to rig the pilot ladder as the pilot 
was on the way. Soon after, the D/O noticed a grey boat containing five pirates being launched by a 
mother fishing vessel nearby. The pirates in the boat, armed with automatic weapons and wearing life 
jackets, pretended to be officials and demanded that the pilot ladder be lowered. As the ship was not 
expecting to berth until the following day, the Master raised the alarm and the crew activated fire 
hoses. The boat followed the ship for a while and returned to the mother ship. The Master reported the 
incident but no action was taken.” 
71
 IMB, "Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships - Annual Report 2009," pp. 70-71.   
72
 For details of the attack on Songa Emeral and other vessels in 2010, see IMB, "Piracy and Armed 
Robbery agains Ships - Annual Report 2010," pp. 65-70.   
73
 IMO, "Reports on Acts of Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships: Acts reported during August 
2012 " MSC.4/Circ.188,  29 October 2012.  
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Guinea and its surrounds, hence the State’s classification as a secondary 
piracy enclave.  
 
Nigeria, together with Benin and Togo, receive a category 1 
classification, and are thus the most dangerous coasts in the Gulf of 
Guinea. However, Nigeria stands out as the epicentre of Gulf of Guinea 
piracy, and is therefore considered a primary piracy enclave. Indeed, 
Nigeria alone accounts for 80 per cent of reported piracy incidents in the 
Gulf of Guinea.
74
 The analysis in section 4.4.3 will demonstrate the 
transformation of piracy from a specific threat in the Nigerian enclave 
into a regional threat. To appreciate this evolutionary process, it is 
important to first provide the context of Gulf of Guinea piracy showing 
the immediate dynamics that has led to the spate of piratical attacks.   
 
4.4.2 The Paradigm of Gulf of Guinea Piracy  
This section provides the answers two important questions: (i) what 
fundamentally drives piracy, especially in the primary enclave that 
accounts for over 80 per cent of reported piracy incidents in the Gulf of 
Guinea?; (ii) who are the primary actors responsible for these activities? 
Answers to these questions lie in the transmutation of an insurgency into 
a ravaging piracy network. This is analysed in the following sections.  
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For details of the frequency and severity of attacks off the Nigerian coast, see IMB, Piracy and 
Armed Robbery against Ships -Annual Reports 2005-2010. Page 26 of the IMB 2008 Report, which 
analysed global piracy trends, cited the coast of Nigeria as the area with the second highest number of 
serious attacks in the world. See also UNODC, "Transnational Organized Crime in West Africa: A 
Threat Assessment,"  February 2013, pp. 26-30.  
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4.4.2.1 The Movement for the Emancipation of Niger Delta  
The Movement for the Emancipation of Niger Delta (MEND) is a loose 
coalition of militant groups that emerged in 2005 in the Niger Delta 
Region of Nigeria, ostensibly seeking a greater share of oil revenue for 
the region.
75
 The Joint Revolutionary Council surfaced in 2006 as an 
umbrella organisation for MEND and other splinter groups;
76
 
nonetheless MEND continued to be the most dominant and cohesive of 
these insurgent groups.
77
 While MEND claims to fight for ‘community’ 
interests, intense criminality dominates its practical existence and 
activities.
78
 Indeed, expatriate workers are regularly kidnapped for 
ransom at each okrika, a MEND term representing the area or axis of 
control of a subunit or splinter group.
79
  
 
At the strategic level, the MEND insurgency gained increasing notoriety 
for attacks on critical installations in the Niger Delta region, starting with 
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 Nigeria is a Federal State and the Niger Delta region is made up of a number of Nigerian States 
including Delta State, Bayelsa State, Endo State, Ondo State and Rivers State. The swampy coastal 
areas and deep seas bordering the Niger Delta are one of the world’s richest oil and gas regions. John 
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Africana June 2012, pp. 166-81. 
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Delta People's Volunteer Force (NDPVF), and the Martyrs Brigade. The JRC was used as a platform 
to claim responsibility for attacks and release public statements. See, “Country briefing - Nigeria: 
April 2009 to March 2010,” Janes Terrorism Monitor, 7 May 2010.  
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 Stratfor Global Intelligence provides insightful analysis on the genesis and nature of MEND, see,  
Nigeria's MEND: A Different Militant Movement  19 March 2009, Stratfor Global Intelligence, 
Available: http://www.stratfor.com/analysis/20090316_nigerias_mend_different_militant_movement 
16 August  2011. Stephanie Hanson, MEND: The Niger Delta’s Umbrella Militant Group,  22 March 
2007, US Council on Foreign Relations, Available: http://www.cfr.org/nigeria/mend-niger-deltas-
umbrella-militant-group/p12920, 2 March 2010. 
78
 Ilufoye S. Ogundiya, "Domestic Terrorism and Security Threats in the Niger Delta Region of 
Nigeria," Journal of Social Science 20, 1,  2009, pp. 31-42. 
79
 Okrika is a MEND term used to describe areas of control. Each okrika is regarded as semi-
autonomous and controlled by a leader or commander. Stratfor Global Intelligence provides insightful 
analysis on the genesis and nature of MEND, see, Nigeria's MEND: A Different Militant Movement   
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onshore oil pipelines and later offshore oil platforms.
80
 The Federal 
Government of Nigeria responded with the establishment of a Joint Task 
Force (JTF) of security agencies to counter the activities of the 
insurgency. Despite the robustness of the JTF, MEND continued to be 
lethal, successfully engaging and killing government forces in multiple 
gun battles.
81
 For example, three Navy personnel were missing and 
feared dead in 2007, nine were killed in June 2008, and three were killed 
in April 2009.
82
 
 
4.4.2.2 Rising Threat and Amnesty Pact  
After almost four years of insurgent attacks, the Federal Government of 
Nigeria entered into negotiations with MEND in late 2008, resulting in a 
formal amnesty proclamation in June 2009.
83
 This rapprochement was 
influenced by the increasing threat posed by insurgents to oil security, as 
epitomised by the successful attack on the Bonga Floating Production 
and Storage and Offloading unit (Bonga FPSO) in 2008.
84
 The attack 
had serious implications for Nigeria, the wider Gulf of Guinea region, 
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 For a detailed analysis of these attacks, see pages 89-142 Mikhail Kashubsky, "Offshore Petroleum 
Security: Analysis of Offshore Security Threat, Target Attractiveness, and the International Legal 
Framework for the Protection and Security of Offshore Petroleum Installations," University of 
Wollongong, PhD Thesis 2011. 
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navy members killed in fresh attack,” AFP, 10 June 2008. “3 Nigerian navy soldiers killed, 2 gunboats 
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83
 The First Amnesty Proclamation was issued on 25 June 2009. See Oscar E. Ubhenin, "The Federal 
Government’s Amnesty Programme in the Niger-Delta: An Appraisal," Yönetim Bilimleri Dergisi 21, 
1, 2013, pp. 179-203.  
84
 For a detailed analysis of the Bonga incident and its effect on global energy and insurance 
industries, see, Mikhail Kashubsky, "Offshore Energy Force Majeur: Nigeria’s local Problems with 
Global Consequences " Maritime Studies,  May-June 2008, pp. 20-26.    
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and beyond. The Bonga attack marked a highpoint in a series of threats 
to energy security in the Gulf of Guinea, and represents a new chapter in 
global asymmetric threats.  
 
Indeed, excluding the attack on the Aban VII off the cost of India in 
2006,
85
 the Gulf of Guinea has recorded the highest number of attacks 
against offshore platforms in the world, with all such attacks taking place 
off the coast of Nigeria.
86
 The Bulford Dolphin, a mobile drilling rig, 
was attacked in April 2007 by insurgents.
87
 In May 2007 the Mystras 
was also attacked, and three days later Trident VIII was targeted.
88
 In 
addition to the physical damage and personal injury inflicted by the 
insurgents, these incidents impact on the operation of the platforms 
themselves.
89
 The attack on the Mystras was indeed very significant, as it 
marked the second FPSO attack in two years.  
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 The Aban VII was located outside the territorial sea of India and was boarded by pirates in 2006. 
IMB, "Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships - Annual Report 2006," pp. 53. 
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 Kashubsky, "Offshore Petroleum Security: Analysis of Offshore Security Threat, Target 
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These incidents boosted the confidence of the insurgents, culminating in 
the attack on the Bonga FPSO in June 2008 – a major hub of the oil giant 
Royal Dutch Shell – about 120 kilometres offshore.
90
 After the incident, 
Nigeria’s oil production dropped to the lowest in 25 years, whilst global 
oil prices soared.
91
 The Bonga incident also heightened global fears that 
even deep-sea energy installations were not safe from insurgent and 
terrorist activities.
92
 In a statement released after the attack, MEND 
affirmed that their grand objective was to disable oil export operations, 
describing the attack as a humiliating security breach for the Nigerian 
Military and warning that their “next visit [would] be different.”
93
 Soon 
after, the Nigerian Government and MEND group leaders came to the 
negotiation table and an amnesty pact was entered into. The arrangement 
involved insurgents laying down their weapons in return for monthly 
allowances and skills training.
94
  However, some commentators have 
opined that members of the insurgent leadership were accommodated in 
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content&Itemid=422, 2 January 2014.  
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luxurious hotels alongside high-ranking politicians and influential 
people, all while arrangements were being made for them to receive 
juicy financial ‘pay-offs’.
95
 
 
The amnesty led to the demobilisation of insurgent forces and the 
organisational structure of MEND, as well as a decline in its activities, 
starting from the latter part of 2008.
96
 Interestingly, in the same period 
piracy attacks in the Gulf of Guinea decreased from a high of 60 
incidents in 2007 to 50 incidents in 2008, reaching a low of 36 cases in 
2009 (as shown in Table 4.1).
97
 A review of piracy reports of the 
International Maritime Bureau (IMB) for 2009 and 2010 showed that 
there were few or no occurrences of piratical incidents in the last and 
first quarter of 2009 and 2010 respectively.
98
 However, the amnesty 
arrangement became tenuous thereafter, partly because the amnesty 
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‘cake’ had not been divided between all actors (and certainly not in sizes 
that were satisfactory to all members of the insurgency).
99
 Splinter 
groups thus announced an intention to resume normal campaigns,
100
 and 
once again piracy attacks became prevalent for the remainder of 2010. 
By the close of 2011, the Gulf of Guinea had recorded 61 piracy 
incidents, a sharp contrast to the low figures of 2009.  
 
4.4.2.3 Insurgency, Criminality, Piracy and Security Complex  
The above analysis, as well as the discussion in the next section, gives 
credence to the fact that the creeks of the Niger Delta region harbour 
dangerous pirates that threaten the security of sea lines of 
communication in the Gulf of Guinea. Components of MEND that are no 
longer pursuing their normal activities – such as attacking offshore oil 
platforms, kidnapping offshore workers for ransom and extorting money 
from oil companies, have turned to piracy as their principal criminal 
activity. This insurgent-piracy is symptomatic of the nexus that often 
exists between different kinds of organised crimes.
101
 In the case of the 
Gulf of Guinea, however, piracy is committed with impunity, and rather 
than remaining in a symbiotic relationship, insurgents have fully 
transformed into pirates.  
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While noting that piracy is crime and must be treated as such, it is still 
essential to investigate the broad scope of actions and complexities 
surrounding the piracy threat. It may for instance be argued that the 
Niger Delta piracy represents a trade-off of one element of security for 
another. The lessons of history are replete with examples of States 
adopting a range of policy options (including partnerships), that they 
would not have made but for their need to safeguard against a particular 
threat.
102
 It has been posited, for example, that in the fight against piracy 
in Somalia, Western States (including the United States), initially 
refrained from adopting robust measures against the leadership of some 
Somali clans
103
 who were known to be key sponsors of piracy.
 104
 Indeed, 
this was to prevent the disintegration of the authority and organisational 
structure of these clans, which would otherwise have created an 
exploitable power vacuum for the al-Shaabab islamist militants. Indeed, 
this example reflects the balancing of maritime security interests with 
broader security and strategic concerns.   
 
At any point in time, much so prior to the amnesty process, the Niger 
Delta insurgency posed threat to five critical security interests: the 
national security of Nigeria, the investment security of oil companies, 
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global energy security, regional security, and finally, the security of 
shipping. These five segments of security are in many ways interlinked. 
Insurgent activities impact negatively on Nigeria’s economic interests 
and stability, which are key components of national security. Insurgent 
attacks equally threaten the investment interests of oil companies, as well 
as global energy security, the safety and security of shipping, and 
regional stability. In the case of Nigeria, safeguarding national security 
becomes paramount following incidents such as the Bonga attack, with 
the security of shipping a lesser concern. Oil companies initially secured 
their investment interests by succumbing to the extortion attempts of 
insurgent groups.
105
 The amnesty arrangement then became an 
assurance, albeit a temporary one, of Nigeria’s national security, oil 
investment security, and by extension, Nigeria’s oil contribution to 
global energy security. In an effort to protect these security interests, 
regional security and the security of shipping are left in peril. This 
situation may be regarded as unintended, or viewed as Nigeria 
sacrificing one element of security interest for the other. Indeed, as far as 
the shipping industry was concerned Nigeria had “no political will to 
combat the problem of piracy.”
106
  Although this statement is open to 
varying interpretations, the shipping community was most likely 
expressing the view that there was a political nexus to the increasing 
piratical attacks. The analysis in the next section demonstrates how the 
Niger Delta piracy has evolved into a regional threat.   
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4.4.3 Evolution of Insurgent-Piracy from the Primary Piracy 
Enclave into a Regional Threat 
This section will examine the evolution of the Niger Delta insurgency 
from its origins as a primary piracy enclave (PPE) into a regional piracy 
threat. This evolution encompasses not only changes in time and space, 
but also in tactics, trends and transnational dimensions. As in many 
instances of criminal morphing, the exact dates of the transitions are 
difficult to pinpoint, but the patterns are nonetheless discernible. The 
sections that follow summarise the evolution of piracy in eight stages – 
beginning in 2005 and concluding with the hijacking of the Orfeas in 
October 2012.
107
  
 
4.4.3.1 Opportunistic Piracy    
The first phase of Gulf of Guinea piratical attacks may be described as 
“opportunistic piracy.” This taxonomy applies to piracy incidents up 
until 2005, but also extends to attacks as recent as 2007. Two-thirds of 
attacks during this period took place in ports and anchorages, 
interspersed with robberies in the territorial sea.
108
 It needs to be 
emphasised that the description of this phase as “opportunistic” is not 
based on the capability of the actors, but rather relates to sea robbery as a 
subsidiary activity. The attention of insurgents during this period was on 
attacking offshore platforms, extorting money from oil companies and 
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kidnapping expatriate workers for ransom. However, ships were also 
hijacked and crews kidnapped for ransom. 
  
Piracy reports during this period indicated that attacks in the region 
would be dominated by gangs of hijackers using speedboats and armed 
with heavy weapons. The use of speedboats can be contrasted with 
Somali piracy, where fishing vessels and skiffs are the principal 
platforms.
109
 In 2006 four crew members of the Northern Comrade (a 
Norwegian Tug) were kidnapped for ransom.
110
 In May 2007 over forty 
people armed with guns in six speedboats attacked the Dlb Cheyen. The 
Nigerian military engaged the pirates in a shootout, but the pirates 
nevertheless kidnapped the crew of the ship.
111
 In the same month 
another ship, the Oloibiri, was attacked using explosives and its crew 
were again kidnapped for ransom.
112
 It is clear from these incidents that 
in hijacking ships, the modus operandi of insurgent groups was to kidnap 
expatriate oil workers on land and offshore for ransom. Moreover, the 
level of professionalism exhibited by the pirates clearly precludes the 
possibility that such attacks were perpetrated by members of 
impoverished coastal communities. 
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4.4.3.2 Widening the Enclave  
In the same the period, and up to until 2009, there were signs of another 
trait emerging in Gulf of Guinea piracy. Unlike Somalia, where pirates 
set out hunting for victim ships,
113
 pirates in the Gulf of Guinea 
undertake calculated attacks by converging on locations of interest. 
Attacks by insurgents during this period expanded beyond the South and 
West coasts of Nigeria, with westerly swarms targeting vessels off the 
coast of Benin, while those to the south targeted ships beyond the 
neighbouring coast of Cameroon.   
 
In 2008 ten armed men in military clothing boarded the Elbia, a cement 
carrier off the Island of Bioko in Equatorial Guinea. The men identified 
themselves as Nigerian rebels, demanded food from the ship’s crew, and 
after six hours on board disembarked into speedboats.
114
 In the same 
year, heavily armed pirates with RPGs kidnapped the crew of a French 
tug off the coast of Cameroon.
115
 The 2008 IMB Piracy Report referred 
to these pirates as “Nigerian rebels,” “Nigerian militants” and 
“Protectors of the Bonny River.”
116
 It is equally instructive that the 
President of Equatorial Guinea, in alerting the international community 
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to this new piracy threat in the region, made specific reference to the 
“growing number of attacks by rebels and smugglers.”
117
  
 
The point to note is that these surges signalled the ability of insurgents to 
extend the intensity and scope of their activities. This was demonstrated 
by the alleged involvement of Niger Delta insurgents in a sea-borne 
attack targeting the Presidential Palace of Equatorial Guinea in February 
2009.
118
  The incident was the catalyst for the establishment of a sub-
regional maritime security framework by member States of the 
Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS).
119
 Despite 
the challenges confronting the ECCAS maritime framework,
120
 it 
nonetheless weakened the southern surges of rebel forces, resulting in 
fewer piracy attacks in the southern segment of the Gulf of Guinea. 
 
4.4.3.3 The Pursuits and Violence 
In 2009 insurgent piracy tactics evolved once again. Pirates started 
hunting and attacking vessels, albeit selectively, and often with a high 
incidence of violence. Once a high value target was identified, gangs of 
pirates in speedboats would shadow the vessel further out to sea, and at 
the most vulnerable location the vessel would be violently attacked. 
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These types of attacks ensured quick outcomes, while at the same time 
compensating pirates for the absence of sanctuaries where vessels could 
be kept during ransom negotiations.
121
 A review of the IMB Piracy 
Report for 2009 gives startling accounts of violence. In February 2009 
grenades were thrown at an oil tanker (the Front Chief) killing a crew 
member, while the crews of other vessels including the Emirates Swam, 
the Sevastopolskaya and the Buhta suffered serious injuries during 
similar attacks.
122
 These incidents parallel Gulf of Guinea historical 
records which show that pirates employ violence and killing to sustain 
their operations.
123
 
 
4.4.3.4 Full Scale Insurgent-Piracy  
The transition from insurgency into full-scale piracy is a post-amnesty 
phenomenon. Indeed, following insurgent disengagement from the 
amnesty deal in 2010,
124
 attacks have become more prevalent, resulting 
in a higher number of reported incidents between 2010 and 2013.
125
 
Indications of these brazen attacks include the chasing of, and firing 
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upon, the Elbtank Germany for over an hour, as well as the shadowing of 
Cape Bon for two days in both February and March 2011.
126
   
 
4.4.3.5 Mother ships and Oil Cargo  
As piracy itself has become a primary activity, as opposed to a corollary 
of another exploit, Gulf of Guinea pirates have devised new measures to 
boost their exploits. Indeed, a variant of the “mother ship” concept has 
emerged, with pirates hijacking fishing vessels to store fuel for extended 
operations, similar to Somali piracy methods. But in the case of the Gulf 
of Guinea, this technique has largely been a deception measure, allowing 
pirates to get close to target vessels without arousing suspicion. In April 
2011, pirates using skiffs chased and fired at the Star Gamma about 85 
nautical miles off Nigeria.
127
 And a month earlier an oil tanker was 
approached three times by suspected pirates in a fishing vessel.
128
  
 
Furthermore, as pirates are seeking higher and quicker returns, oil 
tankers (and particularly those that carry refined oil), have become prime 
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targets.
129
 The cargo is invariably siphoned into smaller tankers - a novel 
method of assisting piracy vessels, and then sold illegally within and 
outside the Gulf of Guinea.
130
    
 
4.4.3.6 Regional Threat and Piracy Networks - Invasion of 
Benin’s Coast  
The regional threat of piracy first became apparent following multiple 
attacks off the coast of Benin in June and July 2011. Off course, piratical 
incidents off the coast of Benin are by no means new,
131
 but unlike 
earlier cases, the June-July attacks represent an invasion of Benin’s 
coastal space. When these incidents (which are reproduced in Table 2 
below), are compared to the piracy profile analysed in the last part of this 
chapter, it is clear that Nigerian pirates have expanded the scope of their 
activities to the coast of Benin.  
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Table 4.2 Piratical Attacks off the Coast of Benin – June and July 2011 
Date Ship Description of Incident Location 
08/06/11 Aristofanis 
Chemical tanker 
 Liberia 
Armed robbers hijacked the ship at anchor and 
forced the crew to sail to an unknown location. 
Crew members were forced to discharge part of 
the cargo of the ship into another vessel. The 
robbers stole the ship’s property and escaped. 
 
Port 
14/06/11 New Ranger 
Chemical tanker  
Malta 
Robbers hijacked the ship at anchor and forced 
the Master to sail to an unknown location. The 
robbers stole the ship’s property and escaped 
Territorial Sea 
24/06/11 Paterna 
Chemical tanker  
Malta 
Twelve armed pirates hijacked the ship, taking all 
crew members hostage. The pirates sailed the 
ship to an unknown location, harassed the crew, 
then stole the ship’s cash and property before 
escaping 
 
High Seas 
24/06/11 Sp Atlanta  
Tanker 
Marshall Islands 
Ten 10 robbers armed with guns and knives in a 
speed boat approached the ship at anchor. Four 
robbers boarded and stole the ship's cash and the 
crew's personal belongings. Some crew members 
were threatened while others were beaten 
 
Territorial Sea 
24/06/11 Silvaplana  
Tanker 
Greece 
Four robbers in a speed boat boarded the ship 
during ship-to-ship operations. They captured the 
2nd engineer and the Master and beat them. They 
also stole the ship’s property and the crew's 
personal 
belongings before escaping 
 
Territorial Sea 
30/06/11 Freja Hafnia  
Product tanker 
Singapore 
Armed robbers in a speed boat boarded the ship 
during ship-to-ship operations. The robbers stole 
the ship’s property and the crew's personal 
belongings 
 
Territorial Sea 
06/07/11 Varg Star  
Tanker 
Bahamas 
Ten robbers armed with guns attempted to board 
the ship at anchor using a hook attached to a rope. 
Alert crew raised the alarm. Master sent Mayday 
message via VHF and informed Cotonou signal 
station and the Navy. The next day the same 
robbers attempted to board the ship. The crew 
were alerted and parachute flares were fired. The 
pirates escaped 
 
 
Territorial Sea 
16/07/11 Aegean Star 
Product tanker 
Liberia 
Armed robbers in a boat boarded the ship at 
anchor. The robbers remained on the ship for 63 
hours. Some crew members were injured. The 
robbers stole the ship's cargo and damaged 
navigation and radio equipment 
 
Port 
24/07/11 Rbd Anema E Core  
Product tanker 
Italy 
Armed pirates hijacked the ship during ship-to-
ship 
operations, taking 23 crew members hostage 
High Seas 
31/07/11 Gotland Sofia 
Chemical tanker  
Bahamas 
Ten robbers armed with guns boarded the 
ship at anchor during ship-to-ship operations. The 
robbers fired towards the bridge. The crew 
retreated to the engine room until the robbers left 
the vessel. 
 
Territorial Sea 
Source: IMO Piracy Reports June and July 2011 (MSC.4/Circ.173, 11 July 2011 and MSC.4/Circ.174, 8 August 
2011) 
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Two significant trends have emerged from the incidents above, the first 
of which defies normal risk analysis regarding the safety and security of 
ships. It is customary for ships in port areas to be shielded from violent 
piratical activities, and crews in these areas will normally lower their 
security threshold, risking only minor robberies and minimal violence 
usually perpetrated by intrastate criminals. However, the description of 
incidents in Table 4.2 challenges that assumption, with pirates actively 
entering port areas to hijack vessels. In the case of the Aristofanis, the 
tanker was subsequently sailed to open seas where its cargo was 
discharged onto another vessel.  
 
The second piracy trend that has emerged from Benin is the growing 
network of transnational criminals in the Gulf of Guinea. This is evident 
from the report on the hijacking of the Duzgit Venture in April 2011, as 
reported in the IMB Annual Piracy Report. Fourteen pirates in two boats 
boarded the tanker underway, took control of the vessel and ordered the 
Master to sail to Gabon. The captain was forced to sail the vessel all the 
way to the coast of Gabon, where the pirates planned to transfer the oil 
onto a barge. Having failed to meet with the barge, the captain was 
forced to sail off Warri, Nigeria, to lighter the cargo. After a series of 
unsuccessful attempts to get a vessel to transfer the cargo, the pirates 
disembarked into fast boats, kidnapping the captain and another crew 
member.
132
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This incident reflects the growth in piracy networks in the Gulf of 
Guinea, networks that facilitate the sale of stolen cargo. The pirates were 
clearly working in conjunction with other actors located 4,000km from 
the point of the hijacking, with the pirates successfully commandeering 
the hijacked ship across the coastal spaces of five States.  
 
4.4.3.7       Togo in the Claws-Consequences of Operation Prosperity   
The piratical invasion of the coast of Benin had a staggering impact on 
the State’s economy. Indeed, insurance companies declared the coast of 
Benin a high-risk zone.
133
 As a result, shipping activities plummeted, 
with the port sustaining a revenue loss of US$81 million in 2011.
134
  The 
State’s fishing industry also received a heavy blow, losing US$1 million 
a month.
135
 The President of Benin took two diplomatic steps in response 
to the crisis. At the multilateral level, he sent a request to the UN 
Secretary General requesting the support of the international community 
to fight piracy off the coast of Benin.
136
 Second, he sought the support of 
his counterpart in Nigeria to combat transnational crime, especially 
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piracy.
137
 In August 2011, the two States launched joint patrols, code-
named Operation Prosperity.
138
  
 
Within months of Operation Prosperity being launched, a UN Secretary 
General Assessment Team that had been dispatched to the Gulf of 
Guinea observed that the joint patrols had led to a reduction in piracy 
attacks off the coast of Benin.
139
 This was corroborated by the Military 
Chief of Benin in a separate interview.
140
 However, these assessments 
failed to view the progress made in a regional context. The fundamental 
question that should have been asked is: what has been the effect of 
Operation Prosperity on the region’s immediate neighbours – namely, 
Nigeria and Benin? Table 4.3 is a compilation of selected piracy cases 
from the coasts of Nigeria to Cote d’Ivoire from June 2011 to August 
2012.  
Table: 4.3    Piracy Incidents in Togo Involving Gangs with Guns and Speed 
Boats within 1 year of Operation Prosperity  
 
2011 2012 
 Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec Jan Feb  Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug 
Nigeria - 1 1 - 3 - 1 3 3 2 - 2 3 1 1 
Benin 6 4 3 2 - - - - 1 - - - - 1 - 
Togo - - - 5 1 - - - - - 4 - - 3 3 
Source: Compiled by Author from IMO Reports  
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Although the data in the Table is limited and does not unequivocally 
point to one conclusion, it nevertheless shows a rise in piracy incidents 
off the coast of Togo – thus signalling another phase in Gulf of Guinea 
piracy. Indeed, since the launch of Operation Prosperity there has been a 
steady decrease in piracy incidents off the coast of Benin, but also a 
corresponding rise in piratical cases off the coast of Togo.
141
 
Interestingly, attacks off the Togolese coast coincide with few or no 
reported incidents off the coasts of Nigeria and Benin. Some of these 
attacks have occurred deep in the port areas of Togo, similar to the 
earlier attacks in the port of Benin.
142
 On 4 April 2012, ten robbers in a 
boat attempted to board a ship in port, but having been detected, the 
pirates moved towards a different ship; meanwhile another speedboat 
with robbers moved towards a third ship.
143
 On 12 April 2012, robbers 
armed with machine guns attacked a ship in the territorial sea of Togo, 
and less than three weeks later, a product tanker hijacked off the coast of 
Togo was sailed to an unknown location, only to be released five days 
later.
144
 These incidents suggest that Operation Prosperity has actually 
pushed piratical attacks further to the west.  
 
This phenomenon has been made easier by the short coastlines of Benin 
and Togo, tactically allowing pirates to treat the two coasts as a single 
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operational space. This is demonstrated by two reported incidents in 
September 2011. On 14
 
September at 4.15am, armed robbers attacked 
the Abu Dhabi Star, a Singapore flagged chemical tanker, a few nautical 
miles off Lome, Togo, but aborted the attack after being noticed. Four 
hours earlier, at 23.52pm, two gangs of pirates had hijacked tankers 
undertaking ship-to-ship operations, the Mattheos I and the Northern 
Bell, 62 nautical miles off Benin. The pirates succeeded in sailing the 
Mattheos I to an unknown location, but the crew of the Northern Bell 
regained control of the ship. Taking into account the time, location and 
distance between the two incidents, it is likely that that the same gang 
that aborted their attack on the Northern Bell off Benin sailed towards 
Togo, setting their sights on the Abu Dhabi Star.  
 
4.4.3.8 Cote d’Ivoire under Siege – Nowhere is Safe  
The hijacking of the Orfeas in October 2012 marks the seven-phase 
evolution of piracy from a primary enclave in the Niger Delta into well 
entrenched regional piracy. Figure 4.2 illustrates the hijacking of the 
vessel and its movements thereafter.
145
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Figure 4.2:   The Hijacking of the Orfeas  
 
Source: Maritime Bulletin, 9 October 2012, posted at 
http://www.odin.tc/news/read.asp?articleID=1419, accessed 9 December 2012.     
 
 
The Orfeas was hijacked on 6 October 2012 off Cote d’Ivoire. After 
gaining control of the vessel, the pirates sailed over 2,000km to the coast 
of the Niger Delta, stole the ship’s oil cargo, and released the vessel two 
days later.
146
 This incident shows that attacks in the western area of the 
Gulf of Guinea are becoming more brazen. The incident encapsulates 
most of the tactics already discussed, but also brings to the fore the 
additional sophistication of Gulf of Guinea piracy. Soon after the 
hijacking, the pirates drew the vessel into deeper seas. This allowed them 
sufficient time to make contact with their criminal networks, while at the 
same time ensuring the ship was out of reach of a possible rescue. In 
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December 2012, armed pirates with machine guns attacked another oil 
tanker in the port area of Cote d’Ivoire.
147
  
 
It is clear from the above analysis that piracy in the Gulf of Guinea is 
well established. Therefore, though the numbers of attacks in the region 
are still less, when compared to the figures recorded in the highpoints of 
the piracy situations in Somalia and Indonesia, it is essential for the 
paradigm of Gulf of Guinea piracy to be examined in the context of 
contemporary piracy concepts. This will illuminate relationship between 
piratical dynamics in the Gulf of Guinea with the broader global 
understanding.  
 
4.5 SITUATING GUINEA PIRACY WITHIN 
CONTEMPORARY PIRACY THEORIES AND PROVIDING FOR 
THE GOVERNANCE DIMENSION  
 
A number of theories aimed at explaining the causes and drivers of 
piracy have been proposed.  Four concepts have particularly gained 
prominence: (i) piracy as a social problem; (ii) piracy as a symptom of 
failed states; (iii) the business model of piracy; and (iv) the piracy cycle. 
The analysis below demonstrates  the relevance and limitations of 
applying these theories to Gulf of Guinea, and then provides the 
                                                          
147
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governance dimensions to Gulf of Guinea piracy which though relates to 
some of the theories still has distinctions on its own.   
 
4.5.1 Piracy as a Social Problem   
The social theory of piracy, which is divided into classical and 
revisionist camps, argues that poverty is the primary driver of piracy.
148
 
The classical argument is that piracy represents an uprising of 
disadvantaged and impoverished coastal communities against those that 
enjoy major benefits from the sea, especially maritime trade.
149
 The 
revisionist camp supports the classical hypothesis, while asserting that 
poverty creates a malignant environment that is exploited by pirates and 
criminal networks.
150
  
 
The social theory of piracy has been used to account for piracy both in 
Indonesia and Somalia.
151
 In the case of Somalia, it has been argued that 
following the overthrow of the Siad Barre regime in 1991, poverty 
became endemic, mainly due to the collapse of fishing cooperatives that 
previously employed local fishermen and supported the livelihood of 
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coastal communities.
152
 Moreover, foreign fishing trawlers began to 
illegally plunder the rich fishing grounds off Somalia, and toxic waste 
from European industrial plants started being dumped off the Somali 
coast.
153
 In light of these events, local fishermen formed vigilante groups 
to protect the Somali coast. This public motive gave way to private 
interest and eventually criminality, especially when it became clear that 
accepting bribes from those involved in the illegal fishing and dumping, 
as well as theft and extortion, provided lucrative sources of income.
154
 
Proponents of the social theory also refer to correspondence from the 
Transitional Federal Government to the United Nations Security Council 
(UNSC), with Somali authorities asserting that the illegal exploitation of 
Somali resources by foreign fishing interests served to legitimise piracy 
activities among the local population.
155
  
 
Applying the social theory to the piracy situation in the Gulf of Guinea 
has both strengths and limitations.  Poverty, unemployment and illegal 
fishing are major issues confronting the region, and indeed have 
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implications for ocean resource management and stability.
156
 But, there 
is neither evidence of a direct link between poverty in coastal 
communities and piracy, nor the direct engagement of unemployed 
fishermen in piracy. The closest example of this assertion, are threats 
made by Senegalese fishermen in March 2012 to resort to piracy if the 
government failed to address issues of illegal fishing and foreign fishing 
licenses.
157
 Therefore, the classical formulation of the social theory 
which places emphasises on poverty, inadequately explains the 
increasing threat of piracy in the Gulf of Guinea. However, the 
restatement of the social theory by revisionist camp is of relevance to the 
piracy syndrome in the Gulf of Guinea. The analysis in sections 4.3 and 
4.4 demonstrates that the Niger Delta insurgency is a product of socio-
political dynamics in the Niger Delta region. There are two possible 
classification of the insurgency: it may be regarded as a legitimate 
process that became criminal; or a criminal group that exploited a 
legitimate process.
158
 Both of these descriptions accords with the 
revisionist school of the social theory.   
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4.5.2 Piracy as a Symptom of Failed States 
The social theory of piracy is often discussed alongside a second 
construct – one that seeks to account for piracy by viewing it is a 
symptom of “failed states.”
159
 According to this theory, pirates are non-
state actors (along with mafia groups, militias and drug cartels) that 
spring up and thrive due to state failure.
160
 Somalia has again served as 
the perfect testing ground for this theory.
161
 During the period that 
Somali pirates caused havoc with international shipping, the Somali 
State had been divided into territories and controlled by combatants and 
other groups that generally lacked domestic, regional and international 
legitimacy to combat crime, including piracy.
162
 The international 
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community also had difficulty responding to the situation, as no 
engagement could be made with legitimate authority.
163
  
 
While noting that the concept of “failed state” is a contested subject,
164
 
there are linkages to draw from the “failed state” rankings of some Gulf 
of Guinea States with piracy dynamics in the region. Nigeria has 
systematically slipped from a relatively strong position of number 54 in 
2005 to number 14 in 2011, thus joining the top twenty fragile countries 
in the global “failed state” ranking.
165
 During the same period piratical 
attacks, as shown by the statistics and analysis in this chapter, has 
steadily increased to a high point in 2011.  It is equally important that 
Guinea, which is the secondary piracy enclave in the Gulf of Guinea, has 
equally ranked in the top twenty of fragile countries of the world since 
2005.
166
 Piracy in the Gulf of Guinea can therefore be situated within the 
“failed state” concept.  
 
The above deduction may equally be queried on the basis of the same 
statistics and trends that has been analysed earlier. As illustrated in 
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Figure 4.1, piratical incidents off the coasts of the Democratic Republic 
of Congo (DR Congo), Guinea-Bissau and Liberia are generally limited 
to robberies in ports, yet these States are among the most fragile in the 
Gulf of Guinea.
167
 Indeed, DR Congo has consistently been placed in the 
top five “failed states” of the world from 2005 to 2011,
 168
 but has low 
incidents of piracy. Nonetheless, this contrast should not dismiss the 
application of the “failed state” concept to the Gulf of Guinea; first 
because the correlations in the case of Nigeria and Guinea are too strong 
to disregard; and second, the concept is better explained when viewed in 
the context of governance. This is examined below after analysing the 
“business model” and “piracy cycle” concepts.  
 
4.5.3 Business Model of Piracy 
Research into the world of Somali piracy has revealed that piratical 
activities are supported by transnational networks of individuals, groups 
and even professionals.
169
 Some of these networks provide funds to 
sustain piracy, while others supply logistical equipment including 
weapons, Global Positioning Systems (GPS) and fuel directly to 
pirates.
170
 In return, financiers profit from the ransoms extorted by 
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pirates, which is estimated to be in the millions of dollars.
171
 However, 
does the business model of piracy fit into the case of the Gulf of Guinea?  
 
The classical case of the Somali piracy business which operated along 
the lines of ransom payments does not fit well into the Gulf of Guinea. 
Although there are multiple cases of crews being kidnapped, with pirates 
demanding ransom payments for their release,
172
 it is very doubtful 
whether the quantum and frequency of money extorted could sustain a 
piracy business model of the Somali type.  The analysis of the evolution 
of piracy in section 4.4.3, however, points to a different piracy business 
model in the Gulf of Guinea, which is based on the hijacking of oil 
tankers and selling the cargo.
 173
  Indeed, oil tankers are prime targets of 
pirates and there is a growing organised criminal market within and 
outside the Gulf of Guinea that facilitates the crime.
174
  
 
4.5.4 The Piracy Cycle 
The last of the four theories, the piracy cycle, has been used by both 
historical and contemporary researchers to explain the phenomenon of 
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piracy.
175
 The hypothesis underlying this theory is that piratical activities 
often go through a criminal cycle, starting with attacks by “coastal 
peasants” who, over time, aggregate into “organized groups” and 
threaten the security of shipping, until they are ultimately defeated by 
powerful navies.
176
  
 
As with the other theories, the piracy cycle theory has limitations when 
applied to the Gulf of Guinea, nonetheless, it is still of relevance in 
understanding the piracy dynamics in the region. The classical 
hypothesis of concept will not fit into the Gulf of Guinea because the 
analysis of trends and evolution does not show attacks by “coastal 
peasants” graduating into “organized groups.” In fact, even if we liken 
attacks by “coastal peasants” to robberies in ports (which researchers 
often refer to as “subsistence piracy”),
177
 the inadequacy of the piracy 
cycle theory becomes clear. This is because the statistics in Table 4.1 do 
not exhibit a gradual transformation of robberies in ports or coastal 
surrounds into full scale offshore piracy. More so, the MEND insurgency 
cannot also be described as “coastal peasants.” The relevance of the 
piracy cycle, however, lies in analysis of the evolution of piracy 
discussed in section 4.4.3. In the context of the wider region and the 
global community, the Niger Delta piracy is a localised crime or threat 
that has become a threat to regional and international security.  
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4.5.5 The Governance Factor in Gulf of Guinea Piracy 
While the four piracy theories discussed above have relevance in 
explaining current and future trends of piracy in the Gulf of Guinea, it is 
better to account for the rising threat of piracy from the broader political 
and governance-based dynamics of the region. Indeed, chapter six will 
examine the governance nexus to maritime security in general terms. 
However, in order to fully explain the piracy paradigm in the Gulf of 
Guinea, the governance nexus should also be discussed here.   
 
The 2006 United Nations Niger Delta Human Development Report 
provides an incisive description of the socio-economic conditions of the 
people of the Niger Delta.
 178
 The Report noted that the region has 
“dismal health and health service delivery”, that the people are living in 
“predominantly poor quality [housing]”, and that nearly all school 
facilities are in “a state of extreme disrepair”. The Report summed up the 
situation by stating that there was increasing “disillusionment and 
frustration” among inhabitants in the region, as well as “deepening 
deprivation and environmental devastation” across the Niger Delta.
179
 
Considering the tremendous amount of oil wealth generated by the Niger 
Delta region, the dismal social picture painted by the UN Report is 
difficult to comprehend.  However, for the people of the Niger Delta 
resentment would be at its height in such an environment, leading to 
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restiveness, conflict and crime.
180
 This brings the piracy anatomy in the 
Niger Delta close to the sociological school that seeks to explain piracy 
from the point of view of social issues. 
 
However, it is the author’s view that while each of four piracy concepts 
offers insights into the piracy situation in the Gulf of Guinea, a 
governance approach provides an all-embracing explanation and 
analytical framework to the piracy paradigm in the Gulf of Guinea. 
Indeed, the governance-maritime security nexus is important for 
understanding the causality of threats and also for devising appropriate 
responses to the plethora of maritime security threats in the region. As 
analysed in chapter two, Nigeria is among the top oil producing 
countries in the world, receiving millions of dollars in oil revenue each 
year. Thus, it is the failure of successive governments to sufficiently 
carter for the governance and developmental needs of the people that has 
resulted in the poor socio-economic conditions in the Niger Delta.
181
 In 
fact, some research suggests that the quantity of oil that has been spilled 
in the Niger Delta region from oil exploitation in the last fifty years
 182
 is 
more than fifty times the volume of the oil that spilled from the Exxon 
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Valdez accident of 1989 - one of the greatest environmental disasters the 
world has ever witnessed.
183
 This poor environmental management has 
led to serious pollution and environmental degradation, limiting the 
opportunity of people to earn a living from both farming and fishing 
grounds.
184
As shown by the analysis in the earlier sections, it was only 
after insurgent attacks starting posing a threat to the economic security of 
Nigeria (and also global energy security), that an amnesty process was 
initiated. Therefore, bad governance lies at the centre of the piracy 
problem; not just of social issues but also of environmental stewardship. 
Chapter six will analyse the facets of this governance deficit in the Gulf 
of Guinea. 
 
4.6  IMPLICATIONS OF GULF OF GUINEA PIRACY FOR 
REGIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY 
Although the Niger Delta insurgency, which accounts for a substantial 
number of piratical attacks in the Gulf of Guinea, has its roots in 
insurgency, there is no doubt that ‘insurgency’ now qualifies as ‘piracy’ 
in both legal and practical contexts. The analysis has demonstrated that 
vessels are attacked for the economic and personal benefit of the 
perpetrators. Ransom payments are exacted, equipment, money and 
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personnel effects are rampantly stolen, and increasingly part or all of a 
vessel’s cargo (especially refined oil), is siphoned and sold within and 
outside the Gulf of Guinea.  
 
This penultimate section of the chapter examines the impact and 
implication of piracy and armed robbery in the Gulf of Guinea. Although 
the analysis will compile the trends and developments that have emerged 
from the rest of the chapter, the discussion will be conducted within the 
context of the dimensions and levels of security examined in chapter 
three.    
 
4.6.1 Transportation Security  
Guaranteeing the safety of shipping has been a traditional concern for 
maritime security, but advancements in technology and the advent of 
globalisation has added new dimensions and challenges to this task.
185
 
The security of international shipping now depends on multiple factors, 
including effective performance of flag State responsibilities, efficient 
managers and operators, as well as reliable and affordable insurance. 
However, the safety and security of ships and their crew remain the 
fundamental requirement for maritime transportation security. Table 4.4 
contains information on 43 vessels belonging to sixteen different flag 
States that were attacked and boarded in the Gulf of Guinea in 2012 
alone.  
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Of particular interest is the column that specifies high risk activities 
associated with the attacks. Indeed, in almost all the attacks the safety 
and security of the ship and its crew were put at serious risk. The 
piratical attacks outlined in the table resulted in multiple injuries, 
kidnappings, as well as the death of three crew members. Moreover, the 
prevalent use of weapons (including explosives) in the commission of 
the crimes represents an aggravating risk factor. Many of ships suffered 
damaged to their hull, and in most cases, the navigation and 
communication equipment of the vessels was damaged, disabled or 
stolen. 
 
Table 4.4: Nationality of Vessels Attacked in 2012 
Flag State/ No. of 
Vessels 
Names of Vessel Risk Activities 
Bahamas - 2 Withheld, Orfeas Firing, Comms equipment 
damage  
Curacao  - 2 Breiz Klipper, UAL Transporter Injuries, kidnapping, firing, 
damage  
Denmark-2 Withheld, Withheld  
Germany Olivia  Injuries  
Isle of Man/UK -1 Energy Centurion  Firing  
Italy - 1 Asso Ventuno Kidnapping  
 
Liberia - 8 
Hansa Cloppenburg, Gallia, Zouzou, 
Hellespont Drive, SCF Provider, 
Ermer,  
Withheld, Wappen von Hamburg   
Ship equipment stolen  
Navigation equipment damaged  
Luxemburg - 1 Bourbon Liberty   
Malta - 3 Grand, Costanza, Marciana Vessel damage 
Marshall Islands - 2 Argos, SP Brussels  
Nigeria WAO Brass  
Norway-1 Spar Rigel  Firing   
 
Panama - 8 
Saphina, BW Rhine,Fourseas, 
Emmanuel 
Geo Endeavour, Madonna , Nord 
Sincere,  
Anuket Emerald 
Death, injuries, firing   
Vessel damage  
Comms equipment damage 
Philippines -1  Season Trader Vessel damage 
St Kitts & Nevis - 2 Stormbas II Jascon 33 2 deaths, injuries,  
 
Singapore -7 
Pacific Amethyst, Ursula, Ark Charly 
, 
Pacific Retriever, Maersk Harmony, 
Pacific Raider,  Abu Dhabi Star 
Comms equipment disabled  
Source: IBM Annual Piracy Report 2012.  
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4.6.2 Global Trade and Economy  
In addition to impairing the safety and security of shipping, piracy and 
armed robbery negatively impacts on global trade and economic 
development. While international law requires a ship to sail under the 
flag of one State,
186
 in practice a single ship can represent layers of 
different interests cast around multiple States. For example, the 
nationality of the beneficial owner of a ship is often different from the 
ship’s flag State. Moreover, the ship may be financed, managed and 
insured by individuals or companies in another state, and manned by a 
crew of multiple nationalities. A further layer of complexity is added if 
one considers that ships on international voyages often carry cargo to 
multiple destinations, particularly in the case of containerised shipping 
and bulk cargo ships transporting crude oil.   
 
Each of the above interests represents a layer of corporate and national 
investment that aggregates into a global economic trade interest. As a 
result, a threat to any of these interests translates into a global economic 
cost. This explains why piracy and armed robbery constitute a major 
threat to the global economy. Piratical incidents affect the timely 
delivery of goods and also lead to higher insurance premiums. Money is 
also lost through ransom payments, and ships incur extra security costs 
when purchasing additional equipment and/or employing maritime 
security guards. Furthermore, in an attempt to avoid pirates, ships burn 
extra fuel, increasing operational costs even further. Although there is no 
consensus on the exact cost of piracy to the global economy, one report 
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conducted in 2012 put the annual cost of Somali piracy at between 
US$0.9 to 3.3 billion per annum.
187
 A similar report commissioned by 
the One Earth Future Foundation in 2011 put the combined cost of 
piracy at between US$6.6 to $6.9 billion per annum.
188
  
 
4.6.3 Energy Security 
The analysis in chapter two demonstrated the global reliance on the Gulf 
of Guinea region as a current and future source of energy security. To 
ensure the continuous delivery of oil and gas supplies to the international 
market, good order at sea is paramount. This includes safe drilling and 
exploration for reserves, as well as securing production infrastructure 
and transportation networks. An important point demonstrated by the 
analysis of the evolution of piracy and armed robbery in this chapter is 
the interrelated risk posed by insurgency and piracy to the security of 
shipping and critical offshore energy infrastructure. 
 
Piracy and armed robbery disrupt the production activities of oil 
platforms, and also impact greatly on the safety of oil tankers. In turn, 
this affects the availability of oil supplies to the international market. For 
example, as a result of the attack on the Bonga facility in June 2008, 
Nigeria’s oil production dropped substantially, pushing up already 
volatile oil prices from US$110 per barrel in May that year to US$130 in 
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July.
189
 Top energy experts have therefore described insecurity in the 
Gulf of Guinea as a key threat to global energy security.
190
 
 
4.6.4 Economic Losses and Food Security in the Gulf of Guinea 
Threats to maritime transportation and energy resource investments will 
undoubtedly have ramifications for economic and food security in the 
Gulf of Guinea. As indicated earlier, port revenue in Benin declined by 
US$81 million in 2011 due to piratical attacks, with the country’s fishing 
industry suffering a US$1 million a month loss in the wake of the 
attacks.
 191
 Indeed, Nigeria’s Maritime Administration estimates the 
State’s financial loss due to pirate activities to be US$3.5 billion 
annually.
192
 
 
The rise in piratical attacks is also pushing up the cost of shipping in the 
Gulf of Guinea. In August 2011, Lloyds and other insurers placed part of 
the Gulf of Guinea in the same high-risk category as Somalia.
193
 The 
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International Transport Workers Federation (ITF) similarly declared the 
Gulf of Guinea to be a high risk area when reviewing the wages and 
working conditions of crews.
194
 Available figures show that in the case 
of Somalia, insurance costs alone increased from US$500 per voyage in 
2008 to US$20,000 in 2009 because of piracy.
195
 It is important to note 
that these are the direct (and thus easily verifiable) costs associated with 
piracy. The real economic and social costs of piracy are much higher. 
Furthermore, as analysed in chapter two, Gulf of Guinea States depend 
heavily on imports. Therefore, high shipping costs will translate into 
more expensive prices for imported goods, including food, which may 
result in a worsening of social and economic conditions.  
 
A second overlap between piracy and food security in the Gulf of Guinea 
can be seen in the attacks on fishing vessels. In 2007 the Agricultural 
and Allied Workers Union of Nigeria reported that over forty-four 
fishing personnel had been killed by pirates, and that fishing vessels had 
routinely been robbed of their goods and property.
196
 Subsequently, in 
2008, the Association withdraw over 170 fishing vessels from service 
due to the increasing threat to the security of its members, and as a form 
of protest against the lack of protection being afforded by Nigeria’s 
Federal Government.
197
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4.6.5  Regional and National Security 
All the threats analysed above ultimately impact on the national security 
of individual Gulf of Guinea States, as well as the security of the region 
as a whole. However, such threats also have the capacity to directly 
affect national and regional security.  
 
A general way of stating this fact is to say that piracy, like all criminal 
activities, undermines national security. But there are more nuanced 
ways of analysing the nexus, and MEND provides a good example. Even 
when piratical attacks were in their infancy, and regarded as 
opportunistic, they still posed significant national security threats. As 
these attacks increased in sophistication, involving not only theft but 
extortion attempts, kidnapping and ransom demands, they provided a 
source of funding for insurgents, allowing them to sustain their 
livelihoods. As a result, insurgent groups were able to focus on their 
primary objective – creating political instability, thereby creating more 
serious security threats.  
 
The second point to note is that piratical attacks should be seen as both a 
transitional and growing threat. Indeed, this can be seen in the case of 
insurgents practicing the rudiments of piracy as part of their political 
campaigns, and later turning to it on a full-time basis. National security 
assessors may have disregarded piracy’s incubation period as of little 
consequence, but that in itself has become a national and regional 
security threat. It is important to note that there is always a tendency for 
transnational crimes to blend together or overlap with each other. Indeed, 
212 
 
there are already reports of insurgents in the Niger Delta accepting 
cocaine as payment for undisclosed services.
198
 Drug traffickers could 
thus start using the services of pirates to ferry drugs in their speedboats, 
in a similar way that fishermen are currently used to transport drugs in 
the region.
199
 These are threats and trends that have serious implications 
for national and regional security. But the situation has the capacity to 
become even more complex. 
 
In 2009, maritime security concerns in the Gulf of Guinea came to a 
head following an alleged sea-borne attack targeting the Palace of the 
President of Equatorial Guinea. The attackers were thought to be 
insurgents from Niger Delta who regularly engaged in piracy activities in 
neighbouring coasts.
 200
 The incident also generated tensions between 
Equatorial Guinea and Cameroon, leading to a temporary suspension of 
trading activities between the two States. This was because the attackers 
were said to have sailed from, and retreated to, a port in Cameroon.
201
 
 
A 
second incident occurred in Cameroon in 2011, when Niger Delta pirates 
and insurgents attacked and robbed a bank, killing several people in the 
process.
202
 Although the perpetrators of these incidents may not always 
be identified and brought to justice, one thing is known: the incidents 
highlight the interface of attacks between ships and offshore assets, 
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creating a new, seaborne asymmetric threat to national and regional 
security.
203
  
 
4.7 PIRACY PROFILE AND FUTURE PROJECTIONS  
Given the far reaching implications of piratical attacks in the Gulf of 
Guinea, effective counter-piracy measures must be adopted by regional 
States and international community to address the situation. Indeed, 
counter-piracy initiatives in the Gulf of Guinea must take into account 
the emerging piracy profile of the region. The modus operandi of pirates 
must also be understood, and emerging trends closely monitored. 
Therefore, this concluding section summarises the piracy profile in the 
Gulf of Guinea as well as the future projections. 
 
4.7.1 Profile of Niger Delta Pirates  
By the close of 2012, the evolving piracy profile had crystallised, with 
the details summarised in Table 4.5 below.   
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Table 4.5 Profile of Gulf of Guinea Piracy  
Subject  Description/Outcome  
Platforms Speedboats – These were already being used by insurgents. They are ideal for 
piracy because of their speed and manoeuvrability. Generally faster than victim 
ships and naval ships. 
Grouping  There can be up to 40 pirates in multiple speedboats.  
Large numbers are ideal for overpowering crew.  
Weapons AK 47s, machine guns, RPGs, grenades and knifes.  
Able to stop ships underway with strong fire power.  
Violence High level of violence and injury to crew. 
Instils fear and ensures quick outcome of attacks. 
Reach/Range  South – Nigeria to Equatorial Guinea (over 1,550km). 
West – Nigeria to Cote d’Ivoire (over 2,000km). 
Time Pirates operate both day and night, but are shifting towards night operations. 
An element of surprise is achieved through night attacks.  
Target ships  Oil and product tankers, with the objective of stealing refined oil cargo. 
Other vessels attacked for money and valuables. 
Mother ship Hijacked fishing vessels are occasionally used on a resupply basis or as a decoy 
when approaching targeted ships.  
Assisting Ships Tankers used to transfer stolen oil cargo. 
Ransom Not a prime motivation, but still employed as a supplementary activity. 
Networks Stolen oil sold within and outside the region. Timing of attacks suggest prior 
information about location of oil tankers  
  
The above profile has emerged from the discussion of the seven phases 
of piracy, with the main focus being on the primary piracy enclave. 
However, Gulf of Guinea piratical activity is marked by fluidity and 
increasing complexity. Effective responses should therefore be scoped 
within the broader maritime security context of the region, with 
particular attention being paid to developments in the way piratical 
activities are being carried out (and their links to criminal networks). The 
following trends should be closely watched in both the primary and 
secondary piracy enclaves. 
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4.7.2 Increasing Trends in Piracy and Criminal Oil Networks  
Unlike Somalia, where multilateral counter-piracy efforts have led to a 
steady decline in successful attacks since 2009,
204
 the Gulf of Guinea has 
seen an escalation in attacks. Pirates in the region have mastered the 
geography and shipping profile of the Gulf of Guinea, making attacks 
easier to perpetrate. The IMO reported 13 attacks in the Gulf of Guinea 
between January and February 2013 alone, with 8 of the attacks taking 
place on the high seas.
205
 If this trend continues, the region will record 
over 100 incidents in 2013, twice the yearly average of the last 8 years, 
and more than half of these will be committed on the high seas. 
 
The maritime security profile of the Gulf of Guinea shows that distance 
is not a limiting factor for piratical activities. Conversely, long-range 
attacks give pirates more time to plunder ships and transfer stolen cargo. 
Clearly, there is no area in the Gulf of Guinea too remote or too secure to 
dissuade pirates from their marauding activities. Indications of a 
widening primary piracy enclave became apparent in July 2013, when an 
oil tanker was hijacked near the Port of Gabon, and subsequently sighted 
under the control of the hijackers off the coast of Nigeria.
206
 This 
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incident shows once more that oil tankers will continue to be targeted by 
pirates because the financial rewards for the pirates, their accomplices, 
as well as the buyers of the stolen oil, are extremely high.
207
 However, 
while pirates hunt for these high value targets, all other vessels become 
susceptible to piratical attacks. Therefore, the oil factor is indeed a 
critical determinant of the future of maritime security in the region.  
  
4.7.3 Other Piratical Groups within the Primary Piracy Enclave  
It is important to note that the situation in the primary piracy enclave is 
even more complicated than this analysis has highlighted. Indeed, there 
is a history of attacks by two other organised groups in neighbouring 
Cameroon – groups that are completely removed from the Niger Delta 
insurgency. The first is the Bakassi Freedom Fighters (BFF), a group that 
is opposed to Nigeria returning the Bakassi Peninsula to Cameroon.
208
 
The BFF attacked an oil tanker in 2008, kidnapping the crew and 
detaining them for ten days, before successfully negotiating a ransom 
payment.
 209
 The second group, the Africa Marine Commando (AMC), 
kidnapped a Chinese fishing crew in 2010, accepting a ransom for their 
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release.
210
 There have not been any other discernible cases of piratical 
attacks by the BFF or the AMC, partly because of robust responses from 
the Cameroon government – responses which have included lethal force 
being used against group members.
211
However, the groups are far from 
being dismantled, with reports indicating that the AMC was involved in 
the kidnapping of local officials in 2011.
212
  
 
4.7.4 Deepening Piratical Attacks in the Secondary Piracy Enclave 
Another concern is the future safety of the coasts of Guinea and Sierra 
Leone. Indeed, the trajectory of incidents in this enclave is worrying, 
with a high level of violence often being employed. There is also a very 
close correlation between reported piratical incidents off the coast of 
Guinea and incidents in neighbouring Sierra Leone - a portent sign of 
organised criminal activity in the area. In March 2007, pirates armed 
with machine guns boarded the Atropos, which was underway 40 
nautical miles off Sierra Leone.
213
 In August the same year, thirty pirates 
armed with guns boarded a United Kingdom registered product tanker 
off Guinea.
214
 Later, in December, pirates armed with AK47s and 
wearing military-like uniforms fired upon and boarded a tanker off 
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Sierra Leone.
215
 In August 2010, ten pirates armed with AK47s again 
attacked a ship off the coast of Guinea,
216
 and more recently in 2012, a 
Maltese cargo ship, the Costanza, was attacked 20 nautical miles off 
Guinea by armed pirates with AK47s, with the ship sustaining 
damage.
217
 Indeed, these are indications of entrenched piratical activities. 
As attacks from the secondary enclave spread southwards, a piracy arch 
with the primary enclave will be formed, leading to a very grave 
situation at sea – one which has far reaching consequences for regional 
security. 
 
4.7.5 Threats Beyond Piracy  
 
While the Gulf of Guinea grapples with a spate of piratical activity, new 
transnational actors are gaining notoriety in the region. Indeed, the 
extremist Islamist group, Boko Haram,
218
 whose activities were 
previously confined to the northern part of Nigeria, has broadened its 
operations. In August 2011, the group claimed responsibility for a 
suicide attack on the United Nations Office in Nigeria, killing 18 United 
                                                          
215
 The tanker Jamal Massry is Gambian registered. See IMB, Piracy and Armed Robbery Against 
Ships Annual Report 2007, p. 74.  
216
 IMB, Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships Annual Report 2010, p. 55.  
217
 IMO, Reports on Acts of Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships – August 2012, IMO, 
MSC.4/Cir.188, 29 October 2012). See also the hijacking of the Marciana, a general cargo ship, 
Malta, in October 2012 (IMO, MSC.4/Cir.190, 21 January 2013). 
218
 “Boko Haram” translates to “western education is bad”. The group is an extremist Islamic sect in 
Northern Nigeria that is waging a war against the Government of Nigeria, demanding the 
institutionalisation of Islamic rule in Nigeria. According to the United States Peace Institute, the group 
is not in the same category as other terrorist groups as it is not targeting western interests. See, 
Andrew Walker, What Is Boko Haram? United States Peace Institute, May 2012, 
http://www.usip.org/publications/what-boko-haram, 14 March 2013.   
219 
 
Nations staff and injuring over one hundred others.
219
 This attack 
dramatically changed earlier assessments of the group that viewed their 
threat as limited.
220
 In June 2013, following repeated attacks on major 
cities and towns in Nigeria, the Government of Nigeria officially 
declared Boko Haram a terrorist group,
221
 with the Nigerian Minister of 
Defence emphatically describing the group as a franchise of Al-Qaeda.
222
  
 
To date, there have been no reports of Boko Haram having launched 
maritime attacks. And although a strike on an onshore pipeline in 
February 2012 by a group “want[ing] to register their presence” raised 
fears that Boko Haram may have been targeting strategic oil assets, no 
connection with the group has been established.
223
 Nevertheless, the 
possibility of Boko Haram or another terrorist group - such as Al-Qaeda 
in the Islamic Magreb (AQIM), targeting offshore oil and gas 
installations in the Gulf of Guinea cannot be discounted.
224
 Indeed, the 
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 Vangauard Newspaper, UN House Bombing: Boko Haram Claims Responsibility,  27 August 2011, 
Nigerian Bulletin Available: http://nigerianbulletin.com/2011/08/27/un-house-bombing-boko-haram-
claims-responsibility-vanguard/, 30 August 2011. See also, Bashir Adigun, UN Headquarters Car 
Bombing in Nigeria kills 18,  27 August 2011, The Associate Press, Available: 
http://www.google.com/hostednews/ap/article/ALeqM5gOTyKRMIh695bDlsnpuxCVTWxYWA?doc
Id=25af455aab4440aeb6acaeccf757547b, 30 August 2011. 
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 See Jane's Terrorism and Security Monitor, 7 May 2010. Gwynne Dyer, Nigeria and Boko Haram: 
Islamist extremists threaten democracy and Muslim-Christian unity in Africa’s largest country  
29August 2011, Available: http://www.thespec.com/opinion/columns/article/586023--nigeria-and-
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221
 “Jonathan officially declares Boko Haram a terrorist organization,” Premium Times, 4 June 2013. 
222
 Hon. Erelu Olusola Obada, "Nigeria’s Defence Priorities: Domestic Stability for Regional 
Security," Chatham House,  18 July 2013, pp. 4. See also Ola Awoniyi, “Nigeria Defence Chief says 
Boko Haram has ties to Al-Qaeda,” AFP, 23 February 2012. 
223
 Militants claim attack on Eni oil pipeline 5 February 2012, BusinessDay, Available: 
http://www.businessdayonline.com/NG/index.php/news/76-hot-topic/32640-mend-claim-attack-on-
nigeria-eni-oil-pipeline, 14 March 2013 2013. 
224
 The AQIM operates in the Sahel or Maghreb region of Western Africa, falling largely within Chad, 
Mali, Niger and Senegal. See Anneli Botha, “Terrorism in the Maghreb the Transnationalisation of 
Domestic Terrorism,” ISS Monograph Series, No 144, South Africa, June 2008. See also UNSC 
Report, “Peace and Security in Africa,” May 2013 Monthly Forecast, 
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high value of these assets, coupled with their vulnerability, make them 
attractive targets.
225
  
 
4.8 CONCLUSIONS  
This chapter has demonstrated that piracy presents a major risk to the 
geostrategic advantages of the Gulf of Guinea. The analysis has shown 
that piratical attacks are on the increase, that the trends and dynamics of 
such attacks are becoming more complex. The analysis of the future 
projections for the region also reveals deepening piracy trends and 
widespread insecurity. These trends have enormous implications for 
maritime security in the Gulf of Guinea. Without doubt, piracy and 
armed robbery is a significant threat to the safety and security of 
international shipping, undermining global energy security, and also 
impacting on national and regional security. 
  
It is evident from the examination of the evolution of piracy that 
although pirates operate with impunity, the counter-piracy measures 
adopted by States have largely been ineffective. The analysis has also 
demonstrated that unless national and bilateral initiatives are coordinated 
                                                                                                                                                                    
http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/monthly-forecast/2013-
05/peace_and_security_in_africa.php?print=true, 5 September 2013.  
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Lloyd's MIU Handbook of Maritime Security, CRC Press, 2008. Torbjorn Thedeen, "Setting the Stage: 
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within a regional framework, pirates will merely transfer their activities 
to neighbouring coasts or modify their tactics, which will ultimately 
compound regional and global insecurity. More worrying, however, is 
the fact that apart from piracy, other serious maritime security threats 
exist in the Gulf of Guinea.   
 
It is indeed clear from the analysis in this chapter, as well as that in the 
previous chapter, that the enhancement of maritime security in the Gulf 
of Guinea requires: (i) the effective exercise of jurisdiction and 
enforcement by Gulf of Guinea States; (ii) effective regional 
cooperation; and (iii) viable global engagement and support; and more 
importantly (vi) appreciating the land-sea nexus to maritime security and 
addressing the governance dimensions to insecurity. The next chapter 
will assess the extent to which Gulf of Guinea States have implemented 
pertinent international instruments and frameworks which form the basis 
for the exercise of maritime security jurisdiction. Chapters six and seven 
will then proceed to assess regional and global cooperation in the Gulf of 
Guinea region.   
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CHAPTER FIVE 
IMPLEMENTATION OF INTERNATIONAL 
FRAMEWORKS FOR ENHANCING MARITIME 
SECURITY IN THE GULF OF GUINEA 
 
5.1   INTRODUCTION 
The analysis in chapter three demonstrated the role of international 
frameworks in defining the scope and content of the concept of maritime 
security. Additionally, international legal and policy frameworks serve 
as tools for asserting jurisdiction at the national level, and as cooperative 
mechanisms for addressing maritime security challenges. Therefore, the 
degree of implementation of maritime security frameworks in the Gulf of 
Guinea is a measure of national and regional capacity and commitment 
to combat maritime security threats.  
 
This chapter will examine how effectively Gulf of Guinea States have 
implemented key multilateral frameworks that seek to address various 
aspects of maritime security. The chapter is divided into five parts. First, 
the chapter will analyse the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law 
of the Sea (UNCLOS), which is the primary international legal treaty 
governing ocean use and governance, assessing its implementation in the 
Gulf of Guinea. The next four parts will examine the implementation of 
selected frameworks that have direct bearing on the maritime security 
threats analysed in chapters three and four. Each part will focus on three 
objectives: (i) reviewing the background of the relevant international 
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framework or instruments; (ii) analysing the content of the framework 
and its relevance to maritime security in the Gulf of Guinea; and (iii) 
assessing the implementation of the framework in the Gulf of Guinea. 
 
5.2 IMPLEMENTATION OF THE LAW OF THE SEA 
CONVENTION IN THE GULF OF GUINEA 
The importance of UNCLOS
1
 as a charter of global order and maritime 
security is highlighted in its preamble, which declares it to be an 
instrument for the "maintenance of peace”, for promoting “peaceful uses 
of the seas and oceans”, and for enhancing “equitable international 
economic order.”
 2
 These principles anchor the normative and 
institutional arrangement of the Convention, and equally demonstrate 
that it is indeed the “constitution of the oceans” and an embodiment of 
the political, economic and security needs of States.
 3
  
 
To properly situate the framework of the Convention in this chapter, a 
brief examination of its background is necessary. It is important to note 
that this historical review is being carried out from the perspective of 
African States in order to assess whether Gulf of Guinea States have 
                                                          
1
United Nations, United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), 1833 U.N.T.S. 397. 
The Convention opened for signature at Montego Bay, Jamaica, on 10 December 1982, and came into 
force on 16 November 1994.  The Convention has 166 Ratifications as at 29 October 2013. The full 
text of the Convention is reprinted in 21 International Legal Materials 1261 (1982). 
2
 The reference to the “realization of just and equitable international economic order” in the Preamble 
has been understood by many commentators as a fulfilment of the “New International Economic 
Order” doctrine that was fought for by developing countries, especially newly independent African 
States. See Barbara Kwiatkowska, The 200 Mile Exclusive Economic Zone in the New Law of the Sea 
2, Dordrecht, Martinus Nijhoff, 1989. Harry J. Johnson, The New International Economic Order 
Graduate School of Business University of Chicago, 1976.    
3
 The description of the Convention as the constitution of the world’s oceans was used in an address 
by the President of the Conference that adopted the Convention, Tommy T.B. Koh. The address is 
posted at http://www.un.org/depts/los/convention_agreements/texts/koh_english.pdf, 23 August 2013.  
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subsequently utilised the opportunities provided by the Convention for 
securing vital maritime security interests.  
 
5.2.1 African States and the Evolution of the 1982 Law of the Sea 
Convention 
UNCLOS evolved from three international conferences held under the 
auspices of the United Nations (UN).
 4
 This section summarises the 
participation of African States in the three conferences and the 
negotiations that crystallised into the adoption of UNCLOS.  
 
5.2.1.1 First Law of the Sea Conference and the 1958 
Conventions 
The First United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS I) 
was convened by a resolution of the UN General Assembly in 1957.
5
 
UNCLOS I was held from 24 February to 27 April 1958, barely a year 
after Ghana had liberated itself from colonial rule.
6
 Thus Ghana and 
Liberia, together with five other African States, took part in UNCLOS I, 
which was attended by eighty-six States.
7
 Four Conventions and an 
                                                          
4
 The analysis in this part relies heavily on a publication co-authored by the author, Martin Tsamenyi 
and Kamal-Deen Ali, "African States and the Law of Sea Convention: Have the benefits been 
realized?," Ocean Yearbook 26,  2012, pp. 113-60. 
5
 The Conference was convened by the UN General Assembly Resolution 1105(XI) of 21 February, 
1957. The travaux preparatoires and proceedings of the Conference can be found in “Official Records 
of the UN Conference on the Law of Sea,” vols. I to VII, UN publication, Sales No. 58, V.4, vols. I to 
VII.  
6
 Ghana had independence on 6 March 1957, and was the first country in the Gulf of Guinea to have 
independence.  
7
 Other African States at the Conference included Egypt, Ethiopia, Tunisia, Sudan and South Africa.  
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Optional Protocol were adopted at the end of the conference.
8
 These 
Conventions were subsequently ratified by three Gulf of Guinea States at 
various stages following their independence – namely, Nigeria, Sierra 
Leone and Senegal.
9
 In contrast, none of the African States that 
participated in the conference (with the exception of South Africa) 
ratified any of the Conventions. Indeed, this was a clear indication of the 
dissatisfaction of African States with the 1958 law of the sea regime. 
10
  
 
Many African States refrained from ratifying the 1958 law of the sea 
framework because the Conventions were geared towards entrenching 
the interests of developed States to the disadvantage of developing States 
(and particularly African States that had just emerged from many years 
                                                          
8
 "Convention on Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone, 1958 " UN Treaty Series, 516, pp. 205, in 
force 10th September 1964, "Convention on the High Seas, 1958 " UN Treaty Series 450, pp. 11, in 
force 30th September 1962, "Convention on Fishing and Conservation of the Living Resources of the 
High Seas, 1958," UN Treaty Series 559, pp. 285, in force 20th March 1966, "Convention on 
Continental Shelf, 1958, in force10 June 1964," UN Treaty Series 499, "Optional Protocol on 
Compulsory Settlement of Disputes, 1958," UN Treaty Series 450, pp. 169, in force 30th September 
1962 .  
9
 Nigeria achieved independence on 1/10/1960 and ratified the Conventions as follows: Territorial Sea 
and Contiguous Zone, 26/6/1961; Convention on the High Seas, 26/6/1961; Convention on Fishing 
and Conservation of Living Resources of the High Seas, 26/6/1961; Convention on the Continental 
Shelf, 28/4/1971. Sierra Leone achieved independence on 27/4/1961 and ratified the Conventions as 
follows: Convention on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone, 13/3/1962; Convention on the High 
Seas, 13/3/1962; Convention on Fishing and Conservation of Living Resources of the High Seas, 
13/3/1962; Convention on the Continental Shelf, 25/11/1966.  
Senegal achieved independence on 4/4/1960 and ratified the Conventions as follows: Convention on 
the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone, 25/4/1961; Convention on the High Seas, 25/4/1961; 
Convention on Fishing and Conservation of Living Resources of the High Seas, 25/4/1961; 
Convention on the Continental Shelf, 28/4/1961. Senegal subsequently renounced three of the 
Conventions. The details of registration of the denunciations are as follows: Convention on Territorial 
Sea and Contiguous Zone, 9 June 1971 (see, No. 7477, UN Treaty Series, vol. 781, p. 332); 
Convention on Living Resources of the High Seas, 9 June 1971 (see, No.8164, UN Treaty Series, vol. 
781, p. 332); Convention on Continental Shelf, 1 March 1976 (see, No. 7302, UN Treaty Series, vol. 
997, p. 486). The denunciations were to take effect 30 days after registrations of the notices of 
denunciation. 
10
 Martin Tsamenyi and Kamal-Deen Ali, "African States and the Law of Sea Convention: Have the 
benefits been realized?" Ocean Yearbook 26, 2012, p. 117. See generally Tayo O. Akintoba, African 
States and Contemporary International Law: A Case Study of the 1982 Law of Sea Convention and 
the Exclusive Economic Zone The Hague, Martinus Nijhoff 1996. 
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of colonial rule).
11
 Indeed, this is illustrated by the design of the 
Continental Shelf Convention.
12
 After providing that the seaward limit of 
the continental shelf is the distance where the depth of the sea is 200 
metres, Article 1 introduced an additional criterion, allowing States to 
extend the limit of the shelf “to where the depth of the superjacent waters 
admits of the exploitation of the natural resources.”
13
 This additional 
window rendered the exact limit of continental shelf indefinite, and since 
exploitability of marine resources is dependent upon technological 
innovation, the Convention was, in essence, a tool for developed States 
to annex large areas of the seabed.
14
  
 
Also, developing States generally sought an extension of the territorial 
sea beyond the customary law limit of 3 nautical miles, but this was 
opposed by developed States who viewed it as a fetter on their military 
and fishing interests.
15
  
 
 
 
                                                          
11
 Tayo O. Akintoba, African States and Contemporary International Law: A Case Study of the 1982 
Law of Sea Convention and the Exclusive Economic Zone, The Hague, Martinus Nijhoff, 1996, p.68. 
See also Nasila S. Rembe, Africa and the International Law of the Sea, Netherlands Sijthoff and 
Nordhoff, 1980.  
12
 "Convention on Continental Shelf, 1958,” in force10 June 1964, UN Treaty Series 499. 
13
 Article 1 of the Convention on the Continental Shelf, UN Treaty Series Vol. 499, p. 311.  
14
 Robin R. Churchill and Vaughan Lowe, Law of the Sea, Manchester, Manchester University Press, 
1999, p.147.  
15
 On the evolution of the territorial sea, see Robin Churchill and Vaughan Lowe, Law of the Sea, 
Manchester University Press, 1999, p.71-81.  
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5.2.1.2  Second Law of the Sea Conference - No Convention 
Adopted 
Due to demands placed on the UN General Assembly by developing 
States for a new ocean regime, the Second United Nations Conference 
on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS II) was held in 1960.
16
 Cameroon and 
Guinea, together with Ghana and Liberia, were among the ten African 
States that participated in the conference.
17
 The core objective of 
UNCLOS II was to resolve conflicting claims to territorial seas and 
fisheries zones.
18
 Whilst some States were still considering the 
maximum limit of the territorial sea to be 6 nautical miles, African States 
proposed a 12 nautical mile territorial sea limit at UNCLOS II.
19
 In fact, 
most of the African States at the conference had already enacted 
domestic legislation claiming a territorial sea of 12 nautical miles and 
beyond, or were in the process of doing so.
20
 Due to irreconcilable 
differences, UNCLOS II ended without the adoption of a Convention 
after six weeks of deliberations.  
 
 
 
 
                                                          
16
 General Assembly per Resolution 1307 (XIII) of 10 December 1958 requested the Secretary-
General to convene a Second United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea to consider the topics 
of the breadth of the territorial sea and fishery limits - issues which had not been agreed upon in the 
1958 Conventions. The Conference was held from 17 March to 26 April 1960 and adopted two 
resolutions in its Final Act (A/CONF.19/L.15). 
17
 Eighty-eight States were at UNLOS II. The ten African States in attendance were Cameroon, 
Ethiopia, Ghana, Guinea, Liberia, Libya, Morocco, Sudan, Tunisia and South Africa. See UNCLOS II 
Official Records, pp. 13–24. 
18
 Robin R. Churchill and Vaughan Lowe, Law of the Sea, Manchester, Manchester University Press, 
1999, p.14.  
19
 See Statements by African States at UNCLOS II, UNCLOS II, Official Records, A/CONF. 19/8, 
Ghana p.33 paragraph 12; Tunisia p.91 Paragraph 34; Sudan p. 110 paragraph 15; Libya p.123 
paragraph 22.  
20
 For a commentary on these claims, see Ashley J. Roach and Robert W. Smith, United States 
Responses to Excessive Maritime Claims, London and Boston, Martinus Nijhoff, 1996, p. 151-158.   
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5.2.1.3 Third Law of the Sea Conference and UNCLOS 1982 
The failure of participating States to reach a consensus at UNCLOS II 
resulted in the 1960s and 1970s being a period of intense contestation, 
with developed and developing States trying to secure their respective 
interests.
21
 However, in the absence of a prevailing governance regime 
for the oceans, developed States were (predictably) better placed to 
derive maximum benefits from the zeitgeist of ‘self-help’ and 
unilateralism.
 22
 Using the Organisation of African Unity (OAU)
23
 
 
as a 
platform, African States demanded the development of a normative 
framework that would cater for their interests.
24
 In order to add 
momentum to their demands, African States united with other 
developing States under the umbrella of the ‘Group of 77’. This alliance 
of sorts was designed to gain attention on the floor of the UN and on the 
international stage in general.
25
 In 1972, the Yaoundé Regional Seminar 
declared the right of African States to establish an economic zone 
beyond the territorial sea.
26
 In the same year, and under the leadership of 
                                                          
21
  Robert L. Freidheim, “The ‘Satisfied’ and ‘Dissatisfied’ States Negotiate International Law,” 
World Politics 18, 1965, p. 21. 
22
 Michel Virally, “Sources of International Law,” in Max Sorensen, ed., Manual of Public 
International Law, New York, St. Martin’s Press, 1968, p. 137. See also Ram Prankash Anand, 
"Tyranny of the Freedom of the Seas Doctrine " International Studies 12,  1973, pp. 416-29. Richard 
Falk, “The New States and the International Legal Order,” Recueil des Cours, vol. 2, 1966, pp. 16-17.  
23
 On OAU, see chapter 6.  
24
 See in particular Resolutions CM/250 (XVI) and CM/238 adopted at the Seventeenth Ordinary 
Session of the Council of Ministers, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, 15 to 19 June 1971. 
25
 The Group of 77 was initiated on the basis of a Joint Declaration of Developing Countries, General 
Assembly Resolution 1877 of 1963, UN Doc A/5587. The Group commenced work on 15 June 1964, 
with 77 developing countries sitting on the sidelines of the First Session of the United Nations 
Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) in Geneva. In October 1967, the Group of 77 
adopted the “Charter of Algiers”, which recognised the Group as a permanent institutional structure 
with Chapters and Liaison Offices in Nairobi, Paris, Rome, Vienna and Washington. Although the 
membership of the Group expanded with time, when UNCLOS III convened in 1974, the Group’s 
membership was approximately 120 States. The original name of the Group has been retained due to 
its historic significance.   
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Kenya, the concept of the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) was 
formulated and presented at the United Nations Seabed Committee, 
which was meeting in Geneva.
27
 Then, the Addis Ababa and Mogadishu 
Declarations of 1973 and 1974 gave final force to the African position.
28
 
These Declarations emphatically stated the right of African States to an 
EEZ and the reciprocal recognition of the EEZs of other States.
29
  
 
While the above developments were taking place, the Third United 
Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III) was convened, 
with its first substantive session taking place in 1974, and enduring until 
1982.
30
 Meanwhile, the concept of the EEZ had already received 
endorsement from African and Latin American States, as well as many 
other developing States.
31
 These endorsements were so widespread that 
the concept of the EEZ was considered a rule of customary international 
                                                                                                                                                                    
26
 See, Conclusions in the General Report of the African States Regional Seminar on the Law of the 
Sea, held in Yaoundé, Cameroon, June 1972, UN Leg. Ser. B/16, p.601. The Yaoundé Regional 
Seminar was held from 20
th
 to 30
th
 June 1972 in Yaoundé, Cameroon.  
27
 See, UN Doc. A.AC. 138/SC.II/L.10, 1973. The Draft Articles are reproduced in International 
Legal Materials 12, 1973, p.33.  
28
 Martin Tsamenyi and Kamal-Deen Ali, "African States and the Law of Sea Convention: Have the 
benefits been realized?" Ocean Yearbook 26, 2012, p. 121. 
29
 Declaration of OAU Council of Ministers held in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, 17-24 May 1973, and the 
Mogadishu Declaration of the Twenty First Ordinary Session of the OAU, Mogadishu, Somalia, 6 to 9 
September 1974. The text of the Declarations are reproduced in the document titled “Conservation 
and Utilization of Living Resources of the EEZ: Legislative History of Articles 61 and 62 of the 
United Nations Convention on the Law of Sea”, United Nations, New York, 1995, p. 9. 
30
 The Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III) was convened pursuant 
to General Assembly Resolution 2750 C (XXV) of 17 December 1970. The conference was to 
commence in 1973 but was postponed to the following year to allow the completion of the work of the 
UN Seabed Committee which was to form part of the preparatory documents for UNCLOS III.    
31
 The EEZ concept also received support from a few developed States, particularly Canada, East 
Germany, West Germany and Norway. See United Nations, Summary of Records of Meeting - First 
Session, UNCLOS III Official Records vol. I, United Nations, New York, 1973. See also Edward L. 
Miles and William T. Burke, "Pressures on the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 
Arising from New Fisheries Conflicts: The Problem of Straddling Stocks," Ocean Development and 
International Law 20,  1989, pp. 343-57.   
230 
 
law even before UNCLOS III was finalised.
32
 The EEZ later received 
detailed expression in Part V of the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention. 
The demands of African States also led to the creation of Part XI of 
UNCLOS, which created a juridical regime that prevents unilateral 
national appropriation and control of the deep seabed. This area is 
commonly referred to as the Common Heritage of Mankind.
33 
 
 
5.2.2 Overview of the Framework of the Law of the Sea Convention  
UNCLOS was adopted on 30 April 1982 by one hundred and thirty votes 
to four, with seventeen abstentions.
34
 However, there was still some 
opposition, largely from developed States, to Part XI of the Convention 
that dealt with the deep seabed. Thus, it was only after the re-negotiation 
of Part XI
35
 that the Convention entered into force in 1994.
36
 The main 
body of UNCLOS consist of 320 Articles dealing with a plethora of 
                                                          
32
 Thus in the 1985 Libya/Malta Case, the ICJ stated emphatically that it was “incontestable that…the 
EEZ…is shown by the practice of States to have become part of customary law.” See [1985], ICJ 
Report, p. 33. See also Robin R. Churchill and Vaughan Lowe, Law of the Sea, Manchester, 
Manchester University Press, 1999, p.161. Generally on the evolution of the concept of the EEZ, see 
David Attard, The Exclusive Economic Zone in International Law, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 
1987. 
33
 The concept or doctrine of the Common Heritage of Mankind broadly asserts that certain rights or 
resources should not be enjoyed by some States to the exclusion of others. For a discussion of the 
concept in the context of developing States and the law of sea, see Kemal Baslar, The Concept of the 
Common Heritage of Mankind in International Law, The Hague Martinus Nijhoff 1998, p. 210-216. 
Edwin Egede, Africa and the Deep Seabed Regime: Politics and International Law of the Common 
Heritage of Mankind Heidelberg, Springer, 2011. 
34
 Israel, Turkey, the United States and Venezuela voted against the adoption of the Convention. 
Belgium, Bulgaria, Belarus, Czechoslovakia, the German Democratic Republic, the Federal Republic 
of Germany, Hungary, Italy, Luxembourg, Mongolia, the Netherlands, Poland, Spain, Thailand, 
Ukraine, the USSR and the United Kingdom abstained from the vote.    
35
 The instrument of modification is the Agreement Relating to the Implementation of Part XI of the 
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, 20 July 1994. 
36
 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, 10 December 1982, entry into force 16 
November 1994. See 1833 U.N.T.S. 397. Reprinted in 21 International Legal Materials 1261 (1982). 
The Convention has 166 Ratifications as at 29 October 2013.  
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issues including the delimitation of maritime boundaries, the control and 
management of living and non-living resources, the protection of the 
marine environment, shipping and navigation, marine scientific research 
(MSR), the transfer of technology, the protection of underwater 
archaeological objects, as well as the rights and obligations of States 
relating to the peaceful use of the sea. The Convention has 9 Annexes, 
covering various subject matters. Also Annexed to the Convention is the 
Agreement Relating to Part XI, which modifies Part XI of the main 
Convention.
 37
  
 
 
On the whole, UNCLOS can be characterised in two ways. In one 
respect it creates very specific rights and obligations for States; in other 
respects it is a ‘framework convention’ in the sense that its proper 
implementation requires interstate cooperation and the adoption of 
additional instruments.
38
 Indeed, all the instruments being examined in 
the rest of this chapter are related to the Convention. However, it suffices 
at this stage to summarise the maritime zones designated by the 
Convention. Such a summary is necessary for assessing the 
implementation of those provisions of the Convention that deal directly 
with maritime security and boundary delimitation. Other aspects of the 
Convention will be reviewed in other parts of the chapter.  
                                                          
37
 Agreement Relating to the Implementation of Part XI of the United Nations Convention on the Law 
of Sea, 20 July 1994, reproduced in 33 International Legal Materials, 1309, 1994.   
38
 On the further implementation of UNCLOS, see Hans Corell, "Oversight of the Implementation of 
the Global Ocean Regime: The Role of the United Nations’ ", in  Davor Vidas and Willy Østreng, eds. 
Order for the Oceans at the Turn of the Century, Netherlands, Kluwer Law International, 1999. Tullio 
Treves, "The Role of Universal International in Implementing the 1982 UN Law of the Sea 
Convention", in  Alfred H. A. Soons, ed. Implementation of the Law of the Sea Convention Through 
International Institution, Honolulu, Law of the Sea Institute, 1990.  
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5.2.2.1  Territorial Sea and the Protection of Sovereignty and 
Security Interests  
UNCLOS gives coastal States the right to claim a territorial sea not 
exceeding 12 nautical miles from the baselines.
39
 The sovereignty of 
coastal States extends to the territorial sea and the air space above the 
territorial sea.
 40
 By implication, all resources in the water column and 
seabed of the territorial sea are subject to the exclusive control of the 
coastal State. The sovereignty jurisdiction of coastal States in the 
territorial sea is a potent tool for security jurisdiction and enforcement.
41
 
Whilst ensuring that the right of innocent passage is not fettered,
 42
 Gulf 
of Guinea States can enact and enforce laws aimed at protecting 
homeland security and safeguarding the territorial sea itself.
43
 Such laws 
may include the prohibition of illicit trafficking in narcotics,
44
 as well as 
“[any crime] that disturb[s] the peace of the country or the good order of 
the territorial sea.”
45
 This broad legislative and enforcement jurisdiction 
is a veritable tool for combating the maritime security threats analysed in 
chapters three and four.  
 
 
 
                                                          
39
 UNCLOS, Article 3. 
40
 UNCLOS, Article 2. See also Robin R. Churchill and Vaughan Lowe, Law of the Sea, Manchester, 
Manchester University Press, 1999, p.77.  
41
 G. Marston, “The Evolution of the Concept of Sovereignty over the Bed and Subsoil of the 
Territorial Sea”, British Yearbook of International Law, 48, 1976-77, pp. 321 at p. 332.  
42
 Requirements relating to Innocent Passage are contained in Article 19.   
43
 See in particular UNCLOS Articles 2, 21 and 27. See also Robin R. Churchill and Vaughan Lowe, 
Law of the Sea, Manchester, Manchester University Press, 1999, p.95. Jose L. Jesus, "Protection of 
Foreign Ships against Piracy and Terrorism at Sea: Legal Aspects," International Journal  of Marine 
and Coastal Law 18,  2003, pp. 363-400. 
44
 UNCLOS, Article 27(1)(a).  
45
 UNCLOS Article 27 (1)(b). 
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5.2.2.2        Policing and Enforcement Rights in the Contiguous Zone   
In addition to the territorial sea, coastal States may establish a 
contiguous zone not exceeding 24 nautical miles from the baseline from 
which the territorial sea is measured.
46
 Thus, where a coastal State 
claims both the maximum area of the territorial sea and the contiguous 
zone, its contiguous zone will stretch from the end of the twelfth nautical 
mile to the twenty-fourth nautical mile. The legal regime of the 
contiguous zone permits coastal States to exercise policing and 
enforcement powers to prevent the infringement of customs, fiscal, 
immigration and sanitary regulations.
47
 Thus the regime of the 
contiguous zone provides an additional layer of protection with respect 
to national and maritime security. In practice, measures that fall within 
contiguous competence will also be relevant for security, especially 
immigration and customs controls.
48
  
 
5.2.2.3 Enforcement Jurisdiction on the High Seas  
The high seas regime guarantees a number of maritime security 
enforcement rights which are also applicable in the EEZ.
49
 Key among 
these is jurisdiction over piracy and illicit traffic in narcotics.
50
 An 
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 UNCLOS, Article 33. 
47
 Article 33(1) of UNCLOS states: “In a zone contiguous to its territorial sea, described as the 
contiguous zone, the coastal State may exercise the control necessary to: (a) prevent infringement of 
its customs, fiscal, immigration or sanitary laws and regulations within its territory or territorial sea; 
(b) punish infringement of the above laws and regulations committed within its territory or territorial 
sea”. 
48
 On the relevance of the contiguous zone for the protection of security interests, see Shegeru Oda, 
"The Concept of the Contiguous Zone," International and Comparitive Law Quarterly 11, 1,  1962, 
pp. 131-53. Edwin D. Dickinson, "Jurisdiction at the maritime frontier," Harvard Law Review 40,  
1926, pp. 1-29. 
49
 UNCLOS Article 58(2) states:  “Articles 88 to 115 and other pertinent rules of international law 
apply to the exclusive economic zone in so far as they are not incompatible with this Part.” 
50
 For Piracy, see Articles 100-107; and for illicit traffic in narcotics, see Article 108.  
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essential element of the exercise of high seas jurisdiction is the 
requirement to cooperate.
51
 In a regional context, this necessitates the 
adoption of regional agreements and cooperative structures. The next 
section will assess how Gulf of Guinea States have implemented the 
legal framework on piracy, while Part 5.4 will assess the framework 
relating to the suppression of trafficking in narcotics. 
 
5.2.2.4 Protection of Resources and Security Interests in the 
EEZ and on the Continental Shelf  
As discussed earlier, the EEZ was central to the demands of African 
States before and during the law of the sea conference. The EEZ regime 
is now embodied in Part V of UNCLOS, with Article 57 recognising the 
right of Gulf of Guinea States to claim an EEZ up to 200 nautical miles 
from the baseline.
52
 Within the EEZ, coastal States have “sovereign 
rights” for the purpose of exploring and exploiting, conserving and 
managing the living and non-living resources of the sea and seabed.
53
 
This right is particularly relevant for fisheries protection, and will be 
examined in further detail in Part 5.5 of this chapter.  
 
5.2.2.5  Framework for Maritime Boundary Delimitation   
The provisions relating to maritime boundary delimitation are an 
important part of the UNCLOS framework. Indeed, it is only when 
neighbouring coastal States are able to agree on their respective maritime 
                                                          
51
 For example, Articles 100 and 108 impose a duty to cooperate in the suppression of piracy and 
illicit trafficking in narcotics.  
52
 Since the territorial sea limit is 12 nautical miles, properly speaking the breadth of the EEZ is 188 
nautical miles.    
53
 UNCLOS, Article 56.  
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boundaries that there can be certainty of the breadth of their maritime 
zones, and by extension, certainty of the areas over which jurisdiction 
can be exercised.  
 
As a general rule of international law, interstate boundaries or frontiers 
are to be settled or delimited through agreement between the States 
concerned.
54
  This principle has been retained in UNCLOS with regard 
to maritime boundaries.
55
 In the context of Gulf of Guinea States and 
other ex-colonies, the principle of uti possidetis juris (which has been 
cardinal in the consolidation of post-independent State boundaries) is 
equally relevant for maritime boundary delimitation. 
56
 By the 
application of the principle, every State is entitled to possess those areas 
and boundaries that they held immediately prior to independence.
57
 
Thus, coastal States are expected to lay claim to the maritime spaces 
appurtenant to their land territory.
58
 What UNCLOS has done is to lay 
down the principles to be employed in negotiating and agreeing on 
maritime boundary limits. In the case of the territorial sea, the 
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 Brian Opeskin and Martin Tsamenyi, "The Law of the Sea", in  Sam Blay, Ryszard Piotrowicz and 
Martin Tsamenyi, eds. Public International Law: An Australian Perspective, New York, Oxford 
University Press, 2005, pp. 324-50, p.38. This principle is succinctly stated in the Gulf of Maine Case 
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55
 For example, Article 74(1) of UNCLOS, which deals with the delimitation of the EEZ, provides: 
“The delimitation of the EEZ between States with opposite or adjacent coasts shall be effected by 
agreement on the basis of international law, as referred to in Article 38 of the Statute of the 
International Court of Justice, in order to achieve an equitable solution.”  
56
 For an exposition of the principle, see Boubacar N’Diaye, "Mauritania, August 2005: Justice and 
democracy, or just another coup? ," Africa Affairs 105, 420, pp. 421-41. The ICJ also applied the 
Principle in the Frontier Dispute between Burkina Faso and Republic of Mali, I.C.J. Reports 1986, p. 
554. 
57
 Ian Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1998, p. 
132. See also, Victor Prescott and Clive Schofield, The Maritime Political Boundaries of the World, 
Leiden & Boston Martinus Nijhoff, 2005, p. 339.    
58
 It is arguable that, before colonialism, African Kingdoms defined territories and areas of jurisdiction 
on the basis of decisions made by Kings. See, Jonathan I. Charney and Lewis M. Alexander, eds., 
International Maritime Boundaries vol. I, VI vols. Boston and London, Martinus Nijhoff, 1993, p. 
641-68. 
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Convention stipulates the medium line as an appropriate maritime 
boundary, 
 
while EEZ and continental shelf boundaries are to be 
delimited on the basis of equity.
59
    
 
5.2.3 Assessment of the Implementation of UNCLOS in the Gulf of 
Guinea  
The evaluation of the implementation of UNCLOS in this section is 
limited to three areas: (i) an examination of the status of ratification of 
UNCLOS and the appropriate exercise of jurisdiction provided by the 
Convention; (ii) an analysis of the implementation of piracy provisions 
at the national and regional level; and (iii) the delimitation of maritime 
boundaries.    
 
5.2.3.1  Ratification of the Law of the Sea Convention and the 
Exercise of Appropriate Jurisdiction 
Many States in the Gulf of Guinea ratified UNCLOS within a few years 
of its adoption, while others did so soon after its entry into force.
60
 
Following Liberia’s ratification of the Convention on 25 September 
2008, and that of Congo-Brazzaville on 9 July 2008, all Gulf of Guinea 
States are now party to the Convention.
 
These ratifications are significant 
because UNCLOS now serves as a uniform ocean relations instrument in 
the region, and as a result, national legislative and policy frameworks 
                                                          
59
 UNCLOS, Articles 15, 74 and 88. On the application of these principles to maritime boundary 
delimitation in the Gulf  of Guinea, see  Kamal-Deen Ali and Martin Tsamenyi, "Fault Lines in 
Maritime Security: Analysis of maritime boundary uncertainties in the Gulf of Guinea," African 
Security Review,  August 2013, pp. 1-16. 
60
 For the purpose of this thesis, no distinction has been made between ratification and accession to 
international legal instruments. Both shall be referred be to as ratification.   
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must be in conformity with its provisions. Table 5.1 shows the status of 
ratification and the accompanying declaration of maritime zones of 
coastal States in the Gulf of Guinea. Although not listed in the Table, it 
is noteworthy that four out of the five landlocked States in the Gulf of 
Guinea have also ratified the Convention.
61
 
 
Table 5.1 Status of Ratification of the Law of the Sea Convention in the Gulf of 
Guinea 
State Date of 
Ratification 
Territorial     
Sea(NM) 
Contiguous 
Zone (NM) 
EEZ /Continental  
Shelf (NM) 
Angola 5/12/90 12 24 200 
Benin 16/10/97 200   
Cameroon 19/11/85 12  200 
Cape Verde 10/8/87 12 24 200 
Congo 9/7/08 12 24 200 
Cote d’Ivoire 26/3/84 12  200 
DR Congo 17/2/89 12 24 200 
Equatorial Guinea  21/7/97 12  200 
Gabon 11/3/98 12 24 200 
Gambia 22/5/84 12 18 200 
Ghana 7/6/83 12 24 200 
Guinea 6/9/85 12  200 
Guinea Bissau 25/8/86 12  200 
Liberia 25/9/08 200   
Mauritania  17/7/96 12 24 200 
Nigeria 14/08/86 12  200 
São Tomé & Príncipe 3/11/87 12  200 
Senegal 25/10/84 12 24 200 
Sierra Leone 12/12/94 12 24 200 
Togo 16/4/85 30  200 
Source: Compiled from UNDOALOS Status of Ratification   
 
It should be noted, however, that merely ratifying a Convention does not 
allow a State to derive the benefits and protection afforded by the 
Convention. What is essential is for State Parties to incorporate the rights 
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 The chronology of ratification by landlocked States is as follows: Mali: 16 July 1985, Burkina Faso: 
25 January 2005, Chad: 14 August 2009, and Niger: 7 August 2013. The Central African Republic is 
yet to ratify the Convention. 
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and obligations provided by the Convention into domestic legal and 
policy frameworks.
62
 It is only by so doing that the requisite jurisdiction 
provided by the Convention can be asserted for the protection of 
legitimate State interests.
 63
 Gulf of Guinea States have generally failed 
in this regard. The first jurisdictional gap is evident from a review of 
Table 5.1. It can be seen that  half of the States in the Gulf of Guinea 
have failed to declare a contiguous zone. As analysed in the preceding 
section, the policing authority embodied in the regime of the contiguous 
zone is important for preventing threats to national and maritime 
security.
64
 Thus, by failing to declare a contiguous zone, a large number 
of States in the region have circumscribed an essential element of their 
jurisdictional competence.  
 
It can also be seen from Table 5.1 that Benin and Liberia have claimed a 
territorial sea of 200 nautical miles, while Togo has claimed a 30 
nautical mile territorial sea limit. Indeed, the breadth claimed by all these 
States far exceeds the 12 nautical miles stipulated by UNCLOS.
 65
 And 
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 Mohammed Dahmani, The Fisheries Regime of the Exclusive Economic Zone, Netherlands and 
Boston, Martinus Nijhoff 1987, p. 84. Generally on the relationship between international and 
domestic law and the requirement of incorporation, see Dinah Shelton, ed., International Law and 
Domestic Legal Systems: Incorporation, Transformation,  Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2011. Ali 
Kamal-Deen, “Legal and Policy Dimensions of Coastal Zone Monitoring and Control: The Case in 
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 Mohammed Dahmani, The Fisheries Regime of the Exclusive Economic Zone, Netherlands and 
Boston, Martinus Nijhoff 1987, p. 84. Ali Kamal-Deen, “Legal and Policy Dimensions of Coastal 
Zone Monitoring and Control: The Case in Ghana”, Ocean Development & International Law, vol. 
35, 2004, pp. 179–194. 
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 See chapter 3, Section 3.3.2.2. See also Oda, "The Concept of the Contiguous Zone."  Dickinson, 
"Jurisdiction at the maritime frontier." Phillip C. Jessup, The Law of Territorial Waters and Maritime 
Jurisdiction, New York Jennings, 1927, William E. Masterson, Jurisdiction in Marginal Seas, New 
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while these excessive claims are borne out of the ocean politics and 
contestation of the 1970s (as analysed in section 5.2.2.3),
66
 the 
declarations are patently inconsistent with the current regime, and would 
thus need to be modified to ensure compliance with the Convention. 
Doing so would enable the appropriate exercise of jurisdiction by the 
States concerned, as well as facilitate harmonious negotiation and 
delimitation of maritime boundaries. 
 
5.2.3.2 Implementation of Framework on Piracy 
The case study in chapter four extensively analysed the phenomenon of 
piracy in the Gulf of Guinea, as well as the accompanying threats to key 
dimensions of security. The analysis also covered the definition of piracy 
and the extension of the concept of universal jurisdiction to piratical acts. 
By way of summary, Article 100 of UNCLOS encapsulates two 
interrelated obligations regarding piracy. States are required to repress 
piracy at the national level, and also cooperate with other States in the 
suppression of piracy at the regional and international level.
67
 To give 
practical effect to the first obligation, Gulf of Guinea States are required 
to enact and enforce laws covering all aspects of the crime of piracy.
68
 
With respect to the second obligation, cooperative structures should be 
                                                                                                                                                                    
65
 Though Robert W. Smith, eds., International Maritime Boundaries, vol. VI, VI vols., Leiden and 
Boston , Martinus Nijhoff, 2011, at page 4264 allude to a most recent legislation of Benin in which 
Benin claimed 12nm territorial sea 200nm EEZ, there is no public availability of the said legislation. 
66
 As a way of influencing ocean regime changes in the 1970s, African states at the Ibadan conference 
in Nigeria in November 1971, agreed that all African states should extend their territorial sea to 200 
NM and adopt legislation enforcing fisheries and pollution issues in the zone.     
67
 Article 100 of UNCLOS provides: “All States shall cooperate to the fullest possible extent in the 
repression of piracy on the high seas or in any other place outside the jurisdiction of any State.” 
68
 See chapter 4, sections 4.2.1.2 and 4.2.1.3. See also Eugene Kontorovich, "A Guantanamo on the 
Sea: The Difficulty of Prosecuting Pirates and Terrorists," California Law Review 98,  2010, pp. 243-
76. Diana Chang, "Piracy Laws and the Effective Prosecution of Pirates," Boston College 
International and Comparative Law Review,  2010, pp. 273-188.   
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established which, at a minimum, will facilitate the sharing of 
information, and also possibly lead to joint patrols in the region.  
 
A review of the national legislation database of the United Nations 
Division on the Law of the Sea (UNDOALOS) shows that Liberia and 
Togo are the only States in the region that have enacted piracy 
legislation.
69
 Moreover, it is only since January 2013 that Nigeria is 
reported to have initiated a process for the enactment of a law to combat 
piracy and other maritime crimes.
70
 The UN Assessment Mission to the 
Gulf of Guinea also observed that the definition of the crime of piracy in 
the national laws of Benin was out-dated and not consistent with the 
provisions of UNCLOS.
71
 In summary, there is a legislative deficit with 
respect to the crime of piracy in the Gulf of Guinea. Thus, even if Gulf 
of Guinea States are able to conduct patrols off their coasts, the efficacy 
of such patrols would be seriously undermined by the absence of 
domestic legislation to prosecute and punish activities that pose a threat 
to maritime security. This will likely result in what has been termed 
“catch and release syndrome” - a situation which manifested in the early 
periods of Somali piracy when counter-piracy forces frequently released 
apprehended pirates because of challenges with prosecution, thus 
entrenching further insecurity.
72
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 See Penal Code of Liberia, 2008, and Code de la Marine Marchande, Togo, 1971, UNDOALOS, 
Legislation and Treaties Data Base, 
http://www.un.org/Depts/los/LEGISLATIONANDTREATIES/index.htm, 1 January 2013.    
70
 See “NIMASA Seeks Legal Backing to Fight Piracy,” This Day, 14 February 2013.  
71
 See page 5, United Nations, Report of the United Nations Assessment Mission on Piracy in the Gulf 
of Guinea, Security Council S/2012/45,19 January 2012.  
72
 For a discussion of the “catch and release” syndrome, and the difficulties associated with piracy 
prosecution in Somalia, see Eugene Kontorovich, "A Guantanamo on the Sea: The Difficulty of 
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5.2.3.3 Implementation of UNCLOS Framework for Maritime 
Boundary Delimitation  
To enhance maritime security in the Gulf of Guinea, each State would 
need to effectively police and enforce order within its coastal domain. 
Therefore, certainty of maritime boundaries plays a crucial role in the 
operational and policy content of maritime security at both the national 
and regional level. On the contrary, where there are boundary 
uncertainties or overlapping boundary claims, States would be unable to 
assert their jurisdiction, or may in fact be competing for jurisdiction. 
Whichever is the case, maritime security cooperation and enforcement 
would be impeded, thus creating weaknesses which pirates and other 
illegal actors may exploit.
73
 It is also possible for maritime boundary 
disagreements to escalate into conflicts, which in turn can threaten the 
peace and stability of the Gulf of Guinea region. 
 
The three sections below assess the impact of maritime boundary 
delimitation on maritime security cooperation in the Gulf of Guinea. The 
first section summarises the status of maritime boundary delimitation in 
the region. The second demonstrates how delimited maritime boundaries 
have contributed to greater stability and security, while the third section 
assesses the negative implications of maritime boundaries that have not 
been delimited.  
                                                                                                                                                                    
Prosecuting Pirates and Terrorists," California Law Review 98, 2010, pp. 243-76. Elizabeth Andersen, 
Benjamin Brockman-Hawe and Patricia Goff, Suppressing Maritime Piracy: Exploring the Options in 
International Law, Available: http://acuns.org/wp-
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 Clive Schofield, “The Trouble with Islands: The Definition and Role of Islands and Rocks,” in 
Seoung-Yong Hong and Jon M. Van Dyke, Maritime Boundary Disputes, Settlement Process, and the 
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5.2.3.3.1 State of Maritime Boundary Delimitation in the Gulf of 
Guinea 
Several maritime boundary agreements have been struck in the Gulf of 
Guinea. In some cases, States have opted for joint exploitation and 
development of resources,
74
 usually referred to as a Joint Development 
Zone (JDZ).
75
 A JDZ may be necessitated by a disputed maritime 
boundary claim, or where resources (typically oil and gas) straddle an 
actual or potential maritime boundary.
76
 In practice, a JDZ is an 
important confidence building measure (CBM) that can lead to a final 
resolution of boundary issues.
77
 Table 5.2 summarises the maritime 
agreements and JDZs in the Gulf of Guinea, with the remarks column 
outlining the strategic context underpinning the maritime boundary 
agreements. 
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 See for example Management and Cooperation Agreement between the Government of the 
Republic of Senegal and the Government of the Republic of Guinea-Bissau, 14 October 1993 (entry 
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Hydrocarbon Resources on Continental Shelf  " International Journal of Estuarine and Coastal Law 3 
1988 pp. 1-18.    
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 Robin R Churchill, “Joint Development Zones: International Legal Issues,” in H. Fox ed., Joint 
Development of offshore Oil and Gas, vol. II, London, British Institute of International and 
Comparative Law, 1990, p. 57. See also Chidinma B. Okafor, “Joint Development: An Alternative 
Legal Approach to Oil and Gas Exploitation in the Nigerian-Cameroon Boundary Dispute?” 
International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law, vol. 21, No. 4, pp. 489-522.  
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 For example, JDZ has been suggested as best solution for the Nigeria-Cameroon boundary conflict,  
see, Chidinma B. Okafor, “Joint Development: An Alternative Legal Approach to Oil and Gas 
Exploitation in the Nigerian-Cameroon Boundary Dispute?” International Journal of Marine and 
Coastal Law, vol. 21, No. 4, pp. 489-522. Generally on JDZ as a Confidence Building Measure, see 
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H. Fox ed., Joint Development of offshore Oil and Gas, vol. II, London, British Institute of 
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Table 5.2: Overview of Gulf of Guinea Maritime Boundary Agreements  
STATES AGREEMENT/DATE REMARKS  
Cape Verde 
Senegal  
Treaty on the Delimitation of 
the Maritime Frontier, 17/2/ 
1993.  
The agreement deepens existing peaceful 
relations. It also promotes joint fisheries 
management.
78
  
 
Mauritania  
Cape Verde 
Delimitation of the Maritime 
Frontier, 19/9/ 2003 
The Cape Verde-Senegal agreement (see 
above), created a tri-junction favourable to Cape 
Verde. Mauritania agreed to the use of the tri-
junction because of existing peaceful relations.
79
 
 
Gambia 
Senegal 
Treaty fixing Maritime 
Boundaries, 4/6/ 1975. 
This early Treaty has helped reduce tension 
between the two States.
80
 
 
Senegal 
Guinea-Bissau 
Management and Cooperation 
Agreement, 14/10/ 1993. 
Protocol Establishing the 
Management and Cooperation 
Agency, 12/6/ 1995. 
The combined effect of the two agreements is a 
JDZ. The JDZ covers an area that the ICJ 
declared to belong to Senegal. Senegal used the 
JDZ to secure strategic outcomes including 
securing Guinea-Bissau’s support regarding the 
Casamance insurgency.
81
 
 
Equatorial Guinea 
São Tomé & 
Príncipe 
Treaty Concerning Delimitation 
of Maritime Boundary, 26/6/ 
1999. 
This agreement has fostered investor confidence 
and an injection of capital into offshore oil and 
gas development.
82
     
 
Nigeria 
Equatorial Guinea 
 
 
Treaty Concerning Maritime 
Boundary, 23/9/ 2000. 
Protocol Implementing Article 
6.2 of the Treaty of 23 
September 2000, April 2002  
A pool of oil straddles the Zafiro oil field of 
Equatorial Guinea and the Ekanga-1 reservoir 
on the Nigerian side. The 2002 Protocol has 
united the two fields, thus curtailing a volatile 
situation that was heading for conflict.
83
 
 
Nigeria 
São Tomé & 
Príncipe   
 
Treaty on Joint Development of 
Petroleum and other Resources, 
21/2/2001 
Nigeria suffers a setback to getting a full EEZ at 
a short stretch of its southwest coast abutting 
São Tomé. Nigeria has been able to use its 
weight to negotiate a JDZ.
84
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 Jonathan I. Charney and Lewis M. Alexander, eds., International Maritime Boundaries, vol. III, VI 
vols., Boston and London,  Martinus Nijhoff, 2004, pp. 2279-2291, at p.79. 
79
See Jonathan I. Charney and Lewis M. Alexander, eds., International Maritime Boundaries, vol. III, 
VI vols., Boston and London, Martinus Nijhoff, 2004, pp. 2279-2291.  
80
 For a discussion of the Agreement, see Jonathan I. Charney and Lewis M. Alexander, International 
Maritime Boundaries, vol. I, VI vols., Boston and London, Martinus Nijhoff, 2004, pp. 847-855.   
81
 This view has been expressed in Jonathan I. Charney and Lewis M. Alexander,eds., International 
Maritime Boundaries, vol. III, VI vols., Boston and London, Martinus Nijhoff, 2004, pp. 2252-2278, 
at p.2254.  
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vols., Hague and London, Martinus Nijhoff, 2002, pp. 2647-56 at p. 49. 
83
 For a discussion of the Protocol, see David A. Colson and Robert W. Smith, eds., International 
Maritime Boundaries, vol. V, VI vols., Leiden and Boston, Martinus Nijhoff, 2005, pp. 3624-3637. 
84
 Jonathan I. Charney and Robert W. Smith, eds., International Maritime Boundaries, vol. IV, VI 
vols., Hague and London, Martinus Nijhoff, 2002, pp. 2656-68.  
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Gabon 
São Tomé & 
Príncipe   
Agreement on the Delimitation 
of Maritime Border, 26/4/ 2001   
The agreement provides certainty for oil and gas 
development.
85
   
Congo (Brazzaville) 
Angola 
Protocol Approving Offshore 
Unitization Prospects 14K and 
A-IMI,  21/5/ 2002 
The agreement, which considerably favours 
Angola, is regarded as a reward by President 
Sassou Nguesso   to Angolan troops who helped 
restore him to power in 1997.
 86
 
DR Congo 
Angola 
Agreement on the Exploration 
and Production of Hydrocarbon 
in the Common Interest Zone, 
30/7/ 2007   
The Common Interest Zone (JDZ) moves 
heavily towards Angolan waters with existing 
petroleum activity. Angola might have agreed to 
a JDZ to secure DR Congo support over 
Cabinda separatists.
87
 
 
It is essential to situate these agreements within the broader security and 
stability requirements of the Gulf of Guinea. While some of the 
agreements have forestalled conflicts, others have strengthened existing 
relations, promoting shared economic interests and reflecting strategic 
objectives far removed from the maritime domain. An important 
conclusion to be drawn from all the three outcomes is that the 
delimitation of maritime boundaries contributes to peaceful relations and 
the strengthening of cooperation. This is underscored by the 1995 
Senegal-Guinea Bissau agreement which has greatly enhanced 
cooperation between the two States.   
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 For a discussion of the Agreement, see David A. Colson and Robert W. Smith, eds., International 
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5.2.3.3.2 Maritime Boundaries as an Instrument of Cooperation 
and Greater Security – the Case of the Senegal-Guinea Agreement  
Senegal and Guinea-Bissau were involved in a very turbulent maritime 
boundary dispute which was finally resolved in 1995. 
88
  The history of 
the maritime boundary issue dates back to 1960, when their respective 
colonial powers, France and Portugal, reached an agreement on the 
limits of the territorial sea and the continental shelf.
89
 The Agreement 
was concluded by diplomatic communication which explicitly stated that 
the exchange of letters was for the purpose of defining the maritime 
boundary between the Republic of Senegal (at that time an autonomous 
State within the Communauté) and the Portuguese province of Guinea-
Bissau.
90
 However, after independence, Guinea-Bissau disputed the 
validity of agreement. Subsequently, in 1989, Guinea-Bissau instituted 
two judicial proceedings in respect of the disputed maritime boundary - 
the first in a special Arbitral Tribunal agreed to by the Parties, the second 
at the International Court of Justice (ICJ). The outcome of both decisions 
favoured Senegal. 
91
 
 
Nonetheless, in 1993 Senegal entered into a JDZ agreement with 
Guinea-Bissau.
92
 Article 2 of the Agreement covers the sharing of 
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resources.
 93
 Access to fishing resources is on equal terms, while revenue 
from oil and gas is divided 85 per cent for Senegal and 15 per cent for 
Guinea-Bissau. However, the sharing arrangement only applies to oil 
already discovered on the Senegalese side. The Agreement also provides 
for the establishment of an intergovernmental authority to manage the 
exploration, prospecting and marketing of resources. Important, the 
Agreement requires Senegal and Guinea-Bissau to exercise enforcement 
and policing powers in the Zone, including search and rescue (SAR) 
operations.   
 
In the broader context, the Senegal-Guinea Bissau JDZ is a clear 
example of how maritime boundary arrangements can have far reaching 
political and strategic consequences. Given that the ICJ decided the 
boundary issue in favour of Senegal, and that other indicators of State 
power (such as defence capabilities, economic strength, population size 
and national resources) also weighed heavily towards Senegal, it is 
hardly surprising that Senegal chose not to opt for a JDZ. However, it 
has been noted in the authoritative literature on maritime boundaries that 
Senegal might have accepted the agreement for an interest completely 
outside the maritime domain -,
94
 namely, Guinea-Bissau’s cooperation 
and support in fighting the Casamance insurgency.
95
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In addition to the above observation, the larger strategic environment 
surrounding the JDZ agreement should be taken into account. Indeed, 
this can be traced back to the colonial history of the two States. The zeal 
of two colonial powers (France and Portugal) finalising a maritime 
boundary deal amidst anti-colonial struggle is testimony to their vested 
interest in the future of their (soon to be) independent Countries  
However, when President Joao Bernardo Vieira of Guinea-Bissau took 
power by coup in 1980,
96
 he remained on a collision course with former 
colonial power Portugal, and shifted his allegiance to France (including 
by joining the French monetary zone).
97
 This led to geopolitical rivalry 
between France and Portugal, which at one point manifested in 
contestation between their navies off the coast of Guinea-Bissau.
98
 At the 
regional level, Senegal acted as the conduit for achieving the greater 
France agenda, but Senegal also ceased the opportunity to make Vieira 
(and thus Guinea-Bissau), a strong ally.
99
 Close relations with Bissau 
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Vieira in 1998. 
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were also forged to counterbalance Gambia, which was perceived as a 
safe haven for the Casamance insurgency.
100
  
 
The important point to note from the analysis of the Senegal-Guinea 
Bissau example is that maritime boundary agreements are instruments 
for strengthening interstate relationships within and outside the maritime 
realm. Given that both Senegal and Guinea Bissau were aligned with 
France at the time of the negotiation of the JDZ, France’s invisible hands 
would have contributed to the rapprochement. In the maritime context, 
the harmonious resolution of the boundary dispute, and the subsequent 
agreement that was reached, deepened maritime security cooperation 
between the two States and also facilitated joint policing and 
enforcement measures. In other respects, the JDZ strengthened the States 
relationship on wider issues of peace and security, further enhancing 
diplomatic ties. Thus the maritime boundary agreement did not just 
provide clarity of interest at sea; it also illuminated future relations and 
cooperation.  
 
5.2.3.4.3 Maritime Boundaries as a Source of Conflict and 
Insecurity – the Case of Nigeria and Cameroon   
The summary of agreements in Table 5.2 substantially resolved past and 
future maritime boundary disputes in the northern and southern segments 
                                                          
100
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of the Gulf of Guinea.
101
 In contrast, there is not a single boundary 
agreement in the coastal region from Guinea to Benin (as depicted in 
Figure 5.1 below). This has negative implications for maritime security 
enforcement and cooperation, and is also a source of conflict between 
States.  
 
Figure 5.1: Delimited and Un-delimited Areas of the Gulf of Guinea 
 
Source: Kamal-Deen Ali and Martin Tsamenyi (2013)  
 
Currently, a number of States in the Gulf of Guinea are either in the 
throes of internal conflicts or are recovering from the debilitating effects 
of such conflicts.
102
 In many ways, however, we may be witnessing a 
compounding of instability in the region, with interstate conflicts 
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erupting due to increased competition over offshore resources – 
particularly oil and gas. Indeed, such competition is particularly 
worrying, as sovereignty disputes have the capacity to quickly escalate 
into interstate conflicts.
103
 The analysis in chapter three also 
demonstrated the relationship between depleting fisheries resources and 
conflicts in coastal communities. The case of Cameroon and Nigeria 
exemplifies how a combination of boundary uncertainties and resource 
interests can escalate into interstate conflicts, thus inhibiting maritime 
security cooperation.  
 
As far back as the colonial period, the coastal communities of Cameroon 
and Nigeria have been at odds over fishing rights in the Bakassi 
Peninsula.
104
 Thus, the agreements between colonial frontiers preserved 
the fishing rights of local communities, irrespective of the limits of 
colonial frontiers.
105
 This approach was abandoned by Nigeria and 
Cameroon after independence, and at the same time the two States failed 
to delimit their maritime boundaries. The result was multiple conflicts 
between fishing communities living closely across national boundaries. 
This led to increasing tensions at the interstate level.
106
 Expectations of 
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financial revenue from oil resources in the undelimited zone increased 
the intensity of the disagreements, leading to sovereignty disputes and 
military confrontation.
107
 Despite the maritime boundary ruling of the 
ICJ in 2002,
108
 the issue still lingers, prompting further diplomatic 
interventions, including the establishment of a UN-sanctioned 
Commission to resolve the dispute.
109
 The contrasting examples of 
Senegal-Guinea Bissau and Nigeria-Cameroon epitomise the 
significance of maritime boundary agreements to interstate cooperation 
in general, and maritime security cooperation in particular.  
 
In summary, the analysis in this first part of the chapter has demonstrated 
that the effective implementation of the UNCLOS framework is crucial 
for enhancing maritime security in the Gulf of Guinea. The next four 
parts of the chapter will assess the implementation of other international 
frameworks which are essential for combating maritime security 
challenges in the Gulf of Guinea.  
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5.3 IMPLEMENTATION OF THE FRAMEWORK FOR THE 
SUPPRESSION OF UNLAWFUL ACTS AGAINST SAFETY OF 
NAVIGATION AND FIXED PLATFORMS 
The overview of maritime security challenges in chapter three has 
affirmed the presence of significant threats to the security of offshore 
energy platforms off the Gulf of Guinea. The case study on piracy in 
chapter four equally revealed the occurrence of piratical attacks in the 
Gulf of Guinea, while noting that the safety and security of shipping 
does not fall within the international law definition of “piracy”. The 
international framework which governs this category of threats is 
composed of the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts 
against the Safety of Navigation, as well as its three Protocols. 
Collectively, they will be referred to as the “SUA framework”.  
 
This part will assess the implementation of the SUA framework in the 
Gulf of Guinea. The analysis will follow the order outlined in the 
introduction to this chapter. The first section will review the background 
to the SUA framework. The second section will examine the relevance 
of the framework to the Gulf of Guinea, while the third will assess the 
implementation of the framework in the region.   
 
5.3.1 Background to the SUA Framework  
The background to the SUA framework is rooted in attempts to remedy 
the gaps in the international law definition of “piracy”.
110
 As shown in 
chapter four, establishing jurisdiction over the crime of piracy requires 
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 This has been examined extensively in chapter 4, section 4.2.  
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the incident to: (i) have taken place outside the territorial sea; (ii) involve 
two ships; and (iii) be motivated by private ends.
111
 This definition 
excludes other violent attacks that endanger the safety and security of 
ships,
112
 as well as attacks on offshore installations and platforms (which 
by their very nature are attached to the seabed and therefore not regarded 
as ships).
 113
 Moreover, although the scope of the EEZ jurisdiction 
includes the safety of offshore platforms and installations,
114
 UNCLOS 
has not specified which acts constitute threats to safety, or how States 
may cooperate with one another to address these threats.
115
 
 
Addressing these gaps was of prime importance to the international 
community, with the Achille Lauro incident serving as the impetus for 
the adoption of the first SUA framework in 1988.
116
 The Achille Lauro 
incident occurred on 7 October 1985, when a group of men aligned with 
the Palestine Liberation Front (PLF) secretly boarded and hijacked the 
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Achille Lauro - an Italian cruise ship off the Egyptian coast.
 117
 The ship 
was carrying close to four hundred passengers representing more than 
twenty different nationalities.
118
 The hijackers demanded the release of 
Palestinian prisoners held in Israel, threatening to cause harm to the ship 
and its passengers if their request was not met. Eventually, the hijackers 
followed through with their threat, killing one of the passengers on 
board.
 119
   
 
The Achille Lauro hijacking demonstrated the ambiguous nature of the 
jurisdiction (and thus the lack of an international response) over some 
violent activities at sea. Since the hijacking was undertaken from within 
the ship, the act could not be classified as “piracy”, and thus only the 
flag State had clear jurisdiction over the incident. Other States affected 
by the incident could only establish jurisdiction by evoking the passive 
personality or protective principles (as analysed in chapter four). 
However, these bases of jurisdiction are generally only invoked in 
exceptional circumstances, and thus any action taken by a State under 
these heads of jurisdiction may have lacked international support.
120
 It 
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was therefore imperative for the international community to adopt an 
appropriate framework so that States could combat such threats with 
confidence.
121
 With the Achille Lauro incident serving as the 
groundswell, in 1988 the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful 
Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation (1988 SUA Convention) 
was adopted, together with a Protocol. Two additional instruments have 
since been added, bringing the total number of instruments that compose 
the SUA framework to four.   
 
5.3.2 Overview of the SUA Framework for Maritime Security   
Although the four SUA instruments are interrelated, the relevance of the 
instruments to maritime security is better appreciated when they are 
examined separately. This is especially the case with respect to the 1988 
Convention and the Protocol.  
 
5.3.2.1 1988 SUA Convention  
The 1988 Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the 
Safety of Maritime Navigation (1988 SUA Convention) is the parent 
instrument in the SUA framework.
122
 The unique nature of the 
Convention lies in its Article 3, which creates a list of substantive 
offences. The Article makes it an offence for a person to: (i) seize or 
                                                          
121
 On the process towards the SUA Convention, see Malvina Halberstam, "Terrorism on the High 
Seas: The Achille Lauro, Piracy and the IMO Convention on Maritime Safety," American Journal of 
International Law 88, 1988, pp. 269-92. 
122
 1988 Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation, 
10 March 1988, Rome, Italy, Entry into Force: 01 March 1992, 156 Parties as of 2 December 2010, 
1678 UNTS 201 / [1993] ATS 10 / 27 ILM 672 (1988); hereinafter referred to as 1988 SUA 
Convention.  
256 
 
exercise control over a ship by threat or use of force or any other form of 
intimidation;
123
 or (ii) perform an act of violence against a person on 
board a ship or an act of violence likely to endanger the safe navigation 
of that ship;
124
 or (iii) place or cause to be placed on a ship, by any 
means whatsoever, a device or substance which is likely to destroy that 
ship, or cause damage to that ship or its cargo which endangers or is 
likely to endanger the safe navigation of that ship.
125
 Attempting, 
abetting or facilitating any of above acts also constitutes an offence.
126
 
Article 5 obligates all State Parties to create offences with appropriate 
penalties on the basis of Article 3 and to prosecute offenders.
 127
  
 
Articles 3 to 5 have been designed to address the difficulties associated 
with the treatment of the crime of piracy under UNCLOS.
128
 Under the 
SUA Convention, an actual attack or threat of violence constitutes a 
crime, irrespective of whether it comes from within or outside the ship 
and regardless of the motive of the actors.
129
 Article 6 deals with 
jurisdiction over SUA offences, and allows the flag State, coastal State 
or State of nationality of the offender to exercise jurisdiction over the 
offence. If such jurisdiction is not invoked, the State of nationality of any 
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victim of the crime, or any State that the offender seeks to compel to do 
or abstain from doing an act, can assume jurisdiction. These legal 
consequences and obligations remain the same irrespective of whether 
the offence is committed within or outside the territorial sea. 
 
In contrast to the generally permissive language of international 
conventions, the 1988 SUA Convention imposes strong cooperative 
requirements on States. The Convention stipulates that a State Party in 
whose territory a SUA offender is found must take the person into 
custody, irrespective of whether the State wants to prosecute the offender 
or not.
130
 The State must then extradite the suspect to a requesting State 
Party on the basis of an existing extradition treaty, or by using the 
Convention as the basis for extradition.
131
 Where the State fails to 
extradite the suspect, the State is “obliged without exception” to 
prosecute the criminal.
132
  
 
5.3.2.2  1988 SUA Protocol  
The 1988 SUA Convention was adopted in conjunction with the Protocol 
for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Fixed 
Platforms Located on the Continental Shelf 1988 (1988 SUA 
Protocol).
133
 The Protocol mirrors the Convention in many ways, but 
focuses entirely on the safety and security of platforms that are attached 
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to the seabed.
134
 In language that is reminiscent of the SUA Convention 
1988, Article 2 of the 1988 Protocol creates substantive offences, 
including seizing or taking control of fixed platforms by force, damaging 
fixed platforms, as well as causing injury or death to persons on board 
fixed platforms.
135
 The Protocol parallels the Convention by making all 
the Convention requirements regarding the compulsory exercise of 
jurisdiction, as well as the procedures relating to extradition, applicable 
to the Protocol.
136
 This approach enhances the effectiveness of the 
Protocol in much the same way as the Convention and makes it an 
important instrument for addressing maritime security against offshore 
infrastructure.   
 
5.3.2.3 The 2005 SUA Protocols  
The final two instruments that comprise the SUA framework were both 
adopted in 2005 as Protocols to the 1988 SUA Convention and 1988 
SUA Protocol.   
 
Although the 1988 Convention and Protocol were far reaching in terms 
of the substantive offences they created, as well as the obligations they 
imposed on States, there were still concerns that the two instruments did 
not go far enough in responding to maritime security threats.
137
 The 
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primary criticism levelled against the instruments was that they were 
reactive rather proactive, providing States with the jurisdiction to punish 
offences without empowering them to take preventive actions.
138
 This 
limitation became a major concern following the terrorist attacks against 
the United States on 11 September 2001.
139
 As analysed in chapter three, 
the successful hijacking of aircrafts by terrorists heightened fears that 
ships could similarly be hijacked and used as weapons against other 
ships, or that terrorists would load destructive material onto containers 
and land them in ports of target States.
140
  
 
The international response to these post-9/11 maritime security threats 
was two new SUA instruments, both of which were adopted in 2005. 
The first was a Protocol to the 1988 Convention, which dealt with safety 
of shipping navigation,
141
 while the second was a Protocol to the 1988 
Protocol, which dealt with the safety of offshore platforms.
142
 The 2005 
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SUA Protocols have expanded the scope of offences in the 1988 SUA 
framework, while at the same time adding new preventive measures.
143
 
Article 2 of the Protocol to the SUA Convention extends the scope of 
offences to include causing serious injury or damage by the use of 
explosives, radioactive material or any kind of harmful biological, 
chemical and nuclear (BCN) material. Article 3 also prohibits the 
transport of these materials. However, it is Article 8 of the 2005 SUA 
Convention that has made radical changes to the SUA regime. It sets out 
cooperative measures for the suppression of the new SUA offences, 
including mechanisms for the boarding of ships on the high seas.
144
 
Thus, a State Party that has reasonable grounds for suspecting that an 
offence set out in the Protocol is being committed (or is about to be 
committed), may make a request to board the vessel, and the flag State is 
to respond expeditiously
 
to the request.
145
 Thus, in summary, the 2005 
instruments have provided an enhanced regime to respond to terrorist-
type attacks on ships and offshore platforms
146
 
 
5.3.3   Relevance of the SUA Framework to the Gulf of Guinea 
and an Assessment of the Status of Implementation   
The relevance of the SUA framework to the enhancement of maritime 
security in the Gulf of Guinea has already been alluded to in the 
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introduction. The instruments provide the means for securing offshore 
oil platforms, and by implication, energy security in the Gulf of Guinea. 
The 1988 SUA Convention also provides the basis for responding to 
insurgent-type attacks which the Gulf of Guinea is faced with.
 147
 Indeed, 
such attacks have the tendency of falling outside of the scope of 
UNCLOS, as they lack the “private motive” element. However, the 1988 
SUA Convention has dispensed with the private motive requirement, 
thus giving Gulf of Guinea States the opportunity to effectively respond 
to these attacks. Also, as explained in the preceding section, State Parties 
to the SUA framework are under an obligation to prosecute offenders in 
their custody, even if the offence has not been committed off their coast. 
This solves the piracy conundrum discussed in chapter four, where Niger 
Delta pirates commit piratical attacks off the coasts of other States, using 
Nigeria as a safe haven. Under the SUA framework, Nigeria will be 
obligated to prosecute the pirates, or otherwise extradite them to any 
State that makes a request for extradition.  
 
Despite the relevance of the SUA framework, the ratification and 
implementation of SUA instruments by Gulf of Guinea States has been 
unsatisfactory. The status of ratification is presented in Table 5.3. Only 
Cote d’Ivoire is a party to all the SUA instruments, but only since 2012. 
Angola, Cameroon, Congo, Gabon and Nigeria - all of whom are major 
oil producing States with substantial offshore infrastructure, have not 
ratified the 1988 SUA Fixed Platform Protocol. Indeed, this Protocol is 
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 Generally on the SUA framework and the suppression of terrorism, see Helmut Tuerk, "Combating 
Terrorism - The Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation," 
University of Miami International and Comparitive Law Review 15,  2008, pp. 337-67. 
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intended to help States safeguard the security of offshore oil platforms 
and installations. 
 
Table 5.3: Status of Ratification of the SUA Convention and Protocols in the 
Gulf of Guinea 
 
 
State 
 
 
1988 SUA 
Convention 
 
 
1988 SUA 
Protocol 
2005 
Protocol to 
the 1988 
Convention 
2005 
Protocol to 
the 1988 
Protocol 
Angola     
Benin 31/8/06 31/8/06   
Cameroon     
Cape Verde 3/1/03 3/1/03   
Congo Brazzaville      
Cote d’Ivoire 23/3/12 23/3/12 23/3/12 23/3/12 
DR Congo     
Equatorial Guinea  15/1/04 15/1/04   
Gabon     
Gambia 1/11/91    
Ghana 1/11/02 1/11/02   
Guinea 1/2/05 1/2/05   
Guinea Bissau 14/10/08 14/10/08   
Liberia 5/10/95 5/10/95   
Mauritania 17/1/08 17/1/08   
Nigeria 24/2/04    
São Tomé & Príncipe 5/5/06 5/5/06   
Senegal 2/2/04 9/8/04   
Sierra Leone     
Togo 10/3/03 10/3/03   
Sources: IMO Status of Multilateral Convention and Instruments as at June 30 2013.  
 
Those States that have ratified the SUA instruments have generally 
failed to implement the instruments into their domestic legal system.
148
 
For example, although Benin, Cote d’Ivoire, Ghana and Nigeria have all 
ratified the 1988 SUA Convention, not one has incorporated the 
                                                          
148
 This has been confirmed in an address delivered at the UN by the Secretary General of the 
Maritime Organisation for West and Central Africa (MOWCA). See Magnus T. Addico, Maritime 
Security Threats and Responses in West and Central Africa (New York: UNICPOLOS,  23-27 June. 
2008). 
263 
 
Convention under its national law.
149
 According to the United Nations 
Division for Ocean Affairs and the Law of the Sea (UN-DOALOS), 
Liberia is the only State in the region to have taken steps to implement 
the 1988 SUA instruments domestically, having amended its penal code 
in 2008.
150
 However, this still falls short of a comprehensive domestic 
regime, as Liberia has failed to ratify the 2005 Protocol to the SUA 
Convention. This instrument provides an enhanced regime for the 
protection of shipping, and is therefore crucial for Liberia, particularly if 
one considers its status as the second largest flag State in the world.
151
  
 
The inadequate implementation of the SUA framework in the Gulf of 
Guinea has serious maritime security implications. Indeed, Gulf of 
Guinea States are incapacitated from taking enforcement measures at the 
national level, thus allowing threats to be made, and attacks to be 
perpetrated, on offshore platforms and the shipping industry as a whole. 
The decision to delay ratification and implementation of the relevant 
instruments also translates into compromised maritime security and 
cooperation at the regional level. Finally, the situation constitutes a 
threat to global security. Since 2004, the UN has emphasised the 
importance of the SUA framework for enhancing maritime security.
152
 It 
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 For Nigeria, see “NIMASA Seeks Legal Backing to Fight Piracy,” This Day, 14 February 2013. 
For Benin, see United Nations, Report of the United Nations Assessment Mission on Piracy in the 
Gulf of Guinea, Security Council S/2012/45, 19 January 2012. For Cote d’Ivoire and Ghana, see 
Interview with National Authorities, on file with Author.  
150
 Liberia, An Act to Amend the Penal Code of 1976 Adding the Offences of Armed Robbery, 
Terrorism and Hijacking as Capital Offences, 22 July 2008.  
151
 Rating of flag States by the United Nations Commission on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) in 
2012. See UNCTAD, “Review of Maritime Transport, 2012, p.44.   
152
 See United Nations, General Assembly Resolution 62/215, 14 March 2008, paragraph 67.  United 
Nations General Assembly Resolution 61/222, 16 March 2007, paragraph 59. United Nations Security 
Council Resolution 1540, 28 April. 2004. 
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is therefore imperative for Gulf of Guinea States to ratify and implement 
the SUA instruments within their domestic legal and policy frameworks. 
This should be followed by the development of regional responses on the 
basis of the SUA instruments.  
 
5.4 IMPLEMENTATION OF THE UNITED NATIONS 
CONVENTION AGAINST ILLICIT DRUG TRAFFICKING  
Chapter three illustrated that one of the most pressing security challenges 
in the Gulf of Guinea is drug trafficking. The international legal 
framework for suppressing drug trafficking is chiefly contained in the 
1988 United Nations Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs 
and Psychotropic Substances (UN Drug Convention). This part evaluates 
the implementation of the framework in the Gulf of Guinea.  
 
5.4.1 Background to the United Nations Convention against Drug 
Trafficking 
Attempts to combat illicit drug trafficking by sea have traditionally been 
hampered by the need to balance the interests of States affected by such 
conduct with the interests of the State of nationality of the ship 
transporting the drugs - the flag State.
153
 While States affected by drug 
trafficking may wish to take enforcement measures, such as boarding 
and searching ships on the high seas, flag States view such measures as 
an infringement of the freedom of the high seas doctrine (which vests 
exclusive jurisdiction over a vessel on the high seas with the flag 
                                                                                                                                                                    
 
153
 This section draws heavily from the work of Douglas Guilfoyle, see Douglas Guilfoyle, Shipping 
Interdiction and the Law of the Sea, New York, Cambridge University Press, 2009, p.79-96.  
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State).
154
 Article 108 of UNCLOS seeks to balance the rights States in 
this regard, merely directing them to “cooperate” in the suppression of 
illicit drug trafficking.
155
 The 1988 United Nations Convention against 
Illicit Traffic in Narcotics Drugs and Psychotropic Substances (1988 UN 
Drug Convention), which entered into force in 1990,
 156
 represents the 
cooperative framework contemplated by Article 108(1) of UNCLOS.
 
  
 
5.4.2 Framework of the UN Drug Convention  
The UN Drug Convention obligates State Parties to establish criminal 
offences for a range of illicit trafficking activities, including the 
production, sale, purchase, transportation and possession of narcotic 
drugs.
157
 Every State Party is to assume jurisdiction on the basis of the 
offences created, and to prosecute persons who commit trafficking 
offences in its territory or on board a vessel flying its flag.
158
 To 
empower States to combat trafficking more effectively, Article 17 
creates a framework for interdiction on the high seas, but this is premised 
on authorisation or permission being sought from the flag State. Where 
permission is granted, the requesting State may board and search the 
vessel, and if there is evidence of illicit trafficking, the State may take 
                                                          
154
 UNCLOS, Article 92(1) provides that “ships shall sail under the flag one State and …be subject to 
its exclusive jurisdiction on the high seas.” 
155
 Article 108 provides that: “(1) all States shall cooperate in the suppression of illicit traffic in 
narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances engaged in by ships on the high seas contrary to 
international conventions; (2) any State which has reasonable grounds for believing that a ship flying 
its flag is engaged in illicit traffic in narcotic drugs or psychotropic substances may request the 
cooperation of other States to suppress such traffic.” 
156
 United Nations Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances, 
Vienna, 20 December 1988, Entry into force 11 November 1990, United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 
1582, p. 95.    
157
 UN Drug Convention, Article 3(1)(a).  
158
 UN Drug Convention, Article 4(1)(a).  
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appropriate measures with regard to the vessel, cargo and persons on 
board.
159
  
 
Although the UN Drug Convention has provided an improved 
framework for combating illicit drug trafficking (as compared to the 
UNCLOS regime), the Convention still has limitations when it comes to 
the execution of high seas enforcement measures - particularly with 
respect to interdiction, boarding, seizure and arrest procedures. First, as 
noted in the preceding paragraph, boarding on the high seas can only be 
carried out with permission from the flag State. Second, although the 
Convention requires flag States to respond “expeditiously” to boarding 
requests, this is subject to the qualification that the response be provided 
“within the means available” to the flag State.
160
 A flag State can 
therefore exploit this proviso to refuse or delay the boarding. Even where 
a flag State is prepared to cooperate with a requesting State, the flag 
State may nonetheless have to abide by internal administrative processes 
to be able to respond to the request. This can lead to a compromising of 
intelligence and evidence, or even worse, the suspect vessel escaping 
altogether.
161
 Finally, a State that is heavily affected by drug trafficking 
(often referred to as the ‘destination State’), may wish to interdict vessels 
as close as possible to the ‘source State’, conceivably within the 
territorial sea to prevent vessels escaping in the open waters. However, 
                                                          
159
 UN Drug Convention, Article 17(4).  
160
 UN Drug Convention, Articles 17(2) and 17(4) read together.  
161
 Such difficulties have been expressed by US law enforcement officials. See Defining Customs 
Waters for 
Certain Drug Offences: Hearing before the Subcommittee on Crime of the Committee on the 
Judiciary, House of Representatives, 16 May 1985, Washington, DC, 1986. See William C. Gilmore, 
"Narcotics interdiction at sea: UK-US Cooperation," Marine Policy 13, 1989, pp. 218-230. 
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the 1988 UN Drug Convention has completely steered away from such a 
boarding regime, most likely due to sovereignty concerns.  
In view of the limitations of the UN Drug Convention, States have 
sought further cooperative frameworks at the bilateral and regional 
levels. These cooperative frameworks have indeed been encouraged by 
Article 17 of the UN Drug Convention, which calls on State Parties to 
enhance the effectiveness of the Convention through additional bilateral 
and regional agreements.
162
 Two such regional frameworks are the 1995 
Council of Europe Agreement
 163
 and the 2003 US- Caribbean Area 
Agreement.
 164
  
 
5.4.3 Assessment of Implementation of Counter-Narcotics Reponses 
in the Gulf of Guinea  
With the exception of Equatorial Guinea, all Gulf of Guinea States are 
party to the UN Drug Convention.
165
 In 2008, Member States of the 
Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) also declared 
their political commitment to combating drug trafficking at a meeting in 
Cape Verde.
166
 As demonstrated in chapter three, however, illicit drug 
                                                          
162
 See Articles 17(4) and 17(9) of the 1988 UN Drug Convention. 17(9) provides: “The Parties shall 
consider entering into bilateral or regional agreements or arrangements to carry out, or to enhance the 
effectiveness of, the provisions of this article.”  
163
 Agreement on Illicit Traffic by Sea, implementing Article 17 of the United Nations Convention 
against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances, Council of Europe, Strasbourg, 
31 January 1995.  
164
 Agreement Concerning Co-operation in Suppressing Illicit Maritime and Air Trafficking in 
Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances in the Caribbean Area, 10 April 2003.  
165
See UNOCD, Status of Ratification and Accession as at 6 September 2013, available 
http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=VI-19&chapter=6&lang=en, 
6 September 2013. The author’s research h has not pointed to why Equatorial Guinea has not ratified 
the UN Drug Convention.   
166
 UNODC, "Regional Programme for West Africa 2010–2014,"  2010, pp. 135-45. 
268 
 
trafficking in the Gulf of Guinea is on the increase.
167
 This suggests 
serious gaps in counter-narcotics responses in the region. 
 
Table 5.4:  Status of Ratification of UN Drug Convention, 1988 
State Date of Ratification  
 
Angola 26 Oct 2005 
Benin 23 May 1997 
Cameroon 27 Feb 1989 
Cape Verde  8 May 1995 
Congo Brazzaville  3 Mar 2004 
Cote d’Ivoire 25 Nov 1991 
DR Congo 28 Oct 2005 
Equatorial Guinea   
Gabon 10 Jul 2006 
Gambia 23 Apr 1996 
Ghana 10 Apr 1990 
Guinea 27 Dec 1990 
Guinea-Bissau 27 Oct 1995 
Liberia 16 Sep 2005 
Mauritania 1 Jul 1993 
Nigeria 1 Nov 1989 
São Tomé & Príncipe 20 Jun 1996 
Senegal 27 Nov 1989 
Sierra Leone 6 Jun 1994 
Togo 1 Aug 1990 
Source: United Nations Treaty Collection as at June 2013  
 
Drug trafficking is thriving in the Gulf of Guinea due to multiple factors, 
including corruption and a lack of enforcement capacity.
168
 This is 
accentuated by the absence of a dedicated regional cooperative 
mechanism for combating illicit drug trafficking. Indeed, the response to 
illicit drug trafficking in the region must be multifaceted, and the core 
requirement is for Gulf of Guinea States to pursue effective regional and 
                                                          
167
 This has been analysed in chapter three of the thesis. 
168
 David E. Brown, The Challenges of Drug Trafficking to Democratic Governance and Human 
Security in West Africa, The Letort Papers, Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2013, 
pp. 43-50. 
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international cooperation. As analysed in chapter three, illicit drugs enter 
the region concealed in containers, but larger quantities are trafficked 
through drug vessels and transhipment at sea. Vessels carrying large 
quantities of drugs may tranship the drugs within the EEZ of a member 
State, or in the immediate high seas area of the region. Smaller crafts 
assisting in the crime will then venture into the territorial waters of the 
region. In the case of drugs trafficked through the use of containers, 
cooperation with source States (and particularly port inspection officials) 
constitutes the most practical means for responding to the threat. In all 
these cases, joint action and the sharing of information within a regional 
framework would also prove useful.  
 
Thus, there is a need for an effective, regional counter-narcotic 
framework that commits Gulf of Guinea States to sharing information 
and intelligence, as well as cooperative enforcement measures at sea. 
The UN and its agencies launched the West Africa Coast Initiative 
(WACI) in 2009 as a pilot drug watch programme.169 Gulf of Guinea 
States can use the WACI platform as a base for building a counter-
narcotic framework. However, for a framework to be durable and 
effective, ownership and commitment by regional States is critical. 
Pragmatism dictates that the framework should include extra-regional 
partners, especially EU States.  
 
                                                          
169
 The WACI is being piloted in four States - Cote d’Ivoire, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia and Sierra Leone. 
See United Nations Office for West Africa, West Africa Coastal Initiative, 
http://unowa.unmissions.org/Default.aspx?tabid=841, 31 July 2013.  
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In developing a regional framework, Gulf of Guinea States can draw 
from some of the structures in the 1995 Council of Europe Agreement 
and the 2003 US-Caribbean Area Agreement. For example, the Council 
of Europe Agreement has clarified ambiguities regarding the cost of 
enforcement - an issue that can undermine cooperative frameworks.
170
 
This has been done by specifying key measures for the suppression of 
drug trafficking which every State is obligated to enforce at its own cost, 
even when the enforcement is invoked by another State.
171
 In all other 
cases the requesting or intervening State will be responsible for the 
cost.
172
 Therefore, the principle of burden-sharing has been adopted 
under the Council of Europe framework – a principle which is absent 
from the UN Drug Convention. Similarly the US-Caribbean Area 
Agreement has key strengths which Gulf of Guinea States can draw 
on.
173
 The Agreement not only requires States to act expeditiously in 
answering requests for verification of the identity of suspected vessels, 
but also stipulates four hours as the maximum delay period.
174
 Also, the 
willingness of Caribbean States to cooperate with the US has led to 
surveillance assistance and capacity building programmes in the 
Caribbean region, including reforms in the security sector and the 
judicial system.
175
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 Agreement on Illicit Traffic by Sea, implementing Article 17 of the United Nations Convention 
against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances, Council of Europe, Strasbourg, 
31 January 1995. 
171
 The key measures are in Articles 4 and 5, while the provision on cost is contained in Article 25 (1).  
172
 See Articles 9, 10, 25(1), 1995 Council of Europe Agreement. 
173
 Agreement Concerning Co-operation in Suppressing Illicit Maritime and Air Trafficking in 
Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances in the Caribbean Area, 10 April 2003.  
174
 Articles 6(4) and (5).  
175
 Liana Sun Wyler, International Drug Control Policy: Background and U.S. Responses, 
Congressional Research Service, 13 August 2013, p.17, http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL34543.pdf, 
6 September 2013,  
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5.5 IMPLEMENTATION OF INTERNATIONAL LEGAL AND 
POLICY FRAMEWORKS FOR FISHERIES GOVERNANCE IN 
THE GULF OF GUINEA  
The socio-economic importance of fisheries in the Gulf of Guinea has 
been examined in chapter two. Chapter three also demonstrated the 
impact of declining fisheries on food security, as well as wider regional 
security implications. It is thus imperative for Gulf of Guinea States to 
implement measures that will address the causes of declining fisheries, 
as well as promote the sustainable management of fisheries resources in 
general.  
 
This part examines the extent to which Gulf of Guinea States have 
implemented requisite international frameworks for fisheries 
governance. The frameworks being examined consist of binding and 
non-binding instruments, and together they serve as the key global legal 
and policy regimes for addressing fisheries governance concerns. The 
analysis is organised into three sections. The first section will examine 
the binding governance frameworks, the second section will examine the 
non-binding frameworks, while the third section assesses the 
implementation of the frameworks in the Gulf of Guinea.   
 
5.5.1  Binding Fisheries Governance Frameworks   
Four binding instruments on fisheries governance will be considered in 
this section: the UNCLOS fisheries framework, the FAO Compliance 
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Agreement, the UN Fish Stocks Agreement and the Port State Measures 
Agreement.
176
    
 
5.5.1.1 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 
As analysed in the first part of this chapter, the desire to control fishing 
resources was the catalyst for the evolution of the concept of the EEZ. 
Thus, UNCLOS recognises the sovereign right of coastal States to 
exploit and manage living resources in the EEZ.
177
 This right co-exists 
with an obligation to take sound conservation measures and, in 
particular, to ensure that living resources in the EEZ are not endangered 
by over-exploitation.
178
 To facilitate the realisation of the interests of 
coastal States in the EEZ, and the accompanying obligations, UNCLOS 
gives coastal States enforcement rights in the EEZ. These include the 
right to board and inspect fishing vessels, as well as the ability to arrest 
and prosecute persons for violations of fisheries regulations.
179
 UNCLOS 
also entreats States to cooperate in the conservation and management of 
living resources, and in some cases, makes such cooperation 
obligatory.
180
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 The analysis in this section relies heavily on the work of Mary Ann Palma, Martin Tsamenyi and 
William Edeson, Promoting Sustainable Fisheries: The International Legal and Policy Framework to 
Combat Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Fishing, Leiden, Martinus Nijhoff, 2010, Chapter 
Three.  
177
 UNCLOS, Article 56.  
178
 UNCLOS, Article 61(2). Mary Ann Palma, Martin Tsamenyi and William Edeson, Promoting 
Sustainable Fisheries : The International Legal and Policy Framework to Combat Illegal, Unreported 
and Unregulated Fishing, Leiden, Martinus Nijhoff, 2010, p. 58. 
179
Article 73 of UNCLOS states: “1. The coastal State may, in the exercise of its sovereign rights to 
explore, exploit, conserve and manage the living resources in the exclusive economic zone, take such 
measures, including boarding, inspection, arrest and judicial proceedings, as may be necessary to 
ensure compliance with the laws and regulations adopted by it in conformity with this Convention.”  
180
 For example, Article 61(2) encourages regional, sub-regional and global cooperation, while 
Articles 63 and 64 make cooperation compulsory.  
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The rights and obligations of States regarding living resources also 
extend to the high seas. Under international law, all States - coastal and 
landlocked - enjoy the freedom of high seas fishing, and this has been 
codified in Article 87 of UNCLOS.
181
 The exercise of the freedom is, 
however, subject to a number of obligations. States must adopt measures 
for the conservation of high seas living resources, ensure that their 
nationals adhere to such measures, and they must also cooperate with 
other States in the management and conservation of high seas living 
resources.
182
 
 
5.5.1.2 FAO Compliance Agreement 
The Agreement to Promote Compliance with International Conservation 
and Management Measures by Fishing Vessels on the High Seas (FAO 
Compliance Agreement) was adopted in 1993 as the first post-UNCLOS 
binding agreement for fisheries management.
 183
  A crucial issue 
successfully dealt with by the FAO Compliance Agreement was the 
reflagging of fishing vessels.
184
 Under the Agreement, a vessel that is 
serving a suspension for violating fishing regulations is prohibited from 
re-registering (reflagging) under any other State unless the period of 
                                                          
181
 UNCLOS, Article 87(1)(e).  
182
 UNCLOS, Articles 117 and 118. See also Mary Ann Palma, Martin Tsamenyi and William 
Edeson, Promoting Sustainable Fisheries : The International Legal and Policy Framework to Combat 
Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Fishing, Leiden, Martinus Nijhoff, 2010, p. 59. 
183
 FAO, Agreement to Promote Compliance with International Conservation and Management 
Measures by Fishing Vessels on the High Seas, Rome, Italy, 24 November 1993, entered into force 24 
April 2003.  
184
 Robin R. Churchill and Vaughan Lowe, The Law of the Sea, Manchester, Manchester University 
Press, 1999, pp. 302-303.  
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suspension has ended.
185
 This prohibition has crystallised into an 
important tool for combating IUU fishing in more recent fishery 
frameworks. It is important to note, however, that the governance regime 
of the FAO Compliance Agreement only covers fishing activities on the 
high seas.
186
   
 
5.5.1.3  United Nations Fish Stock Agreement 
The United Nations Fish Stock Agreement was adopted in 1995 as the 
implementing instrument for Articles 63 and 64 of UNCLOS, entering 
into force in 2001.
187
 The UN Fish Stock Agreement regulates the 
management of species of fish described as straddling stocks and highly 
migratory species.
188
 Indeed, the very description of these species of fish, 
tuna being the most dominant,
189
 shows that their management requires 
some form of interstate cooperation.
 190
 Thus, the UN Fish Stock 
Agreement creates a mechanism for managing these stocks through 
regional fisheries management organisations (RFMOs).
191
 The regime 
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 FAO, Compliance Agreement, Article III (5).  
186
 FAO, Compliance Agreement, Article II (1).  
187
 FAO, United Nations Agreement for the Implementation of the Provisions of the United Nations 
Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982 relating to the Conservation and 
Management of Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks, 1995, in force 11 
December 2001.  
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 UNCLOS, Article 63 and 64. See also Robin R. Churchill and Vaughan Lowe, The Law of the Sea, 
Manchester, Manchester University Press, 1999, p.294. Edward L. Miles and William T. Burke, 
"Pressures on the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea Arising from New Fisheries 
Conflicts: The Problem of Straddling Stocks " Ocean Development and International Law 20,  1989 
pp. 343–57.   
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 On highly migratory and straddling stocks, see FAO, "The State of World Highly Migratory, 
Straddling and other High Seas Fishery Resources and Associated Species," FAO Technical Paper 
495,  2006. 
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 UNCLOS, Articles 63 and 64. Robin R. Churchill and Vaughan Lowe, Law of the Sea, 
Manchester, Manchester University Press, 1999, p.294. Edward L. Miles and William T. Burke, 
"Pressures on the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea Arising from New Fisheries 
Conflicts: The Problem of Straddling Stocks," Ocean Development and International Law 20, 1989, 
pp. 343–57.   
191
 FAO, UN Fish Stock Agreement, Articles 8-14.   
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consists of a wide range of responsibilities, including vessel licensing, 
record keeping, catch verification, information sharing, as well as the 
monitoring, control and surveillance (MCS) of fishing vessels.
192
 
  
The UN Fish Stock Agreement also creates mechanisms for meeting the 
enforcement and capacity-building needs of developing countries.
193
 
Also, the duty of States to ensure conservation of straddling stocks is 
balanced by the need to ensure that conservation measures do not create 
vulnerability in the food and nutritional requirements of communities, 
especially the fishing communities of developing States.
194
 
 
 
5.5.1.4 FAO Port State Measures Agreement  
To further enhance the sustainable conservation and governance of 
fisheries, consultations on the adoption of Port State Measures (PSM) 
commenced in 2007,
195
 with the Agreement on Port State Measures 
(PSMA) to combat IUU fishing finally adopted in 2009.
196
 In simple 
terms, PSMs involve the in port inspection of fishing vessels to ensure 
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 UN Fish Stock Agreement, Part V. See also Lawrence Juda, "The United Nations Fish Stocks 
Agreement," Yearbook of International Co-operation on Environment and Development 2001/02, pp. 
53-58. Moritaka Hayashi, "The 1995 UN Fish Stocks Agreement and the Law of the Sea", in  Davor 
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 UN Fish Stock Agreement, Article 24(1) and Articles 25-27.   
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 UN Fish Stock Agreement, Article 24(2). 
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 FAO, Twenty-seventh Session of the Committee on Fisheries, Rome, Italy, 5-9 March 2007, FAO 
Fisheries Report No. 830, 2007.  
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 FAO, Agreement on Port State Measures to Prevent, Deter and Eliminate Illegal, Unreported and 
Unregulated Fishing, 22 November 2009.  
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compliance with fisheries governance and conservation measures.
197
 The 
inspection should, at a minimum, cover the documentation of the vessel, 
the type of fishing gear being used, as well as the quantity and origin of 
the fish on board the vessel.
198
 Since this inspection is carried out in port, 
it is regarded as more cost-effective than other types of enforcement 
measures.
199
  
 
5.5.2   Non-binding Fisheries Governance Frameworks    
There are also a number of non-binding fisheries frameworks that are 
part of the governance framework for fisheries. Much like binding 
agreements, these non-binding frameworks are generally adopted at the 
meetings of FAO member States, or as technical guidelines by FAO 
special committees. Therefore, non-binding frameworks equally serve as 
key multilateral instruments for engagement at regional and global 
levels. Some of these non-binding instruments deal with specific 
fisheries governance concerns, such as the use of fishing driftnets,
200
 the 
regulation of fishing capacity,
201
 as well as the conservation of seabirds 
and sharks.
202
 Others have a wider application, especially the FAO Code 
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 Mary Ann Palma, Martin Tsamenyi and William Edeson, Promoting Sustainable Fisheries : The 
International Legal and Policy Framework to Combat Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Fishing, 
Leiden, Martinus Nijhoff, 2010, p. 164. 
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 UN Resolution on Drift Fishing, Resolution 46/215, 1991, adopted by the UN General Assembly 
on 20 December 1991.  
201
 FAO, International Plan of Action for the Management of Fishing Capacity, adopted at the twenty-
third Session of FAO Fisheries Committee, Rome, Italy, 1991.  
202
 FAO, International Plan of Action for Reducing Incidental Catch of Seabirds in Longline 
Fisheries, adopted at the twenty-third Session of FAO Fisheries Committee, Rome, Italy, 1991. FAO, 
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of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries and the International Plan of 
Action against IUU Fishing (IPOA-IUU). These two instruments are 
examined below. 
 
5.5.2.1 FAO Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries 
The FAO Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries was adopted at the 
twenty-eighth Session of the FAO Conference in Rome, Italy, in 1995.
203
 
Unlike the UN Fish Stocks Agreement (that deals with specified fish 
species), or the Compliance Agreement (that only regulates high sea 
fishing), the Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries targets the 
management of all fisheries, irrespective of type or geographical 
space.
204
 Although it is a non-binding instrument, its strength lies in the 
broad measures it provides, including market-based measures for 
combating IUU fishing.
205
  
 
Like the UN Fish Stocks Agreement, the Code of Conduct also 
recognises the capacity building needs of developing States.
 206
 An 
important trade principle in the Code of Conduct (which also has the 
                                                                                                                                                                    
International Plan of Action for the Conservation and Management of Sharks, adopted at the twenty-
third Session of FAO Fisheries Committee, Rome, Italy, 1991. FAO, International Plan of Action for 
the Conservation and Management of Sharks, adopted at the twenty-third Session of FAO Fisheries 
Committee, Rome, Italy, 1991.  
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 FAO, Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries, adopted at the twenty-eighth Session of FAO 
Conference, Rome, Italy, 31 October 1995.  
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effect of combating IUU fishing), is the requirement for States to ensure 
that trading in fish and fish products at both international and domestic 
levels accords with sound conservation and management practices. This 
is to be achieved by improving the identification of the origin of fish and 
fishery products traded.
207
  
 
5.5.2.2 International Plan of Action against Illegal and 
Unreported Unregulated Fishing 
The International Plan of Action against illegal unreported and 
unregulated Fishing (IPOA-IUU) was adopted in 2001 on the platform of 
the FAO as a holistic global instrument for combating IUU fishing.
208
 
Although the IPOA-IUU is a non-binding instrument, it has been 
modelled in such a way that it links with many of the binding and non-
binding instruments reviewed thus far.
 209
 As indicated in chapter three, it 
was the adoption of the IPOA-IUU in 2001 that introduced the concept 
of IUU fishing into fisheries governance. An analysis of the various 
components of IUU fishing has already been undertaken in chapter 
three.
210
 The IPOA-IUU lays down actionable plans for addressing the 
threat of IUU fishing - plans which essentially translate into coastal 
State, flag State and port State responsibilities.
211
  
                                                          
207
 FAO, Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries, Principle 11.  
208
 FAO, International Plan of Action to Prevent, Deter and Eliminate Illegal, Unreported and 
Unregulated Fishing (IPOA-IUU), Rome, Italy, 2 March 2001, endorsed by the FAO Council on 23 
June 2001.  
209
 Mary Ann Palma, Martin Tsamenyi and William Edeson, Promoting Sustainable Fisheries : The 
International Legal and Policy Framework to Combat illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Fishing, 
Leiden, Martinus Nijhoff 2010, p. 57. 
210
 See chapter 3, particularly section 3.5.4.2. 
211
 See chapters 5, 6 and 7 respectively. Mary Ann Palma, Martin Tsamenyi and William Edeson, 
Promoting Sustainable Fisheries: The International Legal and Policy Framework to Combat Illegal, 
Unreported and Unregulated Fishing, Leiden, Martinus Nijhoff, 2010. 
279 
 
 
The IPOA-IUU requires coastal States to develop comprehensive 
legislation targeting all aspects of IUU fishing, including evidence 
gathering and ensuring that such evidence meets admissibility 
requirements in judicial and settlement processes.
212
 States must also 
develop strong mechanisms for the effective monitoring, control and 
surveillance (MCS) of fisheries.
213
 The IPOA-IUU reinforces the flag 
State responsibilities imposed by the earlier instruments, and extends 
some of these obligations to coastal States. For instance, it stipulates that 
coastal States should not allow vessels to undertake fishing activities 
within their waters without a valid licence, and also proscribes 
transhipment of fish catches at sea.
214
 The IPOA-IUU also sets out a 
wide range of Port State Measures (PSMs), including the inspection of 
documents authorising fishing and the inspection of catches to confirm 
the species, origin and quantity of the fish caught.
215
 
 
5.5.3 Assessment of the Implementation of Fisheries Governance 
Frameworks by Gulf of Guinea States     
It is clear from the analysis above that the framework for fisheries 
governance is quite broad. Thus, the assessment in this part will focus 
on: (i) the status of ratification of the relevant binding instruments; (ii) 
the implementation of the IPOA IUU; and (iii) the implementation of 
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Port State Measures. The last section will highlight other pertinent issues 
that impede effective fisheries governance in the Gulf of Guinea.  
 
5.5.3.1 Ratification of Binding Instruments  
The four binding instruments whose ratification is being assessed are 
those that have been analysed in Section 5.5.1: UNCLOS, the UN Fish 
Stocks Agreement, the FAO Compliance Agreement and the Agreement 
on Port State Measures. The assessment in Section 5.2.3.1 of this chapter 
has already shown that UNCLOS has been widely ratified by Gulf of 
Guinea States. However, as UNCLOS only provides a general 
jurisdiction for fisheries, it is the ratification and enforcement of the 
three other instruments (and particularly those that are binding), that 
actually affords effective fisheries governance measures and 
cooperation. Table 5.5 depicts the status of ratification of the binding 
instruments in the Gulf of Guinea. 
 
 
Table 5.5 Status of Ratification of Binding Fishery Instruments 
State UN Fish Stock 
Agreement 
1994 
Compliance 
Agreement  
1993 
Agreement on Port 
State Measures  
2009 
Angola X 7 Mar 2006 X 
Benin X 4 Jan 1999 X 
Cameroon X X X 
Cape Verde X 27 Jan 2006 X 
Congo Brazzaville  X X X 
Cote d’Ivoire X X X 
DR Congo X X X 
Equatorial Guinea  X X X 
Gabon X X X 
Gambia X X X 
Ghana X 12 May 2003 X 
Guinea 16 Sep 2005 X X 
Guinea-Bissau X X X 
Liberia 16 Sep 2005 X X 
Mauritania X X X 
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Nigeria 2 Nov 2009 X X 
São Tomé & Príncipe X X X 
Senegal 30 Jan 1997 8 Sep 2009 X 
Sierra Leone X X X 
Togo X X X 
Source: FAO and UNDOALOS  
 
It is clear from the Table that the ratification of binding fisheries 
instruments in the Gulf of Guinea is highly inadequate. The UN Fish 
Stocks Agreement came into force since 2001, but has only been ratified 
by four States.
216
 Meanwhile, the Compliance Agreement has been 
ratified by only five States, despite having been in force since 2003.
217
 
Given the scanty ratification of these two instruments, it is not surprising 
that no Gulf of Guinea State has ratified the 2009 Agreement on Port 
State Measures which is yet to enter into force. The conclusion to be 
drawn from the ratification status of the above instruments is that 
national and regional fisheries governance responses in the Gulf of 
Guinea are highly deficient, contributing to illegal fisheries activities and 
depleting fish stocks in the region.  
 
5.5.3.2 Implementation of the IPOA-IUU  
The IPOA-IUU framework requires every State to develop a National 
Plan of Action (NPOA) which will constitute the policy platform for 
implementing the IPOA-IUU.
218
 The NPOA should include a description 
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of the country’s situation with regard to IUU fishing, a list of activities to 
be undertaken in combating IUU fishing, the assignment of 
responsibilities with respect to particular activities and actions, a time 
frame and indicators for implementation of the activities, as well as an 
embedded plan for its revision.
219
 FAO Resolution 6/2003 of December 
2003 called on States to finalise their NPOAs by the end of 2004.
220
 
However, as at December 2005, Gambia and Ghana were the only States 
in the region to be cited as having developed their NPOA.
 221
 A 2011 
Report has also indicated that Benin has completed its NPOA.
222
 Thus, 
more than a decade after the adoption of the IPOA-IUU framework, a 
majority of Gulf of Guinea States have failed to create actionable plans 
for its implementation. It is important to note, however, that the 
development and implementation of NPOAs in many States is 
constrained by funding.
223
 For example, the development of Gambia’s 
NPOA was funded with assistance from the Global Environmental Fund 
(GEF),
224
 while Nigeria (which has the highest Gross Domestic Product 
in the region), has not dedicated funding for developing a NPOA or for 
combating IUU fishing generally.
225
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Although the IPOA-IUU does not necessitate the adoption of Regional 
Plans of Actions (RPOA), subsequent initiatives and decisions have 
stipulated this to be a requirement.
226
 The World Summit on Sustainable 
Development held in Johannesburg in 2002 encouraged the development 
of RPOAs by the end of 2004, the same date set for NPOAs.
227
 Some 
reports have indicated that the Fishing Committee for West Central 
Africa (FCWC) developed a RPOA in 2009.
228
 However, the Plan does 
not appear in the FAO database or on the official web page of the 
FCWC. There is also no indication that any other Regional Fishery 
Management Organisation in the Gulf of Guinea has developed an 
Action Plan.
229
  
5.5.3.3 Implementation of Port State Measures 
The third outcome for the purpose of this assessment is the 
implementation of Port State Measures (PSMs).
 230
 Since these 
inspections are carried out in port, they should be more cost-effective 
compared to other enforcement requirements. However, yet again Gulf 
of Guinea States have failed to adopt and implement the requisite 
PSMs.
231
 In fact, most of the States in the region have been assessed as 
having no Port Inspectorates at all, while those that do have insufficient 
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numbers generally lack the requisite skills to conduct port inspections 
effectively.
232
   
 
In light of the above discussion, it is clear that fisheries governance in 
the Gulf of Guinea is ineffective, and this is undermining sustainable 
fishing and creating a permissive environment for IUU fishing. This 
assessment also shows that the ability of Gulf of Guinea States to combat 
IUU fishing even in the immediate future is questionable. 233 Global 
funding mechanisms for assisting developing States to implement the 
IPOA-UU is still being explored, but it is unlikely that enough funding 
will be made available.
234
  Hence, until Gulf of Guinea States take 
positive measures to effectively implement binding and non-binding 
fisheries management instruments, and also address the governance 
issues analysed in chapter three, fisheries resources will remain at risk of 
depletion, with serious consequences for food security as well as national 
and regional security.    
 
5.6 IMPLEMENTATION OF THE INTERNATIONAL 
FRAMEWORK AGAINST TRANSNATIONAL ORGANISED 
CRIMES  
 
The assessment of the implementation of the United Nations 
Transnational Organized Crime Convention (UNTOC) and its Protocols 
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has been purposefully chosen as the last subject matter to be discussed in 
this chapter. This is because the Convention and its three Protocols, 
collectively referred to as the transnational organised crime instruments 
(TOC instruments), are very relevant for combating all the maritime 
security threats analysed in chapters three and four, particularly illicit 
trafficking in drugs and weapons, as well as illegal migration by sea. 
This part examines the extent to which Gulf of Guinea States have 
implemented the UNTOC and its three Protocols.  
 
5.6.1 Background to the Transnational Organized Crime 
Instruments 
The analysis of the evolution of the concept of maritime security in 
chapter three demonstrated the context within which the doctrine of 
mare clausum was espoused in 1635.
 235
 The doctrine was used to justify 
the British claim to a customs zone and the imposition of security 
measures along its coast in response to the illegal importation and 
trading of contraband goods, including narcotics by foreign ships and 
networks.
236
 This shows that the threat of transnational organised crime 
(TOC) is not a recent phenomenon. However, increasing globalisation 
has made both the effects and dynamics of TOC graver than before.
237
 
Criminal networks are now able to execute crime across State boundaries 
with ease and speed, exposing the inadequacy of national efforts at 
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combating TOC.
238
 Indeed, the advent of TOC in the contemporary 
world has called for a shift away from the piecemeal method of crime 
prevention that focuses on specific crimes to a potent approach that will 
target the drivers of organised crime.
239
   
 
The most important step towards establishing a global framework on 
TOC was taken at the World Ministerial Conference in 1994 which 
called for a holistic global instrument on TOC.
240
 A series of multilateral 
engagements on the subject led to the adoption of the United Nations 
Transnational Organized Crime Convention (UNTOC) in 2000.
241
 The 
objective of the Convention is to succinctly capture the words of the UN 
Secretary General - that “if crime crosses borders, so must law 
enforcement.”
242
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5.6.2 Scope and Content of Transnational Organized Crime 
Instruments   
The United Nations Transnational Organized Crime Convention 
(UNTOC) was adopted in 2000 and entered into force in 2003.
243
 The 
UNTOC covers a number of transnational crimes including money 
laundering,
244
 corruption by public officials
245
 and the obstruction of 
justice
246
 - all under the rubric of TOC. An organised criminal group is 
defined as a structured group of persons acting in concert with the aim of 
committing crimes in order to obtain some financial or other material 
benefit, whether directly or indirectly.
247
  
 
An offence is regarded as transnational in character if it fits any of these 
descriptions: (i) the actions constituting the offence are committed in 
more than one State;
248
 (ii) the offence is committed in one State but a 
substantial part of its preparation, planning, direction or control takes 
place in another State;
249
 (iii) the offence is committed in one State but 
involves an organised criminal group that engages in criminal activities 
in more than one State;
250
 or (iv) the crime is committed in one State but 
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has substantial effects in another State.
251
 State Parties are required to 
enact laws against TOC, prevent the commission of organised crimes 
within their territories, as well as investigate and prosecute perpetrators 
of organised crimes.
252
 The Convention also places great emphasises on 
international cooperation in combating organised crime. The prescribed 
cooperative measures include the identification and confiscation of 
proceeds of crime and mechanisms for initiating and responding to the 
extradition of suspects.
253
 
 
Three Protocols have been adopted to supplement the UNTOC. Two of 
the Protocols - the Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking 
in Persons,
254
 as well as the Protocol against the Smuggling of Migrants 
by Land, Air and Sea,
255
 were adopted together with the Convention in 
2000. The third Protocol - the Protocol against Illicit Manufacture and 
Trafficking in Firearms, was adopted a year later.
256
 The design of the 
three Protocols is similar to the parent Convention. The Protocols 
stipulate acts that constitute crimes in respective areas, obligating States 
to take preventive and enforcement actions, and to further indicate 
cooperative mechanisms to be adopted. 
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The difference between the crimes of migrant smuggling and people 
trafficking has been examined in great detail in chapter three. As a 
summary, in the case of migrant smuggling organised criminals gain a 
financial or other material benefit by facilitating the illegal entry of 
people who voluntarily undertake a journey into another State.
257
 
Meanwhile, the trafficking of people always has an element of deceit, 
with the objective of the crime being to put the trafficked persons in 
some form of servitude, typically prostitution or forced labour.
258
 
 
5.6.3  Relevance of TOC Instruments to Gulf of Guinea and an 
Assessment of the Implementation  
UNTOC is a very important instrument for combating maritime security 
threats in the Gulf of Guinea, particularly when its distinctiveness is 
appreciated. Unlike the other international frameworks reviewed in this 
chapter, UNTOC targets the sub-culture that promotes transnational 
crime: organised networks, corruption, money laundering and the 
obstruction of justice. The analysis of maritime security threats in 
chapters three and four, and also in the present chapter, has revealed 
elements of this sub-culture in the Gulf of Guinea. Indeed, drug 
trafficking thrives on organised networks, corruption and the complicity 
of public officials. The crimes of illegal migration and illicit trafficking 
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in persons and weapons are aided by the same sub-culture. The case 
study on piracy in chapter four revealed that piracy itself is an organised 
crime, while demonstrating that the trading of stolen oil cargo is 
promoted by organised networks within and outside the Gulf of Guinea. 
Even more ominous is the fact that piratical acts are increasingly being 
committed with the use of arms and weapons. Finally, although not 
always apparent, IUU fishing involves an element of organised crime, 
and has been known to flourish in corrupt environments.
259
  
 
5.6.3.1 Status of Ratification of TOC Instruments   
It is clear from the analysis above that ratification and implementation of 
UNTOC and its related instruments is crucial for enhancing maritime 
security in the Gulf of Guinea. However, there are serious gaps in the 
ratification of TOC instruments in the Gulf of Guinea.  
 
Table 5.6: Status of Ratification of Transnational Organised Crime Instruments    
State UNTOC  
2000 
Protocol on 
Illegal 
Migration 2000 
Protocol on 
Trafficking in 
Persons 2000 
Protocol against 
Trafficking in 
Weapons 2001 
Angola 1 Apr 2013 X X X 
Benin 30 Aug 2004 30 Aug 2004 30 Aug 2004 30 Aug 2004 
Cameroon 6 Feb 2006 6 Feb 2006 6 Feb 2006 X 
Cape Verde 15 Jul 2004 15 Jul 2004 15 Jul 2004 15 Jul 2004 
Congo Brazzaville  X X X X 
Cote d’Ivoire 25 Oct 2012 X 25 Oct 2012 X 
DR Congo 28 Oct 2005 28 Oct 2005 28 Oct 2005 28 Oct 2005 
Equatorial Guinea  7 Feb 2003 X 7 Feb 2003 X 
Gabon 15 Dec 2004 X 22 Sep 2010 22 Sep 2010 
Gambia 5 May 2003 5 May 2003 5 May 2003 X 
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Ghana 21 Aug 2012 21 Aug 2012 21 Aug 2012 X 
Guinea 9 Nov 2004 8 Jun 2005 9 Nov 2004 X 
Guinea-Bissau 10 Sep 2007 X 10 Sep 2007 24 Sep 2013 
Liberia 22 Sep 2004 22 Sep 2004 22 Sep 2004 22 Sep 2004 
Mauritania 22 Jul 2005 22 Jul 2005 22 Jul 2005 22 Jul 2005 
Nigeria 28 Jun 2001 27 Sep 2001 28 Jun 2001 3 Mar 2006 
São Tomé & Príncipe 12 Apr 2006 12 Apr 2006 23 Aug 2006 12 Apr 2006 
Senegal 27 Oct 2003 27 Oct 2003 27 Oct 2003 7 Apr 2006 
Sierra Leone X X X X 
Togo 2 Jul 2004 28 Sep 2010 8 May 2009 17 Jul 2012 
Source: UN Treaty Collection as at 17 November 2013 
As shown in Table 5.6, Congo Brazzaville and Sierra Leone are not 
Parties to any of the four instruments. Angola has ratified UNTOC but 
not the accompanying Protocols. Cote d’Ivoire and Ghana ratified the 
instruments almost a decade after UNTOC’s entry into force, and even 
then the instruments have only partially been ratified. The ratification 
status of other States with regard to TOC instruments – such as 
Equatorial Guinea, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Gabon and Gambia – is 
equally incomplete.  
As is the case with the other instruments discussed in this chapter, the 
practical implementation of the TOC framework dictates effective 
regional and international cooperation.
260
 The UN General Assembly 
has, in Resolution 55/25, called on regional organisations to ratify 
UNTOC and its Protocols.
261
 Indeed, under the framework of UNTOC, 
regional organisations are required to set guidelines for the 
implementation of aspects of TOC instruments, including the promotion 
of cooperation among judicial and law enforcement authorities.
262
 
However, neither ECOWAS nor ECCAS are signatories to the 
instruments, making the contribution and commitment of these 
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organisations to addressing corruption and organised crime highly 
questionable.  
 
5.6.3.2 Implementation of Protocols on Illegal Migration   
Given the high profile of organised crime, cooperation between Gulf of 
Guinea States and the EU is germane, especially on the issue of illegal 
migration (which often co-exists with human trafficking).
263
 Spain 
initiated the Africa Plan in 2006, cooperating with a number of African 
States on illegal migration, including Cape Verde and Senegal, which are 
regarded as frontline migration States in the Gulf of Guinea.
264
 The 
Spanish initiative is also coordinated under the EU border protection 
agency, Frontex.
265
 The engagement with Cape Verde has been largely 
successful, resulting in the conclusion of an EU-Cape Verde Mobility 
Partnership Agreement in 2008.
266
 Although Portugal (Cape Verde’s 
former colonial power), is not an entry point for illegal migrants from the 
Gulf of Guinea, the State has been pivotal in the implementation of the 
Mobility Agreement.
267
 Action points in the Agreement include capacity 
building on maritime border control and enforcement measures, as well 
as a contribution by EU States to sea patrols off Cape Verde. In short, 
the EU-Cape Verde partnership has been successful in combating illegal 
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migration by sea. However, there are concerns that Cape Verde’s 
commitment to the Mobility Agreement has undermined its cooperation 
in ECOWAS.
268
 This is because the arrangement has limited the free 
movement of other ECOWAS citizens into Cape Verde - a prerequisite 
for regional integration.
269
 
 
In contrast to the success story of Cape Verde, cooperation between the 
EU and Senegal on illegal migration has been chequered at best.
270
 Initial 
media reports in 2006 suggested a positive roadmap,
271
 but the 
agreement was later limited to the return of Senegalese nationals only.
272
 
Within a few months the entire arrangement had stalled, owing to the 
alleged inhumane treatment of Senegalese migrants by Spanish 
officials.
273
 Following the incident, the government of Senegal came 
under intense pressure from its nationals to terminate the agreement.
274
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pp.408-427.  
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http://www.irinnews.org/report/60468/senegal-senegal-spain-agree-to-joint-patrols-to-stem-illegal-
migration, 9 September 2013.    
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By the close of the year there were reports of a renewed plan, with Spain 
agreeing to grant work permits to Senegalese migrants, as well as a 
further US$24 million to assist Senegal to combat illegal migration.
275
 
This paved the way for patrols led by Frontex in Senegalese waters in 
2007, and within three months of the patrols being initiated, almost a 
thousand illegal migrants were intercepted.
276
 It was hoped that Senegal 
and the EU would eventually agree on a more permanent arrangement in 
the form of a Mobility Partnership Agreement, but continued 
disagreement led to the suspension of the initiative in 2009.
277
 
 
There is, however, a wider context to the question of cooperation 
between Gulf of Guinea States and the EU in combating illegal 
migration. And although this cannot be explored extensively in this 
chapter, it should form part of the assessment. During negotiations for 
the Cotonou Agreement in 2000 (which covers EU relations with the 
African-Caribbean-Pacific Group of States (ACP)), an article was 
inserted into the Agreement linking the question of migration with trade 
and development partnerships.
278
 This was vehemently opposed by Gulf 
of Guinea States in particular, but nonetheless the Article was 
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Cotonou, Benin, 23 June 2000, revised in Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso, 22 June 2010.  
295 
 
included.
279
 Thus, while the EU and Gulf of Guinea States continue to 
pursue cooperative initiatives on illegal migration on the basis of the 
Cotonou Agreement, these initiatives are likely to be reluctantly agreed 
to because of the economic muscle of the EU.
280
  
 
No matter what value judgement is formed from the analysis of this 
contested cooperation, it is imperative for Gulf of Guinea States to adopt 
a regional framework to address the issue of illegal migration. The 
analysis of the maritime environment of the Gulf of Guinea in chapters 
three and four demonstrates that different types of security threats are 
now starting to merge. Therefore, ignoring organised crime as it relates 
to illegal migration may prove to be the region’s Achilles' heel. The 
same organised groups that profit from the illegal smuggling of persons 
into Europe may also be shipping illicit drugs or weapons into the Gulf 
of Guinea.
281
 Thus, there is great value in fostering cooperation and 
positive engagement within and outside the region. 
 
5.6.3.3 Implementation of the Protocol against Illicit Weapon 
Trafficking   
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 For an extensive discussion, see Ole Elgström, "Lomé and Post-Lomé: Asymmetric Negotiations 
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Although trafficking in small arms and light weapons (SALW) has led to 
immense instability in the Gulf of Guinea, almost half of the States in the 
region have not ratified the protocol on illicit trafficking in weapons.
282
 
Indeed, attempts to implement the Protocol at the regional level have not 
been without their challenges. The 2010 implementation report by 
ECOWAS member States highlighted gains in awareness campaigns, 
capacity building, as well as the development of national legislation, but 
noted that little progress had been made on the substantive issue of 
reducing circulation of SALW.
283
 The case study on piracy in chapter 
four demonstrated the rampant use of weapons in piratical attacks, 
including AK47s, Rocket Propelled Grenades (RPGs) and explosives. 
That is a manifestation of a weak monitoring regime of SALW.
284
  
 
One a positive note, member States of ECOWAS adopted a Convention 
on SLAW in 2006, while a similar instrument was adopted in 2010 for 
the ECCAS region.
285
 These frameworks can help address the issue of 
illegal trafficking of arms in the Gulf of Guinea if effectively 
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implemented. There is, however, some disconnect between these 
regional initiatives and the global instruments. As indicated in the 
previous paragraph majority of Gulf of Guinea States have not ratified 
the global instrument for combating the trafficking of arms.  Essentially 
therefore, the regional frameworks adopted by ECOWAS and ECCAS 
do not tie well with the overall global process for dealing with the threat. 
Since illegal trafficking in arms has global dimensions, Gulf of Guinea 
States will have to commit to the global process while taking steps to 
address specific regional concerns.   
 
 
5.7 CONCLUSION 
The analysis in this chapter has demonstrated a general lack of 
implementation of international frameworks for maritime security in the 
Gulf of Guinea. The analysis has also shown that the inadequate 
implementation of the requisite international frameworks hampers the 
enforcement of maritime security jurisdiction in the region. Indeed, the 
inadequate ratification and implementation of the relevant frameworks 
by Gulf of Guinea States limits their capacity to effectively combat 
maritime security threats, while simultaneously undermining their 
commitment to maritime security in the region.  
 
These conclusions do not suggest that the frameworks by themselves 
provide sufficient solutions to maritime security challenges. Indeed, the 
discussion demonstrates that international frameworks are themselves a 
product of consensus building, and therefore have limitations.  
Nonetheless, they represent the most viable responses that can galvanize 
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bilateral, regional and global maritime security cooperation. Thus, failure 
to anchor maritime security responses to these frameworks constitutes a 
serious impediment to building regional security cooperation, and 
equally hinders global support and partnerships. The presence of un-
delimited maritime areas, which is itself a product of the inadequate 
implementation of UNCLOS, complicates the already weak cooperative 
environment, and is also a recipe for interstate conflict and regional 
instability. 
 
Finally, with regard to the analytical and conceptual framework 
underpinning the thesis, this chapter has demonstrated that an effective 
legal framework enhances maritime security capacity at the national 
level, and is also an enabler of regional and global maritime security 
cooperation. Conversely, deficiencies in the legal framework encumber 
national response capabilities, creating dysfunctional cooperative 
outcomes.  
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CHAPTER SIX 
 
PROSPECTS AND CHALLENGES FOR EVOLVING 
MARITIME SECURITY COOPERATIVE INITIATIVES 
IN THE GULF OF GUINEA  
 
6.1 INTRODUCTION 
The analysis in the preceding chapters has underscored the need for 
effective maritime security cooperation in the Gulf of Guinea. Indeed, 
regional cooperation is a useful platform for aggregating national 
responses, enhancing enforcement output, and enlisting international 
support and cooperation. A review of the Gulf of Guinea environment 
shows that four platforms are currently being used to pursue maritime 
security cooperation. These platforms have different institutional 
foundations, with the evolving initiatives covering different geographical 
scopes.  
 
The United Nations Security Council (UNSC) has explicitly advocated 
these platforms and initiatives as collaborative mechanisms for 
enhancing maritime security in the Gulf of Guinea region.
1
 However, 
notwithstanding the importance of maritime security cooperation, the 
wholesale sanctioning of ongoing initiatives without reviewing their 
content, context, structure and integrative strengths is neither beneficial 
for Gulf of Guinea States nor the international community at large. Also, 
from a practical perspective, the need for maritime security cooperation 
                                                          
1
 United Nations, Resolution 2018 - Piracy and Security in Africa(Security Council 6645th Meeting. 
31 October 2011). United Nations, Resolution 2039 - Peace Consolidation in West Africa(Security 
Council 6727th Meeting. 29 February 2012). 
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in the Gulf of Guinea cannot be divorced from the broader governance 
and political dynamics in the region. Indeed, the degree of maritime 
security cooperation that can be achieved is dependent upon both the 
nature of interstate relations and national socio-economic indicators.    
 
It is against this backdrop that an assessment of the ongoing maritime 
security initiatives in the Gulf of Guinea will be conducted. As in the 
case of the earlier chapters, this chapter has both conceptual and 
empirical relevance to the thesis. Conceptually, this chapter investigates 
the strengths and limitations associated with the regional platform for 
maritime security cooperation, as well as the critical role of good 
governance in enhancing maritime security. Empirically, the chapter 
examines the ways in which Gulf of Guinea States are fostering regional 
maritime security cooperation, and the opportunities and challenges 
created by these initiatives. It is important to note that this chapter is 
concerned with cooperative initiatives being pursued only by Gulf of 
Guinea States, while the next chapter will examine interventions by 
external actors.  
 
This chapter is organised in four parts. The first part will examine the 
context and content of the cooperative initiatives, while the remaining 
three parts will assess the structural, geopolitical and governance 
challenges associated with the evolving cooperative frameworks. The 
interaction between these different but coterminous challenges needs to 
be highlighted. Structural challenges relate to the operationalisation of 
cooperative frameworks, and some of these may be so fundamental as to 
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prevent the development or realisation of the initiative altogether. 
Geopolitical challenges may produce the same effect, especially where 
there is a high level of interstate contestation. Otherwise, geopolitical 
challenges largely affect cohesiveness and the effective delivery of 
results. The same can be said of governance challenges, although the 
negative impacts run much deeper and are felt long term. This implies 
that unless governance challenges are identified and addressed, States 
run the risk of investing time and resources in cooperative initiatives 
which may not produce the desired results.  
 
6.2 COOPERATIVE PLATFORMS AND EVOLVING 
MARITIME SECURITY INITIATIVES  
The four platforms that are being used to garner maritime security 
cooperation in the Gulf of Guinea are the Maritime Organization for 
West and Central Africa (MOWCA), the Gulf of Guinea Commission 
(GGC), the Economic Community for West African States (ECOWAS), 
and the Economic Community for Central African States (ECCAS). The 
four sections below will provide an overview of each of these 
institutional frameworks, as well as the maritime security objectives 
being pursued. This will provide the background for the analysis in the 
next part of the chapter.    
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6.2.1  The Maritime Organization for West and Central Africa 
and the Integrated Coastguard Network Project  
The Maritime Organization of West and Central Africa (MOWCA) has 
twenty five member States. Of these, twenty are coastal, five are 
landlocked, and together they form the member States of the Gulf of 
Guinea region as defined in the thesis.
2
 MOWCA is the successor 
organisation of the Ministerial Conference of Maritime Transport of 
West and Central African States (MINCONMAR), which was 
established in 1975 by the Charter of the Ministerial Conference of West 
and Central African States on Maritime Transport.
3
 MINCOMAR was 
one of several platforms established by developing States in the 1970s to 
secure equity in international trade by lobbying for an end to the 
shipping monopoly enjoyed by developed States. In particular, 
developing States advocated for a quota system so that their newly 
established shipping lines would be entitled to carry a percentage of the 
cargo loaded and offloaded in their ports.
4
 
 
However, this objective was never met, as the national shipping lines of 
developing States would soon collapse under the pressure of increased 
                                                          
2
 See chapter 2. The coastal States of MOWCA are Angola, Benin, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Congo 
Brazzaville, Cote d’Ivoire, DR Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-
Bissau, Liberia, Mauritania, Nigeria, São Tomé and Príncipe, Senegal, Sierra Leone and Togo. The 
landlocked States are Burkina Faso, the Central Africa Republic, Chad, Mali and Niger.   
3
 MOWCA, Charter of the Ministerial Conference of West and Central African States on Maritime 
Transport(Abidjan May 1975).    
4
 Generally on the contest between developed and developing States on shipping and maritime trade, 
see Alexander Yeats, Trade Barriers Facing Developing Countries: Commercial Policy Measures 
and Shipping  London Macmillan, 1979, p. 184-93. Louise L. Fawcett and Andrew Hurrell, eds., 
Regionalism in Word Politics: Regional Organization and International Order,  Oxford, Oxford 
University Press, 1995. Karl Fasbender and Wolfgang Wagner, Shipping Conferences, Rate Policy, 
and Developing Countries, Hamburg Verlag Weltarchiv, 1973.  
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competition and globalisation.
5
 And although MINCONMAR continued 
to serve as a platform for discussing shipping issues, the attention of its 
Secretariat shifted largely to facilitating the implementation of shipping 
regulations adopted on the floor of the International Maritime 
Organization (IMO). Following a stakeholder meeting in August 1999, 
MINCONMAR was renamed the Maritime Organization of West and 
Central Africa (MOWCA),
 6
 perhaps to reflect its affiliation with the 
International Maritime Organization (IMO).  
 
Dialogue between MOWCA States on the establishment of a coastguard 
network commenced in 2001 at a meeting held in Abuja, Nigeria.
7
 At a 
second meeting jointly organised by MOWCA and the IMO in 2003, a 
consensus was reached to engage the services of a consultant to carry out 
feasibility studies on the coastguard programme.
8
 Pursuant to this 
decision, the Maritime Safety Committee of the IMO mandated that the 
IMO Secretariat provide funding for the feasibility study.
9
 The study 
involved visits and meetings in selected States,
10
 and a report with a draft 
convention for the establishment of a regional coastguard network was 
submitted in 2006.
11
 However, the General Assembly of MOWCA 
                                                          
5
 Awini Behnam, "The Ocean Trade in the New Economy: A Keynote Address," Ocean Development 
& International Law 35, 2,  2004, pp. 115-30, at p.18. 
6
 The decision to change the name of the organisation from MINCONMAR to MOWCA was taken at 
an extraordinary session of the General Assembly of Ministers of Transport held in Abidjan, Cote 
d’Ivoire, 4-6 August 1999.  
7
 On the history and processes underlying the coastguard network, see MOWCA, Establishment of 
MOWCA Integrated Sub-Regional Coast Guard Network(MOWCA Secretariat. May 2005).   
8
 Meeting of member States of MOWCA, Accra, Ghana, 17-19 March 2003.   
9
 See IMO, Report of the Maritime Safety Committee(MSC 78/26. 28 May 2004).   
10
 The States visited were Angola, Cote d’Ivoire, Ghana, Nigeria and Senegal. 
11
 See IMO, Report on the Mission on Evaluation and Assessment of the Feasibility to Establish An 
Integrated Coast Guard Network in the West And Central African Region(TC/0046-01-2000. 15 
February 2006).  
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instead adopted a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) in 2008 – 
albeit one which provided a framework for establishing an integrated 
coastguard network.
12
 There is no formal indication as to why the 
original idea of a convention was abandoned, but the author’s view is 
that the MOU was selected to avoid the more formal requirements 
associated with international conventions.  
  
 
The overarching objective of the MOWCA coastguard project is to 
create a maritime law enforcement program under a unified 
administration for the whole of West and Central Africa.
13
 As part of this 
grand objective, a regional maritime information sharing centre will be 
established, allowing member States to share and exchange security 
related information.
14
 Article 12 of the MOU divides the coastguard 
network into four zones. Zone I comprises Mauritania, Senegal, Gambia, 
Guinea Bissau and Cape Verde. States in Zone II include Guinea, Sierra 
Leone, Liberia, Cote d’Ivoire and Ghana. Zone III is composed of Togo, 
Benin, Nigeria, Cameroon and Equatorial Guinea, while Zone IV
 includes Gabon, Sao Tome and Principe, Congo Brazzaville, DR 
Congo and Angola. Each zone will have a designated coordination 
centre, with the entire network being coordinated from two principal 
coordination centres.  
 
                                                          
12
MOWCA, Memorandum of Understanding on the Establishment of a Sub-Regional Integrated Coast 
Guard Network In West and Central Africa, MOWCA/XIII GA.08/8. 2008, herein referred to as 
MOWCA Coastguard MOU, adopted at the 13th Session of the General Assembly of MOWCA 
meeting, held from 29 – 31 July 2008, Dakar, Senegal. See Law of Sea Bulletin(No.68. 2008).    
13
 Article 6(1), MOWCA Coastguard MOU 2008. 
14
 Article 6(2), MOWCA Coastguard MOU 2008. 
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The highest administrative body for the coastguard network is the 
Council of Ministers, which comprises ministers responsible for 
maritime transportation from each member State.
15
 Other important 
functions will be undertaken by a Committee of Representatives, with 
members drawn from each State Party.
16
 Article 11 provides for the 
office of a Principal Coordinator who is responsible for the general 
management of the coastguard network (and who also acts as the 
network’s legal representative). Under the MOU, the Principal 
Coordinator and two deputies will be appointed by the Council of 
Ministers on the recommendation of the Committee of Representatives.
17
 
However, the implementation of the project is equally entrusted to a 
Technical Committee of Evaluation, which is to be appointed solely by 
the Secretary General of MOWCA.
18
 
 
 
The MOU also sets out rules governing the operation of assets and 
platforms associated with the coastguard network. The plan is for the 
coastguard network to acquire and operate relevant assets, including 
ships that will have distinctive markings and fly the flag of MOWCA.
19
 
The network will be funded by financial contributions from member 
States, with donor organisations and donor countries providing 
additional financial support.
20
 Any member State seeking the presence of 
ships in its zone must send a request with a “useful justification” to the 
relevant Zone Coordinators, who will then approve the request and plan 
                                                          
15
 Article 8, MOWCA Coastguard MOU 2008.  
16
 Article 10, MOWCA Coastguard MOU 2008.  
17
 Article 10, MOWCA Coastguard MOU 2008.  
18
 Article 9, MOWCA Coastguard MOU 2008.  
19
 Article 15, MOWCA Coastguard MOU 2008.  
20
 Article 28, MOWCA Coastguard MOU 2008. 
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the mission.
21
 The Zone Coordinators also have authority to contract out 
the maintenance and supply of ships to private companies.
22
   
 
Other aspects of the MOU will be analysed in the next part of this 
chapter, including the limitations and structural challenges of the 
evolving maritime security initiatives. However, it should already be 
apparent that the coastguard network is a complicated bureaucratic 
concept with serious structural issues, thus making its successful 
operationalisation highly improbable. Indeed, it is idealistic to expect 
States to surrender their sovereignty and law enforcement authority to 
Zone Coordinators that they have no control over. It is also impracticable 
to assume that States will contribute to the acquisition of very expensive 
assets like ships, and at the same time forfeit their absolute authority 
over the operation and deployment of such ships.    
 
6.2.2  The Gulf of Guinea Commission  
The Gulf of Guinea Commission (GGC) was identified in chapter two as 
one of the key regional organisations in the Gulf of Guinea whose 
maritime security cooperative initiatives would be analysed. Although 
the treaty establishing the Commission has defined its membership as the 
sovereign States bordering the Gulf of Guinea, the Commission only has 
eight member States: Angola, Cameroon, Congo-Brazzaville, DR 
Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Nigeria and São Tomé and Príncipe.
23
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 Article 22, MOWCA Coastguard MOU 2008. 
22
 Article 18, MOWCA Coastguard MOU 2008. 
23
 See Article III, Treaty of the Gulf of Guinea Commission, February 2001. The Treaty is not in force 
and research suggests that only Nigeria has ratified the Treaty thus far. However, James Forest and 
Mathew Sousa have indicated that the Treaty has also been ratified by São Tomé and Príncipe. See, 
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In numerical terms, the Gulf of Guinea Commission is the smallest of the 
six platforms being examined in this chapter, but strategically, the 
Commission is the nerve centre of the Gulf of Guinea region, especially 
when viewed in the context of global energy security interests.  
In 2011, Nigeria and Angola accounted for 81 per cent of the total oil 
supply from the Gulf of Guinea region, with shares of 47 and 34 per cent 
respectively.
24
 The output levels of other member States of the 
Commission are also quite high, especially when compared to other Gulf 
of Guinea States.
25
 Therefore, from the perspective of energy resource 
security, it is the membership of the GGC that has gravitas in the Gulf of 
Guinea region.
26
 This explains why the Commission features 
prominently in the literature on maritime security in the Gulf of 
Guinea.
27
 Since energy security is a global concern, it is not surprising 
                                                                                                                                                                    
Federal Republic of Nigeria, Act of Ratification and Enforcement of the Treaty Establishing the Gulf 
of Guinea Commission, 2004. James J.F. Forest and Mathew V. Sousa, Oil and Terrorism in the Gulf 
of Guinea: Framing  U.S. Energy and Security Policies for the Gulf of Guinea, Plymouth Lexington 
Books, 2006, p. 67.   
24
 Statistics contained in a report by Chatham House UK, see Chatham House, "Angola and the Gulf 
of Guinea: Towards an Integrated Maritime Strategy," Chatham House,  November 2012.   
25
 See chapter 2.  
26
 Generally on geopolitical interests in Gulf of Guinea natural resources (including oil), see Ricardo 
Soares de Oliveira, Oil and Politics in Gulf of Guinea, London, Hurst and Company, 2007. Manuel 
Correia de Barros, "Can the Gulf of Guinea Develop a Common Regional Oil Policy? ", in  Rudolf 
Traub-Merz and Douglas Yates, eds. Oil Policy in the Gulf of Guinea: Security & Conflict, Economic 
Growth, Social Development, Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, 2004, pp. 68-71. Howard W. French, 
"Commentary - China and Africa," African Affairs 106 2007 pp. 127-32. Pierre Abramovici, "United 
States: the new scramble for Africa," Review of African Political Economy 31,  2004, pp. 685-90. 
Richard Auty, Sustaining Development in Mineral Economics: The resource curse thesis London 
Routledge, 1993. Nicholas Shaxson, Poisoned Wells: The Dirty Politics of Africa Oil, Basingtsoke 
Pelgrave Macmillan, 2008. Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler, Greed and Grievance in Civil War 
Washington DC World Bank Development Research Group, 2000.  
27
 See, for example, Ricardo Soares de Oliveira, Oil and Politics in Gulf of Guinea, London, Hurst, 
2007, p. 1. Raymond Gilpin, "Enhancing Maritime Security in the Gulf of Guinea," Strategic Insights 
VI, 1,  January 2007. Mark Lowe, "African Countries for More Security in the Gulf of Guinea," 
Maritime Security Review,  13 August 2012, Gbenga Oduntan, "The Emergent Legal Regime for 
Exploration of Hydrocarbons in the Gulf Of Guinea: Imperative Considerations for Participating 
States and Multinationals " International and Comparative Law Quarterly 57,  2008, pp. 253-302. 
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that the UN Security Council has advocated the role of the Commission 
in delivering maritime security in the Gulf of Guinea.
28
  
 
There are other cogent reasons underlying the role of the GGC as a 
viable platform for maritime security cooperation. First, the Treaty of the 
Commission expressly indicates that its objective is to promote peace 
and security, and to also serve as a forum for addressing joint security 
issues.
29
 Second, the GGC is the only regional organisation in the Gulf 
of Guinea that is ‘entirely maritime’ (in the sense that all of its eight 
members are coastal States),
30
 while the motivation behind the formation 
of the Commission was to exploit offshore resources in a secure and 
beneficial manner.
31
 Third, the moderate size of the Commission means 
that the prospects for achieving consensus on regional arrangements are 
quite high. Finally, unlike other regions in the Gulf of Guinea, 
increasingly access to oil revenue places member States of the GGC in a 
relatively better position to acquire the necessary logistics and 
cooperative platforms for maritime security, without the need for 
extensive support from the international community.   
 
In light of the above discussion, it is clear that the Secretariat of the GGC 
should be able to enlist national, regional and external assistance to 
develop a buoyant maritime security cooperative and enforcement 
                                                          
28
  See, for example, paragraph 3 of UN Security Council Resolution 2039, 29 February 2012. 
29
  See Article VI, Treaty of the Gulf of Guinea Commission, 2001.  
30
 This assessment also applies to MOWCA, as its membership includes landlocked States.  
31
 See Articles IV and V, Treaty of the Gulf of Guinea Commission, 2001. 
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framework. In reality, however, it has not been able to achieve this 
objective, with the Commission’s shortcomings not being limited to 
maritime security concerns, but extending to the discharge of all its 
objectives. High level consultations between member States have 
produced very few tangible results, and programmes devised by 
technical committees of the Commission have scarcely been 
implemented.
32
 In advocating for the Commission to play a central role 
in maritime security, the Executive Secretary of the Commission, Mr 
Miguel dos Anjos da Cunha Lisboa Trovoada,
33
 asserted in August 2012 
that collective security was a key driver behind the creation of the 
Commission, but bemoaned that little was being done on that front.
34
 
Interestingly, Mr Trovoada had confirmed a few months earlier that there 
were major problems militating against the smooth functioning of the 
Commission’s Secretariat.
 35
 
 
Therefore, although the GGC commands great recognition, the 
organisation produces little or no concrete outcomes. Of course, the 
internal politics of organisations are usually complex, and multiple 
reasons may well account for the GGC’s lacklustre performance. 
However, the author contends that the critical factor preventing the 
                                                          
32
 Osita C. Eze and Rudolf Traub-Merz, "Interstate Conflict and Conflict Resolution in the Gulf of 
Guinea ", in  Rudolf Traub-Merz and Douglas Yates, eds. Oil Policy in the Gulf of Guinea: Security 
and Conflict, Economic Growth, Social Development, Nigerian National War College, 2004, pp. 73-
86.  
33
 The Executive Secretary, Mr Miguel dos Anjos da Cunha Lisboa Trovoada, previously served as 
the Prime Minister (1975–1979) and President (1991–2001) of São Tomé and Príncipe. 
34
 "Gulf of Guinea Security," Maritime Security Review,  August 2012. See also allafrica.com, 
Angola: Gulf of Guinea Commission Told to Meet Security Challenges 9 April 2012, Available: 
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Commission from making progress is the geopolitical environment 
within which it is cast. This will be examined in second part of the 
chapter.  
 
6.2.3  Maritime Security Initiatives of the Economic 
Community of West African States  
Fifteen of the twenty five States in the Gulf of Guinea are part of the 
Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), which was 
established in 1975.
36
 The formation of ECOWAS was, however, 
marked by serious diplomatic challenges. It has been argued that France 
regarded the formation of ECOWAS merely as a platform for Nigeria to 
increase its control in the region, thereby undermining France’s 
dominance in West African politics (and especially in the Francophone 
enclave).
37
 Internally, Cote d’Ivoire was deemed to be obstructing the 
formation of ECOWAS, partly in aid of the French agenda, but also 
because of a regional leadership contest with Nigeria.
38
 However, the 
                                                          
36
 Treaty of ECOWAS, Lagos, Nigeria, 28 May 1975. A copy of the Treaty is in 14 International 
Legal Materials (1975) 1200. The coastal States of ECOWAS are Benin, Cape Verde, Cote d’Ivoire, 
Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Liberia, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone and Togo. The 
Landlocked States are Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger. 
37
 Olusegun Obasanjo, My Command, London Heinemann, 1980, p. 152. Generally on the 
involvement of France and Nigeria in West African politics, see Bassey Ate, "The Presence of France 
in West-Central Africa as a Fundamental Problem to Nigeria," Millennium Journal of International 
Studies 12, 2, Summer, pp. 110-26. Daniela Kroslak, "France's Policy Towards Africa, Continuity or 
Change?", in  Ian Taylor and Paul Williams, eds. Africa in International Politics: External 
Involvement on the Continent, London and New York, Routledge, 2004, pp. 61-82. Bola A. 
Akinterinwa, "The Role of France in Nigeria’s Relations with its Neighbours " Jerusalem Journal of 
International Relations 12, 1,  1990, pp. 112-47. Yves Person, "French West Africa and 
Decolonization", in  Prosser Gifford and William R. Louis, eds. The Transfer of Power in Africa: 
Decolonization 1940-1960, New Haven, , Yale University Press, 1982, pp. 141-72. Shaun Gregory, 
"French Military in Africa: Past and Present " African Affairs 99,  2000, pp. 435-48   
38
 Olajide Aluko, "Oil at Concessionary Prices for Africa: A Case Study in Nigerian Decision-Making 
" Africa Affairs 75, 301,  1976, pp. 425-43 at p.36. See also Adekeye Adebajo, Building Peace in West 
Africa: Liberia, Sierra Leone and Guinea Bissau, International Peace Academy Occasional Papers, 
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discovery of oil by Nigeria, followed by oil booms in early 1970s, 
propelled Nigeria into a stronger position to drive the formation of 
ECOWAS.
39
  
 
ECOWAS is the most structured regional organisation in Africa, and is 
widely regarded as a pacesetter on most subjects concerning integration 
across the African continent.
40
 Indeed, the organisation has played a key 
role in resolving conflicts and crises in the territories of member States, 
even though its constitutive authority has largely been confined to 
economic cooperation.
41
 Whereas the role of other regional organisations 
has remained in the socio-economic realm, the ECOWAS Revised 
Treaty of 1992 deepened the political and security objectives of the 
organisation.
42
 This facilitated the adoption of a treaty in 1999 
establishing the Peace and Security Mechanisms of ECOWAS, which 
                                                                                                                                                                    
Lynne Reinner, London, 2002, pp. 30-32. Daniel Bach, "The Politics of West African Co-Operation: 
CEAO and ECOWAS," Journal of Modern African Studies 21, 4,  1983, pp. 605-30.  
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75, 301, 1976, pp. 425-43 at p.36.  
40
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Adepoju, "Migration Management in West Africa within the context of ECOWAS Protocol on Free 
Movement of Persons and the Common Approach on Migration: Challenges and Prospects", in  Marie 
Tremolieres, ed. Regional Challenges of West African Migration: African and European Perspectives, 
Paris, OECD, 2009, pp. 17-48. Clement A. Emenike, "Hegemony, Security and West African 
Integration: Nigeria, Ghana and the Transformation of ECOWAS," PhD Queens University, Canada, 
1994. 
41
 On ECOWAS and conflict resolution, see Adekeye Adebajo, Building Peace in West Africa: 
Liberia, Sierra Leone and Guinea Bissau, International Peace Academy Occasional Papers, Lynne 
Reinner, London, 2002. Mohamed Sirjoh Bah, ECOWAS and the Dynamics of Constructing a 
Security Regime in West Africa, PhD Dissertation, Queen's University at Kingston, 2004. Mark 
Husband, The Liberian Civil War, London and Portland, Frank Cass 1998. Chris Alden, "From 
Neglect to ‘Virtual Engagement’: The United States and the New Paradigm for Africa  " African 
Affairs 99,  2002, pp. 355-71 and  Nkechi Mgbeoji, Collective Security – The Liberian Crisis, 
Unilateralism and Global Order, Vancouver University of British Columbia Press, 2003  
42
 ECOWAS, Revised Treaty of the Economic Community of West African States, Cotonou, Benin, 
24 July 1992, reprinted in 35 International Legal Materials (1996) 660. 
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has been replicated at the continental level by the African Union (AU) 
and also mirrored by other regional institutions across the continent.
43
 
Further integration occurred in 2006, when the ECOWAS Secretariat 
became a commission with enhanced powers.  
 
These achievements go some way to explaining why ECOWAS has 
projected itself as both a “mature” organisation and “the master of its 
[own] destiny.”
44
 However, in the context of maritime security 
cooperation, these attributes are lacking, with ECOWAS member States 
failing to develop a cooperative framework despite entreaties by the UN 
Security Council in Resolutions 2018 and 2039.
45
 Indeed, the only 
tangible output in the region thus far has been the Nigeria-Benin joint 
patrols (code-named Operation Prosperity), which launched in August 
2011.
46
 The inability of this bilateral initiative to suppress piracy and 
armed robbery off the coasts of the two States has been discussed in 
chapter four. Analysis in that chapter also demonstrated how, despite 
Operation Prosperity, piratical attacks have burgeoned off the coasts of 
neighbouring States.  
 
In a Meeting in July 2013, the Heads of State and Government of 
ECOWAS reaffirmed their determination to combat piracy and other 
                                                          
43
 ECOWAS, Protocol Relating to the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, 
Peace-Keeping and Security, adopted at Lome, Togo, 10 December 1999.  
44
 ECOWAS, “ECOWAS Commission at a Glance,” http://www.comm.ecowas.int/, 27 September 
2013.  
45
 UN, Resolution 2018, adopted at the 6645th Security Council Meeting, 31 October 2011 and 
Resolution 2039, adopted at the 6727th Meeting of the Security Council, 29 February 2012. 
46
 UN Security Council, “Report of the United Nations Assessment Mission on Piracy in the Gulf of 
Guinea,” S/2012/45, 19 January 2012.   
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forms of transnational organised crime.
47
 The Meeting further directed 
the ECOWAS Commission to facilitate the adoption of an ECOWAS 
maritime strategy, as well as the establishment of Pilot Zone E (which 
had been agreed on at the Yaoundé Summit of ECOWAS and ECCAS 
member States a month earlier).
48
 These positive developments suggest 
that ECOWAS member States are taking steps to mirror the maritime 
security framework of ECCAS, which is analysed below.  
 
6.2.4  Maritime Security Framework of the Economic 
Community of Central African States 
The Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) has 
eleven member States, seven of whom are coastal States.
49
 ECCAS was 
formed in the early 1980s, but due to protracted internal and interstate 
conflicts in the region, the administrative structures of the Community 
only became operational in 1999.
50
 Security cooperation within ECCAS 
came to fruition in 2004, following the coming into force of the Protocol 
relating to the Mutual Security Pact in Central Africa (COPAX),
51
 which 
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 ECOWAS, Final Communique, Forty-third Ordinary Session of the ECOWAS Authority of Heads 
of State and Government, Abuja, Nigeria, 17-18 July 2013, paragraph 37 and 38.  
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September 2013.  
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is essentially the ECCAS version of the ECOWAS and African Union’s 
Peace and Security Mechanisms.
52
  
 
In 2009, member States of ECCAS successfully adopted a Protocol on 
Maritime Security which laid down a structure for ECCAS maritime 
security cooperation.
53
 The background to this Protocol has been 
discussed in the case study on piracy in chapter four. The case study 
showed that by 2008, Niger Delta insurgents had firmly extended their 
piratical activities off the coasts of Cameroon and Equatorial Guinea, 
both of whom are members of ECCAS.
54
 Then, in 2009, there was an 
alleged seaborne attack targeting the residence of the President of 
Equatorial Guinea.
55 
The incident heightened political tensions within 
ECCAS, as Equatorial Guinea suspected Cameroon of being complicit in 
the attack, particularly since the perpetrators were believed to have sailed 
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from a port in Cameroon.
56
 At the same time, the insurgency in Niger 
Delta was identified as the source of the attack.
 57
   
 
These events propelled the birth of the ECCAS maritime security 
framework, which is anchored to the Maritime Security Protocol.
58
 That 
the Protocol has been adopted and ratified by the Heads of State and 
Government of ECCAS lends legal and political authority to the 
framework. Indeed, the preamble to the Protocol affirms that the 
maritime security cooperative framework being established is an 
offshoot of the broader ECCAS Peace and Security Mechanisms.
59
 The 
Protocol commits member States to collectively enhance maritime 
security through the sharing of information, the implementation of joint 
surveillance and patrols, as well as the harmonisation of legal regimes.
60
   
 
Articles 5 to 7 of the Protocol set out a three-tier security structure 
composed of regional, zonal and national coordination centres. The 
Regional Coordination Centre, known by its French acronym 
CRESMAC (Centre Régional de Sécurité Maritime de l’Afrique 
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Centrale), will be in DR Congo.
61
 The maritime space of ECCAS is 
divided into three zones, each with a Multinational Coordination Centre 
(Centre Multinational de Coordination - CMC). Each State will also have 
a national operations centre (Centre Opérationnel de Marine - COM) that 
will feed into the zonal centres. The structure is presented in Figure 6.1 
below.      
Figure 6.1: ECCAS Maritime Security Framework 
 
 
Zone A: Angola, DR Congo; Zone B: Angola, Congo (Brazzaville), Gabon; Zone D: Cameroon, 
Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, São Tomé and Príncipe  
 
At first glance, there appears to be several anomalies in the ECCAS 
framework, but these anomalies simply reflect subtleties in the region. It 
can be seen that the three zones are designated as A, B and D, rather than 
the expected A, B and C. It should also be noted that Angola forms part 
of Zone A and B, while Gabon appears in Zones B and D. The 
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motivation behind these particular arrangements can partly be discerned 
from Figure 5.1 in chapter 5. Angola has part of its territory (the resource 
rich Cabinda Province) separated from mainland Angola and lying to the 
west of DR Congo. Thus, the inclusion of Angola in Zones A and B 
enables it to administer the maritime security concerns of the Cabinda 
Province. Strategically, it also allows Angola to assert control over this 
particular area, thus forestalling any potential secession.
62
 A possible 
explanation for Gabon’s inclusion in Zone D is the State’s overlapping 
maritime boundary claims with Equatorial Guinea. Thus, the inclusion of 
Gabon in Zone D eschews any interpretation that such claims have been 
abandoned. The author’s research suggest that the draft Protocol 
included Zone C for the same reason, thus allowing Gabon and 
Equatorial Guinea to share responsibility for that zone. However, the 
deletion of Zone C at the eleventh hour is unfortunate, as it has left a gap 
in the designation of the Zones.  
 
It is the author’s considered view that the structure of the ECCAS 
framework provides a functional approach to maritime security 
cooperation and enforcement. Indeed, situating maritime security within 
a broader regional political and security structure allows member States 
to act at the highest political level possible, and to concurrently draw on 
the strengths of the ECCAS institutional framework. Grouping States 
into zones is a prudent option as it allows larger regional interests to be 
promoted, while simultaneously taking into account local sensitivities 
and concerns. For example, when it became clear that an attack on the 
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Presidency of Equatorial Guinea was imminent, Zone D States 
implemented the framework ahead of other ECCAS States, and indeed 
prior to the Protocol being finalised.
63
 In summary, therefore, the 
arrangement respects national sovereignty, retains “the autonomy of 
national efforts to implement maritime security strategies and allows 
flexibility of partnerships while ensuring coordination among member 
States. Notwithstanding the author’s endorsement of the ECCAS 
framework, it still faces a number of challenges, and therefore cannot be 
said to be “comprehensive” (as the UN Security Council has described it 
to be).
64
 These challenges are discussed as part of the analysis of the 
challenges and limitations of the four cooperative initiatives in the Gulf 
of Guinea.   
 
6.3 STRUCTURAL CHALLENGES AND LIMITATIONS FOR 
EVOLVING COOPERATIVE INITIATIVES 
An assessment of the structural challenges confronting the above 
cooperative initiatives can be guided by asking a number of pertinent 
questions. These include: (i) is there synergy between the evolving 
initiatives?; (ii) what level of political authority and support underpins 
the initiatives?; (iii) how effective are the supporting legal and 
enforcement structures?; (iv) are there inbuilt mechanisms for 
coordination at the national and regional levels?; (v) do the initiatives 
provide viable sources of funding?; and (vi) does the arrangement take 
cognisance of the sovereignty concerns of States?  
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6.3.1  Political and Institutional Authority  
The successful implementation of the evolving cooperative initiatives 
chiefly depends on two factors: (i) the level of political authority that the 
cooperative arrangement commands; and (ii) the extent to which the 
mechanisms are kept within the bounds of sovereignty concerns. Unless 
these two requirements are satisfied, a cooperative initiative will remain 
a mere expression of policy intention. The fundamental point is that 
maritime security cooperation, like all forms of security partnerships, 
must earn the highest commitment of States. To be effective, it is not 
sufficient for some State representatives to be part of the process. Rather, 
it is crucial that the entire leadership team of States, and particularly 
those members responsible for foreign affairs and defence portfolios, be 
involved.   
 
Of the four initiatives analysed in this section, the MOWCA coastguard 
concept has the greatest difficulty meeting the fundamental requirements 
mentioned above. The MOWCA initiative enjoys significant visibility 
and goodwill, primarily because it is geared towards the protection of 
shipping (the most dominant maritime activity), and also because it is 
anchored to the IMO. However, the main difficulty with enforcing 
regional maritime security through the leadership of MOWCA is that, as 
an organisation, MOWCA’s raison d'etre is the promotion of 
commercial shipping activities. Confronted by an apparent lack of 
institutional authority with regard to maritime security, MOWCA drafted 
a Convention to achieve this very objective, but as previously noted, the 
form of document eventually settled upon was a MOU. Article 1 of the 
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Draft Convention stated unequivocally that an international organisation 
known as the West and Central Africa Coast Guard was being created.
65
 
And although this phraseology was deleted from the final MOU (thereby 
removing the label of a supranational organisation), when the Draft 
Convention and the MOU are examined side by side, it is apparent that 
they are almost identical, the main difference being the type of document 
that was settled upon.  
 
The jurisdictional difficulties posed by the structure of the coastguard 
network will be examined in due course. For present purposes, it suffices 
to say that the MOU has, in effect, established a regional security 
architecture that operates outside the framework of ECOWAS and 
ECCAS. Evidently, the operationalisation of such a textual mandate is 
impracticable, as it puts MOWCA into an institutional contest with 
ECOWAS and ECCAS, both of which have regional political and 
security functions. Even if the MOWCA initiative was to clear this 
hurdle at the regional level, it will nonetheless encounter similar 
challenges with respect to the national policies of States. Indeed, the 
coastguard concept would have to be administered and implemented at 
the national level by agencies responsible for maritime transportation, or 
at least coordinated by these agencies to achieve synergy with the 
regional coastguard structure. However, this policy approach contradicts 
the administrative arrangements in most Gulf of Guinea States, where 
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security issues come under the portfolios of Defence, the Interior or 
National Security.
66
  
 
The Gulf of Guinea Commission (GGC) also suffers from a lack of 
political and institutional authority, but for different reasons. First, 
although the Treaty establishing the Commission was adopted over 
thirteen years ago, it is yet to enter into force, and the author’s research 
suggests that the Treaty has only been ratified by Nigeria.
67
 Not only 
does the Commission’s authority hang in the balance, it also shows no 
sign of maturing in the future. One option would have been for the 
Commission to draw on the support of the broader regional political 
framework. However, seven of its members are in the ECCAS region, 
while Nigeria, who is its strongest member, is in the ECOWAS region. 
The analysis in the next section provides further insight into the 
historical and contemporary interstate disputes that prevent the 
Commission from earning the necessary political mandate to implement 
any meaningful maritime security cooperative initiative.   
 
In stark contrast to the GGC, ECOWAS and ECCAS have the requisite 
institutional and political authority to foster security cooperation. It may 
well be that the preference for the GGC and MOWCA in certain quarters 
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is due to perceived difficulties with eliciting sufficient maritime security 
interest and response from regional political frameworks. For instance, it 
may be argued that ECOWAS and ECCAS are already ineffective in 
delivering the traditional objectives for which they were established, and 
therefore cannot be relied on to lead maritime security cooperation.
 68
 
These are indeed legitimate concerns, but then again, dispensing with the 
maritime security roles of ECCAS and ECOWAS confounds pragmatic 
expectations. The fact that ECCAS has been able to activate a maritime 
security framework within a short space of time demonstrates the 
internal strengths available to the two institutions. Both organisations 
have established security structures that can be duplicated in the 
maritime space. In any event, if States are unable to effectively work 
through these existing political structures then surely the chances of 
embryonic arrangements delivering better results are quite remote.  
 
6.3.2  Jurisdictional and Sovereignty Issues    
In principle, interstate cooperation involves a degree of compromise by 
member States, as well as the surrendering of some level of autonomy.
69
 
This is done for the mutual interests of member States, and in 
expectation of greater benefits. Nonetheless, it is difficult to implement 
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cooperative arrangements that undermine the vital interests of States or 
which offend sovereignty sensibilities.   
 
Article 7 of the MOWCA MOU declares the mission of the coastguard 
network as being the promotion of joint efforts and activities. However, 
upon closer analysis of the document, it is apparent that the initiative 
touches on core sovereignty issues. As shown in the earlier analysis, the 
coastguard network will have its own logistics (fixed and mobile), as 
well as training and repair facilities.
70
 Moreover, although the MOU 
provides for a Representative Committee of State Parties,
71
 the project 
will be implemented by a Technical Committee of Evaluation, 
nominated by the Secretary General of MOWCA.
72
 Patrols are to be 
organised and dispatched by Zone Coordinators to whom State Parties 
must send requests when they require fleet service ships.
73
 The practical 
effect of this structure is that the Representative Committee of States 
Parties is subservient to the Technical Committee appointed by the 
Secretary General of MOWCA. In addition, the authority of State 
officials has been ceded to the Principal and Zone Coordinators. Finally, 
as part of the funding arrangement for the project, State Parties are 
required to surrender fifty per cent of penalties and fines resulting from 
enforcement actions taken by the Network to the MOWCA Secretariat.
74
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In addition to the above sovereignty concerns there exists serious 
jurisdictional issues. According to the MOU, a ship assigned to a State 
for temporary use must fly the flag of the State, may be operated by its 
officials, but remains the property of the network and must still bear the 
distinctive marks, logo and emblem of MOWCA.
75
 This begs the 
question: pursuant to what authority will enforcement measures be 
carried out? Under international law, enforcement measures (including 
counter-piracy measures) are to be undertaken by authorised officials of 
States using vessels bearing the distinctive marks of the State.
76
 Officials 
are expected to operate in accordance with national law, and any liability 
they incur is attributable to the State.
77
 In light of these requirements, 
how will the logo and emblem of the Network play out vis-à-vis those of 
the State? Will multiple marks be retained in the face of these legal 
issues, or will the State depend on the emblem and marks of the Network 
in utter disregard of its sovereignty and responsibility under international 
law? Furthermore, in the event of any ensuing proceedings, will liability 
rest with the flag State or MOWCA?  
 
These sovereignty and jurisdictional issues, coupled with MOWCA’s 
lack of political and institutional authority to conduct security 
cooperation, makes it very difficult for the coastguard initiative to be 
successfully implemented by MOWCA.  
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6.3.3  Multiplicity of Approaches and Deepening Uncertainty 
There is also a lack of coordination and synergy between the various 
maritime security frameworks in the Gulf of Guinea. As analysed in the 
first part of this chapter, attempts at forging maritime security 
cooperation commenced on the back of the MOWCA platform, with the 
MOU being adopted in 2008 with the aim of establishing a coastguard 
network to service the entire Gulf of Guinea region. In 2009 the ECCAS 
framework was initiated and Zone D became operational, although there 
was no clear policy directive as to whether this was a replacement for, or 
a fulfilment of, the MOWCA project. More than a year later, MOWCA 
and the IMO jointly held a high level conference in Accra, Ghana, with 
the aim of implementing the coastguard initiative, but without reference 
to the ECCAS framework.
78
 Meanwhile, on the sidelines, the GGC had 
been nursing its own approach, and these efforts continued into 2012, as 
evidenced by the visit of the Secretary General of the Commission to 
Nigeria.
79
 But despite these consultations, all the member States of the 
GGC (with the exception of Nigeria) were already part of ECCAS. 
Therefore, the Secretariat should have treated the ECCAS maritime 
security framework as an adequate response to the maritime security 
needs of the region, but unfortunately this did not occur.  
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Clearly, these conflicting approaches undermine the objectives of 
regional cooperation. Rather than amalgamating their strengths, regional 
institutions appear to be advancing their own agendas, and at the same 
time dissipating the already scarce resources available to member States. 
The most recent attempt at fostering a sense of synergy was the Yaoundé 
Summit of Heads of State and Governments of ECOWAS and ECCAS, 
held in June 2013.
80
 The Summit adopted a Code of Conduct against 
Piracy and Illicit Crime in the Gulf of Guinea
81
 - one which has been 
applauded by the international community.
82
 However, despite the 
Summit being an important step towards harmonising maritime security 
cooperation,
83
 the author’s view is that a cautious approach should be 
adopted regarding the effectiveness of the Code, and that opportunity 
should be mistaken for achievement.  
 
The Yaoundé Summit represented an opportunity for Gulf of Guinea 
States to approach maritime security cooperation with a clean slate, 
shaping a clear path of cooperation. However, it is the author’s 
considered view that this opportunity has not been seized to the fullest 
extent possible. The Code of Conduct itself contains very general 
wording, has little normative content, and is still awaiting ratification 
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and implementation. Moreover, the platform is ad hoc and there is no 
indication that it can be sustained in the future. But perhaps the greatest 
indictment of the Summit is that it has no way of addressing parallel 
initiatives in the region, and has thus complicated maritime security 
cooperation in some ways. The preamble to the Code of Conduct refers 
to all the initiatives being pursued (e.g. ECOWAS and ECCAS), but 
does not indicate how the MOWCA coastguard network substantively 
relates to these initiatives. And in the case of the GGC, the Code of 
Conduct seeks to parallel the authority of the GGC with that of 
ECOWAS and ECCAS.
84
 In this way, the Yaoundé Summit has tacitly 
approved all the cooperative initiatives in the region, thereby creating 
further uncertainty.  
 
In much the same way that maritime security threats in the Gulf of 
Guinea require attention, so too does the Zeitgeist of duplication and 
confusion. Both the GGC and MOWCA have the potential to enhance 
maritime security cooperation in very positive ways, and without 
necessarily occupying the driver’s seat. For example, MOWCA could 
engage Gulf of Guinea States more rigorously on the issue of ratification 
and implementation of relevant international frameworks, particularly 
those relating to the safety and security of shipping. MOWCA could 
equally capitalise on its association with the IMO to promote capacity 
building in the region. Meanwhile, the GGC could exercise its treaty 
objective of promoting the efficient exploitation of offshore resources to 
the benefit of maritime security. If member States are able to develop 
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and manage resources efficiently, the outcomes will positively enhance 
maritime security. Therefore, what needs to be promoted is a harmonised 
approach to maritime security.     
 
6.3.4  Limited Capability and Funding  
The operationalisation of cooperative maritime security in the Gulf of 
Guinea is seriously constrained by the limited capability of States. And 
although security sector funding is generally inadequate, the situation 
with respect to Navies and Coastguards is more problematic. Angola’s 
allocation of resources with respect to the protection of its maritime 
estate is typical of Gulf of Guinea States. Angola has an estimated 
coastline of 1600km - the longest in the Gulf of Guinea. Its GDP is the 
second highest in the region, and much of that is derived from offshore 
resources. Yet the personnel strength of the Angolan Navy is only 1,000 
(compared to 100,000 for its Army and 6,000 for its Air Force).
85
 The 
amount of equipment possessed by the Angolan Navy is also very 
limited when contrasted with that of its Army.
86
 The Nigerian Navy is 
similarly underfunded and has limited capability.
87
 Its personnel strength 
is 8,000 - the largest in the Gulf of Guinea, but that is in sharp contrast to 
its 62,000-strong Army.
88
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A quick glance at the personnel strength of Navies and Coast Guards 
across the region reveals a worrying situation: Gambia 70, Benin 200, 
Sierra Leone 200, Guinea Bissau 350, Guinea 400 and Gabon 500.
89
 
Indeed, the author maintains that these personnel strength figures are 
inadequate to police the region’s vast maritime estate.
90
 Liberia 
represents another anomaly, not just for the Gulf of Guinea, but on how 
the global maritime community as a whole matches responsibility with 
maritime interest. Although Liberia is the second largest flag State in the 
world,
91
 its Coast Guard has a diminutive personnel strength of only 50, 
with 8 crafts under ten feet in length servicing the State.
92
 It is thus clear 
that in the Gulf of Guinea, the maritime responsibility exercised by 
States is not commensurate with the size of their maritime interest.  
 
The embryonic ECCAS framework is equally being confronted with 
funding challenges. More than two years after adopting the ECCAS 
framework, the Regional Coordination Centre, CRESMAC, is not 
operational, and no patrols are being carried out in Zones A and B.
93
 
Article 8 of the Protocol envisaged four sources to finance the cost of the 
joint patrols: (i) a region-wide maritime security and safety tax; (ii) a 
percentage of the financial penalties collected by member States; (iii) 
contributions from national shipping organisations; and (iv) financial 
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support from donors and international partners. However, thus far, no 
funding has been derived from the first three sources. Hence, the 
construction of offices to host CRESMAC is currently being funded with 
the aid of donor support.
94
 
 
There are two interrelated explanations for the weak state of maritime 
security logistics and resources in the Gulf of Guinea. The first is that 
Governments in the region are more concerned with land-based security 
issues. The second is that the Gulf of Guinea region suffers from ‘sea 
blindness’- the inability to appreciate the vast potential of maritime 
interests and resources for socio-economic development. .
95
 Both 
interpretations have some merit. For example, the Continental Early 
Warning System (CEWS), which was established under the regional 
Mechanisms for Peace and Security, could be used as a tool for 
highlighting maritime security threats. However, its use has thus far been 
restricted to security issues on land, despite the debilitating effects of 
maritime security threats on the stability and security of the region.   
 
It should, however, be emphasised that the two explanations canvassed 
above have understated the reality of the situation. The truth is that the 
cost of maritime security enforcement is very high, and most States in 
the Gulf of Guinea States would be hard pressed to finance enforcement 
activities considering the fragile state of their economies. This situation 
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is made more difficult by the lack of real commitment and support from 
the international community. This point will be addressed in detail in the 
next chapter.  
 
6.3.5  Inadequate Enforcement Framework and 
Interoperability Issues  
Regional maritime security cooperation cannot take place in a vacuum. 
First, there must be laws, enforcement procedures and judicial processes 
at the national level to support physical patrols and surveillance 
activities. However, as demonstrated in chapter five, many States in the 
region have failed to ratify and implement the requisite international 
legal framework. Thus, there does not exist an adequate legal framework 
upon which jurisdiction can be asserted, and enforcement measures 
implemented. Second, the usefulness of cooperative initiatives depends 
on multilateral and bilateral legal frameworks covering issues such as the 
custody and transfer of suspects, evidentiary material and exhibits, as 
well as the extradition of persons from one State to the other. In the 
absence of these two important requirements, a maritime security 
framework may have the requisite structure to be functional, but will be 
largely ineffective in practice. Indeed, this is the case with the ECCAS 
framework.  
 
Even where the above requirements are met, another critical determinant 
of cooperative enforcement must be present: interoperability.
96
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Interoperability is a broad subject which cannot be covered within the 
scope of the current analysis. However, the key elements that support 
interoperability include effective communication, common procedures 
and a culture of working together.
97
 Indeed, these elements are lacking in 
the Gulf of Guinea because Navies and Coast Guards do not have a 
shared history of partnership.
98
 In addition, they possess different 
operational procedures based on their respective colonial legacies, and 
more importantly, they do not share a common language – perhaps the 
most crucial factor in facilitating cooperative operational enforcement.  
 
It is important for regional cooperative processes to grapple with these 
issues and work towards an effective solution. The US Africa 
Partnership Station (APS), together with a number of Exercises being 
supported by external partners, have the potential to enhance 
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interoperability, 
 
but these programmes are rolled out only once a year, 
and thus their impact is likely to be minimal.
 99
  
 
6.3.6  Lack of Comprehensiveness  
There is a relationship between the structural deficit discussed above, the 
analysis on inadequate enforcement framework in the preceding section, 
as well as the conceptual analysis relating to the concept of security in in 
chapter three. Indeed, the evolving cooperative mechanisms concentrate 
too heavily on combating piracy and safeguarding energy security, 
thereby neglecting other vital dimensions of maritime security, such as 
depleting fisheries.  MOWCA’s use of a regional coastguard network for 
maritime security only makes sense in the context of suppressing piracy, 
while the focus of the GGC has thus far been on energy security. It is 
therefore not surprising that the safety of global shipping and energy 
resource security are topics that sit comfortably with the objectives of 
these two organisations. The Code of Conduct adopted at the Yaoundé 
Summit is also largely targeted at combating piracy.  
 
6.3.7  Maritime Boundaries Disputes 
Finally, maritime boundary disputes make cooperative initiatives 
difficult to implement. This subject has been exhaustively examined in 
chapter five, but will also be highlighted here for completeness. A 
discussion of maritime boundary disputes also provides a suitable link to 
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another challenge confronting cooperative initiatives – regional 
geopolitics.  
 
6.4 GEOPOLITICAL CHALLENGES OF REGIONAL 
COOPERATION  
In the last few years, there has been increased optimism about the 
prospects for maritime security cooperation in the Gulf of Guinea, with 
the evolving initiatives enjoying the fair winds of political harmony. 
Notwithstanding this, there are a series of geopolitical issues which 
maritime security cooperative frameworks must contend with. These 
geopolitical tensions have both historical and contemporary arteries, and 
their impact is not limited to security cooperation. However, unlike other 
cooperative domains, security cooperation does not have the luxury of 
time. The longer cooperation is hamstrung, the greater the opportunity 
for maritime security threats to manifest and organised criminal 
networks to prevail. Understanding the prevailing geopolitical issues 
thus allows the future of maritime security cooperation to be properly 
guided.      
 
6.4.1  Nemesis of the Gulf of Guinea Commission  
A discussion of interstate rivalries and tensions may initially sound a 
little fanciful, particularly in the absence of overt conflict or the 
exchange of ‘hot’ words between States. Furthermore, the evidence of 
interstate hostility is often anecdotal and open to interpretation, 
especially when the points of contention lie in the past rather than the 
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present. And yet these footprints from the past are the best indicator of 
the present relationship between States. Thankfully, in the case of the 
Gulf of Guinea Commission (GGC), there are clues which connect the 
past with the present, illuminating the remnants of interstate contests and 
rivalries.  
 
The media headlines and news reports concerning the visit of the 
Executive Secretary of the GGC to Nigeria in February 2012 are 
noteworthy in this regard, as they point to the tensions and conflicts 
within the Commission.
100
 One news caption read: “Gulf of Guinea 
Commission seeks Nigeria’s support on security”, while another 
proclaimed “Growing security challenge: Nigeria to Partner the Gulf Of 
Guinea Commission.”
101
 The fundamental question posed by these 
headlines can be simply stated: why is an organisation seeking the 
partnership or support of a member State to achieve its objectives? The 
answer to this question is that the Executive Secretary was making a 
frantic effort to bridge a political gap that exists within the GGC.  
 
Fortunately, the content of the news reports further illuminates the point 
being made. According to the reports, the Executive Secretary informed 
the Nigerian Vice President of the inability of the Commission and its 
Secretariat to function effectively, whereupon the Vice President is said 
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to have promised that “Nigeria will as a matter of urgency consider the 
pleas of the Gulf of Guinea Commission on its desire to perform its 
statutory duties”. The Nigerian Vice President also affirmed that he 
would “advise [the] President [of Nigeria] appropriately so that a 
decision shall be reached to allow the Secretariat to function 
optimally.”
102
 The purpose of this diplomatic dialogue was to enable the 
Executive Secretary to tacitly convey to the Vice President the fact that 
Nigeria was preventing the Commission from making progress, and 
interestingly, the Vice President confidently but indirectly acknowledged 
this fact. This illustrates that the future of the GGC rests largely in the 
hands of Nigeria – a situation which requires an appreciation of the 
history and politics of Nigeria and its immediate locale. This historical 
and political context will be examined below, and centres largely on 
Nigeria’s relationship with Equatorial Guinea.
103
 
 
Compared to Nigeria, Equatorial Guinea is a small State, yet the sour 
relations between the two countries have shaped the diplomacy and 
grand strategy of Nigeria.
104
 Tensions between Nigeria and Equatorial 
Guinea heightened in 1976 over the alleged murder of Nigerian migrant 
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workers by Equatoguinean soldiers.
105
 Then, in 1988, Equatorial Guinea 
tied a diplomatic knot with apartheid South Africa, leading to a massive 
influx of South African workers into Equatorial Guinea. The people and 
government of Nigeria realised this was more than mere labour 
diplomacy; Equatorial Guinea was procuring external support to 
countermand Nigeria’s power and dominance.
106
 Indeed, in addition to 
sending a large proportion of its labour force to Equatorial Guinea, the 
South African government was establishing a military base on Bioko 
Island - strategically located close to Nigeria.
107
 It should be also noted 
that Nigeria was a core member of the African anti-apartheid team, and 
was thus engaged in a diplomatic battle with South Africa. For this 
reason, Nigeria regarded the South African military base in Equatorial 
Guinea as a serious national security threat.
108
  
 
In the same period, Equatorial Guinea established another partnership, 
this time with Israel. According to newspaper reports at the time, Nigeria 
looked at this relationship with an equal degree of suspicion.
109
 Indeed, it 
is asserted that these events alerted Nigeria to the fact that it was not 
sufficient for the country’s foreign policy to focus westwards on 
ECOWAS, but that it also needed have its neighbouring southern 
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enclave strongly within its control. To this end, and through a series of 
strategic calculations, Nigeria succeeded in influencing the formation of 
the GGC.
110
  
 
It may thus be argued that as far as Nigeria is concerned, the real purpose 
of the GGC was, and perhaps still is, to provide a strategic counter-
balance to external influences in the region, , thus securing Nigeria’s 
sphere of influence.
111
 According to this conception, the GGC allows 
Nigeria to determine what decisions and alliances are made in the 
organisation, in which case Nigeria and its political leadership stands to 
make strategic gains regardless of whether the Commission makes 
progress or not.
112
 However, this historical angle may not entirely 
explain the GGC’s failure to make headway in the maritime security 
domain. All member States of the Commission rely heavily on oil 
revenue, and as illustrated in chapter 5, Nigeria has joint developments 
relating to offshore oil production with Equatorial Guinea and São Tomé 
and Príncipe.
113
 Thus, the security of offshore platforms is a shared 
concern, and this should spur Nigeria to heed the requests of the GGC 
Secretariat and the UN Security Council to develop a cooperative 
maritime security framework. But if such a framework fails to eventuate 
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(and indeed the facts point towards no change in Nigerian policy in this 
regard), then there must be other considerations at play.   
 
It is the author’s view that there is both continuity and change within the 
GGC, giving Nigeria a firm belief in the security of its old policy of 
strategic rationalisation. Indeed, the motivation for Nigeria maintaining 
the status quo may well be on the rise. High oil reserves, increasing oil 
wealth, and the accompanying diplomatic leverage possessed by 
Equatorial Guinea are all reasons for Nigeria to be on the lookout for 
Equatorial Guinea and the serious challenges it poses to Nigeria’s 
security and strategic interests.
114
 Nigeria may logically be keeping São 
Tomé and Príncipe on its radar as well. The irony of interstate relations 
is that ‘small’ States have the potential to be seen as a threat by their 
‘large’ neighbours. This is because it is customary for smaller States like 
Equatorial Guinea and São Tomé and Príncipe to rely heavily on external 
partnerships and support. Moreover, the oil and gas endowments being 
received by these small States have made such partnerships easier to 
forge. This results in neighbouring countries becoming wary of the ‘big’ 
powers that lie behind ‘small’ States, with the partnerships being 
interpreted as a quest for power. Whether by coincidence or design, this 
presumption looks as though it is becoming a reality, with Equatorial 
Guinea said to be spending a substantial sum on defence equipment.
115
 
Many naval assets have been acquired, with reports indicating that are 
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being delivered from Israel, and corvettes from South Korea.
 116
 This 
defence build-up has been canvassed in commentaries concerning the 
arms race being waged by Equatorial Guinea, with the State seeking to 
balance Nigeria’s naval power and defend its maritime borders. One 
commentator has described the situation as follows: “one of the richest 
countries in Africa, Equatorial Guinea, is rapidly expanding its naval 
power. The fleet of the 600,000-strong country will be larger than that of 
160 million-strong Nigeria.”
 117
 Although this comment exaggerates the 
danger that the military of Equatorial Guinea can pose to Nigeria, the 
description conveys the reality of interstate rivalry.  
 
Angola, another key member of the GGC and host to the GGC 
Secretariat, may well represent another angle to the Commission’s 
politics. As indicated earlier, Nigeria accounts for 47 per cent of oil 
supplies from the Gulf Guinea, while Angola accounts for 34 per cent.
118
 
However, after ten years of being ravaged by civil war, Angola is 
growing steadily and views its financial and military strengths as 
instruments of influence.
119
 This foreign policy arm is not just limited to 
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the ECCAS region, but is being extended to ECOWAS States including 
Guinea Bissau in what may be described as a carving out of the 
Lusaphone enclave.
120
 The growing prowess of Angola is probably also 
being keenly watched by Nigeria. Finally, Nigeria’s relations with 
Cameroon have been dented because of conflict over the Bakassi 
Peninsula.
121
 
 
The above analysis has highlighted the regional politics within which the 
GGC operates. Regardless of its treaty objectives, therefore, the 
Commission remains a political platform with little outcomes. Indeed, 
the GGC is unlikely to make any substantial or enduring changes to the 
maritime security landscape in the region, thus heavy reliance on the 
Commission for effective maritime security results is misplaced.  
 
6.4.2  ECCAS –Tensions and the Test Ahead  
As previously explained, once Nigeria is taken out of the GGC, only 
ECCAS coastal States will remain. For these States, the 2009 ECCAS 
Maritime Security Protocol, together with the Technical Understanding 
that launched cooperative patrols in Zone D, provides the blueprint for 
the operationalisation of region-wide maritime security cooperation. 
However, a number of factors will determine the sustainability of 
maritime security cooperation among ECCAS member States.   
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Angola's growing economic and military strength represents both an 
opportunity and a challenge, and only time will determine where the 
pendulum will settle. However, the likelihood is that Angola’s 
dominance will create a sense of insecurity in the entire region. Indeed, it 
is logical to expect smaller, neighbouring States to be wary of the 
potentially oppressive hegemony which Angola’s increasing power 
represents. Second, Angola has a history of military interventions in two 
Congos - Brazzaville and Kinshasa, and this serves as a reminder of how 
Angola became a game changer in the region. The intervention in 
Congo-Brazzaville in 1999 brought the current President, Sassou 
Nguesso, to power for the second time.
122
 Nguesso has manipulated the 
political system to ensure that he remains in power until August 2016.
123
 
It is only after his exit that it will become clear what degree of harmony 
will exist between Angola and Congo-Brazzaville. Meanwhile, DR 
Congo is still reeling in decades of internal conflicts, while Cameroon 
and Equatorial Guinea are in the grips of Presidents whose terms have 
endured for more than two decades. 
  
 
It is clear from the above discussion that there is a great deal of 
uncertainty surrounding future geopolitical stability in the ECCAS 
region. Indeed, patronage and personnel allegiances seem to be the main 
factors shaping the region’s geopolitical environment. Thus, the vectors 
of regional cooperation may alter dramatically with changes in political 
leadership. This puts the future of maritime security cooperation on an 
uncertain path.  
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6.4.3  ECOWAS Region - Old Troubles in a New Phase 
If ECCAS States are yet to pass an endurance test, as shown by the 
analysis above, can we safely say that the ECOWAS region has scored 
top marks based on the relative stability in the region and the longevity 
of its cooperative structures? And, at any rate, should we forecast a 
promising future where maritime security cooperation is the norm? It is 
argued that the outcome of maritime security cooperation in the 
ECOWAS region depends on three geopolitical factors: first, the history 
of geopolitical differences, and how these differences influence future 
behaviour and prospects for cooperation; second, the extent to which the 
ECOWAS Commission can reap the benefits of cooperation already 
established by member States; and finally (and more importantly), the 
challenges brought about by the new phase of security cooperation.   
Although the present situation may not be as fraught as in the past, the 
Anglophone-Francophone divide in the ECOWAS region still exists, 
perpetuated by disparate languages and geopolitical orientations. 
Emphasising this point is perhaps akin to saying aloud what many are 
saying in whispers. Cote d’Ivoire is beginning to rebuild itself after years 
of conflict and civil war, the most recent clash being in 2011.
124
 Indeed, 
the country’s current President, Alassane Ouattara, was only able to 
occupy the seat of government following a military intervention by 
France that forced former President, Laurent Gbagbo, out of power. 
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Gbagbo had repeatedly refused to relinquish power despite losing 
elections.
125
 President Ouattara has already proclaimed in a recent 
interview that his country is “regaining its former stature in economic, 
political and diplomatic terms.” President Ouattara has further asserted 
that “France is a privileged partner [of Cote d’Ivoire] and we are 
delighted with that.”
126
 This reinforces the strong influence of France in 
the ECOWAS region, but more importantly, the resurgence of an 
Ivorian-French partnership that has the potential to reignite a geopolitical 
contest with Nigeria. 
 
Meanwhile, the fall-out from the political conflict in Cote d’Ivoire has 
affected relations with Ghana. The political leadership in Ghana is 
perceived by Cote d’Ivoire’s new government as being an ally of the 
former Ivorian President, Laurent Gbagbo, with Ghana accusing Cote 
d’Ivoire of sending mercenaries into Ghana to assassinate exiled Ivorian 
politicians.
127
 There is also a maritime boundary dispute between Ghana 
and Cote d’Ivoire which seems to be deepening, with meetings and 
negotiations dating back as far as 2009 yielding no positive results.
128
 
The stakes look very high, with the Ivorian claim overlapping several 
areas where Ghana has already made oil discoveries.
129
 Yet despite the 
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two States being locked in a stalemate, they are expected to share a 
common patrol and surveillance zone in a future ECOWAS maritime 
security framework.
130
  
 
The above analysis shows that interstate cooperation and trust in the 
ECOWAS region is equally unsettled, and this has implications for the 
buoyancy of maritime security cooperation. 
 
6.4.4  “New Security” and the Demands of New Relations  
While this amalgamation of old and new geopolitical rifts will 
undoubtedly test the cooperative and institutional strengths of ECOWAS 
and ECCAS, it is important to keep in mind that maritime security 
cooperation is a relatively new concept - and not just for Gulf of Guinea 
States, but for the whole international community. Indeed, this kind of 
multilateral, integrated, multi-faceted cooperation is a “new security” 
concept that calls for a completely novel approach to geopolitical 
relations.   
 
The present mechanisms which anchor regional and continental security 
cooperation are land centric, having evolved in response to ethnic and 
political conflicts within States. Indeed, to date, the cooperative security 
                                                                                                                                                                    
“Cote d’Ivoire Claims Ghana’s Oil,” Cross Crocodiles, 
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strategies emanating from ECOWAS and ECCAS have focused on 
political consensus-building so that troops can be deployed to restore 
peace in violent conflicts. Such a task is completely different from 
maritime security cooperation.  
 
To begin with, those who commit maritime crimes or benefit from the 
perpetuation of maritime security threats in the Gulf of Guinea will have 
connections with member States of the above organisations in one form 
another, most likely as citizens. Therefore, any enforcement measures 
that are taken will very likely impact national sensibilities. Second, the 
type of cooperation being envisaged is geared towards addressing 
multiple threats, and will thus necessitate multiple national agencies 
working across multiple jurisdictional boundaries. Therefore, while 
information sharing and joint or coordinated patrols represent physical 
responses to maritime security threats, what is really required for 
effective maritime security cooperation is long and enduring interstate 
relations.  
 
This new phase of security cooperation differs significantly from all 
forms of cooperation that have existed in the region thus far. Moreover, 
no precedent has been set for the kind of cooperative maritime security 
framework being contemplated by Gulf of Guinea States. The situation 
between Somalia and the Indian Ocean is somewhat analogous, but in 
that case the deployment was mandated by the UN Security Council and 
enforced by foreign navies. The task was also restricted to combating 
piracy and armed robbery, as well as protecting ships carrying food and 
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humanitarian aid to Somalia.
131
 Further efforts led to the adoption of the 
Djibouti Code of Conduct by the States bordering the Indian Ocean,
 132
 
but this initiative was again restricted to repressing piracy by the States 
concerned, and is yet to find expression in joint patrols.   
 
A second example is the cooperative strategy to repress piracy between 
Malaysia, Singapore and Indonesia in the Malacca Strait, known as 
MALSINDO. The political tensions surrounding this particular initiative 
have led a large volume academic research and commentary.
133
 But 
MALSINDO “cooperation” is again limited to combating piratical 
attacks, and its practical scope is restricted to the three States notifying 
each other of pending patrols (which is described generously in the 
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literature as “coordinated patrols”).
134
 Progress within the broader region 
has led to the Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy 
and Armed Robbery against Ships in Asia (ReCAAP).
135
  
 
The crucial point to note is that existing maritime security cooperative 
initiatives are unlike the comprehensive ECCAS framework (which is 
currently being mirrored by ECOWAS). So although a combination of 
necessity and optimism is propelling Gulf of Guinea States into this new 
form of maritime security cooperation, the limits and challenges of this 
novel approach have not been highlighted. Above all, the new model 
demands a fresh approach to geopolitical relations – one which is yet to 
gain popularity, as well as serious tact and a plethora of confidence 
building measures. Only if these ingredients are present will the 
emerging initiatives be likely to succeed.   
  
6.4.5  The Mauritania Factor 
Finally, the emerging cooperative initiatives will have to grapple with 
another geopolitical issue – one which centres on the role of Mauritania 
in the region. As stated in chapter two, Mauritania withdrew from 
ECOWAS in 2000 as a result of disagreements,
 136
 and is now a member 
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State of the Arab Maghreb Union.
137
 However, Mauritania is still a 
member State of MOWCA. It is clear from the analysis in chapter three 
that if ECOWAS States are to be successful in responding to maritime 
security threats, and particularly illicit trafficking in narcotics and illegal 
migration by sea, some form of cooperation must exist with Mauritania. 
There is also a further relationship between Mauritania and its immediate 
neighbouring States under a Sub-Regional Fisheries Commission 
(SRFC).
138
  
 
Therefore, while Mauritania continues to keep its political distance from 
Gulf of Guinea States, the importance of safeguarding the region’s 
maritime security, and also of ensuring Mauritania’s own fisheries 
interest, demands that Mauritania be integrated into the ECOWAS 
framework. This puts ECOWAS and Mauritania in a difficult situation, 
with Mauritania presenting a difficult geopolitical hurdle for ECOWAS 
States to overcome.   
 
6.5 LAND-SEA NEXUS AND THE GOVERNANCE 
CHALLENGES FOR MARITIME SECURITY COOPERATION 
While the above structural and geopolitical challenges deserve attention, 
it is important to note that the difficulty in responding to maritime 
security threats is really a manifestation of land-based governance 
limitations. In other words, good order at sea is a reflection of good order 
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within States, and conversely, disorder within States will most likely find 
expression in maritime security threats, or at the very least, promote the 
escalation of such threats. Therefore, regional cooperative frameworks 
are not sufficient to enhance maritime security; what is required is good 
governance, and the viability of regional initiatives depends on the 
quality of governance at the national and regional levels.
139
 
 
It is noted that “governance” is a term that has multiple levels of 
meaning. The Commission on Global Governance has defined 
“governance” as the ““ways individuals and institutions, public and 
private, manage their common affairs.”
140
 To the United Nations 
Development Programme (UNDP), governance is “the exercise of 
economic, political, and administrative authority to manage a country’s 
affairs at all levels,”
141
 while the World Bank views it as “the manner in 
which power is exercised in the management of a country’s economic 
and social resources for development.”
142
 Governance has also been 
explained as “a form of order that occurs at various levels of social 
activity and interaction, from the village to the international system.”
143
 
The relationship between governance and security has been succinctly 
captured as follows: “governance, rather than government, more 
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accurately captures the dynamics of security and insecurity on the 
African continent.
144
 A synthesis of the concept of governance (as 
understood by the UN Economic and Social Council) and relevant 
literature elicits words such as “stability”, “legitimacy”, 
“accountability”, “transparency”, “competence” and “effective 
policymaking”.
145
 
 
The importance of these definitions and signposts for the purpose of this 
research is that they recognise governance as both a platform for 
producing responses to management concerns (including security), and 
as a measure or indicator of the performance of governments and 
institutions. In essence, good governance creates order within a State, 
thereby enabling the delivery of effective security. It also empowers a 
State to work more closely with regional partners in pursuing common 
security objectives. The five sections below examine a number of 
governance issues and their relationship with maritime security 
cooperation. Of course, given the multiplicity of governance issues in the 
Gulf of Guinea, the discussion is not exhaustive.
146
 Nonetheless, the 
analysis seeks to show that the scoping of maritime security cooperation 
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in the Gulf of Guinea can only be effective when governance issues are 
openly acknowledged and systematically addressed.  
 
6.5.1 Instability, Political Leadership and Insecurity    
The proclivity of the Gulf of Guinea region to both intrastate and 
interstate conflicts has been alluded to in the discussion of geopolitical 
challenges. It is axiomatic that instability creates disorder, which in turn 
undermines the fundamental interests of States, including maritime 
security cooperation. However, the impact of instability on maritime 
security deserves further analysis. 
 
Conflict and instability reflect the inability of governments to maintain a 
peaceful and ordered society, and thus serve as a catalyst for further 
insecurity, including maritime security threats. At the same time, 
instability represents a high level of insecurity, which diverts the 
attention of the political leadership away from other types of threats, 
such as piracy, drug trafficking and other illicit activities. In the African 
context, there is clear evidence that once instability and disorder become 
pervasive, with malignant actors and illegal activities taking root, 
members of the political leadership become beneficiaries of illegal 
‘services’, thereby compromising their authority (and hence ability) to 
fight crime.
147
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For example, elements of MEND (the main piracy actors in the Gulf of 
Guinea), are alleged to have been used by Nigerian politicians to 
intimidate political opponents.
148
 This symbiotic relationship tends to 
legitimatise other criminal acts perpetrated by these groups. Piracy and 
armed robbery attacks in the Gulf of Guinea have already reached record 
levels in 2013, and there are projections that the number of incidents will 
continue to increase in 2014 and 2015.
 149
 An important risk factor that 
feeds into these projections, but which is not explicitly mentioned in the 
literature, is Nigeria’s presidential election in 2015. Election dynamics 
are likely to revitalise the relationship between the political elite and 
criminal groups, thus compromising the will and commitment of 
governments to combat piratical attacks, ransom kidnappings and the left 
of oil offshore.  
 
There is another important dimension to the governance-instability-
maritime security chain in the Gulf of Guinea. As conflicts in the region 
are generally internal, governments of Gulf of Guinea States give less 
priority to their Navies and Coast Guards while overspending on land 
troops. Therefore, the dismal state of the region’s Navies and Coast 
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Guards is a by-product of conflict and instability. Indeed, a survey of the 
region would reveal that Navies and Coast Guards have been absorbed 
into land forces especially during conflicts, thereby leaving the region’s 
maritime borders and ocean space unprotected.  
 
6.5.2 Institutional Effectiveness and Coordination  
The effectiveness of regional maritime security cooperation depends on 
the competence of national institutions.
150
 In turn, the efficacy of 
national institutions is contingent on stable and ordered governance 
structures. Thus, governance structures and public institutions have an 
interdependent relationship. Whereas weak governance produces poorly 
functioning public sector institutions, dysfunctional institutions tend to 
exacerbate governance problems, including the delivery of security 
objectives.
151
    
 
Also, since maritime security is a shared responsibility between different 
national agencies, institutional coordination is vital for the realisation of 
regional cooperative objectives.  However, the feasibility report 
commissioned by MOWCA and the IMO in 2006 indicated weaknesses 
in the coordination of national agencies across the Gulf of Guinea.
152
 The 
report revealed that in many instances there is hardly any engagement 
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between the multiple agencies charged with maritime security 
responsibilities, and in other cases national bodies have conflicting 
roles.
153
 These institutional gaps need to be addressed to ensure effective 
maritime security cooperation.  
 
6.5.3 Corruption and Lack of Transparency  
Corruption is another important governance issue that impacts on 
maritime security. As shown in Table 2.1 in chapter two, the corruption 
index of Gulf of Guinea States is very high.
154
 Corruption undermines 
the performance of public institutions, affects delivery of governance 
imperatives including security, while also promoting criminal conducts.  
Indeed, if politicians and other members of the ruling elite allow greed to 
dictate the way they conduct public affairs, the net effect will likely be 
the emergence of a national-regional psyche that views criminality as a 
rewarding enterprise.
155
 It is therefore not surprising that the analysis in   
chapter three shows corruption as a factor that promotes illicit trafficking 
in narcotics and IUU fishing. Unless these governance issues are 
addressed as part of the regional cooperative process, the objectives of 
maritime security cooperation will be undermined.   
 
There is also a relationship between corruption and the building of 
strategic partnerships to enhance maritime security in the Gulf of 
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Guinea. As demonstrated earlier, Gulf of Guinea States are plagued with 
capability deficiencies when undertaking maritime security enforcement. 
It is therefore likely that regional States are looking to donor agencies 
and external partnerships to fund and support the cost of maritime 
security enforcement. One of the critical factors that will inform the 
preparedness of donors and partners to offer the necessary support is the 
presence or absence of corruption.  
 
6.5.4 Governance of Offshore Resources   
Chapter three has discussed the importance of fisheries to human 
security, and conversely, how depleting fisheries resources can be a 
source of multiple security threats. Hence, the governance of both living 
and non-living offshore resources is crucial to maritime security. The 
Niger Delta insurgency has its roots in agitations over the management 
of oil and gas resources.
156
 Thus, the increasing offshore oil and gas 
discoveries in the Gulf of Guinea have the potential to be either a source 
of security or insecurity, depending on how Gulf of Guinea States 
manage such resources and the revenue they generate.   
 
6.5.5 Security Governance, Culture and Reform  
The final governance challenge to maritime security cooperation in the 
Gulf of Guinea is the governance of security itself. As illustrated in the 
                                                          
156
 See chapter four. See also Anna Dunin, The Niger Delta: Where Oil is a Curse 8 August 2011, 
Geopolitical Monitor, Available: http://www.geopoliticalmonitor.com/the-niger-delta-where-oil-is-a-
curse-4435 22 August 2011. Emeka E. Okafor, "Dynamics of Niger Delta Struggles and the State 
Responses: The State of Terrorism and Terrorism of the State," Journal of Sustainable Development 
in Africa 13, 2,  2011, pp. 88-105. Ilufoye S. Ogundiya, "Domestic Terrorism and Security Threats in 
the Niger Delta Region of Nigeria," Journal of Social Science 20, 1,  2009, pp. 31-42. 
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analysis of the concept of security, the pursuit of security is optimised 
when it is directed at enhancing the welfare of society.
157
 But this is only 
possible when the driving force behind the desire of governments to seek 
cooperation in the first place is the wellbeing of the people they 
represent.  
 
Although the ECCAS maritime security framework is holistic in terms of 
the outcomes it seeks to secure, the analysis of its background 
demonstrates that it was the seaborne attack on the Presidential Palace in 
Equatorial Guinea that galvanised ECCAS member States into action. 
This illustrates how the political leadership of some States prioritises 
personal and regime security over other dimensions of security. It also 
raises two critical and opposing questions that must be answered. They 
are: (i) is maritime security cooperation mainly being driven by security 
concerns that directly impact on political authority and revenue?; and (ii) 
is there a genuine commitment by Gulf of Guinea States to address 
security issues, such as depleting living resources, that impact on 
communities and society at large?  
 
The author asserts that it is critical to seek a governance approach that 
puts society at the heart of maritime security cooperation. This approach 
necessitates some changes in the security culture of certain States, as 
well as reforms to security sector institutions.
158
 
                                                          
157
 See chapter three.  
158
 The author adopts the definition of “security sector” provided by the OECD – that is, “those state 
institutions which have a formal mandate to ensure the safety of the state and its citizens against acts 
of violence and coercion.” OECD, ‘Security System Reform and Governance: Policy and Good 
Practice’, 2004. See also Paul Williams and Jurgen Haacke, “Security Culture, Transnational 
Challenges and the Economic Community of West African States,” Journal of Contemporary African 
Studies, June 12, 2008. 
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6.6 CONCLUSIONS  
The analysis in this chapter has demonstrated that maritime security 
cooperation in the Gulf of Guinea is currently being pursued through 
multiple institutional frameworks. Indeed, this has resulted in a high 
degree of confusion, undermining the success of some cooperative 
initiatives. Moreover, although the relevant institutions have varying 
strengths and weaknesses, no assessment is being made by the relevant 
actors and the international community as to which regional frameworks 
are most suitable for achieving effective maritime security cooperation.  
 
The analysis has also shown that despite the UN Security Council 
endorsing the GGC and MOWCA as platforms for maritime security 
cooperation, the two institutions are confronted with fundamental 
structural and geopolitical challenges that prevent them from playing a 
pivotal role in the region. Nonetheless, they still possess strengths that 
can supplement the institutional frameworks of ECCAS and ECOWAS 
– both of which have been shown to be more suitable platforms for 
cooperation. Indeed, ECCAS member States have already devised a 
framework for maritime security cooperation which is anchored in the 
broader political and economic structures of the region. This can be 
replicated by ECOWAS member States in the future. 
 
Nonetheless, the analysis has demonstrated that there are three types of 
challenges – structural, geopolitical and governance-related – that need 
to be addressed in order for maritime security cooperation to be effective 
in the region. On the whole, therefore, the analysis in this chapter has 
supported the analytical and conceptual framework of the thesis.   
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION AND THE 
DYNAMICS OF MARITIME SECURITY IN THE GULF 
OF GUINEA 
 
7.1 INTRODUCTION 
The analysis in the preceding chapters has illustrated the convergence of 
maritime security interests in the Gulf of Guinea. Addressing these 
security concerns necessitates the participation of external actors and the 
building of international partnerships. The legitimacy of external 
interventions is also founded on the notion that such interventions are in 
the ‘interest’ of the global community. The role of external actors can 
also be justified on the basis of relevant UN Security Council 
Resolutions. These Resolutions implore the international community to 
support the adoption of comprehensive strategies by Gulf of Guinea 
States to address incidents of piracy and armed robbery in the region.
1
 
Moreover, as illustrated in chapter six, a number of Gulf of Guinea 
States have expressly requested the support and intervention of the 
international community to address the maritime security situation in the 
region.   
 
There is therefore a convergence of interest in addressing the state of 
insecurity in the Gulf of Guinea. However, despite such convergence, 
                                                          
1
 United Nations, Resolution 2018 - Piracy and Security in Africa(Security Council 6645th Meeting. 
31 October 2011). United Nations, Resolution 2039 - Peace Consolidation in West Africa(Security 
Council 6727th Meeting. 29 February 2012). 
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there exists a simultaneous divergence of interests, because the 
objectives and priorities of the various actors may differ. There may, for 
instance, be widespread agreement on the scope of maritime security 
threats, but differences of opinion regarding the order in which to 
address these threats. Also, as with other areas of State relations, 
maritime security cooperation may be underpinned by strategic motives 
or involve the trading of certain benefits and opportunities, thereby 
evoking competition or conflict among participants at different levels. 
The implication of this is that maritime security efforts may pull in 
different directions, while cooperative outcomes may not deliver durable 
security.    
 
It is against this background that the contribution of external actors to 
maritime security regime building in the Gulf of Guinea will be 
examined. Consideration will also be given to the challenges and 
limitations that accompany these interventions. Drawing on the analysis 
of the strategic interests in the Gulf of Guinea in chapter two, and also 
the threat analysis in chapters three and four, the author has selected the 
United States, France, the United Kingdom, China and the European 
Union as the key actors for the purpose of the analysis.  
 
There are additional strategic reasons underlying the scope of the 
chapter. Apart from being a global power, the United States has a 
dedicated maritime security cooperative engagement with the Gulf of 
Guinea, and thus it is important to assess the scope and context of this 
engagement. A combination of historical and contemporary connections, 
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which in some cases includes defence and security arrangements, makes 
France, the United Kingdom and the European Union important 
candidates for the chapter. Finally, China’s growing economic interest in 
Africa, and in particular the presence of Chinese companies in the 
offshore oil and gas industry of the Gulf of Guinea, makes it an 
important candidate for interrogation.  
 
The substantive analysis is organised in six parts. The first five parts will 
examine the interventions, policies and contributions of these actors, 
while the sixth part is devoted to an examination of the challenges and 
limitations of the interventions.  
 
7.2 UNITED STATES AND MARITIME SECURITY IN THE 
GULF OF GUINEA  
As the world’s superpower, the United States (US) has a spectrum of 
maritime interests. This ranges from the protection of international trade 
and shipping, energy security, as well as combating transnational 
organised crimes (including drug trafficking, terrorism and the 
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD)).
2
 These maritime 
security objectives are elucidated in key US policy documents that 
inform the country’s maritime security engagements and policies in 
Africa, and in particular, its maritime security cooperative framework in 
                                                          
2
 Generally on US maritime security interests and responses, see John F. Frittelli, "Port and Maritime 
Security: Background and Issues for Congress," United States Congressional Research Service Order 
Code RL31733,  Updated 27 May 2005. Boske B. Leigh and Lyndon B. Johnson, "Port and Supply-
chain Security Initiatives in the United States and Abroad," United States Congressional Research 
Service,  2006. Joann Peterson and Alan Treat, "The Post-9/11 Global Framework for Cargo 
Security," Journal of International Commerce and Economics,  March 2008, pp. 1-30. 
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the Gulf of Guinea. This section will review the relevant policy 
frameworks and instruments, as well as US maritime security activities 
and interventions in the Gulf of Guinea.  
 
7.2.1  United States Maritime Security Policy Framework  
 
United States seapower will be globally postured to secure our homeland and 
citizens from direct attack and to advance our interests around the world.
3
 
 
The United States National Strategy on Maritime Security (NSMS) is the 
overarching maritime security policy document of the US.
4
 The NSMS 
was promulgated in 2005 as part of a suite of post-9/11 security 
responses. The language and strategic objectives outlined in the NSMS 
covers both ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ security issues.
5
 The opening paragraph of 
the Strategy notes that “the United States has a vital national interest in 
maritime security [and] must be prepared to stop terrorists and rogue 
States before they…threaten or use WMD or engage in other attacks 
against the US and allies and friends.”
6
 The paragraphs that follow also 
note that the security of the world’s oceans is important because they are 
“a source of food, mineral resources, and recreation, and they support 
commerce among nations.”
7
  
 
                                                          
3
United States, A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower. (Washington, October 2007).  
4
 United States, National Strategy on Maritime Security. (Washington DC, September 2005). 
5
 See analysis of the concept of security in chapter 3.  
6
 United States, National Strategy on Maritime Security, 2005, p. 1.  
7
 United States, National Strategy on Maritime Security, 2005, p. 1. 
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These contrasting quotations denote both the hard and soft security 
objectives of the NSMS. This dual strategic objective is to be achieved 
by blending public and private maritime security activities, and also 
through national, regional and international coordination.
8
 The Strategy 
commits the US to pursue cooperative initiatives as a fundamental part 
of its maritime security architecture.
9
 The underlying cooperative 
imperatives are reflected in the International Outreach Coordination 
Strategy adopted in November 2005, as well as the Cooperative Strategy 
for 21st Century Seapower, which launched in 2007.
10
 Whilst these 
strategic documents provide the policy framework for US maritime 
security activities and interventions in the Gulf of Guinea, the actual 
execution of the cooperative engagements is carried out by the United 
States African Command (AFRICOM) and its dedicated maritime 
platform – the African Partnership Station (APS). 
 
7.2.2  Birth of the United States African Command 
Although the US traditionally had five combatant military commands 
overseeing its military interests around the world, no single command 
was dedicated specifically to Africa, despite its significance as one of the 
largest continents in the world.
11
 Indeed, responsibility for Africa was 
distributed among several Commands. The Indian Ocean region was 
                                                          
8
 United States, National Strategy on Maritime Security, 2005, p.11. 
9
 United States, National Strategy on Maritime Security, 2005, p.13. 
10
 United States, International Outreach and Coordination Strategy. November 2005). United States, A 
Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower (Washington, October 2007) 
11
 Northern Command (NORTHCOM) for North America, Southern Command (SOUTHCOMD) for 
South America and the Caribbean, Central Command (CENTCOMD) for the Middle East and South 
West Asia, European Command (EUCOM) for Europe, and the Pacific Command (PANCOM) for the 
Far East and Pacific region.  
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assigned to the Pacific Command (PANCOM), East and Southern Africa 
came under Central Command (CENTCOM), while North Africa and 
Sub-Saharan Africa (which includes the Gulf of Guinea) were 
administered by the European Command (EUCOM).
12
 This 
dissemination of responsibility for Africa reflected the low strategic 
importance that the US attached to the continent.
13
  
 
However, developments that have taken place since 1998 have led the 
US to reassess the continent, and particularly the Gulf of Guinea. These 
developments include the bombing of US Embassies in Kenya and 
Tanzania in 1998, the 9/11 terrorist attacks, as well as the growing status 
of Africa as a source of vital natural resources, including oil, gas and 
minerals.
14
 In line with this new strategic outlook, the US announced 
major funding for African security programmes in 2005.
15
 Then, in 
February 2007, the US African Command (AFRICOM) was created to 
                                                          
12
 For details on these Commands, see Office of the Secretary of Defence and Joint Staff,  
http://www.dod.mil/pubs/foi/combatcomm.html, 11 December 2013.  
13
 George B. N. Ayittey, Africa in Chaos New York St. Martin’s Griffin, 1999, p. 347. David E. 
Brown, "AFRICOM AT 5 Years: The Maturation of a New U.S. Combatant Command," The Letort 
Papers, Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2013, p. 4.  
14
 David E. Brown, "AFRICOM AT 5 Years: The Maturation of a New U.S. Combatant Command," 
The Letort Papers, Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army war College, 2013, p. 4. See also James 
Hentz, "The Contending Currents in United States Involvement in Sub-saharan Africa", in  Ian Taylor 
and Paul Williams, eds. Africa in International Politics: External Involvement on the Continent, 
London and New York, Routledge, 2004, pp. 23-40. Jonathan Steveson, "Africa's Growing Strategic 
Resonance," Survival 45, 4,  2003, pp. 153-72. 
15
 Edward Harris, "United States outlines bigger effort to fight terrorism in Africa: Plan would Pour 
$100m each year into some least-policed areas," Associate Press, 25 May 2005. Otto Sieber, "Africa 
Command: Forecast for the Future," Strategic Insights VI, 1,  January 2007. Sean McFate, “US Africa 
Command: Next Step or Next Stumble,” African Affairs, December 24, 2007, pp. 111-120. Milady 
Ortiz, “U.S. Africa Command: A New Way of Thinking,” National Security Watch, March 13, 2008, 
p. 3. 
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focus exclusively on the African continent, with the Command becoming 
fully operational in October 2008.
16
  
 
The original intention of the US was to locate AFRICOM in Africa - 
“where it can best interact with partner nations.”
17
 However, African 
States steered away from hosting the command, with many being 
opposed to the presence of the US military anywhere on the continent. 
Meanwhile, a negative campaign was being waged by diasporic African 
communities, further intensifying the anti-American sentiment.
 18
 
Eyebrows were raised when reports surfaced that Nigeria had endorsed 
AFRICOM, and was considering hosting the Command’s headquarters. 
However, not only did Nigeria indicate that it would not host the 
headquarters of AFRICOM, it also voiced its objection to AFRICOM 
being accommodated anywhere near its sphere of influence - namely, 
West Africa.
19
 This posture crushed the possibility of stationing 
                                                          
16
 See White House, President Bush Creates a Department of Defense Unified Combatant Command 
for Africa,  6 February 2007, Available: http://georgewbush-
whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2007/02/20070206-3.html 8 October 2011. For an extensive 
analysis of the background and future of AFRICOM see David E. Brown, "AFRICOM AT 5 Years: 
The Maturation of a New U.S. Combatant Command," The Letort Papers, Strategic Studies Institute, 
U.S. Army war College,  2013. Sean McFate, "U.S. Africa Command: A New Strategic Paradigm?," 
Military Review 88, 1,  January-February 2008. 
17
 This quotation is from the Policy Statement of President Bush on the launch of AFRICOM. See 
U.S. Library of Congress, Africa Command: U.S. Strategic Interests, and the Role of the U.S. Military 
in Africa, Washington, D.C Congressional Research Service, 7 December 2007.   
18
 Nigerian newspapers described the situation as an example of “American pomposity” and “US 
contempt for Nigeria,” while some Nigerian military leaders bemoaned that “Nigeria will be finished 
as a force.” See Arild Nodland, "Guns, Oil, and ‘Cake’: Maritime Security in the Gulf of Guinea", in 
Bruce A. Elleman, Andrew Forbes and David Rosenberg, eds. Piracy and Maritime Crime: Historical 
and Modern Case Studies, Newport, Naval War College Press, 2010, pp. 191-206, p.202. See also 
John Liebhardt, The groundswell of Opposition to AFRICOM from African Bloggers,  24 February 
2008, Available: http://globalvoicesonline.org/2008/02/24/african-bloggers-the-groundswell-of-
opposition-to-africom/  4 October 2011. Danny Glover and Nicole C. Lee, Say No to Africom,  19 
November 2007, Available: http://www.thirdworldtraveler.com/Africa/Say_No_Africom.html, 24 
September 2011. 
19
 allAfrica.com, No USA Barack Or Base In Nigeria! Yes!,  3 June 2008, Available: 
http://www.nairaland.com/nigeria/topic-139364.0.html 4 October 2011. Robert Manson, "Do We 
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AFRICOM in Liberia, even though Liberia had made a public 
declaration to host the Command’s headquarters.
20
 The US eventually 
made a policy shift by locating AFRICOM headquarters in Stuttgart, 
Germany, while the main body of the command operates from the US 
and other European States.
21
 
 
The Mission Statement of AFRICOM states that the objective of the 
command is to “protect and defend the national security interests of the 
US by strengthening the defence capabilities of African States and 
regional organizations and, when directed, [to] conduct military 
operations, in order to deter and defeat transnational threats and to 
provide a security environment conducive to good governance and 
development.”
22
 This Mission Statement conceptualises AFRICOM as a 
“combatant command plus.”
23
 What this means is that AFRICOM has 
been structured for the delivery of both hard and soft security. Indeed, it 
                                                                                                                                                                    
Want to "Kill People and Break Things' in Africa? A Historian's Thoughts on Africa Command," 
Strategic Studies Quarterly 2, 1,  Spring 2008, pp. 97-130. See also Arild Nodland, "Guns, Oil, and 
‘Cake’: Maritime Security in the Gulf of Guinea", in Bruce A. Elleman, Andrew Forbes and David 
Rosenberg, eds. Piracy and Maritime Crime: Historical and Modern Case Studies, Newport, Naval 
War College Press, 2010, pp. 191-206. 
20
 See, "U.S. AFRICOM Headquarters to Remain in Germany for "Foreseeable Future'" " 
International Herald Tribune, 19 November 2008. Ezekiel Pajibo and Emira Woods, "African 
Command: Wrong for Liberia, Disastrous for Africa," Foreign Policy in Focus, 26 July 2007. Making 
the case for Liberia to host Africom,  19 November 2007, Liberia and Friends Journal, Available: 
http://liberiaandfriends.blogspot.com.au/2007/11/making-case-for-liberia-to-host-africom.html, 10 
January 2014. 
21
 Some staff members are stationed at the MacDill Air Force Base in Florida, while others are based 
at the Joint Analysis Center of AFRICOM in Moles-Worth, England. Army and Navy Units are 
located in Naples, Italy. The Air Force is located in Kaiserslautern, Germany, while the Marine Corps 
is also based in Böblingen Germany. However, the US has since procured an operational base in 
Djibouti.  
22
 See AFRICOM Mission Statement, Available: http://www.africom.mil/AboutAFRICOM.asp 8 
October 2011.  
23
 David E. Brown, "AFRICOM AT 5 Years: The Maturation of a New U.S. Combatant Command," 
The Letort Papers, Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army war College, 2013, p. 21.  
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has capabilities and strategic responsibilities similar to traditional 
combatant commands, but is also supported by US civilian government 
agencies whose task it is to focus on issues of governance, development, 
and to track all other non-military interests.    
 
7.2.3  The African Partnership Station  
The African Partnership Station (APS) is one of the key platforms for 
meeting US maritime security objectives and other strategic goals in the 
Gulf of Guinea.
 24
 The APS was launched in 2007 with the deployment 
of USS Swift and USS Fort McHenry to the Gulf of Guinea. There has 
since been consistent APS deployments and presence in the region.
25
 The 
APS may be viewed as a more functional replication of the West Africa 
Training Cruise (WATC), a traditional US cooperative maritime 
platform for joint sea exercises in West Africa. Unlike the WATC, 
however, the APS recruits personnel from the Gulf of Guinea for more 
extended periods, at times up to six months, during which time they are 
provided with training and taught essential skills relating to maritime 
security enforcement.
26
 The APS is also used for delivering humanitarian 
assistance to coastal communities in the Gulf of Guinea.  
 
                                                          
24
 The APS originally came under the US European Command, but is now under the Africa 
Command. For details, see Commander US Naval Forces Africa, “About Africa Partnership Station,” 
http://www.c6f.navy.mil/about%20us.html, 28 January 2013. 
25
 Tim Fish, "United States Navy Announces further Support for Africa Partnership Station," Jane's 
Defence Weekly October 2008.  
26
 See, Commander US Naval Forces Africa, “About Africa Partnership Station,” 
http://www.c6f.navy.mil/about%20us.html, 12 December 2013.  
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Another strategic role of the APS may be sea basing. This can be 
inferred from the US Cooperative Strategy which requires US forward-
deployed forces at sea to swiftly suppress conflicts in unstable regions, 
and to increase naval power in order to deter conflicts, aggressive 
transnational actors and rogue States.
 27
 Indeed, this strategic edict 
resonates with the concept of sea basing, which similarly advocates the 
use of US power at sea to influence events and situations on land that 
may affect US vital interests.
28
 Analysing unstable situations in the Gulf 
of Guinea, as well as possible scenarios which may warrant intervention 
by naval platforms, has long been part of the work of the US intelligence 
community.
29
 This Mission is now firmly situated in the Cooperative 
Strategy, with the APS being the most likely platform for execution. It is 
perhaps not a coincidence that the APS was deployed within a few 
months of the Cooperative Strategy being launched. 
30
 Therefore, the 
APS, much like AFRICOM, is an encapsulation of ‘soft’ and ‘hard’ 
security concepts in both a conceptual and practical context.  
  
 
                                                          
27
  US Government, “A Cooperative Strategy for the 21
st
 Century Seapower,” October 2007, p. 11.  
28
 The debate surrounding sea basing is elaborated by Geoffrey Till, "Naval Transformation, Ground 
Forces, and the Expeditionary Impulse: The Sea-Basing Debate " Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. 
Army War College,  December 2006.   
29
 In 2005, US intelligence services had predicted governmental collapse and conflict in Nigeria, with 
the US considering possible options for intervening. See United States National Intelligence Council, 
Mapping Sub-Saharan Africa’s Future: Conference Summary. (Washington, D.C, March 2005). See 
also, Arild Nodland, "Guns, Oil, and ‘Cake’: Maritime Security in the Gulf of Guinea", in  Bruce A. 
Elleman, Andrew Forbes and David Rosenberg, eds. Piracy and Maritime Crime: Historical and 
Modern Case Studies, Newport, Naval War College Press, 2010, pp. 191-206. "US Senate Hears 
Concerns on Security, Corruption in African Gulf," Oil Daily,  2004. 
30
 See also Kathi A. Sohn, "The Global Fleet Station: A Powerful Tool for Preventing Conflict," Naval 
War College Review 62, 1,  Winter 2009, pp. 45-58. Nathan Hodge, “New US Army field manual 
focuses on stabilising failed states,” Jane's Defence Weekly, October 2008. 
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7.2.4   Role of the United States in Promoting Maritime 
Security Cooperation in the Gulf of Guinea 
Meanwhile, the US has been promoting regional maritime security 
cooperation and capacity building on various subjects of maritime 
security across the Gulf of Guinea. The first high profile consultation on 
regional maritime security cooperation was hosted in 2004 by the US 
European Command in Naples, Italy.
31
 In attendance were the Chiefs of 
Naval Staffs from Nigeria and Ghana, as well as senior ranking officers 
of other navies of Gulf of Guinea States. Also present was the UN 
Special Representative for West Africa. In November 2006, the US 
European Command sponsored a second Gulf of Guinea Maritime 
Security and Safety Ministerial Conference in Benin, with the US 
Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs being in attendance.
32
 
The objectives of the Conference were to achieve sub-regional consensus 
on threats to maritime safety and security (MSS), to forge high level 
consensus and political buy-in for a Plan of Action on maritime security, 
to identify and support time-sensitive measures for improving MSS, to 
promote regional collaboration and coordinate the active participation of 
relevant regional institutions, and lastly, to provide a justification and 
mechanism for coordinated and collaborative international assistance.  
 
                                                          
31
 The Conference was held from 3-4 October, 2004. See United States European Command, 
Maritime Security Conference Brings Gulf of Guinea Navies Together 5 October 2004, Available: 
http://www.eucom.mil/article/21949/Maritime-Security-Conference-Brings-Gulf-Guinea, 1 February 
2013. 
32
 United State European Command, Framework for Action Plan adopted at Ministerial Conference 
15 November 2006, United State European Command Available: 
http://www.eucom.mil/article/20998/framework-action-plan-adopted-ministerial, 1 February 2013. 
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These meetings were crucial in helping the US to forge its strategic 
engagement with Africa. In other words, it can be argued that maritime 
security cooperation served as the catalyst for the US furthering its 
strategic interest in Africa and the Gulf of Guinea. Subsequently, in 2010 
and 2011, the US sponsored another maritime security conference at the 
continental level, with the African Union (AU), the Economic 
Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the Economic 
Community of Central African States (ECCAS) all featuring 
prominently.
33
   
 
What is significant about these conferences is the profile and scope of 
the stakeholders involved. The US deliberately projected its maritime 
security dialogue through the US Africa Centre for Strategic Studies 
(ACSS), whose stated mission is to integrate and reflect African interests 
in US policy initiatives.
34
 Thus, the ACSS has managed to congregate 
African participants from different sectors and backgrounds and cast 
them as stakeholders in the emerging US maritime security partnership. 
Other than Navies, key official and policy makers from sectors as 
diverse as fisheries, environmental science and technology, customs, 
shipping and ports, civil society and academia have been involved. It is 
the author’s view that this broad consultative process can help cure the 
                                                          
33
 The theme of the first conference was “Africa Maritime Safety and Security - Towards Economic 
Prosperity,” October 2010, Stuttgart, Germany. The second conference was dubbed “2011 ECCAS-
ECOWAS Maritime Safety and Security - Toward Strategic Synergies in the Maritime Domains of 
West and Central Africa,” 19–21 July 2011, Garmisch, Germany. 
34
 See web page of Africa Centre for Strategic Studies, http://africacenter.org/about/ 16 October 2011.  
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lack of coordination of maritime security measures at the national and 
regional levels in the Gulf of Guinea.
35
 
 
In addition to high-level African involvement, the conferences have 
attracted participation from the UN, the World Bank, the European 
Union (EU), the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the 
International Maritime Organization (IMO) and the Chiefs of European 
Navies (CHENS). This high profile involvement serves to endorse and 
add momentum to the maritime security objectives of the US.  
 
7.2.5 United States Logistics Support and Capacity Building 
As a result of APS deployments, naval and other law enforcement 
officers across the Gulf of Guinea are benefiting from capacity building 
in critical areas of maritime security. Indeed, by sharing skills training 
across the APS platform, navies and coastguards can enhance the future 
interoperability of personnel and operations.  
 
The US may also be able to play a role in enhancing the Maritime 
Domain Awareness (MDA) of Gulf of Guinea States. Effective MDA 
involves the collection, analysis and dissemination of information for the 
purpose of gaining a clear operational picture of maritime security 
threats, thus facilitating a better response to such threats.
36
 Indeed, MDA 
is a key component of the US layered framework for maritime security, 
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 See chapter 6.  
36
 United States, National Plan to Achieve Maritime Domain Awareness for the National Strategy for 
Maritime Security. (Washington DC, October 2005).   
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and MDA resources, platforms and experiences have the potential to 
improve the maritime security information and intelligence deficit in the 
Gulf of Guinea. Although some information may be classified, 
procedures can be developed for sharing what information can be made 
available to further collective interests. 
 
The conclusion to be drawn from the profile of US military activities in 
the Gulf of Guinea, as well as the strategic packaging of its maritime 
security cooperative frameworks, is that the US is a major player in the 
evolving cooperative maritime security framework in the Gulf of 
Guinea.   
 
7.3 FRANCE AND MARITIME SECURITY IN THE GULF OF 
GUINEA 
The choice of France as the second subject of this chapter is in 
recognition of the fact that when it comes to political influence in Africa 
(and especially in the Gulf of Guinea), France is not just another 
European State – France stands alone.
37
 Centuries of French engagement 
with the Gulf of Guinea has crystallised into a network of strategic 
interrelations, including with respect to maritime security. The analysis 
below will identify France’s strategic and maritime security interest in 
the region, evaluate the framework for maritime security cooperation, 
                                                          
37
 Martin Guy, "Continuity and Change in Franco-African Relations," Journal of Morden African 
Studies 33, 1,  1995, pp. 1-20, p.6. See also Jakkie Cilliers, "Still ... France Versus the Rest in Africa?  
," African Security Review 10, 3,  2001. Jean-François Bayart, "Reflexion sur la politique africaine de 
la France," Politique Africaine 58, 1995, pp. 41-51. 
 
373 
 
and also assess the geopolitical perspectives of the French role in Gulf of 
Guinea maritime security.  
 
7.3.1  France’s Strategic and Maritime Security Interest in the 
Gulf of Guinea   
The strategic and maritime security interest of France in the Gulf of 
Guinea is encapsulated in the very description of French colonies as 
territoire d'outre mer – that is, as the “overseas territory” of France. This 
taxonomy is not just a description of relative locations; it is in fact a 
conceptual understanding of how the overseas territories are an integral 
part of France. This concept has survived into the postcolonial era, with 
the country’s foreign policy objectives constantly being adjusted to exert 
even greater control over the African continent.
38
 The oft quoted remark 
of President Francois, that “without Africa France will no longer have 
[a] history in the twenty-first century”,
39
 follows on from the assertion 
made his predecessor, that “I am dealing with African Affairs, namely 
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France's interest in Africa.”
40
 Indeed, these comments make doubly clear 
the importance of Africa to France.   
 
Therefore, the strategic gains of France’s engagement in the Gulf of 
Guinea go beyond economic and historical relations; indeed, they seek to 
maintain a leadership role for France. To demonstrate its commitment to 
the Gulf of Guinea, France has succeeded on many occasions in 
advancing EU initiatives for the development of the region, while at the 
same time monopolising the relative gains.
41
 There are, of course, 
debates and projections of a renewed French policy that would bring an 
end to this paternalistic approach to former colonies.
42
 In his 2007 
election campaign, President Sarkozy promised a major shift in foreign 
policy with respect to former French colonies.
43
 The 2010 Franco-
African Summit was seen as a likely platform for a new policy directive 
to be unveiled, but ensuing events have demonstrated that a policy 
change is unlikely to occur.
44
 While France may  be praised for echoing 
Africa’s  voice for fairness in international affairs (including a demand 
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for a permanent seat on the UN Security Council),
 45
 the central 
geopolitical message that President Sarkozy conveyed at the Summit was 
that France should speak for Africa and adopt a leadership role. Indeed, 
the change in policy that Sarkozy promised was couched in rather 
ambiguous language. Sarkozy pledged that he would “renegotiate” 
defence pacts with Africa. However, this was followed by the caveat that 
France would work with Africa to provide the “security system that 
Africa needs.” 
46
 In the three years following Sarkozy’s pledge, France 
has negotiated additional defence agreements
47
 and increased its role in 
stabilising conflicts in the Gulf of Guinea – particularly in Cote d’Ivoire, 
Mali and the Central African Republic. France has also unequivocally 
declared Nigeria’s extremist group, Boko Haram, as a threat to its 
interest in the Gulf of Guinea region, and offered assistance to Nigeria to 
counter the group’s hostile activities.
48
 
 
Hence, to engage in a discussion of France’s maritime interest in the 
Gulf of Guinea is to focus on only one half of the picture. After all, the 
desire to dominate trade and control sea routes in the region underpinned 
colonial rule.
49
 France is still a major trading partner in the Gulf of 
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Guinea, accounting for a quarter of EU investment in Africa in 2008, and 
it is also a recipient of half of Africa’s investment in Europe.
50
 The 
analysis in chapter two has also highlighted France’s interest in Gulf of 
Guinea oil and gas resources, as well as the region’s fisheries resources.  
 
Maintaining order, control and security in the Gulf of Guinea should 
therefore be both a necessity for France and a demonstration of its status. 
The optimal foreign policy for France would be to assume a leadership 
role in all matters of security in Africa, with the country’s ideal fallback 
position being not to relinquish that leadership role in any of its former 
colonies.
51
 It also needs to be emphasised that preserving this leadership 
role on maritime security, as well as other matters, is not just what 
France seeks for itself. It fits into the broader geopolitical interest of 
political leadership, particularly in Francophone Gulf of Guinea, where 
States seek to maintain a strong relationship with France. 
52
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7.3.2 France’s Framework for Maritime Security Cooperation in 
the Gulf of Guinea  
France has existing defence pacts and cooperative relationships with all 
Francophone States in the Gulf of Guinea.
53
 The Accord de Cooperation 
is the framework agreement protecting France’s strategic interest in the 
region. The document also forms the basis for defence and security 
assistance.
54
  The Accords generally uphold the authority of the 
Francophone State over internal security and external defence, with the 
proviso that France may be requested to play a role in both.
55
 The 
Accords also underpin maritime cooperative initiatives, such as the 
establishment of the naval academy in Cote d’Ivoire, which serves as a 
training institution for all surrounding Francophone States.
56
 
Furthermore, the Accords provide for access to ports and the permanent 
deployment of forces (mission de presénce), including naval 
components.
57
  
 
Following an increase in piratical incidents in the Gulf of Guinea in 
2012, France deployed a surveillance frigate to the region and announced 
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anti-piracy training with Benin and Togo.
58
 Earlier reports of a planned 
sea exercise with Gulf of Guinea States (including Ghana), signalled that 
France intended to expand its maritime security partnership in the 
region.
59
  
 
Beyond these measures, however, there is very little output from France 
towards enhancing maritime security in the region, both in terms of a 
precise policy framework and specific financial and logistics support. In 
an address to the UN Security Council in 2012, France promised to 
spend US$ 1.6 million to reform the maritime security sectors of Togo, 
Benin and Ghana under a Priority Solidarity Fund.
60
 Nonetheless, France 
still commands a privileged position in charting maritime security 
cooperation in the Gulf of Guinea. Therefore, any attempt - whether 
actual or perceived - to dislodge that leadership role will have 
implications for the progress of maritime security cooperation in the 
Gulf of Guinea. These dynamics are analysed in the evaluation of the 
challenges and limitations to external engagements in Part 7.7.   
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7.4 UNITED KINGDOM AND GULF OF GUINEA MARITIME 
SECURITY 
This section will examine the maritime security interest of the United 
Kingdom (UK) in the Gulf of Guinea, and also assess the country’s 
maritime security cooperative framework for the region. 
 
7.4.1 Status of the United Kingdom as a Maritime Nation and its 
Strategic Interest in Maritime Security  
The status of the UK as a maritime nation is incontrovertible in both 
historical and contemporary terms. Indeed, this maritime destiny 
underscored the UK’s Mare clausum crusade in 1635. As illustrated in 
chapter three, the Mare clausum principle was advocated by the UK to 
justify its exercise of exclusive sovereignty over the belt water 
contiguous to its coast for security purposes. In essence, therefore, the 
principle of Mare clausum is in direct opposition to Mare librum (the 
freedom of the seas concept), which was the dominant principle of the 
time. However, in the negotiations leading up to the adoption of 
UNCLOS in 1982 (in which the vicissitudes of Mare clausum were to 
find expression in an extended territorial sea and vested rights in the 
EEZ), the UK was again worried that the evolving regime would result 
in the “nationalization of roughly two-thirds of the earth’s surface.”
61
 
Although these two policy positions appear contradictory at first glance, 
they are both understandable and reconcilable from the perspective of 
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maritime nations.  Mare clausum was championed to secure the 
immediate sea boundaries of the UK (in addition to other strategic 
reasons).
62
 But the antithesis to Mare clausum, the concept of Mare 
librum, was equally crucial for British maritime trade and future naval 
power.
 63
  
 
Today, as in earlier times, the UK is a dominant maritime nation. Indeed, 
London is the citadel of a maritime industry spanning ship ownership, 
ship operators, cargo interests, insurance companies, financial 
institutions and maritime security companies. The contribution of the 
maritime industry to the GDP of the UK in 2011 has been estimated at 
£31.7 billion.
64
 Moreover, this figure may well represent just a fraction 
of the economic gains that the UK makes from the sea. Therefore, while 
the UK, like any other nation, has a vested interest in its own maritime 
domain, the security of the world’s oceans (and the corresponding 
maritime activities that ensure this security), constitute the real strategic 
interest of the UK. The 2009 UK National Security Strategy has, in fact, 
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identified this particular interest as needing protection in order for the 
continued prosperity of the UK and its citizens.
65
   
 
7.4.2 United Kingdom Cooperative Maritime Strategy for the Gulf 
of Guinea  
Compared to France, the UK has an arguably less paternalistic posture 
and interest in its colonial heritage.
66
 Nonetheless, there are still very 
important strategic interests for the UK to protect in the Gulf of Guinea, 
including oil and gas resources (which have been analysed in chapter 
two). The 2010 UK Defence and Security Review outlined a range of 
risks in the region, including political instability and piracy, which 
endanger UK strategic interests and require the adoption of effective 
response measures.
67
 In this respect, the core requirements would be to 
protect critical offshore infrastructure and facilitate the uninterrupted 
supply of oil and gas resources from the region into the global market.
68
 
The Defence and Security Review also highlighted drug trafficking and 
other transnational organised crimes as security threats that need to be 
addressed in the Gulf of Guinea.
69
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With the above strategic and maritime security interests, the UK is 
expected to contribute to maritime security in the Gulf of Guinea in both 
specific and comprehensive ways. Indeed, for many years the UK has 
provided capacity building services for EEZ management through the 
Ghana Armed Forces Staff College, with participation from other 
African States.
70
 The UK also supports military training and capacity 
building initiatives in Sierra Leone and Gambia.
71
 However, these 
initiatives fall short of the interventions required to address the maritime 
security situation in the region.  
 
Recent reports have, however, indicated that the UK (in partnership with 
the private sector), is establishing a Gulf of Guinea Maritime Trade 
Information Sharing Centre (MTISC), which will be stationed in 
Ghana.
72
 Moreover, two Royal Navy ships, HMS Dauntless and HMS 
Rover, are said to have conducted patrols along the Gulf of Guinea in 
2012, providing training to navies and coastguards in the process.
73
  The 
same source has also indicated that the UK is providing assistance to 
ECOWAS to develop a cooperative maritime security strategy.
74
 These 
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interventions may mark the beginning of the UK bringing strong assets 
and capabilities to the maritime security table – assets and capabilities 
which the 2009 National Security Strategy touted as being available 
within the UK defence system to address security threats within and 
outside the UK.
75
 
 
7.5 THE EUROPEAN UNION AND GULF OF GUINEA 
MARITIME SECURITY  
Although the analysis in the last two Parts has extensively covered two 
key States of the EU - France and the UK, it is still important to examine 
the relationship between the EU and the Gulf of Guinea in the context of 
maritime security cooperation. There are multiple reasons why this is 
crucial, but two factors will help illustrate the point. First, analysing the 
maritime security objectives of the EU in the Gulf of Guinea will reflect 
the wider European approach. Second, the EU has institutional maritime 
relations with Gulf of Guinea States, so it is necessary to assess the 
corresponding contribution that the EU brings to maritime security 
cooperation in the region.  
 
7.5.1 Maritime Interest of the European Union in the Gulf of 
Guinea 
The analysis in the previous chapters has outlined the maritime security 
interest of the EU in the Gulf of Guinea. Chapter two discussed both 
energy security and access to fisheries resources. Chapter three 
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examined the mutual interest of the EU and Gulf of Guinea States in 
combating transnational organised crime (with a particular emphasis on 
illicit narcotics trafficking and illegal migration by sea). Chapter four 
demonstrated the global impact of piratical attacks, while chapter five 
reinforced concerns surrounding illegal migration by examining the 
complications encountered by the EU and Gulf of Guinea States in 
seeking to harmonise their respective legal frameworks. The next section 
will therefore focus on the cooperative strategies, frameworks and 
contributions of the EU to maritime security in the Gulf of Guinea.  
 
7.5.2 EU Maritime Security Cooperative Framework in the Gulf of 
Guinea 
In 2005, the Chiefs of the European Navies (CHENS) released a 
strategic document titled “Vision for the Future Role of European 
Maritime Forces”.
76
 Although the document identified Sub-Saharan 
Africa as a region where EU maritime forces will play a role in the 
future, it fell short of identifying how the contemplated responses will be 
executed.
77
 In 2010 a second concept paper was released, highlighting 
new areas and regions where piratical attacks and acts of maritime 
violence are on the increase, thus posing a serious threat to global 
shipping.
78
 Although the Gulf of Guinea was not explicitly mentioned in 
the paper, the profile and description of the piratical activities closely 
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resemble those in the Gulf of Guinea region. In the same year, the 
European Council called on the EU to actively contribute to a stable and 
secure global maritime environment.
79
 
 
These developments can be viewed as antecedents to the Critical 
Maritime Routes in the Gulf of Guinea (CRIMGO) project, which was 
launched by the EU in January 2013.
80
 The €4.5 million project is 
designed to improve safety and security off the coasts of seven Gulf of 
Guinea States – namely, Benin, Cameroon, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, 
Nigeria, Sâo Tomé and Principe and Togo. As the analysis in chapter 
four has shown, the CRIMGO project covers both traditional and 
emerging high-risk piracy areas in the Gulf of Guinea.
81
 Therefore, the 
programme has the potential to enhance the counter-piracy capacity of 
Gulf of Guinea States. It is also appropriate that the scheme comes under 
the thematic Instrument for Stability (IfS), which links issues of 
instability and transnational threats with development concerns. The EU 
Africa Peace Facility (APF) that supports stability programmes in Africa 
(including peacekeeping missions), also falls within the ambit of the 
IfS.
82
 Thus, by locating the CRIMGO project and APF in one thematic 
instrument, the EU and Gulf of Guinea States have an opportunity to 
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synergise policy responses, thereby increasing the prospects for success 
of the two projects. 
 
 
 
However, despite these purported strengths, there are major limitations 
associated with the substantive outcomes of the CRIMGO project and its 
conceptual underpinnings. This is factored into the analysis of the 
challenges and limitations of international support for maritime 
cooperation in the last part of the chapter.  
 
7.6 CHINA AND GULF OF GUINEA MARITIME SECURITY 
China features prominently in almost every discussion on evolving 
patterns in the global community. Thus, an analysis of future maritime 
security cooperation in the Gulf of Guinea must take into account the 
role that China could play. Indeed, as the summary below shows, China 
has strategic interests to protect in the region. 
 
7.6.1 China’s Maritime Security Interest in the Gulf of Guinea. 
China’s offshore energy interest in the Gulf of Guinea, as well as its 
fishing interest in the region, has been extensively outlined in chapters 
two and three. These interests, together with trade and other economic 
activities, constitute vital interests that can be endangered by increasing 
insecurity in the Gulf of Guinea. Indeed, after claiming responsibility for 
a bomb explosion near an oil refinery in 2006, the leadership of MEND 
warned the Chinese government and its oil companies to stay away from 
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the Niger Delta region. The militant organisation further stated that the 
Chinese government would be “placing its citizens in [MEND’s] line of 
fire” by investing in Niger Delta oil resources.
83
 
 
It is thus logical to expect China to have a strategic outlook on Gulf of 
Guinea maritime security, and in particular, to contribute towards 
enhancing maritime security in the region. However, unlike the other 
external actors that have been discussed in this chapter, China has unique 
challenges in seeking inclusion in the evolving maritime security 
initiatives in the Gulf of Guinea. In a strategic context, therefore, these 
difficulties translate as challenges to maritime security cooperation in the 
Gulf of Guinea. Since these issues cannot be ignored, it is important to 
understand the context within which China’s difficulties arise before 
analysing the geostrategic ramifications of China’s position in detail.  
 
Generally, the contribution of a non-regional State in enhancing 
maritime security in the Gulf of Guinea may take one of four forms: 
training and military exercises, defence and security agreements, 
logistics support, or the execution and enforcement of maritime security 
rights under international law. The analysis in this chapter has shown 
that the maritime security engagements of the US, France, the UK and 
the EU are based on these channels. For example, the partnerships and 
engagements of the US and France are generally based on the first three 
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options, while the fourth option is invoked when the tides of insecurity 
are high and key strategic interests are at risk. But where does this leave 
China? How does China relate to these four options? 
 
7.6.2 China’s Opportunities and Challenges in Participating in Gulf 
of Guinea Cooperative Frameworks  
Although China does have general military-to-military relations with 
some Gulf of Guinea States,
84
 it has no defence or security arrangements 
in the region. Indeed, the naval component of China’s military, the 
People’s Liberation Army-Navy (PLA-Navy), has neither a sea presence 
nor a record of joint training exercises in the Gulf of Guinea.
85
 Recent 
counter-piracy deployments off the coast of Somalia have provided an 
opportunity for the PLA-Navy to gain experience on longer deployments 
and multilateral operations on African shores, but this represents an 
exception to the prevailing situation.
86
 Furthermore, it is unlikely that the 
status quo will change anytime soon, mainly because of interoperability 
issues like doctrinal differences, as well as language and cultural 
barriers. 
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China may, however, resort to logistics support or sales as a means of 
getting a footing in the Gulf of Guinea maritime security cooperative 
framework. Indeed, there are signs that this option is already being 
vigorously pursued. At a general level, China’s defence sales to Africa 
have increased in the last two decades,
87 
due largely to the low cost of 
hardware and attractive terms of payment.
88
 In 2006 the Nigerian Navy 
ordered maritime patrol vessels from China, and in 2011 Ghana accepted 
delivery of four Chinese-built vessels. China also donated a riverine craft 
to DR Congo in 2011, and is reported to have offered a grant to Benin 
for the purchase of patrol boats.
89
 And although there are debates 
surrounding the quality of Chinese defence equipment, these ‘deliveries’ 
represent an important contribution to maritime security regime building, 
particularly if one considers the poor state of logistics in the Gulf of 
Guinea region.
90
  
 
Logistics sales and support cannot, however, be a comprehensive 
solution to the types of threats the Chinese interest is exposed to in the 
Gulf of Guinea. A Chinese flagged ship carrying strategic cargo for 
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China may be hijacked by pirates in the Gulf of Guinea. How will China 
be able to protect its interest in this scenario? This makes it imperative 
for China to explore possibly the last remaining avenue for protecting its 
interest – the exercise of enforcement rights under international law. 
However, this option presents fundamental legal and geostrategic 
challenges for China.   
 
As analysed in chapter four, international law recognises the right of 
States to combat piracy on the high seas, and by extension, in the EEZ. 
International law also grants authority to military ships to exercise the 
right of visit in the process of enforcing law and order at sea.
91
 
Furthermore, a military ship may engage in hot pursuit where the 
circumstances so permit.
92
 These rights, which are undoubtedly 
important tools for maritime security enforcement, are very much 
dependent on an equally important right or doctrine – the freedom of 
navigation. Indeed, this right is guaranteed to all States under 
international law.
93
 And although the specific rights mentioned above 
cannot be exercised in the territorial sea, military vessels can deter 
criminal activities (including piratical attacks) in the territorial sea 
simply by exercising the right of innocent passage.
94
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However, the freedom of the seas doctrine, and by extension the doctrine 
of freedom of navigation, may be regarded as hegemonic tools,
 95
 with 
States ascribing to this view possibly limiting the passage rights of other 
States off their coasts.
96
 Indeed, this accords with China’s strategic view, 
with China opposing some military activities in the EEZ, and taking the 
additional position that sovereignty jurisdiction in the territorial sea 
entitles China to receive notification for the passage of military vessels.
97
 
Strategically, therefore, China will shy away from prosecuting any 
maritime security enforcement rights off the coast of the Gulf of Guinea, 
as doing so would contradict its legal and strategic position on the law of 
the sea. It is equally unlikely that China will advocate freedom of 
navigation as the basis for maritime security measures in the Gulf of 
Guinea, because again this would not be in conformity with its core 
strategic principles, especially the policies of non-interference, peaceful 
rise, as well as the principle of development without hegemony.
98
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Therefore, if the increasing piratical incidents in the Gulf of Guinea pose 
a major threat to China’s interest, China will have to seek out options 
outside the four broad tools analysed above to meet its maritime security 
objectives. A possible solution for China would be to advocate for some 
form of UN authorised enforcement, similar to the UN Security Council 
resolutions for Somalia (which gave other States a mandate to implement 
counter-piracy measures). However, this course of action raises another 
set of strategic difficulties for China. The Chinese leadership has 
repeatedly emphasised that the participation of PLA-Navy in combating 
piracy off the Somali coast was a discharge of China’s UN obligation 
and not an attempt to secure its own hegemonic interest.
99
 These 
statements are meant to convey the message that China is acting 
consistently with its peaceful rise doctrine. Therefore, from a policy 
perspective, it is unlikely that China will publicly advocate for any UN 
authorised operations, although such a course of action would be in 
China’s best interests.   
 
It is argued that pragmatism will lead China down the path of silent 
diplomacy in three ways. First, China may covertly push for a UN-led 
initiative that prescribes counter-piracy measures. This opaque 
diplomacy will help disguise China’s policy shift. For Gulf of Guinea 
States, however, authorised intervention by the UN should be the least 
preferable option, as it epitomises the failure of national and regional 
efforts. Authorised intervention could also be viewed as a hegemonic 
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tool by some States, especially Nigeria. China would thus need to mask 
its policy moves very carefully to avoid losing friends in the region. A 
second option would be for China to collaborate more closely with US 
and other Western States, or at the very least be less critical of their 
policies in the Gulf of Guinea, even if such action may look hegemonic. 
By so doing, China may be able to share in the dividends of Western 
initiatives without being accused of jettisoning its own geostrategic 
principles. Thirdly, China may support efforts by Gulf of Guinea States 
to adopt a regional solution in the hope that the regional approach may 
make room for the participation of non-regional States, including China. 
But whereas Western States will be able to substantially exploit regional 
approaches through historical relations and alliances, China has little 
room to manoeuvre in this regard.  
 
It remains unclear how a possible Sino-Gulf of Guinea maritime security 
partnership would evolve beyond logistics support. But there is certainly 
realpolitik at hand, and China will continue to find itself in a difficult 
situation should piratical attacks continue to increase in the Gulf of 
Guinea. The problematic nature of China involvement in the region’s 
maritime security framework will also affect the evolving geostrategic 
environment.  
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7.7 CHALLENGES AND LIMITATIONS OF 
INTERNATIONAL CONTRIBUTION TO MARITIME 
SECURITY IN THE GULF OF GUINEA 
The analysis thus far has centred on the contribution that external actors 
have made (and continue to make) to maritime security in the Gulf of 
Guinea. The discussion has also identified issues and challenges that 
may impact on the participation of particular actors in the evolution of 
maritime security cooperation in the region.  
 
This section examines the broad challenges and contending currents 
associated with the participation and contribution of external actors to 
maritime security regime building in the Gulf of Guinea. Four important 
themes underpin the analysis: (i) the geostrategic undercurrents between 
external actors; (ii) the inadequacy of external support for maritime 
security in the Gulf of Guinea; (iii) the selective approach to maritime 
security adopted by some external actors; and (iv) the governance-based 
obligations of Gulf of Guinea States regarding maritime security. While 
the focus of the discussion will be on the selected actors, the issues and 
challenges under investigation are capable of being extrapolated, albeit 
with modification, to cover actors outside the scope of this chapter.  
  
7.7.1   Multiplicity and Coordination  
The effectiveness of maritime security outcomes depends on 
coordination, not only in regard to regional efforts, but also in respect of 
support services provided by third-party sources. Indeed, external actors, 
donor agencies and relevant international organisations should engage 
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with Gulf of Guinea States on a harmonised platform. However, the 
analysis of the role and contribution of external actors in the region 
points to the unpacking of initiatives with little or no coordination. The 
likely result will thus be a duplication of effort and a less than optimal 
utilisation of resources.  
 
It is tempting to view the multiple interventions by numerous actors as 
an opportunity for Gulf of Guinea States to build capacity. However, the 
reality may be far from ideal. Multiple interventions tend to overstretch 
national administrators, who are then required to respond to and 
implement diverse partnerships. This ultimately overcrowds national 
policy, adversely affecting maritime security decision-making and 
coordination.  
 
7.7.2   Cooperation, Compromise or Competition?  
The assessment in the preceding section suggests the need for a 
comprehensive approach to the intervention of the international 
community on maritime security issues. But as the analysis in chapter six 
has shown, the regional situation itself is less than cohesive, and this 
may partly account for the coordination deficit between external 
partnerships. However, the lack of coordination could equally be due to 
differences in the strategic interests of the actors, or even competing 
geostrategic objectives. Therefore, it is important to explore this subject 
in some detail.   
 
396 
 
Drawing on the analysis of the maritime security activities of the five 
actors (the US, France, the EU, the UK and China), as well as their 
corresponding geopolitical relationship with the Gulf of Guinea, it is 
possible that France is in geo-strategic competition with both its fellow 
EU States and the US. This puts France at the centre of maritime security 
geopolitics in the Gulf of Guinea. Thus, it is imperative to assess 
whether France will serve as an enabler or an obstacle to maritime 
security cooperation in the region. To phrase the question more directly: 
will France view the maritime activities of the US and the UK in the 
Gulf of Guinea as an opportunity or an impediment?  
 
In asking the above question, the author is not seeking to discount the 
significance of some important ongoing cooperative initiatives in the 
region. Indeed, the issue is being raised with full awareness of the 
increasing cooperation between France, the UK and the US on issues of 
peacekeeping in Africa. Such cooperation has facilitated the 
implementation of the US African Contingency Operations Training and 
Assistance (ACOTA) Program, which was initially launched in 1996 as 
the African Crisis Response Initiative (ACRI).
100
 The relationship 
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between the three States has also led to joint military exercises in the 
Gulf of Guinea region, including Exercise Guidimakha, which focuses 
on peacekeeping and counter-insurgency,
101
 and Exercise Obangame 
Express, an annual maritime security enforcement exercise, the most 
recent of which was conducted in February 2013.
102
 On several 
occasions French personnel have also embarked on US ships deployed 
for the African Partnership Station (APS) in the Gulf of Guinea. Finally, 
one may point to counter-piracy operations in the Indian Ocean (where 
Western States have operated under the umbrella of Joint Task Force 
51), as further evidence of France’s willingness to cooperate with fellow 
Western States regarding maritime security in the region.
 103
  
 
The above examples of cooperation do not, however, repudiate the 
possibility of competition between France and other external actors. As 
the discussion in this chapter and elsewhere has shown, maritime 
security co-operation may serve as a conduit for attaining wider strategic 
interests. Thus, when it comes to charting a course for maritime security 
in the Gulf of Guinea, competition cannot be discounted. Indeed, the 
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contest is not so much about whether there is room for all actors to 
participate; it is chiefly about who should lead and who should follow. 
As analysed earlier, France has always taken the lead on security issues 
in Africa, and in 2013 France spearheaded multinational interventions 
into Mali and the Central African Republic. Therefore, it is extremely 
unlikely that France would willingly defer its leadership role when it 
comes to African waters to any other State. On the contrary, history has 
shown that France will seek to maintain its control in the region if it has 
the capacity to do so.  
 
A decade ago, critical commentaries on international relations suggested 
that the increased integration of France into both the EU and the North 
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) would reduce France’s unilateral 
security engagement and quest for leadership in Africa.
104
 Indeed, the 
1998 Saint Malo Declaration between France and the UK was 
interpreted as having two cardinal objectives.
105
 First, to motivate France 
to share defence and security roles in Africa with the UK, and second, as 
a precursor to the implementation of the Treaty of Amsterdam, which 
sought create a Common Defence and Security Policy for the EU.
106
 
However, evidence that France would not share its entrenched security 
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role in Africa with the UK would soon become apparent.
107
 In 2002 
France adopted a domestic policy framework on security and 
peacekeeping in Africa. And although the framework provided for the 
coordination of military action in Africa between France and other EU 
States, decisions concerning security and peacekeeping in Africa were 
reserved for France alone.
108
 This affirms the view that despite an overt 
commitment to policy revision, cooperation and compromise, France is 
likely to revert to unilateral action when it comes to security policy in 
Africa. The St Malo Declaration itself was perhaps a strategic move by 
Paris to balance the increasing attention of Washington on Africa, and to 
also buoy its declining post-Cold War strength.
109
  
 
 
Thus, if France can prevent other Western States from playing a 
significant role in Gulf of Guinea maritime security, it will most likely 
do so. However, with AFRICOM assuming a formidable capability and 
presence in the region, the military power and underlying strategic 
objectives of the US can no longer be curtailed.
110
 Pursuing regional 
maritime security cooperation is a costly endeavour, and realistically, it 
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is the US that has the personnel and resources to carry out such an 
operation. It can be inferred from the US programmes and engagements 
examined earlier in this chapter that Washington is poised for the top 
leadership position in Africa among extra-regional players.
111
  This is 
where the US may be viewed as undoing France in its pré carré (sphere 
of influence). 
 
According to the renowned Franco-Africa relations expert, Jean-François 
Bayart, France has always feared the undesirable effect of American 
influence in Africa.
112
 This fear may have become a reality for France, 
because although existing defence and security agreements (Accord de 
Cooperation) provide significant leverage for France, the absence of 
similar agreements cannot completely constrain US seapower in the Gulf 
of Guinea. From a legal perspective, the US can rely on international law 
rights and obligations (including the freedom of navigation and the duty 
to supress piracy) to pursue its maritime security objectives. Logistically, 
the US also has the platform and resources to sustain its security 
initiatives, and more importantly, international legitimacy from emerging 
UN Security Council Resolutions. Furthermore, the inability of Gulf of 
Guinea States to safeguard their own region, coupled with the US-led 
Somali counter-piracy experiment, are veritable public opinion tools for 
the US.
113
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This evolving geostrategic environment can be viewed as a contest 
between a regional power whose presence on land is undisputable, and a 
global power that is forward-deployed in the littorals. All things being 
equal, Paris will remain committed to ECOWAS and ECCAS as 
platforms of action, while hoping that Washington keeps its burgeoning 
maritime security influence at an even keel. The diplomatic language 
from the Elysée Summit for Peace and Security in Africa will be that 
Gulf of Guinea States should be allowed to find a regional solution. As 
Mr Araud of France asserted during a UN Security Council debate: “it is 
up to [Gulf of Guinea] States…to identify a regional strategy
.”114
 Of 
course, if France has any involvement in this “regional strategy”, it will 
undoubtedly involve France in a stewardship role. If, however, the battle 
for the control of regional institutions falls into the hands of the US, the 
most plausible policy choice for France would be to eschew a structured 
approach to regional maritime security cooperation in favour of more 
flexible arrangements. Indeed, in a US-France leadership struggle, 
France would likely seek to keep its continental authority intact, or at the 
very least secure its Francophone enclave.  
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However, it is important to note that there are other States that may 
challenge the superiority of France in the Gulf of Guinea. For example, 
the UK has its own provinces in the region, Nigeria is a sub-regional 
power to contend with, while China may possibly gain some ground in 
the very near future. It is in this way that the convergence of maritime 
security interests, national strategic objectives, as well as geopolitical 
counterbalancing can hold back the progress of regional maritime 
security cooperation and the delivery of human security imperatives. 
 
7.7.3   In Search of Inclusive Maritime Security 
The analysis in the last section focused on the geostrategic aspects of 
maritime security cooperation in the Gulf of Guinea. But even where the 
discussion is confined to maritime security simpliciter, there are still 
important edges to smooth out. “Maritime security” means different 
things to different partnership players. As a result, it is important to 
deconstruct the evolving cooperative initiatives so that the security 
inclinations of the various actors are made apparent.  
 
Although the stated objective of the EU CRIMGO programme is to 
address maritime security concerns in Critical Maritime Routes in the 
Gulf of Guinea, the coasts of Guinea and Sierra Leone (which are high-
risk piracy areas) are not included in the project.
115
 It is also curious that 
the rich fisheries area of the Gulf of Guinea (from Senegal to Liberia), 
where the EU has many fishing access agreements, has been excluded 
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from the project.
116
 Indeed, this region is synonymous with IUU fishing 
activities.
117
 It is worth restating that in 2012 depleting fisheries stocks 
led to threats by Senegalese fishermen to resort to piracy if the 
government failed to address IUU fishing and foreign fishing 
licensing.
118
  
 
The analysis in chapter three has demonstrated the overlap between 
sustainable fisheries, fisheries access and licensing arrangements, food 
security, maritime security, and the stability of the Gulf of Guinea 
region.
119
 Indeed, the EU should be interested in addressing these links, 
as EU fishing access arrangements form a significant part of the 
equation. However, the geographic scope of the CRIMGO project 
unfortunately stops short of that sub-region. Moreover, a good number of 
States in that enclave, particularly Liberia, Sierra Leone, Guinea and 
Guinea Bissau, suffer multiple setbacks – poverty, weak institutions and 
drug trafficking. If one considers that the EU thematic Instrument for 
Stability is the funding source for the CRIMGO initiative,
120
 it is rather 
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surprising that the project is not seeking to synchronise maritime security 
concerns with the broader issue of regional stability and development.  
 
The above questions demonstrate that something is amiss in the security 
objectives of the CRIMGO project. Further interrogation is warranted by 
a reflection on the project’s name – Critical Maritime Routes in the Gulf 
of Guinea. Compared to the rest of the Gulf of Guinea, there is nothing 
uniquely “critical” about the “maritime routes” that fall within the scope 
of the project, except that the relevant States have rich deposits of oil and 
gas, and as a result many oil tankers use the sea routes.
121
 Therefore, it 
appears that the “critical” concerns that the CRIMGO project has been 
designed to address are energy security concerns - from both the 
perspective of offshore installations and oil vessels. This deduction 
should in no way undervalue the fact that addressing any type of 
maritime security threat in the Gulf of Guinea is worthwhile. 
Nonetheless, it is essential for policy makers in the Gulf of Guinea to 
have a clear understanding of what security objectives are being pursued, 
as well as an understanding of the overarching partnership framework 
and the ultimate purpose of the relevant security outcomes.  
 
A review of the regional dialogue on maritime security suggests that 
energy security takes top priority, followed by the protection of shipping. 
As demonstrated in chapter six, this accounts for MOWCA and the GGC 
being priority partners with some external actors.
122
 Chapter six also 
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highlighted the fact that the Code of Conduct adopted by the Heads of 
State and Governments of ECOWAS and ECCAS is largely geared 
towards addressing piratical attacks. This selective approach to security 
has the potential to leave the Gulf of Guinea without durable security in 
other critical areas, such as food security..  
 
It is also important to have a system in place that defines the priorities 
underpinning cooperative initiatives. For example, the maritime security 
interest of the US spans multiple areas - from counter-piracy to 
combating the proliferation of WMD. However, not all the maritime 
security interests presented by the US as requiring cooperation may be of 
immediate interest to Gulf of Guinea States. This may not sound too 
problematic when viewed in isolation, but where Gulf of Guinea States 
are required to fund part of the cost of security, questions may arise as to 
the direction and justification for the funding, as well as the ultimate gain 
which is being sought. Indeed, even if governments do not raise these 
issues, it is likely that civil society activists will. There is thus a need to 
clarify the content and scope of maritime security objectives for the 
purpose of maritime security cooperation.  
  
7.7.4   Inadequate Logistics and Financial Support  
While maritime security cooperation is arguably allowing some external 
actors to pursue wider strategic interests, there is no corresponding 
allocation of logistical support or funds to address maritime security 
threats. As shown in chapter six, the capability of navies and coastguards 
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across the region is minimal. Therefore, the expectation of regional 
leaders and institutions was that external support would be forth coming. 
This was one of the factors that ballasted the MOWCA coastguard 
initiative for years, despite its apparent lack of authority for the type of 
security enterprise it sought to pursue.
123
 The interest of some national 
heads of shipping administrations in the MOWCA initiative waned 
following a meeting in Accra, Ghana, in December 2011, where external 
partners made no commitment to fund or provide logistical support for 
the initiative, and indeed the presentation by the IMO ended with the 
remark: “African solution to African opportunities…[It’s] investment not 
aid.”
124
  
 
The ECCAS Protocol on maritime security equally stipulates donor 
support as one of the funding sources for joint patrols and other security 
activities.
125
 However, evidence that the anticipated financial support has 
not been forthcoming can be found in the financial commitments that 
have been made to date. France has pledged only US$1.6 million to 
support maritime security,
126
 while funding for the EU CRIMGO project 
(which supports seven Gulf of Guinea States), is just €4.5 million. This 
amount is just a fraction of the annual cost of financing the Nigerian-
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Benin joint patrols (code-named Operation Prosperity), which has been 
estimated by the UN at US$112 million.
127
  
 
Despite this dire financial predicament, the expectation and call for 
external support persists. The Summit of the Heads of State and 
Government of ECOWAS-ECCAS, held in June 2013, concluded with 
an appeal to international donors and Western governments for financial 
assistance.
128
 The words of the Ivorian President were very instructive in 
this regard: “I urge the international community to show the same 
firmness in the Gulf of Guinea as displayed in the Gulf of Aden, where 
the presence of international naval forces has helped to drastically reduce 
acts of piracy,”.
129
 Of course, not all Gulf of Guinea States may share 
President Ouattara’s support for the presence of foreign naval forces in 
their waters. However, the hope is that counter-piracy initiatives in the 
Gulf of Guinea will get similar attention to those in the Indian Ocean, 
where among other projects, a Trust Fund has been established under the 
auspices of the IMO, with support from the UN.
130
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Although it remains to be seen what tangible support will be made 
available by the international community, Gulf of Guinea States need to 
understand that the Indian Ocean region presents different geostrategic 
imperatives to the Gulf of Guinea. The wide multilateral support for 
counter-piracy initiatives in the Indian Ocean is driven by the region 
being an important artery of global shipping. For this reason, the Gulf of 
Guinea cannot be expected to engender the same level of response from 
shipping interests around the world.
131
 
 
Moreover, unlike the Indian 
Ocean and the Gulf of Aden, which are shared by States on multiple 
continents, the Gulf of Guinea is largely bordered by member States of 
ECOWAS and ECCAS.  
 
Therefore, notwithstanding the interest of other States in the region, 
tangible support is likely to remain paltry, and thus Gulf of Guinea States 
will largely need to provide their own security. The unspoken view 
operating in this context can be simply stated: it is extractive resources 
that make the region strategic, and Gulf of Guinea States are already 
receiving revenue from the mining sector and gas industries. To the 
extent that exploitation of these resources can continue with minimum 
disruption, oil and gas companies (and their governments), have no 
incentive to make a financial commitment beyond what is required to 
secure the production platforms. Indeed, most offshore platforms are 
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protected by private security companies, and the costs incurred are 
treated as a tax deduction before royalty payments are made.  
 
Thus, whereas piracy in the Gulf of Guinea is substantially a by-product 
of the poor management of Niger Delta oil resources and bad 
environmental practices by some transnational oil companies, the larger 
impact of piracy is felt by the economies of Gulf of Guinea States, which 
in turn has ramifications for the security and stability of the region. 
Based on the UN estimates referred to earlier, the annual cost of anti-
piracy patrols undertaken by Benin is US$5.6million. Indeed, this is the 
base cost for such patrols, and does not take into account related 
maritime security enforcement expenses. Benin’s GDP is US$6.7billion, 
and according to the World Bank, the country ranks 108 and 112 
respectively in meeting basic health and education requirements out of 
139 States globally.
132
 Thus, spending US$5.6million on piracy patrols 
represents a huge diversion of resources for Benin, resources which 
could otherwise be directed towards other human security needs. Indeed, 
the fact that Benin needs to allocate such a vast sum to anti-piracy 
patrols may further deepen the country’s social and economic fragility. 
The international community must therefore show a greater commitment 
towards supporting maritime security in the Gulf of Guinea.  
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7.7.5 The Overlap between National Security, Governance 
Challenges and Sovereignty  
The call by the Ivorian President, Alassane Ouattara, for a foreign naval 
presence in the Gulf of Guinea is not an isolated case. A similar plea was 
made by the President of Equatorial Guinea following the seaborne 
attack on his Presidential Palace in 2009. Indeed, the President warned 
the US and Europe not to ignore the growing number of “attacks by 
rebels and smugglers” off the Gulf of Guinea.
133
 Then, in 2011, President 
Boni Yaya of Benin wrote to the UN asking for help to fight piracy off 
the coast of Benin.
 134
 This can be interpreted in the same light as the 
earlier demands.  
 
The above comments by leaders of Gulf of Guinea States prompt several 
questions. They include: (i) do the leaders fully understand the 
sovereignty implications of having a foreign naval presence in their 
waters?; (ii) are the leaders ready to commit to transparent and open 
government if such a demand is made by the international community as 
a condition for addressing insecurity in the region?; (iii) if the results 
achieved by the foreign naval force do not meet the expectations (or 
serve the interests) of Gulf of Guinea States, will the leaders of such 
States object to the navy’s continued presence on the basis of national 
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security concerns?; and (iv) will other Gulf of Guinea States support the 
calls made by the leaders of Côte d'Ivoire, Equatorial Guinea and Benin? 
These are all legitimate issues to investigate.  
 
It is argued that requests for a foreign naval presence are driven by short 
term interests, and that such forces are unlikely to enjoy long term 
support from Gulf of Guinea leaders, including those leaders who asked 
for the support in the first instance. In this regard, it should be noted that 
the deployment of foreign navies off the coast of Somalia was made 
possible by the fact that the Somali State was, and still is, in a state flux. 
It may even be argued that the foreign naval presence was viewed 
positively by the Transitional Federal Government because it provided 
the government with both security and legitimacy (the latter being 
seriously contested by opposing forces). This notion of embracing 
elements of foreign security that may, in reality, impinge on a State’s 
sovereignty, but nonetheless serve domestic security or political 
objectives, can be situated on a conceptual spectrum of securitisation
135
 
to omnibancing.
136
 While the traditional discourse on balance of power 
issues focuses on strategic alliances as against external threats, 
omnibancing looks at how alliances may be used to secure external or 
domestic objectives, with the latter being the essential motivation.
137
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It is noted that the call for foreign anti-piracy forces by Gulf of Guinea 
leaders may not be intended to secure political gains. Nonetheless, the 
propensity and eagerness of the political leadership to sacrifice national 
sovereignty concerns can only be a move to   secure short term goals. It 
is submitted that this policy choice is not in the interest of the 
international community, and certainly does not promote the long term 
security of citizens in the region. The reason for this can be succinctly 
stated: the policy itself is simply not durable. Indeed, Gulf of Guinea 
leaders may, in the future, raise the issue of sovereignty or use national 
security concerns as a refuge if the outcomes achieved by foreign 
security forces become unsuitable or unfavourable. For example, it is 
possible that persons connected to the corridors of political power may 
play a role in drug trafficking or transactions involving stolen oil cargo. 
Thus, when foreign States demand reliable and transparent governance, 
the political leadership may no longer be supportive of the gens d'armes 
they voluntarily invited.   
 
External forces are also unlikely to provide a sustainable solution 
because unanimous support for such forces is unlikely to be forthcoming. 
Indeed, some States in the region may have genuine sovereignty 
concerns over the presence of foreign forces in their waters, and will not 
be prepared to compromise on such a sensitive issue. For example, not 
only would Nigeria view a foreign presence in its waters as undermining 
its power, it would also consider such an arrangement as tantamount to 
Nigeria being asked to submit its national security to foreign decision 
making. As analysed in chapter 4, the ravaging Niger Delta piracy 
emanates from Nigeria’s governance deficit and national security 
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bargain. Nigeria would thus be sensitive to any process that seeks to set 
the insurgency back on its previous course, with the State also looking 
unkindly on the calls made by other leaders in the region for a foreign 
naval presence. Hence, such calls have the potential to affect intra-
regional trust and cooperation.  
 
Despite foreign security forces not being a feasible option, the situation 
in the Gulf of Guinea poses a serious threat to regional and global 
security. Nigeria must therefore commit to good governance and seek an 
effective response to maritime security. So too must other States. This is 
because the nexus between poor governance and insecurity in the region 
goes beyond piracy. As shown in chapter five, inadequacies in Ghana’s 
fisheries governance has contributed to IUU fishing in the Gulf of 
Guinea, while drug trafficking thrives across the region because of 
institutional weaknesses and corruption.      
 
7.7.6  Ownership versus Privatisation of Security  
The sixth and final issue that will determine the progress of maritime 
security cooperation in the Gulf of Guinea is the question of private 
security companies (PSCs), or private maritime security companies 
(PMSCs) as they are known in the maritime sector. There are major 
differences of opinion regarding the proper use of armed PSCs on board 
vessels transiting between coastal States.
138 
This has led to tensions and 
                                                          
138
 James L. Taulbee, 'Mercenaries, Private Armies and Security Companies in Contemporary Policy', 
in Daniel N. Nelson and Laura Neack (eds), Global Society in Transition. An International Politics 
Reader, The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 2002.  
414 
 
cooperative challenges in Southeast Asia, and a similar scenario is 
unfolding in the Gulf of Guinea.
 139
 
 
Although PSCs are not entirely new, the US-led war in Iraq has placed 
them centre stage.
140
 PSCs were used by the US and other Western 
States to provide a wide range of services in Iraq, including the 
protection of critical installations and escorting high level personnel.
141
 
This was also the case in the Afghanistan war. Thus, PSCs are seen as 
part of the political economy surrounding these recent conflicts.
142
 A 
good number of PSCs are based in the US and the UK, with several 
having searchlight offices in other parts of the world.
143
 The services of 
PSCs have been adapted for the Somali coast, where they serve as armed 
guards on board commercial ships transiting the coast (thereby 
safeguarding against piracy attacks), or on board specially operated 
vessels escorting commercial ships (much like navies or coast guards).
144
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They also provide protection to offshore oil and gas companies. To 
facilitate the delivery of these services, PSCs operate a network of 
vessels at sea, some carrying large numbers of arms and personnel. In 
many respects, they resemble floating armouries, homes and offices.  
 
There are contested views on the use of PSCs. Some industry 
practitioners and security experts strongly endorse PSCs as an effective 
means of protecting ships from piratical attacks.
145
 The private shipping 
industry views PSCs as a solution to the ineffectiveness of navies and 
coastguards of developing States, and the associated problem of 
corruption in the delivery of security in those States.
146
 Some countries, 
mostly developed States but also flag States, have adopted the same 
position.
147
 These views certainly have some merit, as Navies and Coast 
Guards in the Gulf of Guinea are generally ineffective and corruption is 
a real concern.
148
 Therefore, the proponents of PSCs in the Gulf of 
Guinea have legitimate grounds for their assertions.  
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However, the concept of PSCs, and the business model surrounding their 
use, has been met with opposition in some regions.
149
 Indeed, the 
presence of armed guards in the territorial waters of some States is 
viewed as both a threat to national security and an infringement of 
sovereignty. There are also issues with transparency and public oversight 
over the operations of PSCs, with some reports accusing PSCs of 
secretly fostering further conflict and insecurity so they can remain in 
business.
150
  Governments in Southeast Asia have also blamed PSCs and 
global marine insurance companies for exaggerating maritime security 
risks for their own financial benefit. For example, some estimates put the 
cost of engaging a four-man PSC team for a journey from Asia to Europe 
through the Gulf of Aden at $50,000.
151
 Even the shipping industry is 
wary of this high cost.
152
 It is important to note, however, that the 
associated cost of engaging PSCs is ultimately borne by consumers.153 
 
There have also been some concerns with the operations of PSCs off the 
coast of Somalia. A UN report in 2012 showed that a number of PSCs 
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were in violation of an arms embargo, and in some cases were unable to 
account for the arms in their possession.
154
 This raised the possibility that 
the arms might have found their way into the hands of insurgent or rebel 
groups. Also, while PSCs have played a key role in reducing piratical 
incidents in the Indian Ocean, some experts argue that the combination 
of PSCs and naval forces creates complexity and confusion for ship 
owners, particularly those looking for simple security solutions.
155
 
 
In May 2012, the IMO adopted interim guidelines for the operation of 
PSCs, designated within the IMO as privately contracted armed security 
personnel (PCASP).
156
 The IMO guidelines are meant to chart a common 
course for the use of PSCs, thereby alleviating some of the concerns 
analysed above. Ultimately, however, the IMO process cannot interfere 
with the sovereign right of States to decide whether or not to allow PSCs 
in their territorial waters.
157
 Indeed, the announcement by the IMO that 
the guidelines had been adopted also indicated that there was opposition 
from some State representatives to the process.
158
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The above analysis shows that PSCs have the potential to either enhance 
maritime security in the Gulf of Guinea, or exacerbate national and 
human security problems. In this way, PSCs represent a double edged 
sword for governments in the region. Indeed, there are valid reasons 
supporting the use of PSCs, but their practical effect is that Navies and 
Coast Guards in the region will be less able to build capacity and skills, 
rendering them ill equipped and thus ineffective into the future. Some 
time ago, former French President Valéry Giscard d'Estaing asserted that 
France would have to take care of security in Africa because African 
States “do not have resources to build modern armed forces.” The former 
President further proclaimed that by allowing France to assume 
responsibility for Africa’s security, African governments will be able to 
“allocate resources to development projects.”
159
 More than thirty years 
have passed since former President d'Estaing uttered those words, yet 
Africa enjoys neither peace nor security, has no professional armed 
forces unit, and has not enjoyed the benefits that accompany 
development. This nullifies the hypothesis of the former French 
President.    
 
Given the opposing views on PSCs, Gulf of Guinea States need to adopt 
a clear policy position on the matter. The decision by Nigeria to suspend 
a number of PSCs has been received with disquiet by the private security 
industry.
160
 Southeast Asian States have generally contested (and in 
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some cases prevented) the operation of armed PSCs off their coasts, but 
it is important for governments to demonstrate greater responsibility in 
this area by bolstering the capability of their Navies and Coast Guards to 
forestall maritime security threats in the first place The Somali example 
has also shown that even when using their best efforts, Navies and Coast 
Guards can only patrol a limited area of the coast.
161
 Therefore, it is 
likely that ship owners will continue to rely on the services of PSCs in 
high-risk situations.
162
 This highlights the need for Gulf of Guinea States 
to clarify the role of PSCs in the evolving regional cooperative 
initiatives.   
 
There are reports of some Gulf of Guinea States making police and 
military personnel provide escort services to commercial vessels for a 
fee.
163
 This practice, whether an option extended only to commercial 
vessels or an emerging national policy, is a delicate path to tread. Indeed, 
it amounts to the commercialisation of national security services, and can 
thus seriously undermine the long term security of region. It also puts the 
purpose of States’ security institutions in dispute and disrepute, as they 
are likely to lose their public character. Indeed, the penchant of security 
institutions, especially militaries, to be in control of public affairs and to 
derive personal benefits from their public duties, has contributed 
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significantly to poor governance and human security problems in the 
Gulf of Guinea region.
164
   
 
By allowing the direct sale of security services, governments of Gulf of 
Guinea States are exacerbating governance problems and sponsoring 
unbridled corruption in security services. Indeed, such action sends the 
message that the stakes are high in the emerging maritime market. It may 
not take long for these police or military personnel to become the 
‘praetorian guards’ of the ocean, assuming leadership positions so they 
can ‘properly’ administer what will undoubtedly become a thriving 
business enterprise. Governments should steer clear from this path, and 
instead raise the required revenue through established governmental 
channels, including taxes and royalties. Part of this revenue can then be 
used to equip and build the capability of security agencies, without 
turning them into tax collectors or salesmen.   
 
7.8 CONCLUSIONS 
The analysis in this chapter has demonstrated that there are both 
opportunities and challenges associated with the involvement of the 
international community in Gulf of Guinea maritime security. External 
actors and partnerships may either enhance maritime security 
cooperation or entrench insecurity in the region. Indeed, while the Gulf 
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of Guinea epitomises “bad order at sea,” external actors may well 
represent “bad order from the sea.” 
 
To contribute to greater security in the region, external partners must do 
three things. First, they must moderate their pursuit of exclusive national 
and geostrategic interests. Second, they must be committed to a broader 
and inclusive concept of maritime security, and thirdly, they should aim 
to provide meaningful logistics support and funding to Gulf of Guinea 
States. In turn, States in the region must show greater commitment to 
improving governance and developing necessary policy structures that 
will provide clarity on their maritime security engagement with the 
international community.     
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CHAPTER EIGHT 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
This thesis has examined the state of maritime security in the Gulf of 
Guinea against the hypothesis that current approaches to maritime 
security cooperation in the region are inadequate and suffer multiple 
limitations. The strategic importance of the Gulf of Guinea dates back to 
ancient times, and indeed the region remains vital to global security and 
commerce in the contemporary world. The Gulf of Guinea is a major 
source of essential commodities for both domestic and industrial use, 
while its sea lanes connect trade between multiple continents. There is 
also a growing global focus on the Gulf of Guinea due to increasing 
offshore oil and gas discoveries, as well as international dependence on 
the region for energy security needs. The maritime profile of the Gulf of 
Guinea is also making a significant contribution to the socio-economic 
development of member States. Indeed, if the opportunities afforded by 
the region’s maritime domain are effectively harnessed, there is great 
potential for delivering positive human development outcomes for Gulf 
of Guinea citizens.  
 
There is therefore a convergence of national, regional and international 
interests in the Gulf of Guinea. The key requirement for safeguarding 
these interests is effective regional and international maritime security 
cooperation. However, as the analysis in this thesis has shown, the 
current approaches to maritime security cooperation in the Gulf of 
Guinea are inadequate. Indeed, this conclusion supports the hypothesis 
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that has been put forward in the thesis. This chapter summarises the 
findings and conclusions of the research to demonstrate that the thesis 
hypothesis has been established. First, the chapter will state five 
conclusions from the research that support the thesis hypothesis. Second, 
the chapter will summarise the evidence and findings in support of each 
conclusion. Third, the chapter will provide suggestions for enhancing 
maritime security cooperation in the Gulf of Guinea. 
 
Five key conclusions have been drawn from the thesis, supporting the 
thesis hypothesis. These are: (i) the current processes for maritime 
security cooperation in the Gulf of Guinea do not adequately address the 
multiple security threats in the region; (ii) poor governance contributes 
significantly to maritime security threats in the Gulf of Guinea, but the 
current cooperative framework does not address the land-sea nexus of 
maritime security concerns; (iii) the legal framework for maritime 
security in the Gulf of Guinea is poorly developed, and this undermines 
the effectiveness of maritime security enforcement and cooperation; (vi) 
regional maritime security cooperative processes lack coordination and 
suffer several setbacks; and, (v) international support for maritime 
security cooperation in the Gulf of Guinea is inadequate, uncoordinated, 
and possibly influenced by self-serving national interests that affect its 
overall effectiveness.  
 
Inadequate Maritime Security Processes 
The first conclusion which supports the thesis hypothesis is that the 
current processes for maritime security cooperation in the Gulf of 
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Guinea inadequately address maritime security concerns in the region. 
This conclusion has been substantiated by the findings in chapters two 
and three, and also by additional findings in chapters six and seven. 
Chapter two established the broad scope of maritime interests in the Gulf 
of Guinea – one which spans international trade and shipping, marine 
living resources, offshore oil and gas reserves, as well as the laying of 
submarine cables and pipelines. Chapter three then assessed the threats 
to maritime security in the Gulf of Guinea. This was accomplished by: 
(i) developing a conceptual framework for understanding the concept of 
maritime security; and (ii) providing an empirical analysis of maritime 
security threats in the Gulf of Guinea. The analysis has shown that while 
piracy is undoubtedly a significant maritime security concern in the Gulf 
of Guinea, there are other maritime security threats that equally 
undermine the security and stability of the region. Indeed, the analysis 
has uncovered decades of illegal trafficking in narcotic drugs into the 
Gulf of Guinea, with criminal networks constantly adjusting their modus 
operandi to sustain the drug trade.  Organised criminals also exploit the 
Gulf of Guinea maritime domain for illegal trafficking in arms, thereby 
contributing to violent crimes and conflicts, while illegal migration by 
sea leads to maritime risks and disasters. Finally, illegal fishing 
contributes to depleting fisheries resources in the Gulf of Guinea. 
However, these threats have not been addressed by UN Security Council 
Resolutions 2018 and 2039. The analysis in chapters six and seven also 
revealed that concerns over the illegal trafficking of drugs and arms, as 
well as IUU fishing activities, have not been prioritised in regional and 
international cooperative initiatives. Thus, the findings in the thesis 
support the conclusion that the current processes for maritime security 
cooperation in the Gulf of Guinea do not comprehensively address 
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maritime security threats in the region, thereby failing to provide an 
inclusive concept of security.  
 
Failure to address Poor Governance and the Land-Sea Nexus of 
Maritime Security Threats  
The second conclusion in support of the thesis hypothesis is that poor 
governance by Gulf of Guinea States contributes significantly to 
maritime security threats in the region, and that the present processes for 
cooperation do not address governance concerns. This conclusion has 
been validated by the findings in chapters three and four, and by also by 
the findings in chapter six. The analysis in chapter three has shown that 
although there are different drivers of maritime security threats in the 
Gulf of Guinea, the common factor which accounts for the pervasiveness 
of these threats is ineffective governance - particularly corruption 
involving public officials and weaknesses in law enforcement. 
Meanwhile, the case study on piracy in chapter four demonstrated that 
the growing threat of piracy in the Gulf of Guinea is substantially driven 
by Niger Delta pirates, and that the activities of these actors have been 
spurred by Niger Delta insurgency. Chapter four also highlighted the 
interrelationship between governance failures and the inception and 
proliferation of Niger Delta piracy. The analysis in chapter six, however, 
revealed that the cooperative initiatives being pursued by Gulf of Guinea 
States mainly address piratical incidents as sea-based crimes, thereby 
neglecting the governance dimension of these crimes.  
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Poorly Developed Legal Frameworks 
The third conclusion supporting the thesis hypothesis is that the requisite 
legal framework for enhancing maritime security in the Gulf of Guinea is 
poorly developed, thus presenting a setback for maritime security 
enforcement and cooperation. This conclusion rests on the findings in 
chapter five. Indeed, the chapter assessed the extent to which Gulf of 
Guinea States have ratified and implemented requisite international 
instruments that provide for the exercise of maritime security jurisdiction 
and cooperation. The conclusions reached were that Gulf of Guinea 
States have generally failed to ratify the relevant international 
instruments, and that in cases where the instruments have been ratified, 
many of the States have failed to implement them into their domestic 
legal and policy framework. For example, only Cote d’Ivoire has ratified 
the 1988 SUA Convention and its three Protocols. Moreover, despite 
illegal trafficking in weapons contributing to instability in the Gulf of 
Guinea, nine States are yet to ratify the Protocol against Trafficking in 
Weapons, which was adopted in 2001. Furthermore, although UNCLOS 
has been ratified by all Gulf of Guinea States, many of the States have 
not incorporated the Convention’s framework for combating piracy into 
their domestic legal regime. Finally, in the context of fisheries 
protection, Gambia and Ghana are the only States in the region that have 
developed National Plans of Action against illegal, unreported and 
unregulated fishing (in accordance with the global framework that was 
adopted in 2001), while the 1993 FAO Compliance Agreement has only 
been ratified by five States – Angola, Benin, Cape Verde, Ghana and 
Senegal. There is therefore a gaping deficit in the legal framework for 
maritime security in the Gulf of Guinea. As a result, even if Gulf of 
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Guinea States were able to conduct patrols off their coasts, the efficacy 
of such patrols would be seriously undermined by the absence of 
domestic legislation to prosecute and punish perpetrators of sea-based 
crimes. Poorly developed legal frameworks also undermine regional and 
global cooperation, as there is no common basis for the exercise of 
maritime security enforcement.   
 
An Uncoordinated Regional Cooperative Framework 
The fourth conclusion supporting the thesis hypothesis is that regional 
cooperative initiatives are uncoordinated and suffer multiple setbacks. 
This finding was reached in chapter six, which assessed maritime 
security cooperative initiatives in Gulf of Guinea region. The analysis in 
that chapter showed that four regional organisations are concurrently 
serving as platforms for maritime security cooperation in the Gulf of 
Guinea: the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), 
the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS), the 
Maritime Organisation for West and Central African States (MOWCA), 
and the Gulf of Guinea Commission (GGC). The analysis in chapter six 
further demonstrated that the evolving cooperative initiatives in the 
region are at different stages of development, with the ECCAS 
framework being the most established of the four. The analysis also 
identified three categories of challenges that confront the cooperative 
initiatives: structural, geopolitical and governance-based. 
Fundamentally, however, there is lack of coordination in regional 
processes. Therefore, while the ECCAS maritime security framework 
provides an effective structure for cooperation (and should certainly be 
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implemented by member States), the GGC continues to pursue a 
different cooperative agenda. Indeed, this is despite the fact that all the 
member States of the Commission, with the exception of Nigeria, are 
also members of ECCAS. The analysis in chapter six also demonstrates 
that although the Protocol establishing the ECCAS maritime security 
framework was adopted in 2009, MOWCA has continued to hold 
consultations and meetings to further its plan for a regional coastguard 
network, without any reference to the ECCAS framework. These 
conflicting regional initiatives undermine the processes of maritime 
security cooperation. Sadly, an examination of the outcome of the 
Summit of Heads of State and Governments of Gulf of Guinea, held in 
June 2013, illustrates that there is still no coordination between the 
various regional processes.   
 
An Inadequate International Cooperative Framework 
 
The final conclusion which affirms the thesis hypothesis is that 
international support for maritime security cooperation in the Gulf of 
Guinea is inadequate, uncoordinated, and possibly influenced by self-
serving national interests, thus affecting its overall effectiveness. This 
conclusion is supported by the analysis in chapter seven, though the 
background to that conclusion has been established in earlier chapters. In 
particular, the analysis in chapter six has shown limitations in the 
regional capacity to address maritime security threats, thus the need for 
global cooperation and support. Meanwhile, the analysis in chapter seven 
has demonstrated that a number of programmes are currently aimed at 
enhancing maritime security in the Gulf of Guinea. For example, the US 
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is using its African Partnership Station (APS) programme for capacity 
building in the Gulf of Guinea. France supports maritime security 
initiatives (especially in Francophone States) through defence and 
security agreements. UK ships were on patrol in the Gulf of Guinea in 
2012, provided training to Navies and Coast Guards in the region, while 
the European Union (EU) launched the Critical Maritime Routes in the 
Gulf of Guinea (CRIMGO) project in 2013, with the aim of improving 
maritime safety and security in seven Gulf of Guinea States.  
 
Although these partnerships are important for enhancing maritime 
security in the Gulf of Guinea, the available funding for these projects is 
inadequate. For example, the funding for the maritime security 
programmes of France in 2012 was a paltry US$1.6 million, while only 
€4.5 million has been allocated for the EU Critical Maritime Routes in 
the Gulf of Guinea (CRIMGO) project. In comparative terms, these 
amounts represent a small fraction of the annual financial contribution 
made by Nigeria and Benin for their joint patrols, which has been 
estimated by the UN at US$112 million. Moreover, the analysis in 
chapter seven has shown that there is no coordination between these 
external partnership programmes. Indeed, this has the potential to 
overstretch the resources of national administrators, who would be 
required to respond to and implement a diverse range of maritime 
security partnerships. While there is no clear explanation for the lack of 
synergy between these external programmes, the thesis has proposed 
competing national strategic objectives as a possible factor, particularly 
between the US and France - the two most dominant external maritime 
security partners. The analysis suggests that for the US, maritime 
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security cooperation is an avenue for establishing closer relations with 
Gulf of Guinea States, and for furthering defence and security interests. 
Therefore, it is possible that France may view US maritime security 
partnerships in the Gulf of Guinea as a threat to its long-term dominance 
in the region. 
 
Towards a comprehensive Framework for Maritime Security  
in the Gulf of Guinea 
 
Any proposal for enhancing maritime security cooperation in the Gulf of 
Guinea must be comprehensive. The framework devised for the thesis 
was developed in chapter three (Figure 3.1), and is reproduced below.  
Framework for Maritime Security Cooperation 
 
 
The framework identifies three key components of a comprehensive 
maritime security structure: effective regional cooperation, adequate 
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national capacity and viable global support. It also has three critical 
progress indicators: improved governance, adequate legal frameworks 
and an inclusive maritime security concept. The three overlapping 
triangles show that maritime security is a shared responsibility, but they 
equally denote the three levels of security analysed in the thesis: 
national, regional and international.   
 
Flowing from the proposed framework, the enhancement of maritime 
security cooperation in the Gulf of Guinea will involve four critical 
requirements: (i) defining a functional regional platform for cooperation 
and its interaction with national and international components; (ii) 
incorporating the identified maritime security threats into the cooperative 
process; (iii) providing the requisite legal frameworks for maritime 
security jurisdiction and enforcement; and (vi) addressing governance 
concerns.  
 
The first requirement recognises regional cooperation as a vital vehicle 
for addressing maritime security threats. However, the effectiveness of 
regional cooperation will very much depend on identifying the 
appropriate regional platform for cooperation. In other words, there is a 
need for an effective regional process that can enlist both national and 
international participation. Based on the conclusions reached in the 
thesis, ECOWAS and ECCAS are the most suitable regional platforms 
for developing cooperative frameworks in the Gulf of Guinea, while the 
GGC and MOWCA will play complementary roles. Indeed, if a well-
defined process is formulated, national, regional and international efforts 
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can be galvanised to systematically address other limitations that have 
identified in the thesis, such as inadequate funding and the limited 
national capacity of Gulf of Guinea States.   
 
The second requirement involves incorporating the maritime security 
threats identified in the thesis into the cooperative process. This will help 
address a critical gap in prevailing maritime security initiatives in the 
Gulf of Guinea, and also provide an inclusive concept of security for 
regional and international cooperation.   
 
As demonstrated in the thesis, international legal and policy frameworks 
are essential tools for asserting maritime security jurisdiction and for 
promoting maritime security cooperation. The failure of Gulf of Guinea 
States to ratify and implement relevant maritime security instruments is a 
major obstacle to maritime security cooperation. Therefore, to 
effectively enhance maritime security in the region, Gulf of Guinea 
States will have to ratify and incorporate the relevant international 
instruments into their domestic legal and policy frameworks.   
 
Finally, the land-sea nexus of maritime security cooperation is currently 
being neglected in the cooperative process of Gulf of Guinea States. It 
should, however, be stressed that maritime security threats are largely an 
expression of governance deficits in the Gulf of Guinea region. Thus, if 
maritime security cooperation is to yield positive outcomes with long-
term benefits, governments in the Gulf of Guinea will have to commit to 
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improving governance as an integral part of the evolving cooperative 
process. 
 
Although there are serious challenges facing the Gulf of Guinea, there is 
also the prospect for a bright and promising future. Effective maritime 
security is a sine qua non for harvesting the future prospects. The 
multilateral processes being embarked upon provide the hope that 
regional leaders, external partners and the UN are committed to ensuring 
effective maritime security. This thesis has identified gaps in current 
process of cooperation that will have to be addressed to ensure robust 
maritime security outcomes. Indeed, if the relevant stakeholders take 
heed of the recommendations canvassed in this thesis, the opportunity 
exists to alleviate poverty, halt instability, protect marine resources and 
strengthen regional ties while enhancing regional and global security.  
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APPENDICES 
 
APPENDIX 1 - UN Security Council Resolution 2018 (2011) 
 
United Nations    S/RES/2018 (2011) 
 
Security Council   Distr.: General 
31 October 2011 
 
 
 
Resolution 2018 (2011) 
 
Adopted by the Security Council at its 6645th meeting, 
on 31 October 2011 
 
The Security Council, 
 
Expressing its deep concern about the threat that piracy and 
armed robbery at sea  in  the  Gulf  of  Guinea  pose  to  
international   navigation,   security   and  the economic 
development of states in the region, 
 
Recalling its statement of 30 August 2011 on piracy and 
armed robbery at sea in the Gulf of Guinea, 
 
Expressing  its concern  over  the threat  that  piracy  and 
armed  robbery  at sea pose to the safety of seafarers and other 
persons, including through their being taken as hostages, and 
deeply concerned by the violence employed by pirates and 
persons involved in piracy and armed robbery at sea in the Gulf 
of Guinea, 
 
Affirming its respect for the sovereignty and territorial 
integrity of the States of the Gulf of Guinea and their neighbours, 
 
Further affirming that the provisions of this resolution apply 
only with respect to the situation in the Gulf of Guinea, 
 
Affirming that international law, as reflected in the United 
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 
1982, in particular its articles 100, 101 and 
105, sets out the legal framework applicable to countering 
piracy and armed robbery at sea, as well as other ocean activities, 
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Noting  that  applicable  international  legal  instruments  
provide  for  parties  to create criminal offences, establish 
jurisdiction, and prosecute or extradite for prosecution,  persons  
responsible  for or suspected  of seizing  or exercising  control 
over  a  ship  or  fixed  platform  by  force  or  threat  thereof  or  
any  other  form  of intimidation, 
 
Emphasizing   the  importance   of  finding   a  comprehensive   
solution   to  the problem of piracy and armed robbery at sea in 
the Gulf of Guinea, 
Noting the efforts of the States of the Gulf of Guinea to 
address this problem, including  joint patrols  at sea and the 
activities  of the Federal  Republic  of Nigeria and Benin 
Republic off the coast of Benin, 
Also noting the need for international assistance as part of a 
comprehensive strategy  to support  national  and regional  efforts 
to assist States in the region with their efforts to address piracy 
and armed robbery at sea in the Gulf of Guinea, 
 
Welcoming the contributions made by some Member States 
and international organizations in support of the maritime sector, 
including security, capacity-building and the joint operations of 
the States of the Gulf of Guinea, 
 
Stressing that the coordination  of efforts at the regional level 
is necessary  for the  development  of a comprehensive  strategy  
to counter  the  threat  of piracy  and armed robbery at sea in the 
Gulf of Guinea, 
 
Noting that States in the region have a leadership role to play in 
this regard, supported by organizations in the region, 
 
1.      Condemns all acts of piracy and armed robbery at sea 
committed off the coast of the States of the Gulf of Guinea; 
 
2.      Welcomes the intention to convene a summit of Gulf of 
Guinea Heads of State in order to consider  a comprehensive  
response  in the region and encourages the States of the 
Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the 
Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) and the 
Gulf of Guinea Commission (GGC) to develop a comprehensive 
strategy, including through: 
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(a)    the development of domestic laws and regulations, 
where these are not in place, criminalizing piracy and armed 
robbery at sea; 
 
(b)    the development  of a regional  framework  to counter  
piracy  and armed robbery  at  sea,  including  information-
sharing  and  operational  coordination mechanisms in the 
region; 
 
(c)    the development and strengthening of domestic laws and 
regulations, as appropriate,  to implement  relevant  
international  agreements  addressing  the  safety and security 
of navigation, in accordance with international law; 
 
3.      Encourages   States   of   ECOWAS,   ECCAS   and   the   
GGC,   through concerted action, to counter piracy and armed 
robbery at sea in the Gulf of Guinea through the conduct of 
bilateral or regional maritime patrols consistent with relevant 
international  law;  and  requests  the  States  concerned  to  take  
appropriate  steps  to ensure that the activities they undertake 
pursuant to this resolution, do not have a practical  effect of 
denying  or impairing  freedom of navigation  on the high seas or 
the right of innocent passage in the territorial sea to vessels of 
third States; 
 
4.      Calls   upon   States,   in   cooperation   with   the   
shipping   industry,   the insurance  industry  and the International  
Maritime  Organization  (IMO)  to issue  to ships entitled to fly 
their flag, appropriate advice and guidance within context of the 
Gulf  of Guinea,  on avoidance,  evasion  and defensive  
techniques  and measures  to take, if under the threat of attack, or 
attack when sailing in the waters of the Gulf of Guinea; 
 
5.      Further calls upon States of ECOWAS, ECCAS and 
GGC, in conjunction with  flag  States  and  States  of nationality  
of victims  or of perpetrators  of acts  of piracy   or  armed   
robbery   at  sea,   to  cooperate   in  the   prosecution   of  alleged 
perpetrators,   including   facilitators   and  financiers   of  acts  of  
piracy  and  armed robbery at sea committed off the coast of the 
Gulf of Guinea, in accordance with applicable international law, 
including human rights law; 
6.      Encourages   the  international   community  to  assist,  
upon  request,  the States concerned in the region, ECOWAS, 
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ECCAS, GGC and other relevant organizations and agencies in 
strengthening their efforts to counter piracy and armed robbery at 
sea, in the Gulf of Guinea; 
 
7.      Welcomes the intention of the Secretary-General  of the 
United Nations to deploy  a United  Nations  assessment  mission  
to examine  the  threat  of piracy  and armed  robbery  at sea,  in 
the Gulf  of Guinea  and  explore  options  on how  best  to 
address the problem, and looks forward to receiving the mission’s 
report with recommendations  on the matter; 
 
8.                     Decides to remain seized of the matter. 
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APPENDIX 2 – UN Security Council Resolution 2039 (2012) 
 
United Nations    S/RES/2039 (2012)* 
 
Security Council   Distr.: General 
29 February 2012 
 
 
 
 
Resolution 2039 (2012) 
 
Adopted by the Security Council at its 6727th meeting, on 
29 February 2012 
 
The Security Council, 
 
Recalling its statement  of 30 August  2011  and its resolution 
2018  (2011)  of 31 October 2011, on piracy and armed robbery at sea 
in the Gulf of Guinea, 
 
Expressing its deep concern about the threat that piracy and 
armed robbery at sea  in  the  Gulf  of  Guinea  pose  to  
international   navigation,   security   and  the economic development 
of states in the region, 
 
Recognizing that piracy and armed robbery at sea in the Gulf of 
Guinea affect littoral  countries,  including  their  hinterland  areas  
and  landlocked  countries  in the region, 
 
Expressing  its concern  over  the threat  that  piracy  and armed  
robbery  at sea pose to the safety of seafarers and other persons, 
including through their being taken as hostages, and deeply 
concerned by the violence employed by pirates and persons involved 
in piracy and armed robbery at sea in the Gulf of Guinea, 
 
Affirming that international law, as reflected in the United 
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982, in 
particular its articles 100, 101 and 
105, sets out the legal framework applicable to countering piracy and 
armed robbery at sea, as well as other ocean activities, 
 
Affirming its respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity 
of the States of the Gulf of Guinea and their neighbours, 
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Further affirming that the provisions of this resolution apply 
only with respect to the situation in the Gulf of Guinea, 
 
Recognizing   the  urgent  need  to  devise  and  adopt  effective  
and  practical measures to counter piracy and armed robbery at sea in 
the Gulf of Guinea, 
 
Emphasizing the importance of building on existing national, 
regional and extraregional  initiatives  to  enhance  maritime  safety  
and  security  in  the  Gulf  of Guinea, 
 
Welcoming the initiatives already taken by States in the region and 
regional organizations,   including   the   Economic   Community   of   
Central   African   States (ECCAS), the Economic Community of 
West African States (ECOWAS), the Gulf of Guinea  Commission  
(GGC)  and  the  Maritime  Organization  for West  and  Central 
Africa (MOWCA), to enhance maritime safety and security in the 
Gulf of Guinea, 
 
Noting  the  ECCAS  comprehensive   joint  maritime  security  
architecture   to counter  piracy in the Central African  subregion,  
including  the strategy  adopted  by the ECCAS Peace and Security 
Council in February 2008, the establishment of the Regional  Centre  
for  Maritime  Security  in Central  Africa  (CRESMAC)  in Pointe- 
Noire, Congo, as well as the multinational coordination centres in the 
region, 
 
Further noting the preparatory steps taken by ECOWAS towards 
developing a maritime security approach through an Integrated 
Maritime Security Strategy and an Integrated Maritime Plan, 
 
 
Noting  the  importance  of  adopting  a  comprehensive   
approach  led  by  the countries  of the region to counter the threat of 
piracy and armed robbery at sea in the Gulf of Guinea and their 
underlying causes, 
 
Also noting the need for international assistance as part of a 
comprehensive strategy  to support  national  and regional  efforts to 
assist States in the region with their efforts to address piracy and 
armed robbery at sea in the Gulf of Guinea, 
 
Stressing that the coordination  of efforts at the regional level is 
necessary  for the  development  of a comprehensive  strategy  to 
counter  the  threat  of piracy  and armed robbery at sea in the Gulf of 
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Guinea, in order to enable the prevention and interdiction of such 
criminal activities and to ensure that persons engaging in piracy and 
armed robbery at sea are prosecuted and punished if convicted, with 
due regard for internationally recognized rules and principles of 
international law, 
 
Reiterating   that  States   in  the  region   have   a  leadership   
role  to  play  in countering  the  threat  and  addressing  the  
underlying  causes  of  piracy  and  armed robbery at sea in the Gulf of 
Guinea, in close cooperation with organizations in the region, and 
their partners, 
 
Welcoming the contributions by Member States and international 
organizations in support of ongoing national and regional efforts to 
secure Gulf of Guinea coastal areas  and conduct  naval  operations,  
including  the joint  patrols  carried  out by the Federal Republic of 
Nigeria and the Republic of Benin off the coast of Benin, and also 
welcoming further contributions, upon request, 
 
Expressing  its  concern  about  the  serious  threats  to  
international  peace  and stability in different regions of the world, in 
particular in West Africa and the Sahel Region, posed by 
transnational organized crime, including illicit weapons and drug 
trafficking, piracy and armed robbery at sea, 
 
Affirming  its  full  commitment  to  promoting  the  maintenance  
of  peace  and stability in the Gulf of Guinea region, 
 
1.      Welcomes  the  report  of  the  Secretary-General’s  
assessment  mission  on piracy  in  the  Gulf  of  Guinea,  which  was  
dispatched  to  the  region  from  7  to 
24 November 2011; 
 
2.      Encourages  national  authorities,  as  well  as  regional  and  
international partners to consider implementing  the 
recommendations  of the assessment mission, as appropriate; 
 
3.     Stresses the primary responsibility of the States of the Gulf of 
Guinea to counter piracy and armed robbery at sea in the Gulf of 
Guinea and in this context urges them through ECCAS, ECOWAS 
and the GGC to work towards the convening of  the  planned  joint  
Summit  of  Gulf  of  Guinea  States  to  develop  a  regional anti-
piracy strategy, in cooperation with the African Union; 
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4.      Requests  the  Secretary-General   through  the  United  
Nations  Office  of West Africa (UNOWA)  and the United Nations 
Office of Central Africa (UNOCA) to support States and subregional 
organizations in convening the joint Summit, as referenced in 
resolution 2018 (2011), to the extent feasible; 
 
5.      Urges States of the region of the Gulf of Guinea to take 
prompt action, at national and regional levels with the support of the 
international  community  where able,  and  by  mutual  agreement,   
to  develop   and  implement   national   maritime security strategies, 
including for the establishment of a legal framework for the 
prevention,  and  repression  of  piracy  and  armed  robbery  at  sea  
and  as  well  as prosecution of persons engaging in those crimes, 
and punishment of those convicted of those crimes and encourages 
regional cooperation in this regard; 
 
6.  Encourages Benin and Nigeria to extend their joint patrols 
beyond March 2012, while the countries of the Gulf of Guinea 
continue to work towards building their capacities to independently 
secure their coastlines and also encourages international partners to 
consider providing support, as needed, in that regard and to the 
extent feasible; 
 
7.      Encourages  the  States  of  the  Gulf  of  Guinea,  ECOWAS,  
ECCAS  and GGC, to develop and implement transnational and 
transregional maritime security coordination centres covering the 
whole region of the Gulf of Guinea, building on existing initiatives, 
such as those under the auspices of the International Maritime 
Organization (IMO); 
 
8.      Encourages  international  partners  to provide  support  to 
regional  States and  organizations  for the  enhancement  of their  
capabilities  to counter  piracy  and armed  robbery  at  sea  in  the  
Gulf  of  Guinea,  including  their  capacity  to  conduct regional 
patrols, to establish and maintain joint coordination centres and joint 
information-sharing centres, and for the effective implementation of 
the regional strategy, once adopted; 
 
9.      Requests  the  Secretary-General   to  support  efforts  
towards  mobilizing resources  following  the  creation  of  the  
regional  strategy  to  assist  in  building national and regional 
capacities in close consultation with States and regional and 
extraregional organizations; 
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10.    Further  requests  the  Secretary-General   to  keep  the  
Security  Council regularly  informed  through  UNOWA  and 
UNOCA,  on the situation  of piracy  and armed robbery at sea in the 
Gulf of Guinea, including  on progress made regarding the joint 
Summit as well as by ECOWAS, ECCAS and the GGC to develop a 
comprehensive strategy to counter piracy and armed robbery at sea; 
 
11.  Decides to remain seized of the matter. 
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APPENDIX 3 – MOWCA MOU on Establishment of Regional Coast 
Guard Network 
 
 
MARITIME ORGANISATION  
OF WEST AND CENTRAL AFRICA  
 
 
         
MOWCA 
 
13th Session of the General Assembly  
Dakar 2008 
 
29 – 31 July 2008 
Dakar,  Republic of Senegal 
MOWCA/XIII GA.08/8 
 
Item 6.2.1.1.c  of the Agenda 
Original : FRENCH 
Version : English 
Mission Statement: “Towards a cost-effective Maritime Transport Service, high on 
safety, security and low on pollution” 
 
 
 
 
 
MEMORANDUM OF 
UNDERSTANDING 
ON THE ESTABLISHMENT 
OF A SUB-REGIONAL 
INTEGRATED COAST GUARD 
NETWORK 
IN WEST AND CENTRAL AFRICA. 
 
 
MÉMORANDUM D'ENTENTE 
DU RÉSEAU SOUS-
RÉGIONAL INTÉGRÉ DE 
GARDE-CÔTES DES ÉTATS 
D'AFRIQUE DE L'OUEST 
 ET DU CENTRE. 
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The Coastal Member States of the Maritime 
Organization of West and Central Africa 
(MOWCA) : 
 
1. Angola  
 
2. Benin 
 
3.  Cameroon  
 
4. Cape Verde  
 
5. Congo  
 
6. Congo DR 
 
7. Côte d'Ivoire  
 
8. Gabon 
 
9. The Gambia  
 
10. Ghana  
 
11. Guinea  
 
12. Guinea Bissau 
 
13. Equatorial Guinea 
 
14.  Liberia  
 
15.  Mauritania 
 
16.  Nigeria  
 
17. Sao Tome and Principe 
 
18.  Senegal  
 
19.  Sierra Leone  
 
20.  Togo 
 
Les États côtiers membres de l'Organisation 
maritime de l'Afrique de l'Ouest et du Centre 
(OMAOC) : 
 
1. Angola  
 
2. Bénin 
 
3. Cameroun  
 
4. Cap-Vert  
 
5. Congo 
 
6. Congo RD 
 
7. Côte d'Ivoire  
 
8. Gabon 
 
9. Gambie  
 
10. Ghana  
 
11. Guinée 
 
12. Guinée-Bissau 
 
13. Guinée équatoriale 
 
14. Libéria  
 
15. Mauritanie 
 
16. Nigéria  
 
17. Sao Tomé-et-Principe 
 
18. Sénégal  
 
19. Sierra Leone  
 
20. Togo 
 
 
  
507 
 
Landlocked Member States of MOWCA 
associated to the Memorandum : 
 
Burkina Faso 
Mali  
Niger 
Central African Republic 
Chad 
 
Considering the relevant provisions of 
United Nations General Assembly resolution 
55/2 on the United Nations Millennium 
Declaration and, in particular, section II on 
Peace, security and disarmament; section III 
on Development and poverty eradication; 
section IV on Protecting our common 
environment; and section VII on Meeting the 
special needs of Africa 
 
 
Considering the United Nations General 
Assembly resolution A/RES/55/7 on Oceans 
and the Law of the Sea urging all States, and 
in particular coastal States, in affected 
regions to take all necessary and appropriate 
measures to prevent and combat incidents of 
piracy and armed robbery at sea, including 
through regional co-operation, and to 
investigate or co-operate in the investigation 
of such incidents wherever they occur and 
bring the alleged perpetrators to justice in 
accordance with international law; 
 
 
 
Considering the United Nations General 
Assembly resolution A/RES/59/24 on 
Oceans and the Law of the Sea also urging 
all States, in co-operation with the 
International Maritime Organization, to 
combat piracy and armed robbery at sea; and 
to carry on regional co-operation in the 
prevention and suppression of piracy and 
armed robbery at sea in some geographical 
areas, and urging States to give urgent 
attention to promoting, adopting and 
Les États enclavés membres de l'OMAOC 
associés au Mémorandum : 
 
Burkina Faso 
Mali 
Niger 
République centrafricaine 
Tchad 
 
Notant les dispositions pertinentes de la 
résolution 55/2 de l'Assemblée générale des 
Nations Unies sur la Déclaration du 
Millénaire des Nations Unies et, en 
particulier, la section II "Paix, sécurité et 
désarmement"; la section III "Développement 
et élimination de la pauvreté"; la section IV 
"Protéger notre environnement commun"; et 
la section VII "Répondre aux besoins 
spéciaux de l'Afrique"; 
 
Notant la résolution A/RES/55/7 de 
l'Assemblée générale des Nations Unies sur 
les océans et le droit de la mer, dans laquelle 
l'Assemblée prie instamment tous les États, 
en particulier les États côtiers, de prendre 
toutes les mesures nécessaires et appropriées, 
notamment dans le cadre de la coopération 
régionale, pour prévenir et combattre les 
actes de piraterie et les vols à main armée 
commis en mer, d'enquêter ou d'apporter leur 
concours aux enquêtes menées sur de tels 
incidents partout où ils se produisent et de 
traduire en justice les auteurs présumés, 
conformément au droit international; 
 
Notant la résolution A/RES/59/24 de 
l'Assemblée générale des Nations Unies sur 
les océans et le droit de la mer dans laquelle 
également l'Assemblée engage vivement tous 
les États à lutter, en coopération avec 
l'Organisation maritime internationale, contre 
les actes de piraterie et les vols à main armée 
commis en mer; et à poursuivre la 
coopération régionale en matière de 
prévention et de répression de la piraterie et 
des vols à main armée en mer dans certaines 
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implementing co-operation agreements, in 
particular at the regional level in high-risk 
areas; 
 
régions, et engage vivement les États à 
s'employer d'urgence à promouvoir, adopter 
et exécuter des accords de coopération, en 
particulier au niveau régional dans les 
régions à haut risque; 
Considering the United Nations General 
Assembly resolution A/RES/60/30 on 
Oceans and the Law of the Sea also urging 
all States, in cooperation with the 
International Maritime Organization, to 
combat piracy and armed robbery at sea by 
adopting measures, including those relating 
to assistance with capacity-building through 
training of seafarers, port staff and 
enforcement personnel in the prevention, 
reporting and investigation of incidents, 
bringing the alleged perpetrators to justice, in 
accordance with international law, and by 
adopting national legislation, as well as 
providing enforcement vessels and 
equipment and guarding against fraudulent 
ship registration, 
 
 
 
 
 
Taking into account the Maritime Transport 
Charter for West and Central African States, 
adopted in Abidjan on May 7, 1975 and as 
amended on August 6, 1999;  
 
 
Taking into account the Convention on the 
Institutionalisation of the Ministerial 
Conference of Central African States on 
Maritime Transport adopted in Accra on 
February 26, 1977 and as amended in 
Abidjan on August 06, 1999;  
 
 
Taking into account the MOWCA 
resolution n°193/12/03 on maritime safety in 
West and Central Africa adopted in 
LUANDA on October 31, 2003, in particular 
Notant la résolution de l'Assemblée générale 
des Nations Unies A/Res/60/30 sur les 
océans et le droit de la mer, dans laquelle 
l'Assemblée engage vivement tous les États à 
lutter, en coopération avec l'Organisation 
maritime internationale, contre les actes de 
piraterie et les vols à main armée commis en 
mer en adoptant des mesures, y compris 
d'aide au renforcement des capacités, en 
formant les gens de mer, le personnel des 
ports et les agents de la force publique à la 
prévention et à la constatation des incidents 
et à la conduite d'enquêtes à leur sujet, en 
traduisant en justice les auteurs présumés 
conformément aux dispositions du droit 
international, en se dotant d'une législation 
nationale, en consacrant à cette lutte des 
navires et du matériel adaptés et en 
empêchant les immatriculations frauduleuses 
de navires; 
 
 
Prenant en considération la Charte des 
transports maritimes des Etats de l’Afrique 
de l’Ouest et du Centre, adoptée à Abidjan le 
7 mai 1975 et telle que modifiée le 6 août 
1999; 
 
Prenant en considération la Convention 
portant création de la Conférence 
ministérielle des États de l'Afrique de l'Ouest 
et du Centre sur les transports maritimes 
adoptée à Accra le 26 février 1977 et telle 
que modifiée à Abidjan le 6 août 1999; 
 
 
Prenant en considération la résolution 
No 193/12/03 de l'OMAOC adoptée à 
LUANDA le 31 octobre 2003 sur la sécurité 
maritime en Afrique de l'Ouest et du Centre, 
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the setting up of an integrated sub-regional 
network of coastguards; 
 
 
Recognizing that the history of maritime 
security and safety as well as marine 
environmental protection in West and 
Central African Sub-region is full of 
incidents and accidents that expose the lack 
or inadequacy of response capabilitiy in the 
sub-region ;  
 
 
en particulier la mise en place d'un Réseau 
sous-régional intégré de garde-côtes; 
 
 
Reconnaissant que l'histoire de la sécurité et 
de la sûreté maritimes ainsi que de la 
protection de l'environnement marin en 
Afrique de l'Ouest et du Centre est émaillée 
d'incidents et d'accidents qui ont mis en 
évidence l'absence de capacité de réaction de 
la sous région ou son inadéquation; 
 
Appreciating the efforts carried out in these 
fields, by the United Nations, through the 
International Maritime Organization IMO, 
by the adoption of various conventions, 
including the Convention on the Suppression 
of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of 
Maritime Navigation, 1988 (the 1988 SUA 
Convention), as revised, and the 
International Convention on Maritime 
Search and Rescue, 1979, as amended (SAR 
1979), aiming at developing an international 
search and rescue (SAR) plan so that no 
matter where an accident occurs, the rescue 
of persons in distress at sea would be co-
ordinated by a SAR organization and, when 
necessary, by co-operation between 
neighbouring SAR organizations; including 
also the International Convention for the 
Safety of Life at Sea,1974, as amended 
(SOLAS 1974), the Protocol of 1978 relating 
to the International Convention on the 
Prevention of Pollution from Ships, 1973, as 
amended (MARPOL PROT 1978), OPRC 
Convention, 1990, etc. which provisions 
should be implemented at shore and at sea, 
for the implementation of maritime 
navigation and marine pollution prevention 
and control; 
 
 
 
 
Accueillant avec satisfaction les efforts 
déployés par les Nations Unies, par 
l'intermédiaire de l'Organisation maritime 
internationale (OMI), à savoir l'adoption de 
diverses Conventions dont la Convention de 
1988 pour la répression d'actes illicites contre 
la sécurité de la navigation maritime 
(Convention SUA de 1988), telle que révisée, 
et la Convention de 1979 sur la recherche et 
le sauvetage maritimes (Convention SAR), 
telle que modifiée, visant à établir un plan 
international de recherche et de sauvetage 
(SAR) afin que, partout où un accident se 
produit, le sauvetage des personnes en 
détresse en mer soit coordonné par une 
organisation SAR et, lorsque nécessaire, 
moyennant la coopération entre les 
organisations SAR voisines, ainsi que la 
Convention internationale de 1974 pour la 
sauvegarde de la vie humaine en mer 
(Convention SOLAS de 1974), telle que 
modifiée, le Protocole de 1978 relatif à la 
Convention internationale de 1973 pour la 
prévention de la pollution par les navires, tel 
que modifié (MARPOL PROT 1978), la 
Convention OPRC de 1990, etc., dont les 
dispositions devraient être mises en oeuvre 
sur terre et en mer aux fins de la prévention 
et du contrôle de la pollution marine et de la 
navigation maritime; 
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Recognizing with deep concern the grave 
dangers to the safety and security of persons 
at sea and to the protection of the marine 
environment arising from unlawful acts 
against ships and in particular from acts of 
piracy or armed robbery; 
 
 
Also recognizing that national, regional and 
international efforts to combat terrorism also 
enhance the ability to combat organized 
crime and armed robberies against ships;  
 
 
Being aware that the fight against piracy and 
armed robbery against ships is often impeded 
by the absence of effective or adequate 
legislative and administrative arrangements 
for the investigation of reported cases of 
piracy or armed robbery against ships; 
 
Constatant avec une vive inquiétude les 
graves dangers pour la sécurité et la sûreté 
des personnes en mer et pour la protection du 
milieu marin qui résultent des actes illicites 
commis à l'encontre des navires, et 
notamment des actes de piraterie ou des vols 
à main armée; 
 
Reconnaissant également que les initiatives 
nationales, régionales et internationales de 
lutte contre le terrorisme renforcent aussi la 
capacité de combattre la criminalité 
organisée et les vols à main armée à 
l'encontre des navires; 
 
Conscients que la lutte contre la piraterie et 
les vols à main armée à l'encontre des navires 
est souvent entravée par le manque de 
dispositifs législatifs et administratifs 
efficaces ou appropriés pour enquêter sur les 
cas de cet ordre qui ont été déclarés; 
 
Being also aware that, when arrests are 
made, there is the absolute need for a 
legislative framework and of adequate 
guidelines for the conduct of investigation so 
as to allow for the prosecution, conviction 
and punishment of those involved in acts of 
piracy and armed robbery against ships. 
 
 
 
 
Recalling the obligations of States under 
United Nations Security Council resolutions 
1373 (2001), 1540 (2004) and 1566 (2004); 
 
 
Recalling the provisions of the United 
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 
(UNCLOS); 
 
 
Recalling also the relevant provisions of the 
1988 SUA Convention and the Protocol for 
Conscients également que, dans le cas où 
sont effectuées des arrestations, il est 
absolument nécessaire de disposer d'un cadre 
législatif et de directives appropriées pour la 
conduite de l'enquête de façon à permettre la 
poursuite, la condamnation et le châtiment 
des personnes impliquées dans des actes de 
piraterie et de vols à main armée à l'encontre 
des navires; 
 
 
Rappelant les obligations des États en vertu 
des résolutions 1373 (2001), 1540 (2004) et 
1566 (2004) du Conseil de Sécurité des 
Nations Unies; 
 
Rappelant les dispositions de la Convention 
des Nations Unies sur le droit de la mer de 
1982; 
 
 
Rappelant également les dispositions 
pertinentes de la Convention SUA de 1988 et 
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the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the 
Safety of Fixed Platforms Located on the 
Continental Shelf, 1988 (the 1988 SUA 
Protocol); 
 
Recalling further the need for ships, 
consistent with the provisions of UNCLOS, 
to provide assistance in response to a 
situation of persons in distress at sea; 
 
 
Recognizing also the vulnerability of 
transport networks, the important role energy 
shipping plays in the global economy, and 
the importance, in this respect, of enhancing 
safety, security, and environmental 
protection of the sea area along the Atlantic 
coast of the MOWCA Member States 
(hereinafter referred to as “the coast of West 
and Central Africa”); 
 
 
 
Recognizing further the need to balance 
maritime security and facilitation and to 
minimize any adverse effects on the free 
flow of commerce to and from ports in West 
and Central Africa and that enhanced 
maritime security along the coast of West 
and Central Africa will promote international 
trade, economic co-operation and sustainable 
economic development; 
 
du Protocole de 1988 pour la répression 
d'actes illicites contre la sécurité des plates-
formes fixes situées sur le plateau continental 
(le Protocole SUA de 1988); 
 
Rappelant en outre que les navires doivent, 
conformément aux dispositions de la 
Convention des Nations Unies sur le droit de 
la mer, prêter assistance dans les situations 
où des personnes sont en détresse en mer; 
 
Reconnaissant également la vulnérabilité 
des réseaux de transport, le rôle considérable 
que joue le transport de l'énergie dans 
l'économie mondiale et l'importance qu'il y a, 
à cet égard, à renforcer la sécurité, la sûreté et 
la protection de l'environnement de la zone 
maritime le long de la côte Atlantique des 
États membres de l'OMAOC (ci-après 
dénommée "la côte de l'Afrique de l'Ouest et 
du Centre"); 
 
 
Reconnaissant en outre qu'il faut respecter 
un équilibre entre la sûreté maritime et les 
dispositions visant à faciliter la navigation et 
réduire au maximum tout effet négatif sur le 
libre mouvement du commerce à destination 
et en provenance des ports d'Afrique de 
l'Ouest et du Centre, et qu'une sûreté 
maritime renforcée le long des côtes 
d'Afrique de l'Ouest et du Centre favorisera 
le commerce international, la coopération 
économique et le développement économique 
durable; 
Acknowledging the fact that the 
enhancement of security in the international 
maritime transport sector is an indispensable 
and fundamental condition for the welfare 
and economic security in West and Central 
Africa and is in the direct interest of all 
States; 
 
 
 
Reconnaissant le fait que le renforcement de 
la sûreté dans le secteur des transports 
maritimes internationaux est une condition 
essentielle et fondamentale de la prospérité et 
de la sûreté économiques de l'Afrique de 
l'Ouest et du Centre et que tous les États y 
ont directement intérêt; 
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Further recognizing that the successful 
implementation and maintenance of 
compliance with SOLAS 1974 and the 
International Ship and Port Facility Security 
Code (the ISPS Code) require, inter alia, the 
early and efficient collection, assessment and 
exchange of security-related information; 
 
 
 
Also recognizing the need to set, in 
accordance with SOLAS 1974 regulation XI-
2/7 on Threats to ships, security levels and to 
ensure the provision of security level 
information to ships operating in our 
territorial sea or having communicated an 
intention to enter our territorial sea, and 
where a risk of an attack has been identified, 
to provide advice to the ships concerned; 
 
 
 
 
 
Expressing great concern for the security of 
passengers and crews on board ships 
including small craft, both at anchor and 
underway, in the context of incidents 
involving terrorism and other unlawful acts 
against ships, and the associated risks to 
people on shore or populations in port areas 
as well as to ports, offshore terminals and the 
marine environment; 
 
 
 
 
Being convinced of the need for MOWCA 
Member States to co-operate and to take, as a 
matter of the highest priority, all necessary 
action to prevent and suppress any incidents 
which threaten the security in the 
international maritime transport sector; 
 
Reconnaissant en outre que, pour assurer 
l'application et le respect permanent de la 
Convention SOLAS de 1974 et du Code 
international pour la sûreté des navires et des 
installations portuaires (Code ISPS), il faut, 
entre autres, procéder à la collecte, 
l'évaluation et l'échange rapides et efficaces 
de renseignements concernant la sûreté; 
 
 
Reconnaissant également qu'il faut, 
conformément à la règle XI-2/7 de la 
Convention SOLAS de 1974 relative aux 
menaces contre les navires, établir des 
niveaux de sûreté et veiller à ce que les 
renseignements sur ces niveaux de sûreté 
soient communiqués aux navires exploités 
dans les mers territoriales des États de 
l'Afrique de l'Ouest et du centre ou ayant fait 
part de leur intention d'entrer dans ces mers 
territoriales et, lorsqu'un risque d'attaque a 
été déterminé, informer les navires 
concernés; 
 
Se déclarant gravement préoccupés par la 
sûreté des passagers et des équipages à bord 
des navires, y compris des embarcations de 
faibles dimensions, qu'ils soient au mouillage 
ou en route, dans la perspective d'incidents 
incluant des actes de terrorisme et d'autres 
actes illicites à l'encontre des navires, ainsi 
que par les risques connexes pour les 
personnes à terre ou les populations se 
trouvant dans les zones portuaires et pour les 
ports, les installations portuaires au large et le 
milieu marin; 
 
Convaincus qu'il faut que les États membres 
de l'OMAOC coopèrent et prennent, à titre 
hautement prioritaire, toutes les mesures 
nécessaires pour prévenir et réprimer tous les 
incidents qui menacent la sûreté du secteur 
des transports maritimes internationaux; 
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Recognizing the importance of sustainable 
fisheries as potential means for creating and 
sustaining employment, providing food 
security and generating revenue for the 
national economies of MOWCA Member 
States, and that they contribute to economic 
growth and poverty reduction; 
 
 
 
 
Desiring to move from words to action 
through full implementation of various 
international instruments for sustainable 
fisheries adopted or enacted in the past 
decades, including the 1995 Food and 
Agriculture Organization Code of Conduct 
for Responsible Fisheries, Governments in 
West and Central Africa should appreciate 
the social, economic and financial benefits of 
sustainable fisheries and provide financial, 
material and human resources to achieve 
defined objectives in protecting these 
resources and their environment; 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Recognizing that among those rescued at sea 
may be refugees and asylum seekers who 
should in accordance with international law, 
specifically the 1951 Convention relating to 
the Status of Refugees, and its 1967 Protocol 
as well as the 1969 OAU Convention 
governing the specific aspects of refugee 
problems of Africa, be disembarked 
promptly at a place of safety where they are 
safe from prosecution or other human rights 
violation and where the asylum requests will 
be examined; 
 
 
 
Reconnaissant l'importance que revêtent les 
pêcheries durables en tant que moyen 
susceptible de créer et de maintenir des 
emplois, d'assurer la sécurité alimentaire et 
de générer des recettes pour les économies 
nationales des États membres de 
l'Organisation maritime de l'Afrique de 
l'Ouest et du Centre, ainsi que leur 
contribution à la croissance économique et à 
la réduction de la pauvreté; 
Souhaitant concrétiser les mots par des 
actions en mettant pleinement en œuvre les 
divers instruments internationaux relatifs aux 
pêcheries durables, adoptés ou promulgués 
au cours des précédentes décennies, 
notamment le Code de conduite de 1995 pour 
une pêche responsable adopté par 
l'Organisation des Nations Unies pour 
l'alimentation et l'agriculture, les 
Gouvernements des pays d'Afrique de l'Ouest 
et du Centre devraient être conscients de 
l'intérêt social, économique et financier des 
pêcheries durables et fournir des ressources 
financières, matérielles et humaines pour 
atteindre des objectifs précis en matière de 
protection de ces ressources et de leur 
environnement; 
 
Reconnaissant que parmi ceux qui sont 
secourus en mer, il peut y avoir des réfugiés 
et des demandeurs d'asile qui devraient, 
conformément au droit international, 
précisément la Convention de 1951 relative 
au statut des réfugiés et son Protocole 
de 1967 ainsi que la Convention de l'OUA 
régissant les aspects propres aux problèmes 
des réfugiés en Afrique (1969), être 
débarqués au plus tôt en un lieu sûr où ils 
seront à l'abri de toute poursuite ou d'autres 
violations des droits de l'homme et où les 
demandes d'asile seront examinées; 
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Realizing that measures taken to control 
borders and restrictions on aliens' access to 
territory constitute a valid exercise of State 
sovereignty; 
 
 
Respecting fully the sovereignty, sovereign 
rights, jurisdiction and territorial integrity of 
the States which constitute the network, the 
principle on non-intervention, and the 
relevant provisions of international law, in 
particular, UNCLOS; 
 
 
Conscient que les mesures prises pour 
assurer le contrôle des frontières et les 
restrictions d'accès des étrangers sur le 
territoire sont justifiées dans le cadre de 
l'exercice de la souveraineté d'un État;  
 
Respectant pleinement la souveraineté, les 
droits souverains, la juridiction et l'intégrité 
territoriale des États qui constituent le 
Réseau, le principe de non-intervention et les 
dispositions pertinentes du droit 
international, notamment la Convention des 
Nations Unies sur le droit de la mer; 
 
Recognizing the potential benefits for the 
establishment of an integrated coast guard 
function network for the west and central 
coast of Africa across a wide range of 
activities, including the enhancement of 
maritime safety, security and environmental 
protection, law enforcement, and economic 
development; 
 
 
Recognizing that in the absence of a regional 
integration scheme, these conventions 
impose costly obligations in each West and 
Central African State in so far as each State 
develops its own regulation framework, set 
up its own shore installations and brings into 
service its own coastguard network mainly 
through its Navy or Maritime 
Administration;  
 
 
 
Conscious that the multiplicity of regulations 
and implementation procedures concerning 
their marine and coastal zones is not only 
expensive for the States taken individually, 
but also does not allow the States to take full 
advantage of economies of scale in guarding 
the coast and it also creates barriers and 
obstacles to shipping and trade ;  
 
Reconnaissant l'intérêt que pourrait présenter 
la mise en place d'un Réseau intégré de 
garde-côtes le long du littoral des pays 
d'Afrique de l'Ouest et du Centre dans des 
domaines très variés, notamment le 
renforcement de la sécurité et de la sûreté 
maritimes et la protection de 
l'environnement, l'application des lois et le 
développement économique; 
 
Reconnaissant qu'en l'absence de dispositif 
régional d'intégration, les conventions 
imposent de coûteuses obligations à chaque 
État de l'Afrique de l'Ouest et du Centre, dans 
la mesure où chaque État élabore son propre 
cadre réglementaire, établit ses propres 
infrastructures à terre et met en service son 
propre réseau de garde-côtes, en s'appuyant 
principalement sur sa marine nationale ou 
son administration maritime; 
 
 
Conscients que la multiplicité des règles et 
des procédures d'application concernant leurs 
zones maritimes et côtières n'entraîne pas 
seulement des frais importants pour les États 
pris individuellement, mais également qu'elle 
ne leur permet pas de tirer pleinement parti 
des économies d'échelle en ce qui concerne 
les services de garde-côtes et qu'elle crée par 
ailleurs des obstacles et des barrières aux 
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Noting that, taking into account the 
considerable obligations posed by the 1979 
SAR Convention, it had not been accepted or 
ratified by many Coastal states throughout 
the world including those of West and 
Central Africa and that the SAR Convention 
as amended clarifies the responsibilities of 
Governments and puts greater emphasis on 
the regional approach and co-ordination 
between maritime and aeronautical SAR 
operations ; 
 
Conscious that in the absence of a sub-
regional agreement on the right of hot-
pursuit across national borders, the sub-
region lacks an effective means to pursuit 
and prohibit piracy and armed robbery acts; 
 
transports maritimes et au commerce; 
 
Notant que, compte tenu des obligations 
considérables imposées par la Convention 
SAR de 1979, cette dernière n'a pas été 
acceptée ou ratifiée par nombre d'États 
côtiers à travers le monde, dont ceux de 
l'Afrique de l'Ouest et du Centre, et que la 
Convention SAR, telle que modifiée, clarifie 
les responsabilités des gouvernements et met 
davantage l'accent sur une approche 
régionale et sur la coordination entre les 
opérations SAR maritimes et aéronautiques; 
 
Conscients qu'en l'absence d'accord sous-
régional sur le droit de poursuite à travers les 
frontières nationales, la sous-région manque 
de moyens effectifs de poursuivre et de 
combattre les actes de piraterie et les vols à 
main armée; 
 
  Recognizing that although most of 
MOWCA Member States, through their 
respective Navy, Marine Police and 
Merchant Marine Administrations, already 
perform some coastguard activities, however 
these activities are not co-ordinated for a 
regional response in case of crises 
transcending national boundaries ; 
 
 
Conscious that most of the IMO 
Conventions can only be implemented 
effectively on a regional or sub-regional 
basis and, 
 
Convinced that MOWCA Member States 
individual coastguard activities can take 
advantage of economies of scale derived 
from an improved and harmonized regional 
coastguard network and a strengthened co-
operation and exchange of information  
 
 
 
Reconnaissant que, bien que la plupart des 
États membres de l'OMAOC assurent déjà 
des activités de garde-côtes par 
l'intermédiaire de leur marine nationale, leur 
police maritime et leur administration de la 
marine marchande, ces activités ne sont pas 
coordonnées de manière à pouvoir intervenir 
à l'échelle régionale en cas de crise dépassant 
les frontières nationales; 
 
Conscients que la plupart des conventions de 
l'OMI ne peuvent être effectivement mises en 
œuvre que dans un cadre sous-régional ou 
régional et, 
 
Convaincus que les activités de garde-côtes 
des États membres de l'OMAOC pris 
individuellement  peuvent tirer grand parti 
des économies d'échelle découlant de la mise 
en place d'un réseau régional de garde-côtes 
amélioré et harmonisé et d'une coopération 
renforcée, ainsi que des échanges 
d'informations; 
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Conscious that the issues of management of 
the seas and oceans are closely interrelated 
and need to be considered as a whole ; 
 
Affirming the duty of States to use the seas 
and oceans for peaceful purposes ;  
 
Acknowledging the importance of resolving 
sovereignty and jurisdictional disputes 
peacefully and without resort to force ;  
 
Supporting the will of MOWCA to foster a 
regional environment conducive to 
maintaining the peace, commerce and 
prosperity of the West and Central Africa;  
 
Taking into account IMO Resolution 
A.584(14) of 20 November 1985 on the 
development of measures to prevent 
unlawful acts which threaten the safety of 
ships and security of their passengers and 
crews ; 
 
Acknowledging the guiding principles for 
the Protection of the oceans, all kinds of 
seas, including enclosed and semi-enclosed 
seas, and coastal areas and the protection, 
rational use and development of their living 
resources set out in Chapter 17 of Agenda 
21, agreed at the United Nations Conference 
on Environment and Development (UNCED) 
in Rio de Janeiro in 1992 ;  
Conscients du fait que les questions relatives 
à la gestion des mers et océans sont 
étroitement liées et doivent être prises en 
considération dans leur ensemble; 
 
Affirmant le devoir des États d'utiliser les 
mers et les océans à des fins pacifiques; 
 
Reconnaissant qu'il est important de 
résoudre les conflits de souveraineté et de 
juridiction par la voie pacifique et sans usage 
de la force; 
 
Appuyant la volonté de l'OMAOC de 
faciliter l'émergence d'un environnement 
régional propice au maintien de la paix, au 
commerce et à la prospérité de l'Afrique de 
l'Ouest et du Centre; 
 
Tenant compte de la résolution de l'OMI 
A.584 (14) du 20 novembre 1985 sur 
l'élaboration de mesures visant à prévenir les 
actes illicites qui compromettent la sécurité 
des navires et la sûreté de leurs passagers et 
de leurs équipages; 
 
Reconnaissant les principes directeurs 
énoncés dans le chapitre 17 d'Action 21, 
adopté à la Conférence des Nations Unies sur 
l'environnement et le développement de Rio 
de Janeiro en 1992, à savoir protection des 
océans et de toutes les mers - y compris les 
mers fermées et semi-fermées - et des zones 
côtières et protection, utilisation rationnelle 
et mise en valeur de leurs ressources 
biologiques; 
Acknowledging the importance of seaborne 
trade in the West and Central Africa; 
  
Conscious of the interests which countries 
share in the marine environment, and in a 
spirit of cooperation, friendship and 
goodwill ; 
 
Reconnaissant l'importance du commerce 
maritime dans la région de l'Afrique de 
l'Ouest et du Centre; 
 
Conscients des intérêts que les pays 
partagent en ce qui concerne le milieu marin, 
dans un esprit de coopération, d'amitié et de 
bonne volonté; 
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Conscious of the need to develop a common 
approach to common maritime safety and 
security problems ; and  
 
Taking into account of the 
recommendations of IMO/MOWCA forum 
held in Dakar from 23 to 25 October 2006 on 
the establishment of an integrated coast 
guard function network for West and Central 
African Countries; 
 
Convinced that the following Memorandum 
of Understanding will promote regional 
maritime cooperation and a stable maritime 
environment, contribute to the peace, good 
order and continuing prosperity of the West 
and Central Africa ;  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Agree  to what follows: 
FIRST PART: DEFINITION, 
RELEVANT INSTRUMENTS, RIGHTS 
AND DUTIES: 
 
ARTICLE I              DEFINITIONS 
 
1. For the purposes of the following 
Memorandum :  
 
State Party " or   " Party " means West 
and Central Africa coastal State having 
signed or accepted this Memorandum of 
Conscients qu'il est nécessaire de mettre au 
point une approche commune pour résoudre 
les problèmes communs de sécurité et de 
sûreté maritimes; et 
 
Tenant compte des recommandations du 
forum OMI/OMAOC tenu à Dakar du 23 au 
25 octobre 2006 sur la mise en place d'un 
réseau intégré de garde-côtes pour les États 
d'Afrique de l'Ouest et du Centre; 
 
 
Convaincus que le présent Mémorandum 
d'entente peut d'une part, promouvoir la 
coopération maritime régionale et un 
environnement maritime stable, et d'autre 
part, contribuer à la paix, à l'ordre et à la 
prospérité durable de l'Afrique de l'Ouest et 
du Centre; 
 
Conviennent de ce qui suit : 
 
PREMIÈRE PARTIE : DÉFINITIONS, 
INSTRUMENTS PERTINENTS, DROITS 
ET OBLIGATIONS : 
 
Article 1 :  DÉFINITIONS 
 
1. Aux fins du présent Mémorandum : 
 
"État Partie" ou "Partie" signifie un État 
côtier de l'Afrique de l'Ouest et du Centre 
ayant signé ou accepté le présent 
Mémorandum d'entente. 
  
"eaux archipélagiques" signifie les eaux 
fermées délimitées par les lignes de base 
archipélagiques d'un État archipel tracées 
conformément à l'article 47 de la Convention 
des Nations Unies sur le droit de la mer de 
1982; 
 
 "garde-côtes" signifie l'administration de 
droit public d'un État qui est chargée de 
l'élaboration et de la mise en œuvre des 
politiques relatives à la sauvegarde de la vie 
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Understanding 
 
"archipelagic waters" means those waters 
enclosed by the archipelagic baselines of an 
archipelagic State drawn in accordance with 
Article 47 of UNCLOS ; 
“coastguard” means a public statutory 
agency in a State responsible for the 
development and implementation of policies 
on safety of life at sea, search and rescue 
interventions, maritime navigation police and 
marine pollution police ; 
 
 
humaine en mer, aux interventions de 
recherche et de sauvetage, à la police 
maritime et à la surveillance de la 
pollution marine; 
Competent Officer: An Officer of a State 
Party, competent to enforce legal provisions, 
to investigate infringements to these 
provisions and to prosecute or to report to a 
prosecuting Authority. 
 
Facility: Mobile or fixed facility of the 
Network 
 
"continental shelf" means the submarine 
area of seabed and subsoil as defined by Part 
VI of UNCLOS ;  
 
 
"enclosed or semi-enclosed sea" means a 
gulf, basin or sea surrounded by two or more 
States and connected to another sea or the 
ocean by a narrow outlet or consisting 
entirely or primarily of the territorial seas 
and exclusive economic zones of two or 
more coastal States, as defined by Part IX of 
UNCLOS ; 
 
"exclusive economic zone" means an area 
superjacent to the sea-bed, and subsoil, as 
defined by Part V of the UNCLOS ;  
Fonctionnaire compétent : Fonctionnaire 
d'un État Partie, habilité à appliquer des 
dispositions juridiques, enquêter sur des 
infractions à ces dispositions et engager des 
poursuites devant les tribunaux ou rendre 
compte à l'autorité chargée de ces poursuites. 
 
Moyen : Moyen mobile ou fixe du réseau 
 
 
"plateau continental" désigne les fonds 
marins et leur sous-sol, tel que défini dans la 
partie VI de la Convention des Nations Unies 
sur le droit de la mer de 1982; 
 
 
"mer fermée ou mer semi-fermée" désigne 
un golfe, un bassin ou une mer entouré par 
deux ou plusieurs États et relié à une autre 
mer ou à l'océan par un passage étroit, ou 
constitué, entièrement ou principalement, des 
mers territoriales et des zones économiques 
exclusives de deux ou plusieurs États côtiers, 
telles que définies dans la partie IX de la 
Convention des Nations Unies sur le droit de 
la mer de 1982; 
 
"zone économique exclusive" désigne une 
zone surjacente au fond de la mer, et au sous-
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“foreign sea” means a sea area where a 
State, as coastal State, is different from the 
State providing the flag of a given facility of 
the Organization ; 
 
"high seas" means those waters to which the 
provisions of Part VII of UNCLOS applies ;  
 
 
"marine environment" includes the oceans 
and all seas and adjacent coastal areas ;  
 
“piracy” as defined in Art 101 of UNCLOS 
means : (a) any illegal acts of violence or 
detention, or any act of depredation, 
committed for private ends by the crew or 
the passengers of a private ship or a private 
aircraft, and directed : 
 
sol, telle que définie dans la partie V de la 
Convention des Nations Unies sur le droit de 
la mer de 1982; 
 
"mer étrangère" signifie une zone maritime 
où un État, agissant en tant qu'État côtier, est 
différent de l'État du pavillon d'un moyen de 
l'Organisation; 
 
"haute mer" signifie les eaux auxquelles les 
dispositions de la partie VII de la Convention des 
Nations Unies sur le droit de la mer de 1982 
s'appliquent; 
 
"milieu marin" désigne les océans et toutes les 
mers et les zones côtières adjacentes; 
 
"piraterie", telle que définie à l'article 101 de la 
Convention des Nations Unies sur le droit de la mer 
de 1982 désigne : a) tout acte illicite de violence ou 
de détention ou toute déprédation commise, par 
l'équipage ou les passagers d'un navire ou d'un 
aéronef privé, agissant à des fins privées, et dirigé : 
- on the high seas, against another ship 
or aircraft, or against persons or 
property on board such ship or 
aircraft ; 
- against a ship, aircraft, persons or 
property in a place outside the 
jurisdiction of any State ; 
 
(b) any act of voluntary participation in the 
operation of a ship or of an aircraft with 
knowledge of facts making it a pirate ship or 
aircraft ; 
 
(c) any act inciting or of intentionally 
facilitating an act described in sub-paragraph 
(a) or (b).”; 
 
 
pollution of the marine environment" 
means the introduction by man, directly or 
- contre un autre navire ou aéronef, ou 
contre des personnes ou des biens à 
leur bord, en haute mer; 
- contre un navire ou aéronef, des 
personnes ou des biens, dans un lieu 
ne relevant pas de la juridiction d'un 
État; 
 
b) tout acte de participation volontaire à 
l'utilisation d'un navire ou d'un aéronef, 
lorsque son auteur a connaissance de faits 
dont il découle que ce navire ou cet aéronef 
est un navire ou aéronef pirate; 
 
c) tout acte ayant pour but d'inciter à 
commettre les actes définis aux lettres a) ou 
b), ou commis dans l'intention de les faciliter; 
 
on entend par "pollution du milieu marin" 
l'introduction directe ou indirecte, par 
l'homme, de substances ou d'énergie dans le 
520 
 
indirectly, of substances or energy into the 
marine environment, including estuaries, 
which results or is likely to result in such 
deleterious effects as harm to living 
resources and marine life, hazards to human 
health, hindrance to marine activities, 
including fishing and other legitimate uses of 
the sea, impairment of quality for use of sea 
water and reduction of amenities, as defined 
by Part I of UNCLOS ;  
 
"sea lines of communication" is the term 
used to describe shipping routes used for 
seaborne trade ;  
"surveillance" means the observation of 
aerospace, surface and sub-surface areas, 
places, persons or objects by visual, aural, 
electronic, and photographic means; and  
 
 
"territorial sea" means the belt of sea which 
is claimed by the coastal State as territorial 
sea in accordance with Section 2, Part II of 
UNCLOS.  
 
ARTICLE II              RELEVANT 
INSTRUMENTS 
 
1. For the purposes of this Memorandum, 
“relevant documents” are the under listed 
instruments together with any protocols or 
amendments thereto and mandatory codes enacted 
pursuant to such instruments or protocols :  
 
milieu marin, y compris les estuaires, 
lorsqu'elle a ou peut avoir des effets nuisibles 
tels que dommages aux ressources 
biologiques et à la faune et la flore marines, 
risques pour la santé de l'homme, entrave aux 
activités maritimes, y compris la pêche et les 
autres utilisations légitimes de la mer, 
altération de la qualité de l'eau de mer du 
point de vue de son utilisation et dégradation 
des valeurs d'agrément, telle que définie dans 
la partie I de la Convention des Nations 
Unies sur le droit de la mer, de 1982; 
 
"lignes de communications maritimes" est 
le terme utilisé pour décrire les routes 
maritimes servant au commerce maritime; 
"surveillance" signifie l'observation de 
l'espace aérien, des surfaces terrestres et des 
zones sous-marines, des lieux, des personnes 
ou des objets par des moyens visuels, 
acoustiques, électroniques et 
photographiques; et 
 
"mer territoriale" désigne la partie de la 
mer qui est revendiquée par l'État côtier en 
tant que mer territoriale, conformément à la 
section 2 de la partie II de la Convention des 
Nations Unies sur le droit de la mer de 1982. 
 
Article 2 :  INSTRUMENTS 
PERTINENTS 
 
1. Aux fins du présent Mémorandum, les 
"instruments pertinents" sont ceux énumérés ci-
dessous, avec tous les  protocoles ou amendements 
y afférents ainsi que les codes obligatoires adoptés 
dans le cadre de ces instruments et protocoles : 
 Maritime Transport Charter for West 
and Central Africa adopted in 
Abidjan on May 7, 1975 and as 
amended on August 6, 1999; 
 
 IMO Assembly resolution A.584(14) 
of 20 November 1985 on the 
 Charte maritime d'Abidjan de 
l’Afrique de l’Ouest at du Centre de 
1975, telle que modifiée le 6 août 
1999; 
 
 Résolution de l'OMI A.584(14) du 
20 novembre 1985 sur l'élaboration 
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development of measures to prevent 
unlawful acts which threaten the 
safety of ships and security of their 
passengers and crews; 
 
 
 United Nations General Assembly 
resolutions A/Res/55/2, A/Res/55/7, 
A/Res/59/24 and A/Res/60/30 
 
 
 MOWCA Recommendations No 
04/05; No 05/05; No 06/05 
approving the establishment of four 
(4) coastguard zones in the sub-
region for effective zonal 
coordination and the setting up of 
two principal coordinating centres 
for the region, adopted by the 
MOWCA Bureau of Ministers in 
Luanda, March 2005 and September 
2007; 
 
 
 
 MOWCA Resolution n° 182/11/01   
approving the proposal to establish 
an integrated Sub-regional Coast 
Guard network, adopted at 11
th
 
General Assembly of Ministers of 
MOWCA, Abuja, 4
th
 June 2001; 
 
 
 International Convention for the 
Safety of Life at Sea, 1974, as 
amended (SOLAS 74); 
 
 
 The International Ship and Port 
Facility Security Code.(ISPS Code) 
Code ; 
 
 
 United Nations Convention on the 
Law of the Sea 1982 (UNCLOS) ; 
 
 International Convention for the 
Prevention of Pollution from Ships, 
1973 as modified by the Protocol of 
1978 (MARPOL 73/78) ; 
de mesures visant à prévenir les actes 
illicites qui compromettent la 
sécurité des navires et la sûreté de 
leurs passagers et de leurs équipages; 
 
 Résolutions de l'Assemblée générale 
des Nations Unies A/Res/55/2, 
A/Res/55/7, A/Res/59/24 et 
A/Res/60/30 
 
 Recommandations de l'OMAOC No 
04/05 ; No 05/05; n°06/05 
approuvant l'établissement de quatre 
(4) zones couvertes par des 
garde-côtes dans la sous-région en 
vue d'une coordination efficace entre 
les zones et la création des deux  
centres principal de coordination 
pour la région, adoptées par le 
Bureau des Ministres de l'OMAOC à 
Luanda, mars 2005 et septembre, 
2007; 
 
 Résolution No 182/11/01  de 
l'OMAOC     approuvant la 
proposition visant à établir un   
réseau sous-régional intégré de 
garde-côtes,     adoptée à la 11ème 
Assemblée générale des  Ministres 
de l'OMAOC à Abuja le 4 juin 2001; 
 
 Convention internationale de 1974 
pour la sauvegarde de la vie humaine 
en mer (Convention SOLAS de 
1974) et son Protocole de 1978; 
 
 Code international pour la sûreté des 
navires et des instalations portuaires 
(Code ISPS) ; 
 
 Convention des Nations Unies sur le 
droit de la mer de 1982; 
 
 Convention internationale de 1973 
pour la prévention de la pollution par 
les navires, telle que modifiée par le 
Protocole de 1978 (MARPOL 
73/78); 
 
 Convention sur le Règlement 
international de 1972 pour prévenir 
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 Convention on the International 
Regulation for Preventing Collisions 
at Sea !972; (COLREG 72) ; 
 
les abordages en mer (Convention 
COLREG de 1972); 
 
 
 International Convention on Civil 
Liability for Oil Pollution Damage 
(CLC) 1969 as amended by the CLC 
protocol of 1992; 
 
 
 International Convention for the 
Suppression of Unlawful Acts 
against the Safety of Maritime 
Navigation, 1988; (SUA 88), as 
amended ; 
 
 Protocol for the Suppression of 
Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of 
Fixed Platforms Located on the 
Continental Shelf,1988,.(SUA Prot 
88), as amended ; 
 
 International Convention on the 
preparation,           the fight and the 
co-operation in case oil pollution 
(OPRC 90);  
 
 1979 SAR Convention as amended 
 
 
 United Nations Food and 
Agricultural Program Code of 
Conduct for Fisheries;  
 
 
 1951 Convention relating to the 
Status of Refugees, and its 1967 
Protocol as well as the 1969 OAU 
Convention governing the specific 
aspects of refugee problems of 
Africa.  
 
Article 3: RIGHTS AND DUTIES 
 
1. States recognize:    
 the sovereignty and responsibilities 
of other States in respect of their 
 Protocole de 1992 modifiant la 
Convention internationale de 1969 
sur la responsabilité civile pour les 
dommages dus à la pollution  par les 
hydrocarbures (Protocole CLC 
de 1992);  
 
 Convention de 1988 pour la 
répression d'actes illicites contre la 
sécurité de la navigation maritime 
(Convention SUA de 1988), telle que 
modifiée; 
 
 Protocole de 1988 pour la répression 
d'actes illicites contre la sécurité des 
plates-formes fixes situées sur le 
plateau continental (Protocole SUA 
de 1988 tel que modifié); 
 
 Convention internationale de 1990 
sur la préparation, la lutte et la 
coopération en matière de pollution 
par les hydrocarbures (Convention 
OPRC); 
 
 Convention SAR de 1979, telle que 
modifiée; 
 
 Code de conduite pour une pêche 
responsable de l'Organisation des 
Nations Unies pour l'alimentation et 
l'agriculture; 
 
 Convention de 1952 relative au statut 
des réfugiés (et Protocole de 1967) 
ainsi que Convention de l'UA y 
afférente.  
 
 
Article 3 : DROITS ET OBLIGATIONS 
 
1. Les États reconnaissent : 
 la souveraineté et les responsabilités 
des autres États en ce qui concerne 
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internal waters, territorial seas, and 
archipelagic waters ;  
 
 
 the sovereign rights and duties of 
other States with regard to exclusive 
economic zones and continental 
shelves; and  
 
 
 the rights and responsibilities of 
other States as provided by 
UNCLOS, other conventions, treaty 
obligations and general international 
law.  
 
leurs eaux intérieures, mers 
territoriales et eaux archipélagiques; 
 
 les droits souverains et les 
obligations des autres États en ce qui 
concerne leurs zones économiques 
exclusives et leurs plateaux 
continentaux; et 
 
 les droits et les responsabilités des 
autres États, tels que prévus par la 
Convention des Nations Unies sur le 
droit de la mer de 1982 et les autres 
conventions et traités et par le droit 
international général. 
SECOND PART: THE INTEGRATED 
NETWORK OF COASTGUARDS 
     
TITLE I: AT THE NATIONAL  LEVEL 
 
Article  4: The States Parties take 
following obligations: 
1.  to seek the establishment of a system for 
coordinating agencies with responsibility for 
national coastguard functions by each coastal 
Member State of MOWCA to develop and 
implement, as necessary:  
 
(a) appropriate national maritime security 
policies to safeguard maritime trade from all 
forms of unlawful acts;  
(b) national legislation, practices and 
procedures, which together provide the 
security necessary for the safe and secure 
operation of port facilities and ships at all 
security levels; 
 
(c) legislation which ensures effective 
protection of the marine environment. 
 
 
 2. to establish, as necessary, a national 
system for co-ordinating the related activities 
between the departments, agencies, control 
authorities, and other organizations of the 
State, port operators, Companies and other 
DEUXIÈME PARTIE : LE RÉSEAU 
INTÉGRÉ DE GARDE-CÔTES 
 
TITRE I : AU NIVEAU NATIONAL 
 
Article 4 : Les États Parties s'engagent à : 
 
.1 solliciter la création par chacun des 
États membres de l'OMAOC d'un service 
national de garde-côtes pour élaborer et 
mettre en œuvre, selon qu'il conviendra :  
 
 
a) une politique nationale de sûreté maritime 
afin de protéger le commerce maritime contre 
toutes les formes d'actes illicites;  
b) une législation nationale, des règles 
pratiques et des procédures qui assurent 
conjointement les conditions nécessaires à la 
sécurité et à la sûreté de l'exploitation des 
installations portuaires et des navires à tous 
les niveaux de sûreté; 
c) une législation qui garantit une protection 
efficace de l’environnement marin. 
 
 
.2 mettre en place, le cas échéant, un 
système national en vue de coordonner les 
activités connexes entre les départements, 
institutions, autorités chargées du contrôle, et 
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entities concerned with, or responsible for 
the implementation of, compliance with, and 
enforcement of, measures to enhance 
maritime security and search and rescue; 
 
 
 
3.  to establish, as necessary, a national 
system for harmonizing and co-ordinating 
security measures designed to enhance the 
security in the international maritime 
transport sector with those of other modes of 
transport ; 
 
 
4.  to institute or improve a national 
mechanism for intra- and intergovernmental 
agencies and other relevant stakeholders to 
co-operate and co-ordinate on a coastguard 
function; 
 
 
  
5. to prosecute, in accordance with relevant 
domestic laws, perpetrators of all forms of 
piracy and unlawful acts against seafarers, 
ships, port facility personnel and port 
facilities; 
 
 
autres organismes de l'État, exploitants 
portuaires, compagnies et autres entités 
chargées de mettre en œuvre, appliquer et 
faire appliquer les mesures visant à renforcer 
la sûreté maritime ainsi que la recherche et le 
sauvetage; 
 
.3 mettre en place, le cas échéant, un 
système national en vue d'harmoniser et de 
coordonner les mesures relatives à la sûreté 
destinées à renforcer la sûreté dans le secteur 
du transport maritime international avec 
celles qui s'appliquent à d'autres modes de 
transport; 
 
.4 mettre en place un mécanisme 
national, ou améliorer le mécanisme existant, 
permettant aux institutions officielles 
nationales et intergouvernementales et à 
d'autres parties prenantes concernées de 
coopérer et de coordonner l'action des 
services des garde-côtes; 
  
5. poursuivre en justice, conformément aux 
lois nationales applicables, les auteurs de 
toutes les formes d'actes de piraterie et 
d'actes illicites à l'encontre des gens de mer, 
des navires, des installations portuaires et du 
personnel qui y travaille; 
 
6.   Set up in each MOWCA member States 
the maritime Fund 
 
Article 5: Organization and operation 
 
The organization and the operation of the 
national structure come exclusively under the 
responsibility of each State in accordance 
with the laws and regulations in force. 
 
 
 
TITLE II: AT THE REGIONAL LEVEL 
 
Article 6: The Parties take following 
obligations: 
 
6.  créer, dans chaque État membre de 
l'OMAOC, les fonds maritime. 
 
Article 5 : Organisation et fonctionnement 
 
L'organisation et le fonctionnement de la 
structure nationale relèvent exclusivement de 
la compétence de chaque État Partie 
conformément aux lois et règlements  en 
vigueur. 
 
 
TITRE II : AU NIVEAU RÉGIONAL 
 
Article 6 : Les États Parties s'engagent à : 
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1.  to seek the establishment of an integrated 
coastguard function network for West and 
Central Africa to develop and implement, as 
necessary:  
 
 
(a) appropriate regional maritime security 
policies to safeguard maritime trade from all 
forms of unlawful acts;  
(b) regional legislation, practices and 
procedures, which together provide the 
security necessary for the safe and secure 
operation of port facilities and ships at all 
security levels; 
 
 
 
 
2. to consolidate the existing, or seek to 
establish, as the case may be, a regional 
maritime information centre through which 
the States can share and exchange security-
related information, for the aim of preventing 
or combating unlawful acts against seafarers, 
ships, port facility personnel and port 
facilities in the area and ensuring prompt 
response to any distress or security alert 
received from these ships; 
 
 
 
 
3. to seek ways for engaging States which 
trade with West and Central Africa and the 
shipping industry to support and enhance the 
safety, security and environmental protection 
in West and Central Africa; 
 
 
 
4. to combat piracy, armed robbery against 
ships, unlawful acts and transnational 
organized crime at sea by enhancing the 
regional maritime security strategies and 
multilateral co-operation in their 
.1 s'employer à créer un réseau intégré 
de garde-côtes des pays d'Afrique de l'Ouest 
et du Centre pour élaborer et mettre en 
œuvre, selon qu'il conviendra :  
 
a) une politique régionale appropriée de 
sûreté maritime afin de protéger le commerce 
maritime contre toutes les formes d'actes 
illicites;  
b) une législation régionale, des règles 
pratiques et des procédures qui assurent 
conjointement les conditions nécessaires à la 
sécurité et à la sûreté de l'exploitation des 
installations portuaires et des navires à tous 
les niveaux de sûreté; 
 
.2 renforcer l'actuel centre régional 
d'information maritime, ou s'employer à en 
créer un, selon le cas, grâce auquel les États 
peuvent mettre en commun et échanger des 
renseignements relatifs à la sûreté en vue de 
prévenir les actes illicites à l'encontre des 
gens de mer, des navires, des installations 
portuaires et de leurs personnels se trouvant 
dans la zone, ou de lutter contre ces actes, et 
de garantir une intervention rapide dans tous 
les cas où sont reçues des alertes de détresse 
ou de sûreté provenant de ces navires; 
 
.3 rechercher des moyens d'inciter les 
États Parties qui font commerce avec 
l'Afrique de l'Ouest et du Centre ainsi que le 
secteur des transports maritimes à développer 
et à renforcer la sécurité, la sûreté et la 
protection de l'environnement en Afrique de 
l'Ouest et du Centre;  
 
4.  lutter contre les actes de piraterie et les 
vols à main armée à l'encontre des navires, les actes 
illicites et la criminalité transnationale organisée en 
mer, en améliorant les stratégies régionales de 
sûreté maritime et en renforçant la coopération 
multilatérale aux fins de leur mise en oeuvre; 
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implementation; 
 
5. to integrate  any existing co-operative 
efforts or arrangements relating to combating 
unlawful acts against seafarers, ships, port 
facility personnel and port facilities and 
trans-national organized maritime crime, 
including those relating to collection, 
assessment, sharing and exchanging of 
security-related information and those 
relating to the co-operation and co-ordination 
among the institutions concerned, such as 
naval units, coastal patrol and law 
enforcement agencies, shipping companies, 
seafarers, and port authorities with a view of 
identifying any areas which may warrant 
improvements; 
 
 
 
 
6. to improve international and regional co-
operation with a view to ensure that pirates 
and persons committing unlawful acts 
against seafarers, ships and port facilities and 
port facility personnel do not evade 
prosecution; 
 
 
7. to take into account any existing 
legislative and administrative arrangements 
relating to the investigation of alleged piracy 
or armed robbery incidents and for the 
prosecution, conviction and punishment of 
those involved in acts of piracy and armed 
robbery against ships with a view of 
identifying any areas which may warrant 
improvement taking into account the 
guidelines for the suppression of piracy and 
armed-robbery against ships1 developed by 
the International Maritime Organization;  
 
 
 
8. to improve the capacity of national and 
5. intégrer toutes les initiatives ou 
dispositifs de coopération existants qui ont 
trait à la lutte contre les actes illicites à 
l'encontre des gens de mer, des navires, des 
installations portuaires et de leurs personnels, 
et à la criminalité transnationale organisée 
dans les transports maritimes, notamment 
ceux qui concernent la collecte, l'évaluation, 
la mise en commun et l'échange de 
renseignements relatifs à la sûreté, ainsi que 
ceux qui portent sur la coopération et la 
coordination entre les institutions concernées 
telles que les unités navales, les services de 
recherche côtiers et les organes de la force 
publique, les compagnies de navigation, les 
gens de mer et les administrations portuaires 
afin de recenser tous les éléments qu'il y 
aurait lieu d'améliorer; 
 
6. améliorer la coopération 
internationale et régionale afin de garantir 
que les pirates et les personnes qui 
commettent des actes criminels à l'encontre 
des gens de mer, des navires et des 
installations portuaires et du personnel qui y 
travaille, n'échappent pas aux poursuites; 
 
7.   prendre en compte tous les 
dispositifs législatifs et administratifs 
existants qui ont trait aux enquêtes sur les 
incidents présumés de piraterie et de vols à 
main armée ainsi qu'à la poursuite, à la 
condamnation et au châtiment des personnes 
impliquées dans des actes de piraterie et des 
vols à main armée à l'encontre des navires, 
afin de recenser tous les éléments qu'il y 
aurait lieu d'améliorer en tenant compte des 
recommandations et des directives 
pertinentes sur la répression des actes de 
piraterie et des vols à main armée à l'encontre 
des navires formulées par l'Organisation 
maritime internationale; 
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regional training institutions for the training 
and development of relevant indigenous 
human capital for the operation of an 
efficient regional coastguard function 
network; 
 
 
9. to seek the commitment, consistent with 
the provisions of UNCLOS, of any military 
ship or other ships in the area capable of 
providing assistance, to respond to any 
situation of persons in distress at sea; 
 
.8 améliorer les moyens des institutions 
de formation nationales et régionales aux fins 
de la formation et de la mise en valeur du 
capital humain local en vue de faire 
fonctionner un réseau régional efficace de 
garde-côtes; 
 
.9 obtenir l'engagement, conformément 
aux dispositions de la Convention des 
Nations Unies sur le droit de la mer, de la 
part de tous les navires de guerre ou autres 
qui se trouvent dans la zone et sont en 
mesure de prêter assistance, qu'ils 
interviendront lorsque des personnes sont en 
détresse en mer;  
 
10. to become parties to and implement the 
provisions of, the International Conventions 
and Protocols related to the prevention and 
suppression of international terrorism and, in 
particular, the 1988 SUA Convention, the 
1988 SUA Protocol, the Protocol of 2005 to 
the Convention for the Suppression of 
Unlawful Acts against the Safety of 
Maritime Navigation and the Protocol of 
2005 to the Protocol for the Suppression of 
Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Fixed 
Platforms Located on the Continental Shelf; 
the United Nations Convention against 
Trans-national Organized Crime, 2000; and 
also to become parties to and implement the 
1951 Convention relating to the Status of 
Refugees, and its 1967 Protocol as well as 
the 1969 OAU Convention governing the 
specific aspects of refugee problems of 
Africa;   
 
11. to ensure that, in seeking the fulfilment 
of the above objectives, a balance is 
maintained between the need to enhance 
maritime security and facilitation of 
maritime traffic and to avoid any 
unnecessary delays to international maritime 
trade in West and Central Africa; 
 
10.  devenir parties, dans les plus brefs 
délais, aux conventions et protocoles 
internationaux qui concernent la prévention 
et la répression du terrorisme international, et 
notamment la Convention SUA de 1988, le 
Protocole SUA de 1988, le Protocole de 2005 
relatif à la Convention pour la répression 
d'actes illicites contre la sécurité de la 
navigation maritime et le Protocole de 2005 
relatif au Protocole pour la répression d'actes 
illicites contre la sécurité des plates-formes 
fixes situées sur le plateau continental, la 
Convention des Nations Unies contre la 
criminalité transnationale organisée (2000); 
et aussi devenir parties en appliquant leurs 
dispositions, à la Convention de 1951 relative 
au statut des réfugiés et son Protocole de 
1967 ainsi qu'à la Convention de l'OUA 
régissant les aspects propres aux problèmes 
des réfugiés en Afrique (1969); 
 
11 faire en sorte, en s'efforçant 
d'atteindre les objectifs ci-dessus, de 
respecter un équilibre entre la nécessité de 
renforcer la sûreté maritime et les 
dispositions visant à faciliter le trafic 
maritime, de façon à éviter de retarder 
indûment le commerce maritime international 
en Afrique de l'Ouest et du Centre; 
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12.  to co-operate and collaborate with the 
sub-regional fisheries bodies and the Food 
and Agriculture Organization on preventing 
and combating illegal, unregulated and 
unreported fishing, and protecting fisheries 
resources for sustainable long term 
utilization to sustain livelihoods in West and 
Central Africa; 
 
 
 
13. to ensure that measures taken to control 
borders and restrictions and aliens access to 
territory are in compliance with international 
law including human rights and refugee law;  
 
 
14. to co-operate with the United Nations 
High Commissioner for Refugees with 
regard to the protection of asylum seekers 
and refugees at sea; 
 
.12 coopérer et collaborer avec les 
organismes de pêche sous-régionaux et 
l'Organisation des Nations Unies pour 
l'alimentation et l'agriculture pour prévenir et 
éliminer la pêche illicite, non déclarée et non 
réglementée, et protéger les ressources 
halieutiques en vue d'une exploitation 
durable permettant de conserver les moyens 
de subsistance en Afrique de l'Ouest et du 
Centre;  
 
13. s'assurer que les mesures prises pour 
contrôler les frontières et les restrictions de 
l'accès des étrangers sur le territoire sont 
conformes au droit international, notamment 
aux droits de l'homme et au droit des 
réfugiés; 
 
14.  coopérer avec le Haut Commissariat 
des Nations Unies pour les réfugiés (HCR) 
en ce qui concerne la protection des 
demandeurs d'asile et des réfugiés en mer; 
 
 
15. to review periodically the progress of the 
efforts made in achieving the above 
objective and to share the result of the 
experience gained with MOWCA Member 
States; and 
 
 
16. to have the General Assembly of 
MOWCA and the Bureau of Ministers 
informed of efforts made in achieving the 
above objective, and of the international 
support provided in this regard. 
 
TITLE 2: MISSION AND 
ORGANISATION 
 
Article 7: Missions 
 
The goal of the Coastguard Function 
Network (the Network) is to allow the parties 
to promote and make joint efforts as far as 
their maritime activities are concerned, 
15. examiner régulièrement l'état 
d'avancement des initiatives menées pour 
atteindre les objectifs susmentionnés et 
partager les résultats de l'expérience acquise 
avec les États Membres de l'OMAOC; et 
 
16.  tenir l'Assemblée Générale de 
l'OMAOC et le Bureau des Ministres 
informés des efforts déployés pour atteindre 
les objectifs ci-dessus et du soutien 
international reçu à cet effet. 
 
 
TITRE 2 : MISSIONS ET 
ORGANISATION 
 
Article 7 : Missions 
 
Le Réseau de garde-côtes a pour mission de  
permettre aux États Parties de promouvoir et 
d'entreprendre, dans la mesure où leurs 
activités maritimes sont concernées, des 
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particularly those devoted to the protection 
of the human life, the enforcement of the 
laws, the improvement of safety and the 
protection of the environment. 
 
 
Article 8: Administrative organisation 
 
The highest body of administration of the 
Network is the Council of Ministers 
(hereafter called the Council).  
 
The Council of Ministers elects its bureau in 
accordance with the Rules of Procedure of 
the Organisation 
 
The Council decides on the general policy 
of the Network, adopts the annual budget, 
appoints the Principal Coordinator and takes 
all other decisions envisaged by the 
memorandum. It can interpret the 
Memorandum.  
 
The Council meets twice (2) per annum. It 
can hold extraordinary meetings where 
necessary. 
 
The Principal Coordinator of the Network 
takes part in the meetings of the Council. 
 
The Secretary-General of MOWCA takes 
part in the meetings of the Council as 
observer. 
 
actions communes visant notamment à la 
sauvegarde de la vie humaine en mer, au 
respect des lois, à l'amélioration de la sécurité 
et à la protection du milieu marin. 
 
Article 8 : Organisation administrative 
 
L'organe suprême de décision du Réseau est 
le Conseil des Ministres (ci-après dénommé 
le Conseil).  
 
Le Conseil des Ministres élit son bureau 
conformément au règlement intérieur de 
l'Organisation. 
 
Le Conseil décide de la politique générale 
du Réseau, adopte le budget annuel, nomme 
le Coordonnateur principal et prend toutes 
autres décisions prévues par le 
Mémorandum. Il peut interpréter le 
Mémorandum. 
 
Le Conseil se réunit deux (2) fois par an. Il 
peut tenir des réunions extraordinaires en cas 
de besoin. 
 
Le Coordonnateur principal du Réseau 
participe aux réunions du Conseil. 
 
Le Secrétaire général de l'OMAOC participe 
aux réunions du Conseil en qualité 
d'observateur. 
 
Article 9:  TECHNICAL EVALUATION 
COMMITTEE 
 
The Technical Committee of Evaluation 
(hereafter) called the technical committee, is 
composed of experts nominated by the 
Secretary-general of MOWCA, in charge of 
steering the implementation and the progress 
of the Network 
 
Article 10: Committee of Representatives 
 
The Representatives of the Committee 
Article 9 : Le Comité technique d'évaluation 
 
 
Le Comité technique d’évaluation (ci-après) 
appelé le comité technique, est composé 
d’experts nommés par le Secrétaire Général 
de l’OMAOC, chargé de suivre la mise en 
œuvre et l’évolution du Réseau 
 
 
Article 10 : Comité des représentants 
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(hereafter called the Committee) is 
composed of a Representative for each State 
Party. Each Representative can be assisted 
by two substitutes. 
 
The Representative of a State Party is the 
Person in charge, in his/her country, of 
the general coordination of all the 
questions relating to the Network and the 
only person in charge of the connection 
between his Government and the 
Network, except for what relates to the 
capacity of the Council. 
 
The Committee assists the Principal 
Coordinator in the general administration of 
the Network. On a proposal from the 
Principal Coordinator, it decides principles 
of the work programme and the means of 
the Network. It adopts the relevant 
operational documents relating to the 
activity of the Organisation. 
 
 
Le Comité des Représentants (ci-après appelé 
le Comité) est composé d’un Représentant de 
chaque Etat Partie. Chaque Représentant 
peut être assisté de deux Représentants 
suppléants. 
 
Le Représentant d’une Partie est le 
Responsable, dans son pays, de la 
coordination générale de toutes les questions 
regardant le Réseau et seul chargé de la 
liaison entre son Gouvernement et le 
Réseau, à l’exception des questions relevant 
de la compétence du Conseil. 
 
 
Le Comité assiste les Coordonnateurs 
principaux dans la gestion du Réseau. Sur 
proposition des Coordonnateurs principaux, 
il décide (des principes) du programme 
d’activité des moyens du Réseau. Il adopte 
les documents opérationnels pertinents en 
relation avec l’activité du Réseau. 
 
It examines all the questions submitted to it 
by the Principal Coordinators and, 
according to the cases, delivers opinions, 
decides or transmits to the technical 
evaluation committee.  
 
The Committee proposes to the Council the 
appointment of the Deputy Principal 
Coordinator and the Coordinator of zones.  
 
The committee of evaluation attends the 
meetings of the committee as statutory 
participant. 
 
The Representatives Committee elects its 
bureau in accordance with the rules of 
procedure of the Organisation.  
 
Article 11: Committee of Representatives 
 
The Principal Coordinator is the legal 
representative of the network. He/she is 
Il examine toutes les questions qui lui sont 
soumises par les Coordonnateurs principaux  
et, selon les cas, donne les avis, décide ou 
transmet au comité technique d’évaluation. 
 
Le Comité propose au comité d’évaluation 
la nomination des Coordonnateurs 
principaux Adjoints et les Coordonnateurs 
de zones. 
 
 Le comité d’évaluation assiste statutairement 
aux réunions du comité. 
 
Le Comité des Représentants élit son bureau 
conformément au règlement intérieur du 
Réseau 
 
 
Article 11 : Comité des représentants 
 
Le Coordonnateur principal est le 
représentant légal du Réseau. Il est 
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responsible for its general management and 
can take the required measures to this end, in 
accordance with the provisions of this 
memorandum. He/she can delegate his 
powers to his Assistant and to the 
Coordinator of the zones in accordance with 
the directives approved by the Council. 
 
He/she is replaced by the Deputy Principal 
Coordinator when he/she is unavailable. 
He/she accounts for operational activities of 
the Network at each meeting of the Council. 
 
Article 12: Constitution of the Network 
 
The Network comprises four (04) 
Coastguard zones with respective four (4) 
Coastguard Zonal Coordinating Centres and 
two (2) Principal Coordinating Centres:  
 
- Zone 1: Mauritania, Senegal, Gambia, 
Guinea Bissau, Cabo Verde. 
- Zone 2: Guinea, Sierra Leone, Liberia, 
Cote d'Ivoire, Ghana. 
- Zone 3: Togo, Benin, Nigeria, 
Cameroon, Equatorial Guinea. 
- Zone 4: Gabon, Congo, DRC, Sao 
Tome & Principe, Angola. 
 
ln each zone, a Coordinator is in charge of 
operations in his/her zone, according to 
Principal Coordinator's instructions and 
orders.  
 
 
responsable de sa gestion générale et peut 
prendre les mesures nécessaires à cette fin, 
conformément aux dispositions du présent 
Mémorandum. Il peut déléguer ses pouvoirs 
à son adjoint et aux Coordonnateurs de zone, 
conformément aux directives approuvées par 
le Conseil.  
 
Il est remplacé par le Coordonnateur 
principal adjoint en cas d'empêchement. Il 
rend compte, lors de chaque réunion du 
Conseil, des activités du Réseau. 
 
 
Article 12 : Constitution du Réseau 
 
 Le Réseau comprend quatre (4) zones des 
garde cotes avec quatre (4) Centres de 
coordination de la zone et deux (2) Centres 
principal de coordination : 
 
 
- Zone 1 :  Mauritanie, Sénégal, Gambie, 
Guinée-Bissau, Cap Vert. 
- Zone 2 : Guinée, Sierra Léone, Libéria, 
Côte d'Ivoire, Ghana. 
- Zone 3 :  Togo, Bénin, Nigéria, 
Cameroun, Guinée équatoriale 
- Zone 4 :  Gabon, Congo, RDC, Sao 
Tomé-et-Principe, Angola 
 
Dans chaque zone, les operations sont 
dirigées par un Coordonnateur, selon les 
instructions et ordres du Coordonnateur 
principal.  
 
Article 13 
 
The Network comprises fixed facilities and 
mobile facilities. 
 
Article 14: Fixed facilities include: 
 
 operational facilities, devoted to 
gathering of information (such as radar 
stations) and anagement of operations and, in 
Article 13  
 
Le Réseau comprend des moyens fixes et des 
moyens mobiles. 
 
Article 14 : Les moyens fixes comprennent : 
 
 les moyens opérationnels, consacrés 
à la collecte des informations (comme les 
stations radar) et à la direction des 
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general, of all the  activities of the Network; 
 
 training facilities, devoted to 
improving the  skills  of the staff. Training 
facilities can be shared with another structure 
or created  within the framework of an 
existing training centre; 
 
 
 Means, devoted to the maintenance 
and the  
operational support of the Network.  
 
Article 15  
The logistic means of the Network include 
nautical and aeronautical means, and also 
terrestrial means. All the logistic means of 
the Network are subject to the operational 
rules envisaged by the second part of this 
memorandum. All the means of the Network 
have the same colors and distinctive marks 
adopted by the Council. Similar distinctive 
characteristics appear in the logo and 
emblem of the Network. 
 
 
Article 16: 
Each ship belonging to the Network flies the 
flag of the State Party where it is assigned. It 
is used only in its zone except temporarily 
for joint missions, reinforcements or 
replacements of other ships. The logistic 
means of the Network cannot be used for 
military missions of the flag State, except for 
peace or evacuation missions 
 
 
 
The logistic means are the property of the 
Network. It supplies them with fuel, makes 
the maintenance and assigns each one of 
them to a State Party which has the 
responsibility to equip and train the crew. 
opérations, et d'une manière générale, des 
activités du Réseau; 
 
 les moyens de formation, consacrés à 
l'amélioration des compétences du personnel. 
Les moyens de formation peuvent être 
partagés avec une autre structure ou être 
créés dans le cadre d'un établissement de 
formation existant; 
 
 Les moyens de soutien, consacrés à 
l'entretien et au soutien opérationnel du 
Réseau. 
 
Article 15  
Les moyens mobiles du Réseau comprennent 
des moyens martimes et aéronautiques et 
également  des moyens terrestres. Tous les 
moyens mobiles du Réseau sont soumis aux 
règles d'exploitation prévues dans la 
deuxième partie du présent Mémorandum. 
Tous les moyens du Réseau portent les 
mêmes couleurs et marques distinctives 
adoptées par le Conseil. Des caractéristiques 
distinctives semblables apparaissent dans le 
logo et l'emblème du Réseau. 
  
Article 16  
Chaque navire du Réseau bat le pavillon de 
l'État Partie à laquelle il a été affecté. Il est 
utilisé uniquement dans sa zone sauf, à titre  
temporaire, pour des missions conjointes, du 
renfort ou en remplacement d'autres moyens. 
Les moyens du Réseau ne peuvent pas être 
utilisés pour des missions militaires menées 
par l’État du pavillon, sauf pour des missions 
de maintien de la paix ou d'évacuation. 
 
Les moyens mobiles sont la propriété du 
Réseau qui les approvisionne en carburant, 
les entretient et qui affecte chacun d'eux à 
une Partie qui a la charge d'équipes et de 
former l'équipage. 
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A part of the training of the crew however is 
organized and supported by the Network.  
While endorsing the responsibility to equip 
and train the crew, the Flag State can make 
arrangements with other States Parties in 
order to allow nationals to be embarked in 
the maximum proportion of a third of the 
officers and half of all the crew. 
 
 
Article 17 
However, if the agreement fixing the 
conditions of equipment and maintenance is 
accepted by the Network, a State Party can 
provide the network with logistic means as 
stipulated by the memorandum except for the 
right of ownership.   
 
 
In this case, the conditions of armaments, 
provisioning and maintenance are subject of 
an agreement between the Organization and 
the State Party 
 
Article 18 
The supply and the maintenance of ships can 
be conceded by the zones Coordinators to a 
private company with the consent of the 
Principal Coordinators.  
 
 
 
Article 19  
The Principal Coordinator and zone 
Coordinators are assisted by a permanent 
office including as much as possible agents 
of all the parties concerned. These offices 
include an operational center devoted to the 
collection of information and to the diffusion 
of information relating to the activities of the 
Organization  
 
 
THIRD PART: RULES OF 
OPERATIONS 
 
Une partie de la formation des équipages est 
cependant organisée et supportée par le 
Réseau. Tout en assumant la responsabilité 
d’équiper et de former l'équipage, l'État 
Partie du pavillon peut passer des accords 
avec d'autres Parties pour que des nationaux 
de celles-ci soient embarqués dans la 
proportion maximale d'un tiers des officiers 
et de la moitié de tout l'équipage. 
 
Article 17  
Cependant, si l’accord fixant les conditions 
d’équipement et d’entretien est accepté par le 
Réseau, un État Partie peut mettre un moyen 
mobile à la disposition du Réseau, comme 
prévu par le présent Mémorandum, sauf en ce 
qui concerne le droit de propriété.  
 
 
Dans ce cas, les conditions d'armement, 
d'approvisionnement et d'entretien font l'objet 
d'un accord entre l'Organisation et l'État 
Partie. 
 
 
Article 18  
Les tâches relatives à l’approvisionnement et 
à l'entretien des moyens peuvent être 
concédées par les Coordonnateurs de zone à 
une société privée avec l'accord du 
Coordonnateur principal. 
 
 
Article 19  
Le Coordonnateur principal et les 
Coordonnateurs de zone sont assistés par un 
bureau permanent comprenant autant que 
possible des agents de toutes les parties 
concernées. Ces bureaux comprennent un 
centre opérationnel consacré à la collecte 
d'informations et à la diffusion d'informations 
relatives aux activités de l'Organisation. 
 
TROISIÈME PARTIE : LES RÈGLES 
D'EXPLOITATION 
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TITLE 1: IN NORMAL TIME 
 
Article 20: At national level 
Each State Party organizes at the national 
level, its surveillance missions in accordance 
with its laws and regulations in force.  
 
TITRE I : EN TEMPS NORMAL 
 
Article 20 : Au niveau national  
Chaque État Partie organise, au niveau 
national,  ses missions de surveillance 
conformément à ses lois et règlements en 
vigueur. 
 
 
Article 21: Zone cooperation agreement 
 
 
The States Parties, in addition to the 
provisions of the memorandum and its 
appendices, can sign bilateral cooperation 
agreements without prejudice to the 
agreement set up and organizing the specific 
functioning of each zone.  
 
 
Each time it is necessary, a State Party can 
benefit, through this agreement, from 
logistical and humane support of another 
State Party according to procedures they will 
have adopted.  
 
The same State Party can sign the same 
agreement with the other State Parties of the 
zone.  
 
Article 22: The missions are planned and 
ordered by the zone Coordinators.  
 
The States Parties via their representatives 
send to the zone Coordinators, with any 
useful justification, their requests for 
presence of the facilities in their sector.  
 
The programmes of missions ordered by the 
zone Coordinators are sent to the 
Representatives of the State parties of the 
zone.   
 
Article 23: The facilities must carry out 
constabulary missions in accordance with the 
Article 21 : Accord de coopération au  niveau 
de la zone 
 
Outre les dispositions réglementaires prévues 
par le Mémorandum et ses annexes, les États 
Parties peuvent signer des accords de 
coopération bilatérale sans préjudice de 
l'accord cadre mis en place et organisant le 
fonctionnement spécifique de chaque zone. 
 
Chaque fois qu'il est nécessaire, un État 
Partie peut dans le cadre de cet accord 
bénéficier du soutien d'un autre État Partie en 
moyens logisitiques et en personnel, selon les 
modalités qu'ils auront arrêtées. 
 
Un État Partie peut signer le même accord 
avec tous les autres États Parties de la zone. 
 
Article 22 : Les missions sont planifiées et 
ordonnées par les Coordonnateurs de zone. 
 
Les Parties, par l'intermédiaire de leur 
Représentant, envoient aux Coordonnateurs 
de zone, avec toutes justifications utiles, leurs 
demandes concernant la présence des moyens 
dans leur secteur. 
 
Les programmes des missions ordonnées par 
les Coordonnateurs de zone sont envoyés aux 
Représentants des États Parties de la zone.  
 
 
 
Article 23 : Les moyens doivent servir à 
exécuter les missions de police dans le 
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law of the competent State Party for the 
given sector, and in accordance with 
UNCLOS.  
 
SAR missions are carried out according to 
provisions of SAR Convention and its 
protocols. 
 
 
Article 24: On request or with the 
authorization of a competent agent, a 
coastguard facility can carry out an act of 
police in a foreign sector, as if it were a 
facility of the State Party of this sector and in 
accordance with the applied laws. If the 
competent agent is not on board, his request 
or his authorization can be transmitted by 
any suitable means of communication. The 
reports of the embarked agents on board 
have the same legal force as a report carried 
out by a competent Officer.  
 
 
respect du droit de l'État Partie compétent 
pour le secteur donné, et dans le respect de la 
Convention des Nations Unies sur le droit de 
la mer de 1982. 
Les missions SAR sont exécutées selon les 
dispositions de la Convention SAR et de ses  
documents d'application. 
 
 
Article 24 : Sur demande ou avec 
l'autorisation d'un agent compétent, un 
moyen peut exécuter un acte de police dans 
un secteur étranger, comme s'il était un 
moyen de l'État Partie de ce secteur et en 
conformité avec la législation qui y est en 
vigueur. Si l'agent compétent n'est pas à bord 
du moyen, sa demande ou son autorisation 
peut être transmise par tout moyen de 
communication approprié. Les comptes 
rendus des agents embarqués à bord du 
moyen ont la même valeur juridique qu'un 
compte rendu effectué par un fonctionnaire 
compétent. 
 
Article 25: The States Parties take any 
appropriate measures to harmonize their 
legal status relating to the policing at sea.  
 
TITLE II:  IN TIME OF CRISIS 
  
Article 26: In case of events (accidents, acts 
of piracy, marine pollution, and other illicit 
acts) in territorial waters under jurisdiction 
of a given zone, and requiring an external 
assistance, the Maritime Authority 
approaches at once the Principal Coordinator 
of the zone and informs the agency or 
agencies with responsibility for national 
coastguard functions. 
 
The Principal Coordinator concerned 
implements the action plan envisaged for this 
purpose and annexed at the present 
memorandum.  
 
Article 25 : Les États Parties prennent toute 
mesure appropriée pour harmoniser leurs 
régimes juridiques relatifs à la police en mer. 
 
TITRE II : EN TEMPS DE CRISE 
  
Article 26 : En cas d’événements (accidents, 
actes de piraterie, pollution marine, trafic et 
autres actes illicites) ayant eu lieu dans les 
eaux sous juridiction d'une zone donnée et 
nécessitant une assistance extérieure, 
l'autorité maritime locale saisit aussitôt le 
Coordonnateur principal de la zone en vue 
d'informer les garde-côtes. 
 
 
Le Coordonnateur de la zone en question met 
en œuvre le plan d'action prévu à cet effet et 
annexé au présent Mémorandum. 
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TITLE III: EMERGENCY PLAN 
 
Article 27: The Principal Coordinator works 
out a sub regional draft of emergency plan to 
be submitted to the approval of the Council. 
The Principal Coordinator is in charge of the 
implementation of the emergency plan thus 
adopted.  
 
FOURTH PART: FINANCIAL 
RESOURCES  
 
Article 28: The financial resources of the 
network include: 
- regional maritime funds; 
- the normal or extraordinary 
contributions decided by the Council;  
- contributions of organizations or donor 
countries;  
 
- 50 % of penalties and confiscations 
resulting from the actions of the Network.  
 
Article 29: Each State Party begins to pay its 
financial contribution to the Network in 
accordance with the decisions and 
procedures adopted by the council. 
 
TITRE III : PLAN D'URGENCE 
 
Article 27 : Le Coordonnateur principal 
établit un projet de plan d'urgence sous-
régional à soumettre à l'approbation du 
Conseil. Le Coordonnateur principal est 
chargé de la mise en œuvre du plan d'urgence 
ainsi adopté. 
 
QUATRIÈME PARTIE : RESSOURCES 
FINANCIÈRES  
 
Article 28 : Les ressources financières du 
Réseau comprennent : 
- les fonds maritimes régionaux; 
- les contributions ordinaires ou 
extraordinaires décidées par le 
Conseil; 
- des contributions d'organisations ou pays 
donateurs; 
- 50 % des amendes et confiscations 
résultant des actions du Réseau. 
 
Article 29 : Chaque État Partie s'engage à 
s'acquitter de sa contribution financière aux 
coûts de fonctionnement du Réseau, 
conformément aux décisions et procédures 
adoptées par le Conseil. 
 
 
 
FIFTH PART: ENGAGEMENTS OF 
STATE PARTIES 
 
Article 30: Each State Party gives effect to 
the provisions of this Memorandum or its 
appendices, which constitute an integral part 
of the Memorandum, and will take any 
necessary measures to ratify or accept the 
relevant legal instruments for the 
implementation of the Memorandum.  
 
 
Article 31: Each State Party establishes an 
effective national organization of coastguard, 
by making sure that this organization is in 
conformity with the standards described in 
CINQUIÈME PARTIE : 
ENGAGEMENTS DES ÉTATS PARTIES 
 
Article 30 : Chaque État Partie donne effet 
aux dispositions du présent Mémorandum ou 
de ses annexes, lesquelles font partie 
intégrante du Mémorandum, et prendra toutes 
les mesures nécessaires pour ratifier ou 
accepter les instruments juridiques pertinents 
pour la mise en œuvre du Mémorandum. 
 
Article 31 : Chaque État Partie établit une 
organisation nationale de garde-côtes 
efficace, en s'assurant que cette organisation 
est conforme aux normes décrites dans les 
instruments définis dans le présent 
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the instruments defined in this 
Memorandum.  
 
Article 32: Each State Party consults, 
cooperates and exchanges information with 
other States Parties in order to improve the 
objectives of the Memorandum. 
 
 
SIXTH  PART:    FINAL PROVISIONS  
.  
TITLE I : OTHER PROVISIONS 
 
Article 33: Any State Party which has 
accepted the Memorandum can propose 
amendments or appendices to the 
Memorandum.  
 
In the case of amendment proposal to the  
Memorandum, the following procedure will 
apply: 
a) the amendment suggested will be 
submitted to the principal Coordination 
Centre in order to be studied, at least six 
(06) weeks before the meeting of the 
Committee;  
b) the amendments will be adopted by a 
majority of two thirds of the 
Representatives of the States Parties in 
the Committee; 
c) if the amendment is adopted, it will be 
communicated by the principal 
Coordination Centre to the States Parties 
for acceptance. 
 
 
Mémorandum. 
 
Article 32 : Chaque État Partie se concerte, 
coopère et échange des informations avec les 
autres États Parties en vue de mieux réaliser 
les objectifs du Mémorandum. 
 
 
SIXIÈME PARTIE : DISPOSITIONS 
FINALES 
 
TITRE I : DISPOSITIONS DIVERSES 
 
Article 33 : Tout État Partie, qui a accepté le 
Mémorandum, peut proposer des 
amendements ou des annexes au 
Mémorandum.  
 
Dans le cas d’une proposition d'amendements 
au Mémorandum, la procédure suivante 
s'appliquera : 
a) l'amendement proposé sera soumis au 
Centre principal de Coordination pour 
étude, au moins six (6) semaines avant 
la réunion du Comité; 
b) les amendements seront adoptés par 
une majorité des deux tiers des 
Représentants des Parties présentes et 
votantes dans le Comité; 
c) si l'amendement est adopté, il sera 
communiqué par le Centre principal de 
Coordination aux États Parties pour 
acceptation. 
 
 
Article 34: An amendment is supposed to be 
accepted, either at the end of a period of six 
(06) months after adoption by the 
Representatives of the States Parties in the 
Committee, or at the end of any other period 
determined unanimously by the 
Representatives of the States Parties in the 
Committee, unless for the considered period 
an objection is communicated to the 
Secretariat by a State Party. 
 
Article 34 : Un amendement est réputé avoir 
été accepté, soit à la fin d'une période de six 
(6) mois après adoption par les Représentants 
des États Parties dans le Comité, soit à la fin 
de toute autre période déterminée à 
l'unanimité par les représentants des États 
Parties dans le Comité au moment de son 
adoption, à moins que pendant la période 
considérée une objection soit communiquée 
au Secrétariat par un État Partie. 
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An amendment comes into force sixty (60) 
days after being accepted, or at the end of 
any other period determined unanimously by 
the Council. 
 
Article35: In case of amendment or 
appendix proposals, the following 
procedures is followed:  
 
 
a) the amendment or the appendix proposed 
will be submitted to the examination by 
the States Parties through the Principal 
Coordinator;  
 
b) the amendment or the appendix is 
supposed to be accepted at the end of a 
period of three (03) months from the 
date on which it was communicated by 
the Principal Coordination Centre, unless 
a State Party requests only the 
amendment in writing or the appendix is 
not examined by the Committee. In this 
case, the procedure specified in article 
6.1.1 applies; 
 
c) the amendment or the appendix comes 
into force sixty (60) days after being 
accepted, or at the end of any other 
period determined unanimously by the 
States Parties. 
 
Article 36: The Memorandum comes into 
force without prejudice to the laws and 
regulations derived from an international 
instrument.  
 
A Maritime Authority satisfying the criteria 
specified in this memorandum or its 
amendments or appendices can adhere to the 
Memorandum or its amendments or 
appendices with the agreement of all the 
States Parties which have accepted the 
Memorandum, its amendments or 
appendices.  
 
 
Un amendement entre en vigueur soixante 
(60) jours après avoir été accepté, ou à la fin 
de toute autre période déterminée à 
l'unanimité par le Conseil. 
 
Article 35 : Dans le cas de propositions 
d'amendements ou d'annexes au 
Mémorandum, la procédure suivante est 
suivie : 
 
a) l'amendement ou l'annexe proposé sera 
soumis à l'examen des États Parties par 
l’intermédiaire du Coordonnateur 
principal; 
 
b) l'amendement ou l'annexe est réputé avoir 
été accepté à la fin d'une période de trois 
(3) mois à partir de la date à laquelle il a 
été communiqué par le Centre principal 
de coordination, à moins qu'un État Partie 
ne demande par écrit que l'amendement 
ou l'annexe ne soit examiné par le 
Conseil. Dans ce cas, la procédure 
spécifiée à l'article 6.1.1. s'applique; 
 
c) l'amendement ou l'annexe entre en 
vigueur soixante (60) jours après avoir 
été accepté, ou à la fin de toute autre 
période déterminée à l'unanimité par les 
États Parties. 
 
Article 36 : Le Mémorandum s'applique sans 
préjudice des droits et obligations découlant 
d'un instrument international, quel qu'il soit. 
 
Une autorité maritime, qui remplit les critères 
spécifiés dans le présent Mémorandum ou 
dans ses amendements ou annexes, peut 
adhérer au Mémorandum ou à ses 
amendements ou annexes avec l'accord de 
tous les États Parties qui ont accepté le 
Mémorandum, ses amendements ou annexes. 
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Article 37: The Memorandum remains ready 
for signature to the West and Central Africa 
States and throughout a twelve (12) month 
period, in the headquarters of MOWCA.   
 
However, it comes into force in a given zone 
three months after all the States Parties of 
this zone have signed it.  
 
After the considerations mentioned above, 
the States Parties will be able to implement it 
if they satisfy the requirements contained in 
the Memorandum. 
 
Article 38: Any maritime Authority or 
Organization wishing to take part as observer 
will submit a written request to the 
Committee, and will be considered as 
observer with the unanimous agreement of 
the Representatives of the States Parties 
present and voting at the meeting of the 
Committee.  
 
Article 39:  Each State Party, which has not 
yet done so, is invited to establish, 
specialized Government Agency which shall 
develop and execute on shore and at sea 
duties of maritime navigation and marine 
pollution polices, including search and 
rescue, combating piracy and unlawful acts 
against safety and security of maritime 
navigation. 
 
 
Article 40: In establishing such Agencies, 
States shall take account of the relevant 
international conventions and instruments on 
the aforementioned issues and the need to 
grant adequate enforcement powers to such 
Agencies. States shall take steps to 
harmonize their legal regimes regarding 
enforcement at sea 
 
 
 
Article 37 : Le Mémorandum demeure 
ouvert à la signature des États de l'Afrique de 
l'Ouest et du Centre pendant une durée de 
douze (12) mois, au siège de l'OMAOC.  
 
Toutefois, il entre en vigueur dans une zone 
donnée trois mois après que tous les États 
Parties de cette zone l'ont signé. 
 
Compte tenu des aspects susmentionnés, les 
États Parties peuvent mettre le Mémorandum 
en application s'ils satisfont aux exigences 
qui y sont enoncées. 
 
Article 38 : Une autorité maritime ou 
organisation souhaitant participer comme 
observateur soumettra au Comité une 
demande écrite, et sera admise comme 
observateur avec l'accord unanime des 
Représentants des États Parties présents et 
votantes à la réunion du Comité. 
 
Article 39 : Tout État Partie, qui ne l'a pas 
encore fait, est invité à établir un service 
gouvernemental spécialisé chargé de mettre 
au point et d'exécuter, à terre et en mer, les 
missions de police en matière de  navigation 
maritime et de pollution marine, y compris la 
recherche et le sauvetage, la lutte contre la 
piraterie et les actes illicites commis contre la 
sécurité de la navigation maritime. 
 
Article 40 : En créant de tels services, les 
États Parties tiennent compte des conventions 
et instruments internationaux pertinents 
relatifs aux questions susmentionnées ainsi 
qu'au besoin de garantir des pouvoirs 
coercitifs adéquats à de tels services. Les 
États Parties prennent les mesures 
nécessaires pour harmoniser leurs régimes 
juridiques concernant l'application des lois en 
mer. 
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 MARITIME COOPERATION 
Article 41: States are invited to become 
parties to UNCLOS, SUA and other relevant 
instruments, noting that this will contribute 
to the strengthening of peace, security, 
cooperation, sustainable development and 
friendly relations.  
 
 
COOPÉRATION MARITIME 
 
Article 41 : Les États sont invités à devenir 
Parties contractantes à la Convention des 
Nations Unies sur le droit de la Mer de 1982, 
à la Convention SUA et à d'autres 
instruments pertinents, dans le but de 
contribuer au renforcement de la paix, de la 
sûreté, de la coopération, du développement 
durable et des relations amicales. 
 
Article 42: States Parties accept that a 
comprehensive concept of regional maritime 
security requires an integrated regional and 
multidisciplinary approach, necessitating 
cooperation and coordination of all interested 
bodies and activities. 
 
Article 43: States Parties agree to offer 
assistance upon request in a coordinated 
method to member States on capacity 
building in terms of equipment and 
personnel requirement for the establishment 
of and efficient performance of coastguard 
functions by a designated agency. 
 
Article 44: States Parties recognize the 
importance of cooperation for the 
management of the marine environment, 
particularly with respect to safety, security 
and maritime casualty for the West and 
Central Africa region. 
 
 
MARITIME ROUTES 
 
Article 45: States Parties recognize the 
importance of freedom of navigation, in 
accordance with the provisions of UNCLOS, 
Article 42 : Les États Parties admettent 
qu'une bonne compréhension du concept de 
sûreté maritime régionale implique une 
approche régionale et multidisciplinaire 
intégrée, nécessitant la coopération et la 
coordination de toutes les structures et 
activités concernées. 
 
 
Article 43 : Les États Parties s'engagent à 
apporter leur assistance aux États membres, 
sur demande et de manière coordonnée, afin 
de renforcer les capacités en matière 
d'équipement et de personnel, en vue de la 
mise en place et de l’exécution efficace des 
fonctions de garde-côtes par un service 
désigné. 
 
Article 44 : Les États Parties reconnaissent 
l'importance de la coopération pour la gestion 
du milieu marin dans la région de l'Afrique 
de l'Ouest et du Centre, particulièrement en 
ce qui concerne la sécurité et la sûreté 
maritimes, et les accidents maritimes. 
 
 
 
 
ROUTES MARITIMES 
 
Article 45 : Les États Parties reconnaissent 
l'importance de la liberté de navigation, 
conformément aux dispositions de la 
Convention des Nations Unies sur le droit de 
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to the maintenance of seaborne trade in West 
and Central Africa. 
 
 
Article 46: Taking into account the 
promotion of the safety of navigation and the 
protection of the marine environment, States 
shall develop cooperative approaches to the 
maintenance and protection of maritime 
routes. Such co-operative approaches include 
exchanges of information and training in 
such areas as humanitarian assistance, search 
and rescue, marine safety, and law and order 
at sea. The exchange of information should 
include information on likely threats to, or 
security incidents relating to maritime routes.  
 
 
Article 47: Further implementation of this 
cooperative approach could include naval 
cooperation and the sharing of information 
resulting from maritime surveillance. 
la mer de 1982, pour la poursuite des 
échanges commerciaux maritimes dans la 
région de l'Afrique de l'Ouest et du Centre. 
 
 
Article 46 : Eu égard à la promotion de la 
sécurité de la navigation et de la protection 
du milieu marin, les États Parties établissent 
des stratégies de coopération pour le maintien 
et la protection des routes maritimes. De 
telles stratégies de coopération prévoient 
l'échange d'informations et la formation dans 
des domaines tels que l'assistance 
humanitaire, la recherche et le sauvetage, la 
sécurité maritime et l'ordre public en mer. 
L'échange d'informations devrait inclure les 
renseignements sur les menaces potentielles 
ou les incidents en matière de sûreté 
concernant les routes maritimes. 
 
Article 47 : D'autres mesures de mise en 
œuvre de cette stratégie de coopération 
peuvent inclure la coopération maritime et le 
partage des informations résultant de la 
surveillance maritime. 
  
HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE 
 
Article 48: States Parties recognize the 
benefits of working together on the 
prevention, mitigation and management of 
maritime natural disasters, including 
preparedness and early warning systems, the 
exchange of information, compilation of data 
bases, planning, disaster reduction and relief 
activities, as well as training and education 
programs.  
 
 
SEARCH AND RESCUE 
Article 49: States Parties are invited to 
promote greater sharing of maritime Search 
and Rescue (SAR) experience and expertise, 
ASSISTANCE HUMANITAIRE 
 
Article 48 : Les États Parties reconnaissent 
les avantages découlant des initiatives 
communes de prévention, d'atténuation des 
effets et de gestion des catastrophes 
maritimes naturelles, notamment la 
préparation et les systèmes d’alerte rapide, 
l'échange d'informations, le regroupement 
des bases de données, la planification, la 
prévention des catastrophes et les activités 
humanitaires, ainsi que la formation et les 
programmes éducatifs. 
 
RECHERCHE ET SAUVETAGE 
Article 49 : Les États Parties sont invités à 
promouvoir un plus grand partage de leur 
expérience et expertise en matière de 
recherche et de sauvetage (SAR), et à 
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as well as facilitate coordination and 
cooperation in SAR training and procedures.  
 
Article 50: States Parties consult with regard 
to the ratification, implementation and 
participation in relevant conventions and 
instruments concerning maritime SAR.  
 
MARITIME SAFETY 
 
Article 51: States Parties shall promote 
navigational safety by measures such as: 
- the edition of adequate cartography; 
- the publication and the diffusion of notices 
to sailors; 
- the use of appropriate navigational aids; 
- the notification of recommended shipping 
routes.  
 
Article 52: States Parties express support for 
regional and international efforts to deal with 
the problem of sub-standard ships, including 
the establishment of regional systems of port 
state control.  
 
Article 53: States Parties consult each other 
with regard to the ratification, 
implementation and participation in relevant 
conventions and instruments concerning 
maritime safety.  
 
faciliter la coordination et la coopération en 
matière de formation et de procédures SAR. 
 
Article 50 : Les États Parties se concertent 
en ce qui concerne la ratification, la mise en 
œuvre et la participation aux instruments et 
conventions maritimes pertinents en matière 
de recherche et de sauvetage.    
 
 
SÉCURITÉ MARITIME  
 
Article 51 : Les États Parties favorisent la 
sécurité maritime en prenant des mesures 
telles que :  
- l'édition de cartes adéquates; 
-  la publication et la diffusion d'avis aux 
navigateurs;  
-  l'utilisation d'aides à la navigation 
appropriées; 
-  la notification des routes maritimes 
recommandées. 
 
Article  52 : Les États Parties expriment leur 
appui aux efforts régionaux et internationaux 
destinés à régler le problème des navires sous 
normes, y compris l'établissement de régimes 
régionaux de contrôle par l'État du port. 
 
Article 53: Les États Parties se concertent en 
ce qui concerne la ratification, la mise en 
œuvre et la participation aux instruments et 
conventions maritimes pertinents en matière 
de sécurité maritime. 
  
LAW AND ORDER AT SEA 
 
Article 54: States Parties recognize the importance of 
cooperation in the maintenance and enforcement of law and 
order at sea, including the prevention of piracy, drug 
smuggling, and other crimes at sea, also recognize the rights 
of States Parties to enforce their domestic laws at sea to the 
ORDRE PUBLIC EN MER  
 
Article 54 : Les États Parties reconnaissent 
l'importance de la coopération pour le maintien et 
le respect de l'ordre public en mer, y compris la 
prévention de la piraterie, du trafic de drogue et 
d’autres crimes en mer, et reconnaissent 
également les droits des États à appliquer leurs 
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extent allowed by international law.  
 
 
Article 55: States Parties recognize the right of hot pursuit 
and shall develop an effective mechanism thereof which 
shall take in consideration the provisions of Article III of this 
Memorandum. 
 
Article 56: States Parties are invited to institute regular 
meetings to enhance cooperation and coordination in their 
maritime enforcement activities.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
NAVAL CO-OPERATION 
 
Article 57: States Parties acknowledge the confidence-
building benefits of naval cooperation, including increased 
personnel contacts and voluntary measures to promote naval 
transparency.  
 
Article 58: States Parties may wish to consider a framework 
of bilateral or multilateral instruments for the navy concerned 
in order to avoid the nautical incidents.  
 
 
MARITIME SURVEILLANCE 
 
Article 59: States Parties recognize that maritime 
surveillance may be conducted for peaceful purposes as part 
of the exercise of freedom of navigation and over flight in 
areas claimed as exclusive economic zone or continental 
shelf, and on the high seas. This should be conducted with 
consent and without prejudice to the jurisdictional rights and 
lois nationales en mer dans les limites admises 
par le droit international. 
 
Article 55 : Les États Parties reconnaissent le 
droit de poursuite et mettront en place à cet effet 
un dispositif efficace qui tiendra compte des 
dispositions de l'article III du Mémorandum. 
 
Article 56 : Les États Parties sont invitées à instituer des 
réunions régulières pour renforcer la coopération et la 
coordination de leurs activités en matière d'application des 
règlements maritimes. 
 
COOPÉRATION MARITIME 
Article 57 : Les États Parties reconnaissent les avantages 
découlant de la coopération maritime pour ce qui est de créer 
un climat de confiance, y compris le renforcement des 
contacts entre personnels et les mesures volontaires visant à 
promouvoir la transparence. 
 
Article 58 : Les États Parties peuvent souhaiter 
disposer d'un cadre d'instruments bilatéraux ou 
multilatéraux applicables aux marines nationales 
concernées en vue d'éviter les incidents 
maritimes. 
 
 SURVEILLANCE MARITIME  
 
Article 59 : Les États Parties reconnaissent que 
la surveillance maritime peut être exercée à des 
fins pacifiques, dans le cadre de l'exercice de la 
liberté de navigation et de survol des zones 
économiques exclusives ou des plateaux 
continentaux et de la haute mer. La surveillance 
maritime devrait être exercée avec l'accord de 
l'État côtier et sans préjudice de ses droits et 
responsabilités d’ordre juridictionnel dans sa zone 
économique exclusive ou sur son plateau 
continental, conformément à la Convention des 
Nations Unies sur le droit de la mer de 1982. 
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responsibilities of the coastal State within its exclusive 
economic zone or over its continental shelf, as provided for 
under UNCLOS.http://aus-
cscap.anu.edu.au/memo4.html - 
fn0#fn0http://aus-cscap.anu.edu.au/memo4.html - 
fn0#fn0  
 
Article 60: States Parties shall work towards developing 
arrangements for the sharing of surveillance information with 
other States Parties to this Memorandum.   
 
PROTECTION AND PRESERVATION OF THE MARINE 
ENVIRONMENT 
 
Article 61: States Parties recognize their individual and 
collective obligation to protect and preserve the marine 
environment.  
 
Article 62: States Parties shall consult with regard to:  
 
(a) cooperation on a bilateral, sub-regional and 
regional basis in taking all measures 
necessary to prevent, reduce, monitor and 
control pollution of the marine environment 
from all sources ; 
 
 
(b) the ratification, implementation and 
participation in relevant conventions and 
instruments concerning protection, 
preservation and monitoring of the marine 
environment;  
 
(c) the implementation of Chapter 17 of Agenda 
21, adopted at the 1992 United Nations 
Conference on Environment and 
Development (UNCED), particularly those 
program areas concerning integrated 
management and sustainable development, 
marine environmental protection and the 
strengthening of international cooperation, 
including regional cooperation and 
coordination; and 
 
Article 60 : Les États Parties oeuvrent à la mise 
en place de mécanismes de partage des 
renseignements découlant de la surveillance avec 
d'autres États Parties au Mémorandum. 
 
 PROTECTION ET PRÉSERVATION DU MILIEU 
MARIN  
 
Article 61 : Les États Parties reconnaissent leur obligation 
individuelle et collective de protéger et préserver le milieu 
marin. 
 
Article 62 : Les États Parties se concertent en ce 
qui concerne : 
a) la coopération sur une base bilatérale, 
sous-régionale et régionale, en vue de 
prendre toutes les mesures nécessaires pour 
prévenir, réduire, suivre et contrôler la 
pollution du milieu marin due à toutes les 
sources; 
 
b) la ratification, la mise en œuvre et la 
participation aux conventions et instruments 
pertinents concernant la protection, la 
préservation et la surveillance du milieu marin; 
 
c) la mise en œuvre du chapitre 17 d'Action 21, 
adopté à la Conférence des Nations Unies 
de 1992 sur l'environnement et le 
développement (CNUED), notamment les 
programmes concernant la gestion intégrée et 
le développement durable, la protection du 
milieu marin et le renforcement de la 
coopération internationale, y compris la 
coopération et la coordination régionales; et 
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(d) the development and implementation of 
national, sub-regional and regional 
monitoring programs and contingency plans 
in response to pollution incidents in the 
marine environment. 
 
 
Article 63: States Parties consult at the bilateral and sub-
regional levels in the formulation and harmonization of 
policies for the conservation, management and sustainable 
utilization of marine living resources that straddle maritime 
zones, or which are highly migratory, or occur in the high 
seas.  
 
 
d) l'élaboration et la mise en œuvre de 
programmes de surveillance et de plans 
d'urgence nationaux, sous-régionaux et 
régionaux, pour faire face aux incidents de 
pollution du milieu marin.  
 
Article 63 : Les États Parties se concertent aux 
niveaux bilatéral et sous-régional pour formuler et 
harmoniser les politiques de conservation, gestion 
et utilisation durable des ressources biologiques 
marines qui sont situées de part et d'autre des 
zones maritimes, ou qui sont particulièrement 
migratoires ou bien qui apparaissent en haute 
mer.    
 
Article 64:  States Parties consult at the bilateral and sub-
regional levels in the formulation and harmonization of 
policies for the exploration and exploitation of marine non-
living resources which occur across two or more zones of 
national jurisdiction, especially in cases where a shared 
resource can be exploited, wholly or in part, from one or 
more of the zones of national jurisdiction.  
 
 
 MARINE SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH 
 
Article 65: States parties are invited to cooperate, directly or 
through competent international, regional or sub-regional 
organizations, for the purpose of promoting studies, 
undertaking programs of scientific research and the 
exchange of information and data about the marine 
environment, particularly about pollution of the marine 
environment and changing sea levels.  
 
Article 66: States Parties are invited to consult on the 
harmonization of their respective procedures, in accordance 
with Part XIII of UNCLOS, for granting consent to proposed 
marine scientific research projects in their exclusive 
economic zones and on their continental shelves. 
 
Article 64 : Les États Parties se concertent aux niveaux 
bilatéral et sous-régional pour formuler et harmoniser les 
politiques d'exploration et d'exploitation des ressources non 
biologiques marines qui sont situées de part et d'autre de 
deux ou plusieurs zones sous juridiction nationale, 
notamment dans les cas où une ressource partagée peut être 
exploitée, en tout ou en partie, à partir d'une ou plusieurs 
zones sous juridiction nationale. 
 
 RECHERCHE SCIENTIFIQUE  MARINE 
 
Article 65 : Les États Parties sont invités à coopérer, 
directement ou à par l'intermédiaire des organisations sous-
régionales, régionales ou internationales compétentes, en 
vue de promouvoir des études, de conduire des programmes 
de recherche scientifique et d'échanger des informations et 
des données sur le milieu marin, notamment sur la pollution 
du milieu marin et l'évolution du niveau de la mer. 
 
Article 66 : Les États Parties sont invités à se concerter en 
vue d'harmoniser leurs procédures respectives en matière 
d'octroi d'autorisations pour les projets de recherche 
scientifique marine proposés dans leurs zones économiques 
exclusives et sur leurs plateaux continentaux, conformément 
à la partie XIII de la Convention internationale des 
Nations Unies sur le droit de la mer. 
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 TECHNICAL COOPERATION  
 AND CAPACITY-BUILDING 
 
Article 67:  States Parties recognize the benefits of technical 
cooperation and capacity-building, and are invited to 
implement relevant programs in the maritime sector 
designed to build infrastructures, institutions and capabilities 
for policy formulation and implementation. This includes 
information sharing and development of database.  
 
 
 
 
 COOPÉRATION TECHNIQUE ET  
 RENFORCEMENT DES CAPACITÉS 
 
Article 67 : Les États Parties reconnaissent les 
avantages de la coopération technique et du 
renforcement des capacités, et sont invités à 
mener à bien des programmes pertinents dans le 
secteur maritime pour mettre en place des 
infrastructures, des institutions et des capacités 
en vue de formuler et d'appliquer des politiques 
générales. Cela inclut le partage d'informations et 
la création de banques de données. 
 
  
 
TRAINING AND EDUCATION 
 
Article 68: States Parties cooperate on the development and 
promotion of training and educational programs for the 
management of the marine environment, particularly for the 
maintenance of safety and law and order at sea, the 
preservation and protection of the marine environment, and 
the prevention, reduction and control of marine pollution. 
Such cooperation might include : 
 
a) the offer of places on national training 
courses to other States, subject to payment 
of relevant costs; 
 
b) sharing curriculum and course information;  
 
 
c) the exchange of naval and law enforcement 
personnel, scientists and other experts;  
 
 
d) the exchange of views on maritime issues;  
 
e) holding conferences, seminars, workshops 
and symposiums on maritime subjects of 
common interest; and  
 
f) fostering cooperation among maritime 
training institutions and research centres. 
 
 FORMATION ET ÉDUCATION  
 
Article 68 : Les États Parties coopèrent en vue de 
mettre au point et de promouvoir des programmes 
éducatifs et de formation concernant la gestion du 
milieu marin, notamment le maintien de la sécurité 
et de l'ordre public en mer, la préservation et la 
protection du milieu marin, et la prévention, la 
réduction et le contrôle de la pollution marine. 
Cette coopération peut notamment consister à : 
 
a) offrir des places dans les cours nationaux à 
d'autres États Parties, à condition de payer 
les coûts y afférents; 
 
b) partager les programmes et les informations 
sur les cours; 
 
c) échanger des personnels de la marine et de 
la force publique, ainsi que des scientifiques 
et d'autres experts; 
 
d) échanger des avis sur les questions 
maritimes; 
 
e) tenir des conférences, séminaires, ateliers et 
symposiums sur des sujets maritimes 
d'intérêt commun; et 
 
f) encourager la coopération entre les 
institutions de formation maritime et les 
centres de recherche. 
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g) the offer of places on national training 
courses to other States, subject to payment 
of relevant costs;  
 
h) the exchange of naval and law enforcement 
personnel, scientists and other experts;  
 
 
i) the exchange of views on maritime issues;  
 
j) holding conferences, seminars, workshops 
and symposiums on maritime subjects of 
common interest; and  
 
k) fostering cooperation among maritime 
training institutions and research centres.  
 
 
 
g) offrir des places dans les cours nationaux 
d'autres États, à condition de payer les coûts 
y afférents; 
 
h) échanger des personnels de la marine et de 
la force publique, ainsi que des scientifiques 
et d'autres experts; 
 
i) échanger des avis sur les questions 
maritimes; 
 
j) tenir des conférences, séminaires, ateliers et 
symposiums sur des sujets maritimes 
d'intérêt commun; et 
 
k) encourager la coopération entre les 
institutions de formation maritime et les 
centres de recherche. 
 
 
States Parties are invited to institute regular 
meetings to enhance cooperation and 
coordination in their maritime enforcement 
activities. 
 
 
TITLE II: FINAL PROVISIONS 
 
Article 69: Any State Party can withdraw from the 
Memorandum by a written notification to the 
Committee sixty (60) days before.  
 
Article 70: The English, French and Portuguese 
versions of this Memorandum are authentic.  
 
 
This Memorandum is adopted and open to 
signature in Dakar, 
………………………………………………….. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Les États Parties sont invités à instituer des 
réunions régulières pour renforcer la coopération 
et la coordination dans leurs activités de mise en 
application  de la réglementation maritime.   
 
TITRE II : DISPOSITIONS FINALES 
 
Article 69 : Tout État Partie peut se retirer du 
Mémorandum en le notifiant par écrit au Comité 
soixante (60) jours avant. 
 
Article 70 : Les versions anglaise, française et 
portugaise du présent Mémorandum font 
également foi. 
 
Le présent Mémorandum est adopté et ouvert à la 
signature à Dakar, le -------------------------------------,  
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Hereafter have signed The Representatives of 
the following States Parties:  
 
1.   Angola  
2.   Benin 
3.   Cameroon  
4. Cape-Verde  
5. Congo  
6. D.R. Congo 
7. Côte d'Ivoire  
8. Gabon 
9. Gambia  
10. Ghana  
11. Guinea  
12. Guinea-Bissau 
13. Equatorial Guinea 
14.  Liberia  
15.  Mauritania 
16.  Nigeria  
17. Sao Tomé and Principe 
18.  Senegal  
19.  Sierra Leone  
20.  Togo 
Ont signé les Représentants des États Parties 
ci-après : 
 
1. Angola 
2.  Bénin 
3. Cameroun 
4.  Cap-Vert  
5.  Congo  
6.  Congo RD 
7.  Côte d'Ivoire  
8.  Gabon 
9.  Gambie  
10.  Ghana  
11.  Guinée  
12.  Guinée-Bissau 
13.  Guinée-équatoriale 
14.  Libéria  
15.  Mauritanie 
16.  Nigéria  
17.  Sao Tomé-et-Principe 
18.  Sénégal  
19.  Sierra Leone  
20.  Togo 
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APPENDIX 4 - ECCAS Protocol on Maritime Security Cooperation 
 
 
ECONOMIC COMMUNITY OF CENTRAL AFRICAN STATES                      
(E.C.C.A) 
COMUNIDAD ECONOMICA DE LOS ESTADOS DEL AFRICA CENTRAL     
(C.E.E.A.C) 
COMMUNAUTE ECONOMIQUE DES ETATS DE L'AFRIQUE CENTRALE   
(C:E.E.A.C) 
COMUNIDADE ECONOMICA DOS ESTADOS DA AFRICA CENTRAL          
(C.E.E.A.C) 
 
 
 
PROTOCOLE  
RELATIF A LA STRATEGIE DE SECURISATION DES 
INTERESTS VITAUX EN MER DES ETATS DE LA CEEAC DU 
GOLFE DE GUINEE 
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APPENDIX 5 – Treaty on Gulf of Guinea Commission 
 
 
Treaty On The Gulf Of Guinea Commission 
 
 
Article I Definitions 
 
In this Treaty, 
“Commission” means the “Gulf of Guinea Commission”; 
“Council” means the Council of Minister of the Gulf of Guinea 
Commission; “Minister”  includes the Minister of Foreign 
Affairs, and  Other Ministers of the Parties, responsible for the 
activities within the scope of this Treaty; 
“Senior Officials”  include government officials of each  Party  
designed as such, and accredited to the Commission. 
 
Article II The Organization 
 
An organization is herby established (instituted) to be known as the 
“Gulf of Guinea 
Commission”, and hereinafter referred to as “the Commission”. 
 
Article III Membership 
 
Membership of the Commission shall be limited to sovereign 
States bordering the 
Gulf of Guinea. 
 
Article IV Scope 
 
(i) The Commission shall  have within its purview the promotion 
of peace and se- curity in the Gulf of Guinea, as well  as the 
economic, social  and  environmental well  being  of its members; 
 
(ii) The Commission shall  regulate and harmonize the 
exploitation of the natural resources of the Gulf of Guinea, in 
particular, in such specific endeavours as fis- 
hing and oil exploration, and the exploitation of other resources 
yet to be tapped in the area; 
(iii) With regard to sub-paragraph (ii) above, the Commission shall 
apply a collective approach that would enhance the common 
pooling of technological know-how for the development of the 
common heritage of the Gulf and  reduce  the costs of exploitation 
of all the resources. 
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Article V Aims 
 
The Commission shall be a forum for addressing problems 
affecting Member-states in the following areas:- 
(a) environmental pollution of their common maritime zone; 
(b) border issues vis-à-vis delimitation of maritime borders and other 
conflicts arising in the overlapping Exclusive Economic Zones 
(EEZ); 
(c) security matters such as issue of Joint Border Patrol, Immigration 
and simi- lar matters; 
(d) co-ordination of fishing activities in the Gulf. 
 
Article VI Objectives 
 
The objective  of the Commission shall  be: 
(a)  to help achieve mutual confidence and trust amongst 
member-states; 
(b) to create an atmosphere in which mutually beneficial economic 
activities by citizens  of member-states could be peacefully 
pursued; 
(c) to provide a framework for the monitoring and control  of 
environmental degradation in the Gulf, as well as harmonization 
of the exploitation of na tural resources in the overlapping areas of 
the EEZ, through the pooling of technological and infrastructural 
facilities and other cost-sharing strategies; 
(d) to co-ordinate and articulate common positions on issues of 
particular in- terests to the enhancement of peace and stability in 
the sub-region. 
 
Article VII Institutional Framework 
 
The Commission shall  be recognized as an international legal 
“persona”. 
 
Article VIII 
 
(i) For the purpose of achieving the aims and objectives laid down 
in Article V and VI above,  the Commission shall  encourage 
regular exchange of opinion (consul- tation) amongst the State 
Parties so as to facilitate concertation of views on various African 
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and  international issues  aimed at better  understanding, security  
and stability within the sub-region; 
(ii) to this end, there shall be created, the assembly of Heads of States 
and Govern- ment, and the Council of Ministers, notably Ministers 
in charge of: Foreign Affairs, Economy, Hydrocarbons, Fishing 
resources, Mines,  Environment. 
Article IX Assembly Of Heads Of State And Government 
 
The assembly of Heads of State and Government of Parties to this 
Treaty shall be the governing and decision – making body of the 
Commission. It shall  determine the objectives and  principles 
governing programmes and  activities to be carried out. A 
Summit Session shall  be held once a year, in alphabetical 
rotation. 
 
Article X Council Of Ministers 
 
The Council  of Ministers shall  meet  at last once a year,  to 
harmonise views on issues  and  programmes to be tackled  before  
the assembly of Heads  of State and Government. 
 
Article XI Protocols 
 
Parties  shall  prepare and  adopt  additional protocols stipulating 
measures, pro- cedures and  standards for the purpose of 
clarifying and  improving methods by which the provisions of 
this Treaty shall  be implemented. 
 
Article XII Relationship With Other Organizations 
 
With a view  to achieving the aims and  objectives of this Treaty, 
the Commission shall co-operate through all appropriate means 
with relevant sub-regional, regional and international 
organizations, as well  as with  any other concerned institution. 
 
Article XIII Settlement Of Disputes 
 
The Parties  shall  endeavour to resolve  any  matter in dispute 
arising from the application or interpretation of this Treaty by 
negotiation, conciliation, arbitration or other peaceful means. 
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Article XIV Agreement Concludes By State Parties With Non-Party 
States 
 
Parties may conclude economic, technical or cultural Agreements 
with third Parties outside  the Gulf of Guinea Commission, 
provided that such  Agreements are  not incompatible with  the 
provisions of this Treaty. Copies of such Agreements shall be 
transmitted to the Executive Secretary who shall  inform the 
Council thereof. 
 
Article XV Ratification, Acceptance, Approval Or Accession 
 
This Treaty shall be subject to ratification, acceptance or approval by 
States, which have signed it and shall remain open for accession by 
other States of the sub-region in accordance with  their respective 
legislative procedures. 
 
Article XVI Depository Authority 
 
The present Treaty and all instruments of Ratification, Acceptance, 
Approval or Ac- cession  will be deposited with  the Minister of 
Foreign Affairs of.............................. (or whoever is chosen as 
depository) who shall  tansmit certified copies  of this Treaty to all 
Parties and notify them of the dates of deposit  of each Instrument 
of Ratification, Acceptance, Approval or Accession. 
 
Article XVII 
 
The Depository Authority shall register this Treaty with the 
Organization of African Unity, the United Nations Organization and 
such other Organizations as the Council may  determine. 
 
Article XVIII Entry Into Force, Amendment And Termination 
 
(i)  This Treaty shall  enter into force thirty (30) days following the 
deposit  with the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the ……..…. 
(or whoever is chosen) of the fourth Instrument of 
Ratification. 
(ii)   For each of the States which ratifies, accepts, approves, or 
accedes  after the entry into force, this Treaty shall  enter into 
force thirty (30) days after the deposit  by that State of its 
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Instrument of Ratification, Acceptance, Approval or 
Accession. 
(iii)  This Treaty may be amended by four of the Parties, and such 
amendment shall enter into force within thirty (30) days after its 
adoption. The text of such amend- ment  shall  be circulated to all 
Parties at least sixty (60) days before  voting. 
(iv)  This Treaty shall  terminate by a vote of four of the Parties, 
ninety  (90) days after such a vote is taken. Notice of such 
termination shall be circulated to all Parties  through the 
Executive Secretary, ninety  (90) days before  voting, and may  
be withdrawn at any time before  the vote is taken. 
(v)   After the termination of this Treaty, its provisions shall 
continue to govern all existing and unexpired projects or 
[…non-readable in copy….] within its frame- work. 
 
Article XIX 
 
This Treaty is made in four original languages which are English, 
French, Spanish and Portuguese Languages, each text being  
equally authentic. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF the undersigned, being duly authorized 
by their respective governments for that purpose, have signed this 
Treaty. 
 
DONE at…….this….day of…………19….. 
Republic of Angola 
Republic of Cameroon 
Democratic Republic of Congo 
Republic of Congo Brazzaville 
Republic of Equatorial Guinea 
Republic of Gabon 
Federal Republic of Nigeria 
 Democratic Republic of São Tomé  & Príncipe 
 
